Can a Texas court order the DPS or the state vital statistics office to change the sex listed on a driver's license or birth certificate?

Plain-English summary

Two kinds of state ID, the driver's license and the birth certificate, list a person's "sex." In Texas, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) issues and controls driver's licenses, and the Department of State Health Services (DSHS) prescribes and maintains birth certificates. The Director of DPS told the Attorney General that district courts in several counties had been issuing orders, in uncontested proceedings, that directed these two agencies to change a person's sex or "gender" on their documents. The catch: the agencies were never told about those cases, were never named or joined as parties, and never appeared. The Director asked two questions. Can a court do that? And if not, can the agencies fix records they already changed in response to such orders?

The AG's answer to the first question was no. The opinion runs the orders through the three things a court needs before it can bind anyone: jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over the party, and the power to enter that particular judgment. On subject matter, the AG explained that the Transportation Code and the Health and Safety Code commit the contents of licenses and birth certificates to DPS and DSHS, and neither statute provides for judicial review of those contents (unlike license suspensions, which the law does send to county courts). There is also no "vested property right" in what a license or birth certificate says, sovereign immunity was never waived because no agency was made a party and no Administrative Procedure Act or Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act claim was pleaded, and the petitions raised no justiciable controversy (no injury in fact, no causation, no redressability). On personal jurisdiction, the agencies were never served, so a court could not bind them. And on the power to enter the judgment, the AG pointed to the constitutional rule that only the Legislature can suspend a law and that courts cannot supervise how an executive agency carries out a statutory duty.

Because all three failed, the AG concluded the orders are void and the proceedings were "coram non judice," an old phrase meaning the matter was before someone who was not, in that case, acting as a judge. On the second question, the opinion concluded that the agencies may disregard the void orders and must correct any documents already altered under them. The AG reasoned there is no statute or rule authorizing a "gender" entry on these documents, and that, citing the office's earlier Opinion KP-0401 and Texas case law, no satisfactory proof of a sex change can exist for these records.

What this means for you

For DPS, DSHS, and other state agencies: The opinion's position is that an order issued in a case where the agency was never named, served, or joined does not bind the agency, and that an agency receiving such an order may treat it as void. The opinion goes further and states that DPS and DSHS must correct licenses and birth certificates that were altered under these orders, because in the AG's reading the agencies have no statutory authority to record "gender" and must keep the contents the Legislature prescribed. The AG drew the comparison to Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Morris, where DPS was held to have acted correctly in ignoring stay orders from a court that lacked jurisdiction.

For a Texan who obtained one of these orders or had a document changed: The opinion treats the underlying orders as void rather than merely erroneous, which in the AG's analysis means they "bound no person or thing" and can be revisited. The opinion does not resolve any individual case; it answers the agencies' legal questions in the abstract. Anyone whose records are affected, or who is weighing how to update an ID, would need to look at current statutes and consult their own counsel, because an AG opinion is persuasive authority, not a binding court judgment.

For attorneys and judges: The opinion is a detailed map of why the AG views these ex parte orders as jurisdictionally defective on all three heads, including the point that the Family Code's name-change chapter (chapter 45) supplies no authority for a sex-change order, citing Araguz and McReynolds. It also flags, in a footnote, that a documented pattern of forum-shopping could raise questions about a judge's fitness, while noting that is a fact question outside the opinion's scope.

For journalists and researchers: This is the AG's formal statement of the State's legal position on court-ordered sex changes to Texas IDs, tied to specimen petitions and orders from Travis and Dallas Counties. It rests on jurisdiction and statutory-construction grounds and leans on the office's prior Opinion KP-0401.

Common questions

Q: Does this opinion change the law by itself?
A: No. An Attorney General opinion is persuasive authority, not binding precedent and not a statute. It states the AG's view of what existing law requires. A court could reach its own conclusion, and the Legislature could change the statutes.

Q: Why does the AG say the court orders are "void"?
A: Because, in the opinion's analysis, the courts lacked all three forms of jurisdiction: over the subject matter, over the agencies as parties, and to enter that particular judgment. A judgment missing any of those is void rather than merely wrong, which is what the Latin phrase "coram non judice" describes.

Q: Why couldn't the agencies be bound if they got the order?
A: The opinion explains that a court only gains power over a party through proper service or appearance. The agencies were never named, served, or joined, so under cases like Mapco, Inc. v. Carter and In re Suarez a court could not enter a binding judgment against them.

Q: What did the AG say agencies should do with documents already changed?
A: The opinion concludes the agencies should reverse those changes, treating the orders as void and noting there is no statutory authority to record "gender" on a license or birth certificate, and that the records "may not be changed" absent satisfactory proof of inaccuracy.

Q: Does the opinion address name changes?
A: It distinguishes them. The opinion notes that a name change is governed by chapter 45 of the Family Code and rests on a common-law right, and it states plainly that "a name change is not a sex change." Whether the government must recognize a name change is left outside the opinion's scope.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion reads two licensing-and-records regimes together. Chapter 521 of the Transportation Code governs driver's licenses, from application contents (including "sex") to issuance, suspension, and the limited authority to issue a corrected license on "proof satisfactory to the department" (sections 521.121 through 521.320; section 521.146(b)). The AG stressed that the Legislature provided county-court review of suspensions and revocations but not of the contents of a license, and that DPS's regulation defining the license "description" to include "sex" sits at 37 Tex. Admin. Code section 15.26. Chapter 191 of the Health and Safety Code charges DSHS with administering vital statistics and prescribing the "form and contents" of birth certificates (sections 191.002 and 192.002), and section 191.028 allows a record of birth to be changed only where it is incomplete or proved inaccurate.

The jurisdictional spine of the opinion comes from Texas Supreme Court precedent: State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez for the three components of jurisdiction, PNS Stores and In re D.S. for the rule that a judgment missing any of them is void, and In re Office of the Attorney General for the principle that courts may review an administrative action only where a statute provides it or a vested right or constitutional right is at stake. Sovereign-immunity and ultra-vires doctrine come from Heinrich, Sefzik, Matzen, and Hall v. McRaven; justiciability and standing from Coalson, Brown v. Todd, Heckman, and the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. The personal-jurisdiction analysis draws on Mapco, Inc. v. Carter and In re Suarez, and the "particular judgment" analysis on State v. Ferguson and Tex. Const. art. I, section 28. For the proposition that the agencies may disregard void orders, the AG relied on Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Morris and the historical "coram non judice" line running through York, Templeton, and Stuart v. Anderson. The conclusion that a sex change cannot be proved on these facts cites the office's Opinion KP-0401 (2022), Littleton v. Prange, In re Rocher, and Justice Blacklock's concurrence in State v. Loe.

Citations and references

Statutory and constitutional provisions:

• Tex. Transp. Code ch. 521 (driver's licenses)
• Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 191 and ch. 192 (vital statistics; birth certificates)
• Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.038 (APA declaratory judgments); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 37 (UDJA)
• Tex. Const. art. I, § 28; art. II, § 1

Key cases:

• Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991)
• In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding)
• Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Morris, 436 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1968)
• In re Office of the Attorney General, 456 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2015)
• Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied)
• TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)

Related opinion:

• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0401 (2022) (concerning the biological meaning of "sex")

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0489
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2025/kp-0489.pdf

Original opinion text

KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

March 14, 2025

Colonel Freeman F. Martin
Director
Texas Department of Public Safety
Post Office Box 4087
Austin, Texas 78773-0001

Opinion No. KP-0489

Re: Validity of district court orders directing state agencies to amend a person’s biological
“sex” designation on state identification documents (RQ-0563-KP)

Director Martin: 1

Your inquiry relates to the validity of district court orders directing the Department of
Public Safety (“DPS”) and the Department of State Health Services (“DSHS”) to amend a person’s
biological sex on government-issued documents. Request Letter at 1. For context, you explain that
district courts across Texas have issued “orders” requiring that these state agencies—who are not
notified of, named in, or joined to the underlying proceedings—alter “the gender and sex
identifiers on any and all licenses, certificates, or other official documents under the agenc[ies’]
control.” Id. at 2 (referencing orders in Travis County); see also, e.g., id. at 3 (noting similar orders
in Dallas County). You also indicate that DPS “may have altered . . . government sex records” to
comply with these orders, id. at 4, which are based on petitioners’ representation that their “birth
certificate and other identifying information should conform with [their] true gender/sex,” id. at 2
(citation omitted).

