Can a Texas county commissioners court set vehicle rules that apply to the sheriff's cars?

Plain-English summary

District Attorney Wiley McAfee and Llano County Attorney Rebecca Lange asked the AG about a county driver and vehicle policy handbook the Llano County Commissioners Court adopted in January 2016 and then replaced with a new version in April 2016. The handbook was meant to apply to all vehicles operated on county business, including vehicles allocated to the sheriff and other elected officials. Their questions came down to two issues: whether a commissioners court may adopt a county vehicle policy that applies to county officers and employees, including the sheriff's office, and whether the county auditor may examine records and adopt regulations about the use of county vehicles.

On the first issue, the AG laid out the structure of county government. The Texas Constitution gives a commissioners court broad power over county business, including the budget, and that includes deciding which vehicles to allocate to officers like the sheriff. A vehicle allocated to the sheriff remains county property, so the commissioners court keeps authority over it, including general authority to insure county vehicles and to approve their markings. At the same time, the constitution and statutes give independent elected officers, including the sheriff, a sphere of core authority the commissioners court may not interfere with or usurp. The sheriff's core duty is law enforcement as conservator of the peace and keeper of the jail, which includes discretion over how to deploy officers and vehicles, and discipline of deputies. So a commissioners court may not adopt a vehicle policy that unreasonably interferes with or usurps the sheriff's core duties. It can set broad operational guidelines, but the sheriff also may not frustrate the commissioners court's budgetary responsibilities.

The AG declined to grade the handbook clause by clause. It explained that when a sheriff's office policy and a county policy conflict, deciding which prevails requires analyzing the specific subject of the policies under the facts and the law to see who holds final policymaking authority. That kind of fact-bound, policy-construing analysis is not something an AG opinion does; it is for the commissioners court to determine in the first instance, subject to court review. Whether a given vehicle policy may apply to the sheriff's office depends on whether the policy is within the commissioners court's authority and, if so, whether it usurps or unreasonably interferes with the sheriff's constitutional or statutory duties.

On the second issue, the AG explained that a county auditor, though not elected, has substantial independent administrative duties. The auditor has general oversight of the books and records of county officers who handle county money or property, a right of continual access to records about county financial matters, and a duty to see to strict enforcement of the laws governing county finances. The auditor may impose reasonable reporting requirements in aid of those fiscal duties, and may examine records about county property like vehicles, not just money. But the auditor's authority is limited to what is necessary for the auditor's job: the auditor may not reach records unrelated to county finances, may not divest an officer of reasonable control over records, and its enforcement role is confined to laws governing county finances. So whether the auditor may impose a vehicle-use requirement depends on whether the requirement is reasonably necessary to the auditor's duties and does not usurp or unreasonably interfere with another officer's constitutional or statutory duties.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

The district attorney and county attorney (as the opinion described it): The opinion answered the legal framework but declined the item-by-item review they sought. It set out the test, that a commissioners court vehicle policy applies to the sheriff only so far as it does not unreasonably interfere with the sheriff's core duties, and left application of that test to the specific policies for the commissioners court and, if challenged, the courts.

The commissioners court (as the opinion described it): The opinion confirmed the commissioners court owns the vehicles and holds budgetary authority over them, and may set broad operational guidelines, but described the limit: it may not unreasonably interfere with or usurp the sheriff's deployment of officers and vehicles or discipline of deputies.

The sheriff (as the opinion described it): The opinion described the sheriff's protected sphere of core constitutional and statutory duties, while noting the sheriff likewise may not frustrate the commissioners court's budgetary responsibilities, such as by refusing to turn in an old vehicle.

The county auditor (as the opinion described it): The opinion explained the auditor may examine vehicle records and impose requirements only in aid of the auditor's fiscal examination and reporting duties, and only so far as those requirements do not unreasonably interfere with another officer's duties.

Common questions

Can the commissioners court make the sheriff follow a county vehicle policy?
As the opinion described it, yes, to a point. Because the vehicles are county property and the commissioners court controls the budget, it can adopt vehicle policies that apply to the sheriff's office, but only so far as they do not unreasonably interfere with or usurp the sheriff's core constitutional and statutory duties.

What can't the county tell the sheriff to do?
The opinion said the commissioners court may not interfere with the sheriff's core duties, including the discretion to deploy law enforcement officers and vehicles and to discipline deputies. A policy that micromanages how the sheriff uses the fleet would cross the line.

Why wouldn't the AG just say whether the handbook was legal?
The opinion explained that deciding which policy prevails when the sheriff's rules and the county's rules conflict requires a fact-specific analysis of the particular subject of each policy. AG opinions do not construe local policies or resolve fact questions; that is for the commissioners court first, subject to court review.

What power does the county auditor have over vehicle use?
Under the opinion, the auditor may access records about the use of county vehicles and impose requirements on other officers, but only in aid of the auditor's duty to examine and report on county finances, and only so far as those requirements do not unreasonably interfere with the officer's duties.

