Can Fairfax County regulate parking on state secondary roads inside its boundaries under its specific authority, or is it stuck with the narrower statutes that apply to large or urban-executive counties?

Plain-English summary

Fairfax County officials had been hesitating to use § 46.2-1222, a statute that by name authorized Fairfax and Henrico to regulate parking on state secondary highways within their borders. They were worried that two other statutes, § 46.2-1222.1 (which gives parking authority to urban-county-executive form counties) and § 46.2-1224(B)-(C) (which gives parking authority over commercial vehicles to counties with populations over 500,000), might be the only or the more restrictive limits on what Fairfax could do. Because Fairfax met the eligibility criteria for both of those statutes, the question was whether their narrower terms cabined the broader authority in § 46.2-1222.

Attorney General Bob McDonnell concluded that Fairfax was not limited by those other statutes. Section 46.2-1222 specifically names Fairfax (and Henrico) and grants the county broad authority to "restrict or prohibit parking on any part of the state secondary system of highways" within county boundaries, with power to classify vehicles and impose traffic-infraction penalties. It also includes the controlling clause: "notwithstanding any other provisions of law." Sections 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C), by contrast, are general statutes that apply to a class of counties (urban-county-executive form, population over 500,000). When a specific statute conflicts with a general one, the specific statute prevails. The general statutes add to, rather than limit, Fairfax's parking authority.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2009. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Virginia's secondary highway system consists of the rural and suburban roads outside the primary state highway system, maintained primarily by VDOT but used heavily by local residents. Regulating parking on those roads is normally a state matter, but the General Assembly has carved out delegated parking authority for certain localities through several different statutes.

Section 46.2-1222 is a Fairfax-and-Henrico specific provision. It begins with "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law," and authorizes those two counties to restrict or prohibit parking on the state secondary system of highways within their boundaries, classify vehicles for those restrictions, and prescribe traffic-infraction penalties. It is narrowly scoped to those two counties.

Section 46.2-1222.1 applies to any county operating under the urban county executive form of government. At the time of the opinion, Fairfax was the only county in Virginia using that form. Subsection (A) covers watercraft, boat trailers, motor homes, and camping trailers on any public highway. Subsection (B) covers trailers and semitrailers, vehicles with three or more axles, vehicles with a gross weight rating of 12,000 pounds or more, vehicles designed to carry 16 or more passengers, and hazardous-materials vehicles, with the restriction applying only on public highways in residence districts.

Section 46.2-1224(B)-(C) applies to counties with populations greater than 500,000. Subsection (B) covers certain commercial vehicles in residential zones. Subsection (C) covers certain commercial vehicles on highways in commercial or industrial zones that do not meet current VDOT design standards.

Fairfax satisfied the eligibility criteria for all three statutes. The county's concern was that the specific limitations in §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C) (residence districts only, certain types of vehicles only, certain zoning configurations) might be the outer boundaries of what the county could do, even on secondary roads.

What the AG concluded

The specific-over-general rule resolves the apparent conflict. When two statutes apparently conflict, the more specific one prevails. The AG cited Lynchburg Division of Social Services v. Cook and Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. Department of Environmental Quality for the principle. Section 46.2-1222 is the most specific because it names Fairfax (and Henrico) by name and targets a specific geographic system, the state secondary highway system.

Section 46.2-1222's "notwithstanding" clause is decisive. The statute opens with "notwithstanding any other provisions of law," signaling that the General Assembly meant for it to override any otherwise-applicable limitations. That language defeats the suggestion that the more general statutes constrain it.

The general statutes supplement, not displace. Section 46.2-1222.1 and § 46.2-1224(B)-(C) provide additional parking authority for the class of counties they cover. For Fairfax, this means the county can use § 46.2-1222 for secondary roads generally and also use §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224 where they apply.

The "only urban-county-executive" status of Fairfax does not change the analysis. The fact that Fairfax was, at the time, the only county using the urban-county-executive form did not make § 46.2-1222.1 functionally as specific as § 46.2-1222. Section 46.2-1222 names Fairfax explicitly; § 46.2-1222.1 names a class of counties identified by form of government. Specificity here turns on the statutory text, not on demographic accident.

Common questions

Why did the General Assembly carve out a Fairfax-specific parking statute?
Fairfax has unique parking conditions (high density, heavy commuter traffic, large numbers of through-streets that are technically state secondary highways). The General Assembly delegated more localized control because state-level parking rules were not granular enough to address the county's actual problems.

What can Fairfax actually do under § 46.2-1222?
The county can pass ordinances restricting or prohibiting parking, classifying vehicles (so it can treat heavy trucks differently from passenger cars, or RVs differently from boats), and imposing traffic-infraction penalties.

Does the AG's reading mean Fairfax can ignore the limitations in § 46.2-1222.1?
Not exactly. The county can choose which statutory hook to use for any given regulation. If a particular regulation does not fit within § 46.2-1222, the county might rely on § 46.2-1222.1 (with its limitations) instead. The opinion just says that § 46.2-1222's broader scope is not constrained by § 46.2-1222.1's narrower scope.

Does this apply to Henrico too?
Yes. Section 46.2-1222 names both Fairfax and Henrico. Henrico can use the same authority. The opinion did not separately address Henrico's situation, but the reasoning would apply equally.