Ultimately, you ask whether “Texas courts have the authority to render judgments in
uncontested proceedings that order a non-party to change a person’s ‘sex’ . . . on government
documents,” and, if not, whether affected agencies can correct prior, court-ordered changes that
“were inconsistent with state law.” Id. at 1, 4. Though you also ask “[w]hat constitutes satisfactory
proof of an inaccurate or incomplete ‘sex’ designation,” id. at 1, we address that point as it pertains
to your second question.

1
While this opinion was first requested by former Director McCraw, Letter from Mr. Steven McCraw, Dir.,
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1 (Sept. 13, 2024), www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/
sites/default/files/request-files/request/2024/RQ0563KP.pdf (“Request Letter”), Director Martin has since assumed
office and, on January 8, 2025, asked that we keep the request open. E-mail from D. Phillip Adkins, Gen. Couns.,
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to Off. of Tex. Att’y Gen., Op. Comm. at 1 (Jan. 8, 2025) (on file with the Op. Comm.).
We granted that request on January 9, 2025, and proceed accordingly.

I. District courts lack jurisdiction to issue ex parte sex-change orders

We begin with the classic foundation of judicial authority: jurisdiction. “The very balance
of state governmental power imposed by the framers of the Texas Constitution depends on each
branch, and particularly the judiciary, operating within its jurisdictional bounds.” Brown v. De La
Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 569 (Tex. 2004) (citation omitted). In fact, “the only real power a court
possesses—the power of judgment—cannot be exercised without jurisdiction.” Dickson v. Am.
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 698 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. 2024) (Young, J., concurring in denial of the petition
for review) (collecting cases). Over a century of precedent confirms the same. See, e.g., Tex. & P.
Ry. Co. v. Gay, 26 S.W. 599, 601 (Tex. 1894), aff’d, 167 U.S. 745 (1897) (explaining
“[j]urisdiction must depend on the laws creating the court and prescribing its powers, and, if it
attempts to exercise a power not thus conferred, its judgments and decrees are not binding”);
Withers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 492 (1864) (“Orders and judgments [for] which [a] court has
not the power[] . . . to make or render[] are, of course, null[] . . . .”).

But the term “jurisdiction” has long endured “too many[] meanings.” 2 In re United Servs.
Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2010) (citation omitted). Framed simply, jurisdiction
reduces to a court’s constitutional share of “the judicial power,” which allows judicial officers “to
decide,” “pronounce,” and “carry . . . into effect [judgments] between persons and parties who
bring a case . . . for a decision.” Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 644–45 (Tex. 1933); accord
In re Off. Att’y Gen., 702 S.W.3d at 366 (reaffirming this definition). It follows that a court cannot
“address the merits” of any action without (A) authority to entertain the class of case—i.e.,
“jurisdiction over the subject matter,” (B) the valid invocation of that authority—i.e., “jurisdiction
over the party,” and (C) authority to afford relief—i.e., “jurisdiction to enter the particular
judgment.” State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994). Failing any one of these
requirements, the resulting “judgment is void[] rather than voidable.” In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504,
512 (Tex. 2020); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (same).

We therefore analyze the orders you describe through this three-part jurisdictional lens.

A. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

Three foundational limits on district courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction prove relevant to
your request. First, “[i]t is well settled that trial courts may review an administrative action only if
a statute provides a right to judicial review[] or the action adversely affects a vested property right
or otherwise violates a constitutional right.” In re Off. Att’y Gen., 456 S.W.3d at 157 (emphasis
added); Stone v. Tex. Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385–86 (Tex. 1967) (same); City of
Amarillo v. Hancock, 239 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. 1951) (same). This is why exhaustion of
administrative remedies—a jurisdictional prerequisite where an agency possesses exclusive
jurisdiction—is said to be “of no consequence” where the governing framework “is . . . silent on

2
With this in mind, the Supreme Court of Texas has undertaken recent efforts to clarify that judicial authority
is not shaped by the political importance of a question, Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tex. 2020)
(per curiam); a putative distinction between common-law versus statutory causes of action, Dubai Petroleum Co. v.
Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75–76 (Tex. 2000); the independent validity of a holding, In re Tex. House of Representatives,
702 S.W.3d 330, 336–37 (Tex. 2024); or fidelity to the perceived purpose of a statutory text, In re Off. of the Att’y
Gen., 702 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam).

the question of appeal.” Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 157–58
(Tex. 2007). Indeed, “[n]o principle is more firmly established[] than that where . . . exclusive
authority[] is delegated to any . . . officer of the government, and no mode of revising his decision[]
by appeal or otherwise[] is provided by law, his [discretionary] action is final and conclusive.”
Keenan v. Perry, 24 Tex. 253, 260 (1859). This settled precept “was added to the Texas
Constitution” in Article V, section 8, which “gives district courts general jurisdiction ‘except in
cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or
other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.’” 3 Morath v. Sterling City Indep.
Sch. Dist., 499 S.W.3d 407, 412 & n.25 (Tex. 2016) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8).

A second, independent constraint on subject-matter jurisdiction resides in sovereign
immunity. Non-consensual suits against the state government lay beyond the settled scope of
“judicial power” that preceded the Texas Constitution’s adoption in 1876. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (tracing this prohibition to 1847); see also,
e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that
“sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of . . . jurisdiction”). Suits against a state agency thus
require express legislative consent—like that found in the Administrative Procedure Act or the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act—to raise an administrative controversy upon which the
judiciary can weigh. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc.,
145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (discussing the APA); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d
432, 446 (Tex. 1994) (discussing the UDJA). To be sure, “Texas courts likewise recognize that an
action . . . against a state official who has acted ultra vires—that is, without legal or statutory
authority—is not a suit against the State that sovereign immunity bars.” Phillips v. McNeill,
635 S.W.3d 620, 628 (Tex. 2021). But a plaintiff must “allege, and ultimately prove, that the
officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act” to invoke this
exception to sovereign immunity. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009).

Justiciability represents a third, independent limit on district courts’ subject-matter
jurisdiction. “The constitutional roots of justiciability doctrines . . . lie in the prohibition on
advisory opinions[] . . . .” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d
439, 442 (Tex. 1998); accord Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, 691 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex. 2024)
(per curiam). Yet it is “our separation of powers article, TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1, [that] prohibits
courts from . . . decid[ing] abstract questions of law without binding the parties.” Brown v. Todd,
53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2001); see also, e.g., Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d
744, 747 (Tex. 1980) (“District courts, under our Constitution, do not give advice nor decide cases
upon speculative, hypothetical, or contingent situations.”). This article “underscores the structural
limits that inhere in our Constitution no less than in [its] federal counterpart,” In re House, 702
S.W.3d at 342–43, and commands that no department “shall exercise any power properly attached
to . . . the others,” TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. Consequently, “the judicial power does not embrace
. . . advisory opinions” because that authority “is vested in the executive branch.” Firemen’s Ins.

3
Previously, this section of the Texas Constitution enumerated various categories of district court
jurisdiction—including “original jurisdiction over all causes of action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is
not provided by law or this Constitution, and such other jurisdiction[] . . . as may be provided by law.” Tex. S.J. Res.
14, § 4, 69th Leg., R.S., 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3355, 3358.

Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968) (collecting cases); accord Gen. Land Off. v. OXY
U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990); Morrow, 62 S.W.2d at 643–44.

As explained below, however, each of these limits belie the exercise you describe—
meaning the resulting orders are “void.” D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 512; PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 272.

