Can a Texas district judge over two counties appoint a separate court coordinator for each county?
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This page answers the general question as of 2023. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Texas law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
The Lampasas County Attorney asked how court coordinators work in a judicial district that spans two counties. The 27th Judicial District Court covers Bell and Lampasas counties. Right now one court coordinator handles Bell County matters, while the Lampasas district clerk has long done coordinator-type work for Lampasas. As both counties grow, the judge wants to appoint a second coordinator dedicated to Lampasas under Government Code section 74.101.
On the central question, the AG concluded the statute allows only one coordinator per court. Section 74.101(a) lets a judge "appoint a court coordinator for his court," using the singular, and the AG found nothing authorizing multiple coordinators. Other statutes consistently refer to a single coordinator, and a separate provision (section 74.103) lets a court appoint staff and support personnel "according to the needs in each county," which shows the Legislature knew how to authorize a flexible number of appointments and chose not to do so for coordinators. So a court would likely hold the judge gets one coordinator per court, even across two counties. The practical fix is that the judge can define that one coordinator's duties to cover both counties and add county-specific support staff under section 74.103.
The AG then answered the follow-up questions about process. First, on approval: section 74.101(a) lets the judge appoint a coordinator with no outside approval, but section 74.104 makes the compensation subject to commissioners court approval and funding. Reading those together, only a commissioners court that will actually fund the position has to approve the "position and compensation," because approving the pay is how a county consents to and funds the role. Second, on cost-sharing: because no statute spells out apportionment for a coordinator (unlike court reporters, whose salaries are split by population), and because section 74.104 is built to make the judge and commissioners court set pay by collaboration (as prior opinions KP-0052 and KP-0298 explained), the appointing judge and the funding commissioners courts must collaborate to apportion the cost between the counties as part of the compensation-approval process. Third, on duties: section 74.102 puts the coordinator's duties largely in the appointing judge's hands by local administrative rule, and those duties may cover both counties at the judge's discretion. Fourth, on support staff: a judge appointing staff under section 74.103 must still seek commissioners court approval under Local Government Code section 151.001, though the judge decides how many positions are appropriate and how to structure their duties, including staff dedicated to one county.
What this means for you
If you are a district judge in a multi-county district
Based on this opinion, you can appoint one court coordinator for the court, not one per county. To cover both counties, you can define that coordinator's duties to serve the whole district and add support personnel under section 74.103 tailored to each county's needs, including staff dedicated to a single county. Your local administrative rule is where the coordinator's duties get set.
If you sit on a commissioners court in such a district
You approve and fund the coordinator's compensation, and that approval is also how the position itself gets greenlit, but only the counties that will fund the position need to approve it. Expect to collaborate with the appointing judge to set the coordinator's pay and apportion the cost between the counties; there is no automatic population-based split like the one that applies to court reporters.
If you advise a court or county on staffing
Watch the line between a "court coordinator" under section 74.101 (one per court) and "staff and support personnel" under section 74.103 (flexible by county need). The support-staff route is the way to get county-specific help, but it runs through commissioners court approval under Local Government Code section 151.001. The opinion also notes a court's inherent authority to compel essential staffing exists but is fact-bound and not something the AG resolves in an opinion.
Common questions
Q: Can the judge appoint a separate court coordinator for each county?
A: The AG concluded no. Section 74.101(a) authorizes a single court coordinator per court, even in a multi-county judicial district.
Q: How do you get help for the second county, then?
A: The judge can define the one coordinator's duties to cover both counties and appoint additional staff and support personnel under section 74.103 based on each county's needs, including staff dedicated to one county.
Q: Do both counties have to approve and pay for the coordinator?
A: Only a commissioners court that will fund the position must approve the "position and compensation." The cost is apportioned between the funding counties through collaboration between the judge and the commissioners courts.
Q: Who decides the coordinator's duties?
A: Largely the appointing judge, by local administrative rule under section 74.102. Those duties may cover both counties at the judge's discretion, and no statute requires commissioners court approval of the duties themselves.
Q: Does the judge need approval to hire support staff under section 74.103?
A: Yes. A judge appointing staff or support personnel under section 74.103 must seek commissioners court approval under Local Government Code section 151.001, though the judge sets the number and structure of those positions.