Does this apply to cities or towns inside Fairfax?
No. Section 46.2-1222 is a county statute. Cities and towns get their own parking authority through different statutes and their charters.

Citations

• Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1222 (Fairfax/Henrico parking on secondary roads)
• Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1222.1 (urban-county-executive parking authority)
• Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1224(B)-(C) (counties over 500,000)
• Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Srvs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465 (2008)
• Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 270 Va. 423 (2005)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2009/08-104-Bulova-Sickles.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Robert F. McDonnell

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Attorney General

February 11, 2009

The Honorable David L. Bulova
Member, House of Delegates
P.O. Box 406
Richmond, Virginia 23218

The Honorable Mark D. Sickles
Member, House of Delegates
P.O. Box 406
Richmond, Virginia 23218

Dear Delegate Bulova and Delegate Sickles:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented

You ask whether Fairfax County is subject to §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C) regarding regulation of parking on roads in the secondary systems of highways or whether it may exercise the authority provided by § 46.2-1222.

Response

It is my opinion that Fairfax County may exercise the specific authority provided by § 46.2-1222 to regulate parking on roads in the secondary system of highways within its boundaries. The County is not limited by §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C) in the exercise of such authority.

Background

You advise that Fairfax County officials are hesitant to exercise the authority provided by § 46.2-1222 to regulate parking on secondary roads within the County. You relate that such officials are concerned that their authority is limited by §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C). You note that the County operates under the urban county executive form of government and has a population in excess of 500,000; thus, the County may meet the eligibility guidelines of §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C).

Applicable Law and Discussion

Section 46.2-1222 provides, in part, that:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the governing bod[y] of Fairfax … Count[y] by ordinance may (i) restrict or prohibit parking on any part of the state secondary system of highways within their respective boundaries, (ii) provide for classification of vehicles for the purpose of these restrictions and prohibitions, and (iii) provide that the violation of the ordinance shall constitute a traffic infraction and prescribe penalties therefor.

The express language of § 46.2-1222 specifically applies to Fairfax County and grants authority to the County to enact an ordinance regulating parking on secondary roads within its boundaries.

On the other hand, § 46.2-1222.1(A) permits "[a]ny county operating under the urban county executive form of government" to regulate or prohibit the parking of watercraft, boat trailers, motor homes, and camping trailers on any public highway. Additionally, § 46.2-1222.1(B) permits any such county to regulate or prohibit parking of trailers or semitrailers, vehicles with three or more axles, vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 12,000 pounds or more, vehicles designed to transport sixteen or more passengers, and vehicles being used to transport hazardous materials "on any public highway in any residence district." Thus, § 46.2-1222.1 applies to any county with an urban county executive form of government and has a more general application than the authority contained in § 46.2-1222, which applies specifically to Fairfax County.[1]

Likewise § 46.2-1224(B) authorizes "counties with populations greater than 500,000" to regulate by ordinance the parking of certain "commercial vehicles"[2] on the highways in areas zoned for residential use. Further, § 46.2-1224(C) authorizes "counties with populations greater than 500,000" to regulate the parking of certain commercial vehicles[3] in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use on highways that "do not comply with the current geometric design standards of the Virginia Department of Transportation Road Design Manual or Subdivision Street Requirements."[4] Again, § 46.2-1224 provides a more general application than § 46.2-1222.

Generally, when there is an apparent conflict between several different statutes, the more specific statute prevails.[5] An accepted principle of statutory construction is that when it is not clear which of a number of statutes is applicable, the more specific prevails over the more general.[6] In this situation, § 46.2-1222 specifically names and authorizes Fairfax County to regulate parking of any type of vehicle on the secondary roads lying within its jurisdictional boundaries. Section 46.2-1222 specifically addresses parking on the state secondary system of highways as opposed to "highways" generally. While § 46.2-1222.1 does provide authority for counties operating under the urban county executive form of government or the county manager plan of government to regulate parking of certain vehicles on public highways within their boundaries, it is not meant to limit the operation of, or the authority granted by, § 46.2-1222 as applied to secondary highways in Fairfax County. Likewise, while § 46.2-1224(B)-(C) provides additional authority for Fairfax County to regulate parking on highways in certain zoning districts within its boundaries, it also does not limit the operation of § 46.2-1222. Therefore, any conflict between § 46.2-1222 and §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C) would be resolved in favor of § 46.2-1222, the statute specific to Fairfax County, which applies notwithstanding any other provision of law.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that Fairfax County may exercise the specific authority provided by § 46.2-1222 to regulate parking on roads in the secondary system of highways within its boundaries. The County is not limited by §§ 46.2-1222.1 and 46.2-1224(B)-(C) in the exercise of such authority.

Thank you for letting me be of service to you.

Sincerely,

Robert F. McDonnell
5:14; 1:941/08-104

1. The fact that Fairfax County is the only county in Virginia that presently utilizes the urban county executive form of government does not alter this conclusion.
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1224(B) (Supp. 2008) (defining "commercial vehicles" for purposes of § 46.2-1224).
3. See id.
4. See § 46.2-1224(B)-(C) (2008).
5. See Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Srvs. v Cook, 276 Va. 465, 480-81, 666 S.E.2d 361, 368-69 (2008); see also Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Quality ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 270 Va. 423, 439-40, 621 S.E.2d 78, 87 (2005).
6. See 2003 Op. Va. Att'y. Gen. 6, 9.