1. Judicial Review of Administrative Actions

The statutory frameworks governing driver’s licenses and birth certificates do not
contemplate judicial review over amendments to either form of government identification.
Chapter 521 of the Texas Transportation Code, for example, details all aspects of driver’s
licenses—ranging from the uniform content and appearance requirements to applications,
issuance, denials, suspensions, and revocations. TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 521.121–.127, .141–.148,
.181–.183, .291–.320 (addressing these topics in respective order). Much of this rubric has
remained substantively unchanged since driver’s licenses were first introduced to Texas in 1936:
Applicants must still “apply in a manner prescribed by the department,” id. § 521.141(a); accord
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a, § 5(a) (Vernon’s 1936); those applications must still include an
applicant’s name, birthplace, birthdate, and “sex,” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.142(a), (c)(1);
accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a, § 5(b) (Vernon’s 1936); and the ensuing license must still
include a unique number as well as the licensee’s name, age, description, and address, TEX.
TRANSP. CODE § 521.121(a)(1)–(5); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a, § 8(b)
(Vernon’s 1936); see also 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.26(4) (refining “description” to include a
person’s “sex”). Likewise, the discretion to issue corrected licenses—as well as the quantum of
proof necessary to support the same—has been committed to the exclusive discretion of DPS since
1968. 4 TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.146(b) (requiring “proof satisfactory to the department that
supports the change” (emphasis added)); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687b, §§ 14, 20
(Vernon’s 1974) (same); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687b, § 14 (Vernon’s 1968) (same).

This stands in sharp contrast to the Legislature’s consistent provision of judicial review
over administrative actions like suspensions and revocations—categories over which county courts
alone have possessed jurisdiction since the framework’s inception. TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 521.308(a)–(b) (providing for county court appeals of sustained license suspensions or
revocations); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a, § 17 (Vernon’s 1936) (allowing “[a]ny
person denied a license by the Department” to petition county courts for review); 5 see also, e.g.,
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 524.041(a)–(b) (providing for county court review of sustained,

4
Before then, DPS could issue “a duplicate or substitute” license if “lost or destroyed.” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
art. 6687a, § 9 (Vernon’s 1936); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687b, § 14 (Vernon’s 1942) (same). Yet even that
discretion was invested in DPS alone—requiring an individual to “furnish[] proof satisfactory to the Department.”
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a, § 9 (Vernon’s 1936) (emphasis added). That same standard exists today.
5
Though the controlling statutes from 1938 to 1959 allowed county court appeals over a broader range of
departmental action—contemplating petitions for judicial review when a license was “denied,” “cancelled, suspended,
or revoked by the Department,” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a, § 17 (Vernon’s 1938); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
art. 6687b, § 31 (Vernon’s 1948) (same)—we need not outline the presumptive breadth of these categories because
they were condensed to focus on suspensions, alone, eight years before the Legislature provided DPS with statutory
authority to issue corrected licenses. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687b, § 22(c) (Vernon’s 1960) (specifying
appealable suspensions), with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687b, § 14 (Vernon’s 1968) (governing corrected licenses).

intoxication-based suspensions); id. § 601.401(a)–(b) (same, suspensions under the Texas Motor
Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act); cf. also, e.g., id. § 524.041(b) (permitting motion-based
transfers to district courts “[i]f the county judge is not a licensed attorney”).

Birth certificates are no different. Chapter 191 of the Health and Safety Code empowers
DSHS to “administer the registration of vital statistics” and directs the agency to “establish a vital
statistics unit . . . for the preservation of its official records,” “establish a statewide system of vital
statistics,” “provide instructions and prescribe forms” for the entire process of “preserving vital
statistics,” and “require the enforcement” of associated statutes and rules. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 191.002(a)–(b) (emphasis added). This chapter also mandates that DSHS “shall prescribe
the form and contents of . . . birth certificate[s],” id. § 192.002(a); accord 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 181.13(a) (same, explaining the requisite “items will be designated on department forms”), and
specifies that “[a] record of birth[] . . . may not be changed except” where “incomplete or proved
by satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate,” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 191.028(a)–(b) (noting
that “amendment[s] must be in a form prescribed by the department”).

Yet this centralized framework is nothing new. For the last century, DSHS has been
singlehandedly charged with ensuring “uniform observance . . . and . . . maintenance of a perfect
system of registration.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 191.004(b) (detailing the State Registrar’s
duties and obligations); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4553a, R. 48 (Vernon’s 1914) (same);
see also, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4477, R. 56 (Vernon’s 1925) (“No system for the
registration of births and deaths shall be continued or maintained in any city or county of this State
other than the system provided for and prescribed by . . . this Chapter.”). Among these unchanged
mandates is DSHS’s obligation to “carefully examine the certificates received” and, “if necessary,”
to “require additional information to make the record complete and satisfactory.” TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 191.031(a)–(b); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4553a, R. 48 (Vernon’s 1914)
(same). It was not until 1984 that this framework first included a “judicial procedure to establish
facts of birth,” which vested county-level jurisdiction over DSHS’s refusal to register a delayed
birth certificate. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4477, R. 51a, § B.6 & C (Vernon’s 1984); see also TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 192.027(a) (same, allowing review in statutory probate or district
courts). The Legislature did not, however, provide similarly for the contents of birth certificates.

We must ultimately “presume that the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care,”
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011), and “[w]hen the
Legislature includes a right or remedy in one part of a code but omits it in another, . . . ‘we must
honor that difference,’” City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. 2009) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). To honor that difference here is to conclude the district courts
described in your request “lacked authority to order [DPS or DSHS] to [amend] . . . its files”
because there is no “authority expressly providing for . . . [such] review.” In re Off. Att’y Gen.,
456 S.W.3d at 157; see also, e.g., Hous. Mun. Emps., 248 S.W.3d at 157–58; Stone, 417 S.W.2d
at 385–86; Hancock, 239 S.W.2d at 790. Neither the Transportation Code nor the Health and
Safety Code contemplate judicial review over the contents of driver’s licenses or birth
certificates—unlike administrative actions that carry notice and hearing requirements, e.g., TEX.
TRANSP. CODE §§ 524.040–.041 (administrative suspensions of driver’s licenses); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 191.057(c) (refusal to issue certified copies of birth certificates)—as has been
true since the Legislature established both frameworks.

It is of no moment that “[t]he right to challenge administrative actions . . . on the basis that
such actions unconstitutionally deprive the plaintiff of a vested property right is a right to judicial
review distinctly different from [one] . . . given by a statute.” Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional
Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 404 (Tex. 2000). This only proves relevant “[w]hen a vested
property right has been adversely affected by the action of an administrative body so as to invoke
the protection of due process.” 6 Brazosport Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 342
S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. 1961) (emphasis added); accord Hous. Mun. Emps., 248 S.W.3d at 157–
58 (rejecting a “right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute explicitly
provides that right or the order violates a constitutional right”); Hancock, 239 S.W.2d at 790 (same,
vested property right); see also, e.g., Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Kennedy,
514 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. 1974); Chem. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427, 433
(Tex. 1963). But there is no vested property right in the contents of either Texas driver’s licenses
or birth certificates. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Schaejbe, 687 S.W.2d 727, 728
(Tex. 1985) (explaining driver’s licenses are “not a [legal] right[] but a privilege”); Gillaspie v.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 259 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Tex. 1953) (same); see also, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639
F.3d 146, 158–59 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting claim “that the full faith and credit clause
entitles [a person] to a revised birth certificate”). Generally, a cognizable property interest requires
“more than a unilateral expectation.” Wigginton v. Jones, 964 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted); see also, e.g., Gore v. Lee, 107 F.4th 548, 557–58 (6th Cir. 2024) (explaining
“the [U.S.] Constitution does not require the States to embrace the plaintiffs’ view of what
information a birth certificate must record”); Brown v. Cooke, No. 06-CV-01092-MSK-CBS, 2009
WL 641301, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2009) (same, driver’s licenses), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 897
(10th Cir. 2010).

2. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity also betrays subject-matter jurisdiction on the facts you describe. As
a “general rule[,] . . . the plaintiff’s petition must state facts which affirmatively show the
jurisdiction of the court.” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Brite, 215 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. 2007)
(quoting Richardson v. First Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1967)). Consequently,
suits against “[a] unit of state government” obligate a plaintiff to “alleg[e] a valid waiver of
immunity.” Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003).

It appears the district courts you reference have incorrectly concluded otherwise. The
petition available in Travis County, for example, calls upon a single statute in the “Request for
Judgment” section—stating “upon application to the Vital Statistics Unit my Texas birth certificate

6
Neither does it matter that dictum later broadened the description of an “inherent constitutional right to
judicial review” as if resulting either from “administrative decisions . . . [that] adversely affect a vested property right
or otherwise violate some [constitutional] provision.” Cont’l Cas. Ins., 19 S.W.3d at 404; accord In re Off. Att’y Gen.,
456 S.W.3d at 157. Administrative action precedes either putative path to review. Yet here, the petitions you describe
circumvent the state agencies altogether and do not take issue with any administrative action. See infra pp. 9–11
(discussing the ensuing justiciability problem). We therefore undertake no discussion of whether it is appropriate to
“assume jurisdiction . . . in order that the administrative body may function,” Hancock, 239 S.W.2d at 790–91—
despite the categorical impropriety of assuming jurisdiction. See Fin. Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566,
578 (Tex. 2013) (rejecting hypothetical jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Dickson, 698 S.W.3d at 238 (Young, J., concurring
in denial of the petition for review) (describing hypothetical jurisdiction as constitutionally “incoherent”).

shall be amended pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code 192.011 to reflect my sex/gender.”
Petition to Change Gender and Sex Identifier of an Adult (“Travis County Petition”) at 3
(Rev. June 2019), https://tinyurl.com/Travis-County-Sample (last visited Feb. 19, 2025). The
petition from Dallas County additionally invokes “Section 45.102 of the Texas Family Code”
alongside “Section 192.028 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.” Original Petition for Change
of Name of Adult with Gender Marker Correction/Sex on Birth Certificate (“Dallas County
Petition”) at 1, https://tinyurl.com/Dallas-County-Sample (last visited Feb. 19, 2025). But
“[s]overeign immunity [can] not be avoided merely through . . . insistence on styling [a] suit as an
‘ex parte’ proceeding.” Ex parte Springsteen, 506 S.W.3d 789, 802 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet.
denied); accord In re Thompson, 330 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, orig. proceeding)
(observing the UDJA “does not contemplate ex parte proceedings”). At bottom, neither of these
petitions even purports to invoke an express waiver of immunity.

Nor could they. Again, the Transportation Code as well as the Health and Safety Code
contain no provision for judicial review over the contents of driver’s licenses or birth certificates—
a matter long committed to DPS and DSHS, respectively. See supra pp. 4–5 (detailing both
frameworks). Texas courts have likewise rejected the notion that the Family Code provides any
authority for a “court to . . . change [an individual’s] gender designation.” In re Rocher, No. 14-
15-00462-CV, 2016 WL 4131626, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 2, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.). “[U]nlike a name change, which is governed by Chapter 45 of the Texas Family Code,
there is no corresponding chapter of the [F]amily [C]ode governing a sex change.” 7 In re Estate of
Araguz, 443 S.W.3d 233, 245 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, pet. denied); accord In re
McReynolds, 502 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) (confirming that the Family
Code “does not authorize Texas courts to render sex change orders”).

Second, these petitions cannot be read to implicitly invoke a recognized waiver of
sovereign immunity like that in the APA or UDJA. Both frameworks mandate that a state agency
be made party to the underlying suit, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038(c) (APA); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 37.006(a) (UDJA), and the APA requires that suits be filed in Travis County alone,
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038(b). See generally Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d
500, 511 (Tex. 2012) (discussing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034, which made “notice requirements,
and all other statutory prerequisites to suit, jurisdictional as to governmental entities”). Neither
could a petitioner invoke either waiver of sovereign immunity without “challenging the validity of
a statute” or “the validity or applicability of any agency rule.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355
S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (addressing the UDJA and APA, respectively); accord

7
Of course, the name-change rubric does not require a waiver of sovereign immunity because it does not
pertain to administrative action and invites no judgment against the state government; these statutes instead “provide
a method for recording the change” as a supplement to “the common law rule [that] allows a person to change his
name without resort to legal procedure.” Appeal of Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1965,
writ ref’d) (discussing history of the common-law right); see also, e.g., Ex parte Smith, 476 S.W.2d 29, 30
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ) (observing “there is no opposing party in a case of this nature”). This
distinguishes the corollary question as to whether a name change must be recognized by the government. See, e.g.,
Brown, 2009 WL 641301, at *5 (observing “a considerable body of caselaw recognizes that the Government is under
no obligation to conform its own records to acknowledge an individual’s decision to change his name”). That topic is
beyond the scope of this opinion, however, and we observe only that a name change is not a sex change.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038(a) (limiting scope of declaratory judgments under the APA);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004(a) (defining subject matter of relief under the UDJA).

Yet the petitions you reference name no agency defendants and at least one, by its very
nature, contemplates suit outside of Travis County. In substance, too, these petitions articulate no
challenges through which sovereign immunity could be waived under the APA or UDJA: Neither
challenges DPS’s statutory mandate that driver’s licenses “contain the same type of information”
and “may not include any information” beyond that detailed in statute, TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 521.121(e)(1)(C), (e)(2); DPS’s rule mandating that the “description” information include “sex”
rather than gender, 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.26(4); or the need to provide DPS with “proof
satisfactory to . . . support[] [a] change,” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.146(b). These petitions also
contain no challenge to the statutory mandate that DSHS “shall prescribe the form and contents of
. . . birth certificate[s],” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 192.002(a); DSHS’s statutory discretion
to determine what records are “incomplete or proved by satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate,”
id. § 191.028(a)–(b); or DSHS’s rule providing that “[t]he State Registrar shall determine the items
of information to be contained on certificates of birth,” 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 181.13(a).

Third, the petitions you reference do not affirmatively allege ultra vires conduct that could
obviate the foregoing. “Plaintiffs who seek to bypass sovereign immunity using an ultra vires claim
must plead, and ultimately prove, that the defendant government official ‘acted without legal
authority or failed to perform a ministerial act.” Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388
(Tex. 2021) (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372). This exception “depend[s] on the scope of the
state official’s authority” and “not the quality of the official’s decisions,” which is why “it is not
[enough] . . . for an official to make an erroneous decision within the [discretionary] authority
granted.” Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 555 S.W.3d 54, 68 (Tex. 2018) (citation
omitted). Put differently, “ultra vires suits do not attempt to exert control over the state—they
attempt to reassert [that] control,” Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372—and “can only . . . compel [a state
official] to follow his governing authority, not . . . change [it].” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232,
240 (Tex. 2017). “To reassert such control,” however, “an ultra vires suit must lie against the
‘allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also,
e.g., Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621–22 (rejecting claim that failed to name “any state official”).

These petitions pursue no such end. Instead, they highlight the perceived consequences of
a district court’s refusal to grant original relief—untethered from an alleged administrative act,
omission, or legal obligation—and name no official-capacity defendants. Travis County Petition
at 1; Dallas County Petition at 2. Of course, to name an agency official would serve only to
highlight why the ultra vires exception cannot apply in this context: The authority to amend the
contents of driver’s licenses and birth certificates is a matter of discretion, respectively committed
to DPS and DSHS alone. See supra pp. 4–5 (detailing both statutory frameworks, which require
agency applications and “satisfactory” proof). Texas courts of appeals to confront identically
“broad delegations of power” have correctly concluded that the ultra vires exception is
inapplicable. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Salazar, No. 03-11-00478-CV, 2013 WL 5878905, at
*11–12 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 31, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing for want of
jurisdiction over DPS’s discretion to demand “satisfactory” proof under the Transportation Code);
see also, e.g., Bacon v. Tex. Hist. Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 178–80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013,
no pet.) (affirming lack of jurisdiction over unsuccessful petitions to rename a Texas landmark).