Background and statutory framework
Government Code chapter 74, subchapter E governs court coordinators. Section 74.101(a) lets the local administrative judge and each district or statutory county court judge appoint "a court coordinator for his court." Reading that singular language with the whole statutory scheme, and applying the interpretive rules in City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. 2023), and Hegar v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 652 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2022), the AG found consistent singular references to a coordinator elsewhere (for example sections 24.579(c), 25.0010(e), and 25.0024(a)) and contrasted section 74.103, which authorizes a flexible number of staff "according to the needs in each county." Under the presumption that the Legislature omits words on purpose (In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2021), quoting In re Commitment of Bluitt, 605 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. 2020)), the AG concluded only one coordinator per court is authorized.
On process, section 74.104(a) makes the coordinator's compensation subject to commissioners court approval, and subsection (b) ties approval of the "position and compensation" to the county's obligation to fund it. Because no statute apportions a coordinator's cost the way section 52.054(a) apportions a court reporter's salary by population, and because section 74.104 is designed to make the judge and commissioners court set pay by collaboration (Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0052 (2015), KP-0298 (2020); Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2017)), the AG concluded the judge and the funding commissioners courts must collaborate to apportion the cost. Duties are set by local administrative rule under section 74.102 and may cover both counties. For support staff under section 74.103, harmonizing that provision with Local Government Code section 151.001(a) (Loya v. Hickory Trail Hosp., L.P., 673 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.)), the AG concluded the appointing judge, a "district officer" under article V, section 7(a), must seek commissioners court approval of those positions.
Citations and references
Statutes:
- Tex. Gov't Code § 74.101 — authority to establish a court coordinator system and appoint a coordinator
- Tex. Gov't Code § 74.104 — coordinator compensation subject to commissioners court approval and funding
- Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 151.001 — district officer must apply to commissioners court to appoint assistants
Key cases:
- City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. 2023) — construe text in light of the statute as a whole, giving effect to all words
- In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2021) — Legislature purposefully omits words it does not choose
- Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2017) — split salary authority calls for a collaborative agreement between judge and commissioners court
Source
- Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0453
- Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2023/kp-0453.pdf
Original opinion text
KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
December 13, 2023
The Honorable John K. Greenwood
Lampasas County Attorney
409 South Pecan, Suite 203
Lampasas, Texas 76550
Opinion No. KP-0453
Re: Authority under Government Code chapter 74 of the Judge of a multi-county district to appoint different court coordinators for each county of the district (RQ-0001-AC)
Dear Mr. Greenwood:
You ask several questions about the authority of a district judge in a multi-county judicial district to appoint multiple court coordinators.1 The district court at issue, the 27th Judicial District Court ("Court"), comprises two counties—Bell and Lampasas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 24.129(a) (establishing the composition of the Court); see also Request Letter at 1 (stating that the Court generally sits in Lampasas County "one day a week for a docket and one week per month for jury trials" and sits in Bell County the remainder of the time). As background, you tell us that currently one court coordinator serves the Court. Request Letter at 1. You explain that the court coordinator's "duties are limited to Bell County matters," while the management of the Court's dockets, notices, trial schedules, and other matters for Lampasas County is handled by the Lampasas district clerk. Id. at 1–2. You explain that the Lampasas district clerk has performed the duties of a court coordinator for many years but that "the growth of both counties and their respective dockets" makes it more difficult for the district clerk to manage both sets of duties. Id. at 2. Accordingly, you tell us the judge of the Court seeks to appoint a second court coordinator dedicated to Lampasas County matters pursuant to Government Code section 74.101. Id.
Government Code chapter 74, subchapter E, governs court coordinators. See generally TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.101–.106. Within subchapter E, section 74.101 authorizes the "local administrative judge and each district or statutory county court judge" to "establish a court coordinator system and appoint a court coordinator for his court to improve justice and expedite the processing of cases through the courts." Id. § 74.101(a). You assert that the statute "speaks of the court coordinator in singular terms," suggesting that this wording may limit the court to the appointment of a single court coordinator. Request Letter at 4. Accordingly, you first ask whether the "judge of a multi-county district [may] appoint a different court coordinator for each county within the district" or whether the district judge is "limited to appointing one coordinator for the entire district, supplemented by assistants, staff and support personnel depending on the needs of each county." Id. at 1.
Subsection 74.101(a) authorizes the appointment of a single court coordinator per court, even in a multi-county judicial district.