Just as sovereign immunity will not yield to the phrase “ex parte” alone, Springsteen, 506 S.W.3d
at 802, an ultra vires claim cannot lie against “the state agency itself,” Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621–
22; accord Matzen, 659 S.W.3d at 388. These petitions therefore openly invite district courts to
“exert control over the state” rather than “reassert control” over one of its agents. Contra Hall,
508 S.W.3d at 238 (citation omitted).

3. Justiciability

The failure to allege a justiciable controversy reveals yet another bar to subject-matter
jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that “[d]istrict courts, under our Constitution, do not give advice nor
decide cases upon speculative, hypothetical or contingent situations.” Coalson, 610 S.W.2d at 747.
“Justiciability doctrines like standing” serve to “ensure that courts do not issue advisory opinions,”
Bienati, 691 S.W.3d at 498, whose “distinctive feature” involves “decid[ing] an abstract question
of law without binding the parties,” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
444 (Tex. 1993). Standing thus “limits subject matter jurisdiction to cases involving a distinct
injury to the plaintiff and ‘a real controversy between the parties, which . . . will be actually
determined by the judicial declaration sought.’” Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 774 (Tex. 2005) (omission in original) (quoting Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d
297, 305 (Tex. 2001)). Unlike sovereign immunity, however, standing does “not [involve] the
viability of the pleaded claim but the nature of the injury alleged” in that pleading—looking “to
matters such as injury, causation, and redressability.” Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191, 198
(Tex. 2022) (emphasis added). Absent these elements, “[a] trial court has no more jurisdiction to
deny [the plaintiff’s] claims than it does to grant them.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman,
252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008).

The petitions you highlight fail each facet of this rubric. First, none alleges a cognizable
injury in fact. The petitions invoke little more than a perceived disparity between a petitioner’s
present “sex/gender” and that listed on their driver’s license or birth certificate, based on the
statutory procedures that expressly reflect DPS’s and DSHS’s authority over those documents.
Travis County Petition at 1; Dallas County Petition at 2. Yet the mere existence of such procedures
“does not in itself confer, and is not the same as, the constitutional standing required to litigate in
court.” Bacon, 411 S.W.3d at 178–79. These statutes reveal “little more than the opportunity to
petition [an agency] to exercise its broad discretion so as to agree,” and “a ‘mere expectation’ [of
agreement] does not . . . confer standing to contest [the agency’s] decision in the absence of a
legislatively conferred right of judicial review.” Id. at 180–81. There is a “fundamental distinction
between ‘standing’ before an administrative agency . . . and the constitutional standing required to
invoke a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 178–79. As such, Texas courts of appeals have
correctly held that “[i]f the [L]egislature intended to create a new justiciable right of action for a
sex change order, it would say so.” McReynolds, 502 S.W.3d at 887; see also, e.g., Araguz,
443 S.W.3d at 245 (observing that the Family Code does not contemplate “sex change” petitions).
But there is “no statutory scheme expressly authorizing sex change orders or establishing
procedures for obtaining such an order,” McReynolds, 502 S.W.3d at 888, and “implying a private
cause of action in a statute that [does] not provide for one” reaches beyond “the judiciary[’s] . . .
jurisdictional bounds,” Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424,
432 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Brown, 156 S.W.3d at 569); accord State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941,
949 (Tex. 1994).

Neither could a statute recognizing an informational injury—e.g., a right to identification
documents that affirm a person’s undisclosed, subjective perception—displace the need to allege
a cognizable injury in fact. Indeed, “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court [in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U.S. 413 (2021)] recently wrestled with similar arguments regarding . . . standing based on
‘informational injury’ alone.” Am. Campus Communities, Inc. v. Berry, 667 S.W.3d 277, 288 n.6
(Tex. 2023). Unlike the statutes referenced in the petitions here, however, the law in TransUnion
obligated defendants “to ‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy’ of
the plaintiffs’ credit files” and “create[d] a cause of action . . . to sue and recover damages for
certain violations.” 594 U.S. at 419, 431 (citation omitted). Still, the Court made clear that while
“Congress may elevate harms that exist in the real world . . . to actionable legal status, it may not
simply enact an injury into existence[] . . . to transform something that is not remotely harmful
into something that is.” Id. at 426 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he mere existence
of inaccurate information in a database [was] insufficient to confer [constitutional] standing” on
plaintiffs whose information had not been disseminated, regardless of the defendant’s statutory
obligation to assure maximum accuracy. Id. at 434. That claim of “harm [was] roughly the same[]
. . . as if someone wrote a defamatory letter and then stored it in her desk drawer,” the Court
explained. Id. But “[a] letter that is not sent does not harm anyone, no matter how insulting.” Id.
The Court likewise rejected those plaintiffs’ independent emphasis on a future risk of harm
because that forecast “was too speculative to support . . . standing.” Id. at 437–38.

Of course, the petitions underlying your inquiry not only want for a recognized
“informational injury” but also depend on even greater speculation than that rejected in
TransUnion. 8 The Travis County Petition vaguely invokes “problems with schools, voting, . . .
travel, . . . obtaining insurance, employment, housing, credit, and . . . producing correct and
consistent identification.” Travis County Petition at 1. Even more, the Dallas County Petition’s
forecast of harm does not turn on the perceived disparity itself but instead suggests that receiving
a “name change without the necessary gender marker correction” would “bias and frustrate [the
petitioner’s] ability to be a fully participating and contributing member of society” as well as
“increase[] the chance that [the petitioner] will be subjected to discrimination, harassment, and
violence, as well as denial of certain rights.” Dallas County Petition at 2 (emphasis added). But
the presumptive sincerity of these concerns cannot change the reality that “[s]tanding is not ‘an
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.’” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566
(1992) (citation omitted). Rather than alleging a cognizable “invasion of a legally protected
interest,” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560–61), both petitions allege conjectural harms that follow from non-existent
interests. As a result, “[a] trial court has no more jurisdiction to deny [these petitions] than it does
to grant them.” Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304.

Second, these petitions openly contradict any claim of causation. This independent facet of
standing serves to “identify[] the proper defendants” because “a court [can] act only to redress

8
It is irrelevant that the TransUnion plaintiffs sought damages, versus injunctive relief, as the Court
highlighted the latter similarly requires a “risk of harm [be] sufficiently imminent and substantial.” TransUnion, 494
U.S. at 435 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013)). Under that standard, too, “plaintiffs
bear the burden of pleading and proving concrete facts showing that the defendant’s actual action has caused the
substantial risk of harm” rather than relying on a “speculative chain of possibilities.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 & n.5.

injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . some third
party not before the court.’” Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex. 2018)
(alteration in original) (quoting Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155). Yet neither petition names any
defendant, let alone alleges a causal relationship between the perceived informational disparity
and the agencies at which the petitions are ultimately directed. This is further confirmed by the
proposed orders, which reveal the underlying petitions precede the applications they purportedly
govern—directing the agencies act “upon application” by the petitioners—and demonstrate there
could be no causal relationship between the putative injury and the non-party agencies. Compare
Travis County Petition at 1–4, and Dallas County Petition at 1–2, with TC-FM-GI1-200, Final
Order to Change the Sex/Gender Identifier of an Adult (“Travis County Order”) at 1,
tinyurl.com/Travis-County-Order (last visited Feb. 19, 2025), and Final Order Granting a Change
of Name of Adult with Gender Marker Correction/Sex on Birth Certificate (“Dallas County
Order”) at 1, tinyurl.com/Dallas-County-Order (last visited Feb. 19, 2025). Again, this
demonstrates that “[a] trial court has no more jurisdiction to deny [these petitions] than it does to
grant them.” Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304.

Third, the very nature of these petitions demonstrates that they are incapable of redressing
any putative injury. “Whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pled that the requested remedy will
redress its harm can turn on whether the plaintiff has shown that the defendant has authority to
respond to any requested injunctive relief.” Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 487–88. But these petitions
name no defendants. Travis County Petition at 1; Dallas County Petition at 1. Far from satisfying
redressability, this reveals that the ensuing orders cannot bind the non-party agencies at which they
are aimed—vitiating any claim of standing. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–70 (rejecting standing
where enjoining the named defendant would not remedy the alleged injury because non-party
agencies, who could not be bound, were ultimately responsible); see also, e.g., Brown, 156 S.W.3d
at 566 (“As the Attorney General is not a party in this proceeding, we cannot decide [whether he
has enforcement authority] without rendering an advisory opinion[] . . . .”). Just as a plaintiff
cannot “effectively . . . obtain[] a declaratory judgment . . . to [express] disagreement with the
Attorney General without making him a party,” Holcomb v. Waller Cnty., 546 S.W.3d 833, 838
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied), these petitions provide no license to render
judgments binding state agencies that are objective strangers to the proceedings themselves.

B. Jurisdiction of the Party

We turn next to whether the “judicial power” could be validly invoked over non-party
agencies in the proceedings you describe. See supra p. 2 (identifying second category of void
judgments). “To issue a valid and binding judgment or order,” of course, “a court must have . . .
personal jurisdiction over the party it purports to bind.” Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372,
379–80 (Tex. 2022) (citing Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 7–8
(Tex. 2021)). This “vital component of a valid judgment[] is dependent ‘upon citation issued and
served in a manner provided for by law,’” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012) (quoting
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990)), and recognizes that “the power underlying
judicial authority must be based on a litigant’s fair opportunity to be heard,” Fairley, 650 S.W.3d
at 388–89 (quoting PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 274). Personal jurisdiction therefore proves
“essential to invoke . . . the power conferred by the Constitution or law upon the court to hear and
decide the cause.” Henderson v. Beaton, 52 Tex. 29, 46 (1879). In this sense, “[a] complete failure

of service deprives . . . a trial court of personal jurisdiction” and renders “the resulting judgment
. . . void.” E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 566; accord Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 388.

Cases like Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam), are
emblematic. There, the Supreme Court of Texas summarily reversed a judgment entered against a
company that was never a party to the trial proceedings. Id. at 686–88. Though the plaintiffs sued
two corporate defendants over a mineral estate, the trial court went beyond ordering partition
among the named parties and entered an owelty award against a defendant’s parent company—
who was not identified “as a party” in the plaintiffs’ pleadings, filed no pleadings, and for whom
the record revealed no waiver of service. Id. at 687. This ran contrary to the settled rule: “In no
case shall judgment be rendered against any defendant unless upon service, or acceptance or
waiver of process, or upon an appearance.” Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 124). As such, the court
rejected the notion that generic references to the parent company itself were “sufficient to place
[it] before the court” and reversed. Id.

In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding), is also
instructive. There, a mother sought to regain custody of her children and served a subpoena duces
tecum to compel the appearance of a Department of Family and Protective Services employee
during the associated proceedings. Id. at 881. But neither the employee nor any other agency
representative appeared, and the trial court ordered sanctions against the non-parties—finding “it
ha[d] jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.” Id. at 883. The department and its employee
thereafter sought mandamus and argued that, as “non-parties to the underlying litigation, the trial
court did not have personal jurisdiction over them[] and[] . . . its sanctions order [was] void.” Id.
at 882. Agreeing, the court of appeals emphasized that “[e]ven if the motion for sanctions[] . . .
could stand as an independent cause of action against the relators, the trial court did not have
personal jurisdiction over [them] as parties to the litigation at the time they allegedly failed to
comply with the subpoena.” Id. at 883. The court rejected the notion that a party can move “for
sanctions against a non-party, serve the motion . . . with a citation informing it that [the non-party]
has ‘been sued,’ and thereby subject the non-party to possible sanctions based on its alleged
violation of a subpoena occurring before the sanctions motion was filed.” Id. at 883–84.

Here, as in Mapco and Suarez, the infirmities you describe preclude the valid invocation
of a district court’s authority. You tell us that agencies like DPS and DSHS are “not provided
notice of [these] proceedings,” are “not named as a party-defendant to [these] proceedings,” and
have “not participated in them in any way.” Request Letter at 2. Nonetheless, the resulting orders
purport to bind both agencies—commanding that they alter government-issued documents—
despite confirming that no state agencies were named as parties. Travis County Order at 2–3;
Dallas County Order at 1–2. Not only does this ignore that “the power underlying judicial authority
must be based on a litigant’s fair opportunity to be heard,” Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 388 (quoting
PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 274), but this exercise runs headlong into the reality that “[a] complete
failure of service deprives . . . a trial court of personal jurisdiction” and renders “the resulting
judgment . . . void.” E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 566; accord Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 388; see also, e.g.,
PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 273 (observing a “[f]ailure to give notice ‘violates the most rudimentary
demands of due process’” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).

C. Jurisdiction to Enter the Particular Judgment

We turn finally to the independent, constitutional impropriety of the orders you describe.
See supra p. 2 (identifying third category of void judgments). “[A] court may have jurisdiction
over the general subject matter[] yet lack the power to render a particular judgment or order in the
case.” Ex parte Swate, 922 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. 1996) (Gonzalez, J., joined by Owen, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 272 (describing “a judgment as void when
‘the court rendering judgment had . . . no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment” (citation
omitted)). Where this proves true, “[m]andamus is proper.” In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602,
605 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); see also, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590,
594 (Tex. 1996) (granting mandamus where a district court’s fee-shifting order could not stand
“under the guise of ‘inherent authority’” without inviting “a judicial end-run around the statutory
fee-shifting scheme”); In re Collins, 242 S.W.3d 837, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007,
no pet.) (Guzman, J.) (granting mandamus for want of authority to appoint an amicus attorney
based on unrelated statutes or “inherent powers”); In re El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d
146, 156 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding) (same, appointed-counsel order).

In re Office of the Attorney General, 456 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam), illustrates
the point. There, the Office of the Attorney General sought mandamus to vacate a trial court order
directing the removal of a “family violence indicator from . . . [its] system.” Id. at 154. Both the
trial judge and the party to the original child-support proceeding “argue[d] that OAG’s
determination to assign the indicator is simply a preliminary administrative matter subject to
judicial review,” vesting trial courts with discretion “over the existence of the indicator[] as
necessary to issue protective orders and prevent disclosure of certain personal information.” Id.
at 156. But “[t]hese two lines do not intersect,” the Court explained. Id. at 157.

While “[t]he Family Code authorizes the trial court to decide whether to disclose protected
information once a case has been designated with the indicator,” the Court went on, “the authority
to assign the indicator to a case rests with OAG.” Id. (emphasis added). “Even assuming that
OAG’s indicator designation [could] be properly categorized as an ‘administrative action,’ . . . the
parties ha[d] not [identified] . . . any authority expressly providing for the right to review the
designation” and offered no claim that could justify the district court’s order in the absence of a
judicial-review statute. Id. (citing Stone, 417 S.W.2d at 385–86). As such, “[t]he Legislature ha[d]
chosen to give OAG discretion . . . and ha[d] not chosen to allow trial courts to intervene, except
to weigh the designation in considering a request for disclosure.” Id. at 156. The Court also rejected
the notion that the Family Code provided the “trial court carte blanche to do as it pleases” by
drawing from the authority to issue “any other order.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.006(c)(2)).
“[S]tudied in context—in light of the text and structure of surrounding and related provisions—
there [was] no question that ‘any other order’ [could not] bear the broad meaning ascribed by the
trial court” and instead related only to the limited function for which the court had jurisdiction:
preventing the “disclosure of protected information.” Id. The Court thus directed vacatur of the
offending order. Id. at 157.