In matters of statutory interpretation, a court's objective "is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Hegar v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 652 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 514 (Tex. 2020)). Courts "interpret statutes by looking to their plain language and construing the text in light of the statute as a whole." City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d 813, 821 (Tex. 2023). Courts also "give effect to all the statute's words without treating any language as surplusage, if possible." Id. Subsection 74.101(a) authorizes each of the specified judges to "appoint a court coordinator for his court . . . ." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.101(a) (emphasis added). The question is whether the Legislature intended this language to limit the judge to appointing a single court coordinator, even in a multi-county judicial district.
The plain language of the statute authorizes a single court coordinator per court. See id. We find no authority for multiple court coordinators elsewhere in the statutes. Instead, in examining the statutory framework governing district and statutory county courts (whose judges are authorized by subsection 74.101(a) to appoint a court coordinator), we find consistent references to a single court coordinator rather than multiple court coordinators. See, e.g., id. §§ 24.579(c) (specifying, among other things, the entity that pays the salary and expenses "related to . . . the court coordinator appointed for [the 435th District Court] under Section 74.101" (emphasis added)), 25.0010(e) (authorizing a statutory county court judge to appoint necessary personnel, "including a court coordinator" (emphasis added)), 25.0024(a) (requiring a statutory probate court judge to hire, among others, "a court coordinator" (emphasis added)). The consistent reference to court coordinators in the singular suggests that the Legislature intended an overall court management structure utilizing one court coordinator per court.
Another provision within chapter 74, section 74.103, supports this conclusion. That provision authorizes a court to "appoint appropriate staff and support personnel according to the needs in each county," demonstrating that the Legislature knows how to authorize a discretionary number of appointments based on individual county needs. Id. § 74.103.2 The lack of similar language regarding court coordinators indicates the Legislature's affirmative decision not to authorize multiple appointments in that context. See In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 158–59 (Tex. 2021) (recognizing that when interpreting a statute, a court will "presume the Legislature chose the statute's language with care, purposefully choosing each word, while purposefully omitting words not chosen" (quoting In re Commitment of Bluitt, 605 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Tex. 2020))). Thus, a court would likely conclude that subsection 74.101(a) authorizes the appointment of a single court coordinator per court, even in a multi-county judicial district.3 As we will discuss, however, the determination of the court coordinator's duties and the supplementation of that role with additional staff may provide flexibility for serving multi-county judicial districts.
In a multi-county judicial district, only the counties that will fund the court coordinator must approve the position and compensation.
Assuming this result, your next set of questions asks about the process required to appoint, determine compensation for, fund, and assign the duties of a court coordinator position in a multi-county judicial district. Request Letter at 3. As an initial matter, we note that no statute details a step-by-step process to address these matters where multiple counties are involved. Despite the lack of statutory guidance, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the existence of multi-county judicial districts when it enacted the court coordinator appointment process in sections 74.101 and 74.104. See Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009) (stating the presumption that "lawmakers enact statutes with complete knowledge of existing law"); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 24.129(a) ("The 27th Judicial District is composed of Bell and Lampasas counties."), 24.129(c) (setting the Court term dates in the respective counties).
Your first question about the multi-county process asks whether both counties in the judicial district at issue are "required to approve the position and compensation . . . ." Request Letter at 3. Subsection 74.101(a), standing alone, authorizes the judge to appoint a court coordinator with no approval requirement by another body. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.101(a). In contrast, subsection 74.104(a) authorizes the appointing judge to determine a reasonable compensation for the court coordinator but expressly makes that determination "subject to approval of the commissioners court." Id. § 74.104(a). Subsection 74.104(b) then states in relevant part that "[u]pon approval by the commissioners court of the position and compensation, the commissioners court of the county shall provide the necessary funding through the county's budget process." Id. § 74.104(b) (emphases added). These provisions must be construed together as part of the larger statutory framework. See Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d at 821. The Legislature's decision to make court coordinator compensation, but not appointment, expressly subject to commissioners court approval likely means that the reference in subsection 74.104(b) to approval "of the position and compensation" is merely a recognition that funding is essential to actualize the position. In other words, the commissioners court necessarily consents to the position's existence when it approves the proposed compensation and obligates itself to provide funding through the budget process. Had the Legislature meant to require approval of a court coordinator position as a threshold matter, it instead could have made the appointment itself expressly subject to approval. See In re CenterPoint Energy, 629 S.W.3d at 158–59. Thus, in the context of a multi-county judicial district, the compensation for—and by extension, the existence of—a court coordinator position only requires approval in order to obligate a commissioners court to fund the position. Accordingly, a court would likely conclude that only a commissioners court that will fund the court coordinator position must approve the "position and compensation" as referenced in subsection 74.104(b).