The orders underlying your inquiry bear indistinguishable flaws. Even assuming the
provision of a driver’s license or birth certificate could constitute “administrative action,” which
ignores that the putative disparity arose only once the petitioners later decided the contents of these

documents were no longer accurate, both the petitions and ensuing orders invoke no authority
expressly providing for judicial review. See supra pp. 4–5 (detailing statutory frameworks); see
also supra pp. 6–9 (highlighting lack of consent to be sued). Neither do the petitions offer any
allegation that would obviate the need for an express judicial-review statute. See supra pp. 5–6
(detailing lack of vested property right). Instead, these petitions and orders rely on statutes whose
plain text, context, and history uniformly reveal no authority to mandate DPS or DSHS act on
petitions that were not filed with them in the first instance. See supra pp. 4–5. “Had the legislature
intended to create [this] statutory right,” of course, “it would not have left it to the judicial branch
to define the right’s substantive elements and procedures.” McReynolds, 502 S.W.3d at 887.

Another jurisdictional problem resides in the function of these orders. “Not only may
judges and courts not suspend a statute, but neither may they supervise and direct the manner and
method of its enforcement by the officers of the executive department . . . charged with the duty
of enforcing [the] same.” State v. Ferguson, 125 S.W.2d 272, 276 (Tex. 1939) (orig. proceeding);
accord Hous. Chron. Publ’g Co. v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 1989) (same). The Texas
Constitution has long commanded that “[n]o power of suspending laws in this State shall be
exercised except by the Legislature.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 28. Like the authority to issue advisory
opinions, which lies beyond the “judicial power” itself, “no power is vested in the judiciary to
supervise and control by injunction the manner and method of exercising [a] power” that is
statutorily reserved to state agencies alone. Ferguson, 125 S.W.2d at 276. “[T]o do so,” the
Supreme Court of Texas has explained, “would be the power to set at naught a valid statute.” Id.

Here, the orders you describe undertake more than simply supervising and controlling the
discretion statutorily vested in DPS and DSHS alone. See supra pp. 4–5. Directing these agencies
to change the contents of driver’s licenses and birth certificates suspends the longstanding statutory
directive that both agencies oversee the fixed contents of these documents, which can in limited
circumstances be altered if “satisfactory” evidence is submitted to the agencies themselves but
have never referenced a person’s “gender.” See supra pp. 4–5. Thus “[t]o state the nature of th[ese]
order[s] is to reveal the lack of power in a judge or court to enter [them].” Ferguson, 125 S.W.2d
at 276. Again, these petitions cannot be read to allege either that the governing statutes are
themselves invalid or assert ultra vires conduct that would allow a court to compel administrative
officers to effect the desired amendments. See supra pp. 7–9. The face of these orders instead
reveals that DPS and DSHS are directed to violate the very laws they are bound to obey. This
ignores the Supreme Court of Texas’s admonition that “[b]efore rushing to act as enforcer, courts
must be confident they are not inadvertently undermining a legislative choice,” as is the case when
“a judicial remedy . . . itself compel[s] violating some other statutory command.” In re Stetson
Renewables Holdings, LLC, 658 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Tex. 2022).

Given the foregoing, there is no jurisdictional foundation on which these orders could rest.
A reviewing court would conclude the ex parte sex-change orders were void ab initio—even
assuming jurisdiction over the proceedings and parties, contra pp. 4–13 (explaining otherwise)—
and mandate vacatur. See, e.g., In re Off. Att’y Gen., 456 S.W.3d at 157; Travelers, 923 S.W.2d at
594; In re Collins, 242 S.W.3d at 848; In re El Paso Healthcare, Ltd., 225 S.W.3d at 156.

II. Prior “corrections” should be reversed because the underlying proceedings
and orders are coram non judice, and there can be no proof of a “gender” or
“sex” change that requires correction on these facts.

Each of the foregoing limits on district courts’ share of “judicial power” lead to your second
inquiry: 9 Whether agencies can correct actions taken in reliance on these void orders. Request
Letter at 1, 4. Two points, detailed below, lead us to answer in the affirmative.

First, “[t]he proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void traces back
to the English Year Books,” which deemed the concept “coram non judice, [i.e.,] before a person
not a judge—meaning[] . . . the proceeding in question was not a judicial proceeding because
lawful judicial authority was not present, and could therefore not yield a judgment.” Burnham v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 608–09 (1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see
also, e.g., ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 413–14 (1952) (noting Anglo-American law recognized “the void judgment [was]
ineffective for any purpose and [could] be disregarded,” just as Roman law deemed “the null
judgment . . . legally inexistent”). The English common law recognized that without “jurisdiction
of the cause, the whole proceeding is coram non judice.” The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68a, 69a,
77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1028 (K.B. 1613). That is to say, “where there is no jurisdiction . . . there is no
Judge; the proceeding is as nothing.” Perkins v. Proctor, 2 Wils. 382, 384, 95 Eng. Rep. 874, 875
(K.B. 1768); accord Terry v. Huntington, Hardr. 480, 483, 145 Eng. Rep. 557, 558 (Ex. 1680)
(explaining that judges who “exceed[ed] their authority[] . . . cease[d] to be [judges]”); see also,
e.g., 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 427 (1634) (“If [a judge] has
acted without jurisdiction, he has ceased to be a judge.”).

Early American practice held similarly. See generally United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. 8,
32 (1835) (explaining English and American reporters “abound in cases exemplifying [the]
principle” that a want of jurisdiction rendered “the whole proceeding . . . coram non judice[] and
void”). Without jurisdiction, “a party whose rights [were] sought to be affected . . . [was] at liberty
to repudiate its proceedings and refuse to be bound by them . . . since this [was] not mere
irregular[ity] . . . but a total want of power to act at all.” THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 351 (Little, Brown & Co. 1868); see also, e.g., THOMAS COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 379, § 210 (Callaghan & Co. 1907) (observing in the context of
judicial immunity that a judge not “clothed with jurisdiction[] . . . is but . . . falsely assuming an
authority he does not possess” and “is not judge when he assumes to decide cases of a class which
the law withholds from his cognizance[] or cases between persons who are not[] . . . before him”).
Courts therefore used the term “[c]oram non judice . . . interchangeably . . . both [for] lack of

9
These settled, foundational limits on district courts’ authority also intersect with your suggestion that the
forum-specific nature of these orders is no accident. You note that “[t]his practice seems to be a part of a years-long
and state-wide effort to alter government records to reflect gender identity,” which involves forum “shopping for
‘friendly’ judges” who facilitate efforts “to evade court opinions holding the practice unlawful.” Request Letter at 3
(collecting sources). If true, this raises a serious question—beyond those included in your request, and involving fact
questions outside the scope of this opinion—as to these judges’ continued fitness for office. See, e.g., In re Ginsberg,
630 S.W.3d 1, 9–18 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2018) (rejecting similar claims of judicial misconduct where the underlying
conduct was neither willful, persistent, nor implicated a settled area of the law).

subject matter jurisdiction and [for] lack of personal jurisdiction because either defect left courts
with no ‘judicial’ power” to exercise. Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional
Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 667–68 (2019) (collecting cases); see also,
e.g., Voorhees v. Jackson, ex dem. Bank of U.S., 35 U.S. 449, 450 (1836) (observing that “[t]he
line which separates error in judgment from the usurpation of power is very definite,” and
describing judgments without jurisdiction as “mere waste paper”).

Texas likewise recognized “classes of cases over which a court has not, under the very law
of its creation, any possible power” and whose “entire proceedings are [thus] coram non judice.”
York v. State, 373 S.W.3d 32, 41 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Templeton v. Ferguson, 33 S.W. 329, 332
(1895)). “In such cases,” there was “no difficulty or hesitation in ignoring its proceedings or
decrees” because “the court [was] without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the status of the
parties, or the person of the defendant.” Templeton, 33 S.W. at 332. Unlike erroneous judgments,
which could “be avoided by such proceedings as the law provide[d] but . . . [were otherwise]
binding on the parties to the action,” a judgment rendered without jurisdiction was “necessarily
void[] and b[ound] no person or thing.” Stuart v. Anderson, 8 S.W. 295, 299 (Tex. 1888); see also,
e.g., Easterline v. Bean, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. 1932) (explaining “that a void judgment is one
entirely null within itself, and which is not susceptible of ratification or confirmation”).

With this backdrop in mind, the situation you describe proves similar to that confronted in
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Morris, 436 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1968). That case arose after DPS “gave
notice to eighty-three respondents to surrender their licenses and automobile registrations,” and a
group of individuals “appealed [those] suspension orders to the [Shelby] County Court . . . where
none . . . had ever been a resident.” Id. at 125. Though “[t]he Shelby County Court issued orders
which stayed each of [DPS’s] suspension orders, . . . the Department ignored them” because “that
court had no jurisdiction” and DPS correctly “proceeded with the next step required by law, which
was the enforcement of [the underlying] suspension[s].” Id. at 125–27. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Texas endorsed the Department’s approach—explaining “that the suspension orders were
in force at all times[] and were never stayed.” Id. at 127. The Court rejected the notion that “the
Department could not ignore” the stay orders because the underlying petitions “omitted any
statement about the residence of the one appealing,” and the Shelby County Court was not
“exercising its general jurisdiction” by acting on petitions that it “had no jurisdiction to entertain.”
Id. at 125–27. Put simply, the Shelby County Court orders “were void.” Id.

Here, as in Morris, DPS and DSHS were (and remain) within their authority to disregard
the facially void orders described in your inquiry. The underlying proceedings were coram non
judice—failing all three heads of jurisdiction, see supra pp. 2–15—and the resulting orders had no
foundation in the “judicial power” endowed to district courts. That is to say, the district courts you
describe were “without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the status of the parties, or the person of
the defendant.” Templeton, 33 S.W. at 332. Over a century of precedent therefore reveals the
ensuing orders were “necessarily void” and bound “no person or thing.” Stuart, 8 S.W. at 299;
see also, e.g., Easterline, 49 S.W.2d at 429; Henderson, 52 Tex. at 45–46.

Second, as in Morris, both DPS and DSHS should continue to abide by their legal
obligation—irrespective of the facially void orders you reference—to maintain a uniform system
of driver’s licenses and birth certificates. See supra pp. 4–5 (detailing both frameworks). An

agency’s power extends only to that the “Texas Legislature has expressly conferred upon it and
those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out its statutory duties.” Tex. State Bd.
of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017);
see also, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53 S.W.3d 310,
316 (Tex. 2001) (explaining an agency cannot “exercise what is effectively a new power, or a
power contradictory to the statute”). Yet there is no statute or regulation that would permit the
inclusion of a person’s perceived “gender” on driver’s licenses or birth certificates.

Nothing in the orders you describe purports to change that DPS must issue driver’s licenses
“contain[ing] the same type of information” and cannot “include any information that [the
Transportation Code] does not reference or require.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.121(e)(1)–(2). The
Transportation Code provides that “driver’s license[s] must include” a “brief description of the
holder,” id. § 521.121(4), and DPS’s unchallenged regulations explain that this description
includes a person’s “sex” in addition to their race, eye color, height, hair color, and weight,
37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.26. “Gender” is not contemplated under this rubric. DPS therefore
remains obligated, as a matter of law, to exercise only the powers granted by the Legislature—
meaning any unlawfully altered driver’s licenses must be corrected, immediately.

The same is true of birth certificates, whose “form and contents” are prescribed and
maintained by DSHS alone. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 192.002(a); accord 25 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 181.13(a) (same, explaining that these “items will be designated on department forms”).
Texas law makes no provision for the inclusion of a person’s “gender” on their birth certificate
and instead compels DSHS to document historical information, which “may not be changed”
except where “proved by satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 191.028(a)–(b). Suffice it to say there can be no inaccuracy in a “gender” designation that does
not exist. Like DPS, DSHS remains legally obligated to exercise only these contemplated
powers—meaning unlawfully altered birth certificates also require immediate correction.

Neither can DPS or DSHS change a person’s “sex” designation without supporting
evidence that, as a matter of law, cannot exist on the facts you describe. “[I]t remains medically
impossible to truly change the sex of an individual because this is determined biologically at
conception,” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0401 (2022) at 2–3, and an individual’s personal
perception of “sex” does not change that “[p]hysical differences between men and women” are
“enduring,” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Put simply, “some things . . .
cannot [be] will[ed] into being.” Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1999, pet. denied) (holding that “the legislature intended the term ‘inaccurate’ in [the Health and
Safety Code] to mean inaccurate at the time the certificate was recorded; that is, at the time of
birth”); see also, e.g., Rocher, 2016 WL 4131626, at *2 (holding that “a mere request for a change
in gender designation is not evidence supporting such a change”). Though “[n]eologisms like ‘sex
assigned at birth’ and ‘gender identity’” may be “intelligible as theoretical concepts,” they “simply

do not correspond to reality.” 10 State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 242 (Tex. 2024) (Blacklock, J.,
joined by Devine, J., concurring).

This is particularly salient when the statutory reality is such that both driver’s licenses and
birth certificates have included a person’s “sex” since 1936, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6687a,
§ 5(b) (Vernon’s 1936) (driver’s licenses); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4477, R. 47a (Vernon’s 1936)
(birth certificates)—a time preceding the term “gender identity,” 11 which “apparently first
appeared in an academic article in 1964,” Loe, 692 S.W.3d at 240 n.4 (quoting Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 715 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)). Without a statutory definition of “sex,” of
course, “we must consider the term’s original public meaning[] . . . when [the statute was]
enacted.’” VIA Metro. Transit v. Meck, 620 S.W.3d 356, 369 & n.15 (Tex. 2020) (alteration in
original) (quoting Taylor v. Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City of Lubbock,
616 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981)); accord ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012) (same).

It is unreasonable to suggest that the original public meaning of “sex,” in 1936, somehow
included a psycho-social concept that had not yet been invented. To be sure, contemporary
definitions of “sex” leading up to 1936 confirmed the observable, biological reality that had
endured for millennia: “Sex” was commonly understood as “pertaining to the distinctive function
of the male or female in reproduction.” WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1931–32 (1910); accord 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 577 (1933)
(referencing “[e]ither of the two divisions of organic beings distinguished as male and female
respectively”). This remained true even after the concept of “gender identity” revealed itself within
academic discourse. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1976) (defining “sex” as “[t]he property or quality by which organisms are classified according
to their reproductive functions”); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (1972) (defining “sex” as
“either of the two divisions, male or female, into which persons, animals, or plants are divided,
with reference to their reproductive functions”); WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1969) (defining “sex” as “either of two divisions of organisms distinguished
respectively as male or female”). This leaves no question that the term “sex” did not contemplate
a modern concept that neither existed before (nor was commonly recognized after) the governing
statutory framework was conceived.

10
Recent federal guidance likewise confirms that the “sexes are not changeable and are grounded in
fundamental and incontrovertible reality,” explaining “sex” is an “immutable biological classification” that “does not
include the concept of ‘gender identity.’” Exec. Order No. 14,168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615 (Jan. 20, 2025).
11
“Transsexualism,” too, “was introduced in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980 and was replaced in 1994 by ‘gender identity disorder.’
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 784–85 (4th ed. 1994).”
Loe, 692 S.W.3d at 240 n.4. “At the time, it was categorized under ‘sexual and gender identity disorders’” and “[o]nly
in 2013 did ‘gender dysphoria’ replace ‘gender identity disorder’ in the official diagnostic manual. Gender Dysphoria
Diagnosis, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/diversity/education/transgender-and-
gender-nonconforming-patients/gender-dysphoria-diagnosis.” Id.

S U M M A R Y

The “judicial power” endowed to district courts does not
countenance ex parte orders directing state agencies to amend a
person’s biological sex on driver’s licenses or birth certificates. The
underlying proceedings are coram non judice, and the resulting
orders are void. State agencies must immediately correct any
unlawfully altered driver’s licenses or birth certificates that were
changed pursuant to such orders.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSHUA C. FIVESON
Chair, Opinion Committee