In a multi-county judicial district, the appointing judge and respective commissioners courts must collaborate in apportioning the cost of a court coordinator's compensation as part of the overall compensation approval process.
Your next set of questions about multi-county districts ask "[h]ow . . . the costs of a single coordinator [are] shared by the multiple counties" and whether the court coordinator is "required to provide coordination services to all the counties" of the judicial district. Request Letter at 3. Our prior opinions in KP-0052 and KP-0298 are potentially instructive here.
In KP-0052 and KP-0298, this office opined on the respective roles under subsection 74.104(a) of an appointing judge, who determines "reasonable compensation" for a court coordinator, and a commissioners court, by which the compensation is "subject to approval." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.104(a); see Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0052 (2015), KP-0298 (2020). This office concluded that because neither has final authority over compensation, "section 74.104 appears designed to require the judge and the commissioners court to establish a court coordinator's compensation by collaboration." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0052 (2015) at 3, KP-0298 (2020) at 3; see also Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 38 (instructing that when a statute splits salary authority between judges and the commissioners court, the parties should work to "reach a collaborative agreement"). The same principle would likely apply when considering the appointment of a court coordinator in a multi-county judicial district. With this in mind, we consider your questions regarding the apportionment between the counties of compensation, and duties. Request Letter at 3.
Regarding compensation, you point to the existence of legislative guidance for cost sharing in a multi-county judicial district for a court reporter, observing that no such guidance exists for a court coordinator. Id. at 4; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 52.054(a) (generally providing that an official court reporter's salary shall be apportioned among the counties of a district based on population). As previously noted, section 74.104 appears designed to require the judge and the commissioners court to establish a court coordinator's compensation by collaboration. Because the question of compensation in a multi-county judicial district necessarily involves the issue of apportionment among the counties in the district, a court would likely conclude that section 74.104 also requires the cost of a court coordinator's compensation to be apportioned between Lampasas and Bell counties4 by the appointing judge in collaboration with the respective commissioners courts as part of the overall compensation approval process.
A court coordinator's duties are largely determined by the judge of the appointing court and may encompass coordination services to all counties of a multi-county judicial district at the discretion of the judge.
Regarding duties, section 74.102 provides that "courts by local administrative rule shall designate the duties of the court coordinators." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.102(a). By statute, court coordinators must also "cooperate with regional presiding and local administrative judges and state agencies having duties in the area of the operation of the courts" in order "[t]o promote uniform and efficient administration of justice in this state[.]" Id. § 74.102(b); see also id. § 74.101(a) (stating that the authority to appoint a court coordinator is "to improve justice and expedite the processing of cases through the courts"). Thus, the court coordinator's duties are largely determined by the judge of the appointing court and may encompass coordination services to both counties at the discretion of the judge. While no statute requires commissioners court approval of those duties, a commissioners court in a multi-county judicial district may consider such duties in the collaborative process of apportioning the court coordinator's compensation.
A judge appointing staff or support personnel under Government Code section 74.103 must seek commissioners court approval of the position pursuant to Local Government Code section 151.001.
Finally, you ask about the appointment of staff and support personnel pursuant to section 74.103, which provides that "[t]he courts may appoint appropriate staff and support personnel according to the needs in each county." Id. § 74.103; see Request Letter at 3. Specifically, you ask whether an appointing judge must comply with Local Government Code section 151.001 "for authority to make such appointments[.]" Request Letter at 3.
Chapter 151 of the Local Government Code sets forth the general employment authority of a county. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 151.001–.903. Local Government Code subsection 151.001(a) states that "[a] district, county, or precinct officer who requires the services of deputies, assistants, or clerks in the performance of the officer's duties shall apply to the commissioners court of the county in which the officer serves for the authority to appoint the employees." Id. § 151.001(a); see also id. § 151.901 (providing that "[t]he commissioners court of a county may enter an order to employ and provide compensation for secretarial personnel for a district, county, or precinct officer if the court determines that the financial condition of the county and the staff needs of the officer justify doing so").
As we observed in Opinion KP-0298, section 74.103 authorizes the appointment of staff and support personnel but does not address other aspects of their appointment. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0298 (2020) at 4 (concluding that because section 74.103 does not address the compensation of staff and support personnel, the provision must thus be read in the broader context of the commissioners court's general authority to set salaries). In this instance, section 74.103 does not address commissioners court approval of the appointment. But a court will "not give a statute meaning that conflicts with other provisions if [the court] can reasonably harmonize the provisions." Loya v. Hickory Trail Hosp., L.P., 673 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.). In the broader context of the commissioners court's general employment authority, Local Government Code subsection 151.001(a) instructs district officers to apply to the commissioners court for approval to appoint any deputies, assistants, or clerks they may require for the performance of their duties. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 151.001(a). A district judge is a "district officer." See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7(a) (providing that "[t]he State shall be divided into judicial districts, with each district having one or more Judges as may be provided by law or by this Constitution"). Harmonizing these provisions recognizes both the Legislature's grant of authority to the courts to appoint necessary staff or support personnel under section 74.103 and its general grant of authority to the commissioners court to consider and approve the appointment of assistants under Local Government Code subsection 151.001(a). Thus, a court would likely conclude that a judge appointing court coordinator staff or support personnel under Government Code section 74.103 must seek commissioners court approval of the positions pursuant to Local Government Code section 151.001. The appointing judge, however, may determine the number of staff positions that are "appropriate . . . according to the needs in each county" and may structure the duties of such personnel in whatever manner serves the needs of the counties within the judicial district, including the appointment of staff and support personnel dedicated to the management of a specific county within a multi-county judicial district.
1 See Letter from Honorable John K. Greenwood, Lampasas Cnty. Att'y, to Honorable Angela Colmenero, Interim Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1–4 (July 21, 2023) ("Request Letter").
2 Some statutes refer to court coordinators as "staff" or "personnel." See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 25.0010(e) (authorizing a statutory county court judge to appoint "personnel necessary for the operation of the court, including a court coordinator"), 25.0024 (authorizing a statutory probate court judge to appoint, among others, "a court coordinator" and entitling "[c]ourt personnel employed under this section" to salary and benefits), 25.1034(i) (authorizing a Harris County statutory probate court judge to "appoint . . . a court coordinator . . . and other staff necessary for the operation of the courts"). While one could argue that court coordinators are thus "staff" or "personnel" that may be hired in whatever number serves the needs of a particular county, construing section 74.103 in this manner would render subsection 74.101(a) meaningless or superfluous, a result that a court is unlikely to favor. See Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021) ("We give effect to all words of a provision and avoid constructions that would render any part of it meaningless."); San Jacinto River Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. 2021) ("It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous or inoperative." (quoting Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 601 (Tex. 1915))).
3 While you ask only about a district judge's authority to appoint a court coordinator pursuant to Government Code section 74.101, we note that courts also possess inherent authority "derived not from statute but born of the constitutionally mandated separation of powers." Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979)). This may include the "inherent power to require the legislative and executive branches to provide essential staffing and facilities for it to properly perform its judicial functions . . . ." Dist. Judges of 188th Jud. Dist. v. Cnty. Judge Gregg Cnty., 657 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, because of the commissioners court's co-equal legislative discretion regarding the expenditure of funds, the judiciary must "assume the burden of showing" that the staffing sought to be compelled is "essential for the holding of court, the efficient administration of justice, or the performance of its constitutional and statutory duties." In re El Paso Cnty. Comm'rs Ct., 281 S.W.3d 16, 27–28 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.). Such an inquiry is necessarily fact-based and, therefore, inappropriate for the opinion process. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0382 (2021) at 3.
4 This is assuming both counties decide to fund the position.
SUMMARY
Government Code chapter 74, subchapter E, governs court coordinators. A court would likely conclude that subsection 74.101(a) authorizes the appointment of a single court coordinator per court, even in a multi-county judicial district such as the 27th Judicial District Court.
A court would likely conclude that, in the context of a multi-county judicial district, only a commissioners court that will fund the court coordinator position must approve the "position and compensation" of a court coordinator as referenced in subsection 74.104(b).
Because the question of court coordinator compensation in a multi-county judicial district necessarily involves the issue of apportionment among the counties in the district, a court would likely conclude that in such a district, section 74.104 requires the appointing judge and respective commissioners courts to collaborate in apportioning the cost of a court coordinator's compensation as part of the overall compensation approval process.
A court coordinator's duties are largely determined by the judge of the appointing court pursuant to section 74.102 and may encompass coordination services to all counties of a multi-county judicial district at the discretion of the judge.
A court would likely conclude that a judge making an appointment of court coordinator staff or support personnel under section 74.103 must seek commissioners court approval of the positions pursuant to Local Government Code section 151.001.
Very truly yours,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff
D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
AUSTIN KINGHORN
Chair, Opinion Committee
BECKY P. CASARES
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
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