Does the sheriff have to comply with the auditor and the commissioners court?
The opinion described a system of checks and balances. The sheriff has a protected core of duties, but may not frustrate the commissioners court's budget authority or refuse reasonable reporting necessary to the auditor's fiscal duties. Where the lines fall depends on the specific requirement.

Background and statutory framework

A commissioners court has broad power over county business, including the legislative function of setting the county budget and discretion over the county's fiscal operations, plus the implied power to carry out its express duties (Tex. Const. art. V, § 18(b); Comm'rs Ct. of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1997); Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189, 194-95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied); City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. 2003)). Independent elected officers have a sphere of core authority the commissioners court may not usurp, a delicate system of checks and balances, though that exclusive sphere consists only of the officer's core constitutional and statutory duties (Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 350 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. 1961); Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1976, writ dism'd); Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied)).

The sheriff's core duty is enforcing the law as conservator of the peace and keeper of the jail, with the reasonable authority necessary to that end, including discretion over deployment of officers and vehicles and discipline of deputies (Tex. Const. art. V, § 23; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.17; Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 351.041, 85.003(c), (f); Fort Bend Cty. Wrecker Ass'n v. Wright, 39 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, writ dism'd)). Vehicles allocated to the sheriff remain county property, and the commissioners court has general authority to insure them and approve their markings, and a sheriff may also use a vehicle forfeited under chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for official purposes (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.027(a), (c); Tex. Transp. Code §§ 721.004(a), .005(b)(1)(B); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 59.06(b)).

A county auditor has general oversight of the books and records of county officers who handle county money or property, a right of continual access to records concerning county financial matters, and a duty to see to strict enforcement of the laws governing county finances, but the auditor's authority over other officers is limited to what is necessary to the auditor's duties (Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 112.006(a), 112.006(b), 115.001; Comm'rs Ct. of Harris Cty. v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

Citations

Constitutional and statutory provisions:

• Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 18(b), 23
• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 2.17, 59.06(b)
• Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 351.041, 85.003(c), (f), 112.006(a), 112.006(b), 115.001
• Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.027(a), (c)
• Tex. Transp. Code §§ 721.004(a), .005(b)(1)(B)

Texas Attorney General opinions:

• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0003 (2015), GA-0480 (2006), JC-0214 (2000), GA-0158 (2004), GA-0308 (2005), MW-490 (1982), JC-0239 (2000), JM-910 (1988), GA-1018 (2013), JM-1098 (1989), H-1190 (1978), GA-0994 (2013), GA-1002 (2013), JM-1275 (1990), JM-1186 (1990), M-756 (1970), GA-0744 (2009), JM-1074 (1989)
• Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-93-107

Cases:

• Comm'rs Ct. of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1997)
• Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied)
• City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2003)
• Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 350 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1961)
• Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1976, writ dism'd)
• Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied)
• Fort Bend Cty. Wrecker Ass'n v. Wright, 39 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
• Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, writ dism'd)
• Comm'rs Ct. of Harris Cty. v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0111
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2016/kp0111.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from the official PDF. Minor extraction artifacts were corrected; the linked PDF is authoritative.

KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

August 25, 2016

The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee Opinion No. KP-0111
District Attorney
33rd and 424th Judicial Districts Re: Whether a commissioners court may
1701 East Polk Street impose a vehicle policy that regulates the
Burnet, Texas 78611 use, deployment, recording, and tracking of
vehicles used by the sheriff (RQ-0100-KP)
The Honorable Rebecca Lange
Llano County Attorney
801 Ford Street, Room 111
Llano, Texas 78643

Dear Mr. McAfee and Ms. Lange:

    Both of your request letters concern the authority of a commissioners court and the county auditor to adopt and administer a county vehicle policy handbook for county officers and employees who operate Llano County vehicles. [1] The McAfee Brief states that in January 2016, the Llano County Commissioners Court adopted a county driver and vehicle policy handbook "intended to apply to all vehicles operated in the course of Llano County business including vehicles that have been allocated to the Sheriff and other elected officials." McAfee Brief at 2. The Lange Request Letter informs us that the commissioners court repealed the January policy handbook and replaced it with a new policy handbook adopted in April 2016. Lange Request Letter at 1. Collectively, your questions concern two basic issues: (1) whether a commissioners court may adopt a county vehicle policy regulating the use of county vehicles that applies to county officers and employees, including the sheriff and employees of the sheriff's office; and (2) whether the county auditor may access and examine county records and adopt regulations concerning county employees and elected officials' use of county vehicles. McAfee Request Letter at 1; McAfee Brief at 3-5; Lange Request Letter at 2.

    With respect to the first issue, the Texas Constitution grants a commissioners court "such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution" or the Legislature. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18(b). A commissioners court is a "county's principal governing body," and its "powers and duties ... include aspects of legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial functions." Comm'rs Ct. of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1997). A commissioners court's responsibility for county business and to make the county's budget is a legislative function, and the commissioners court has broad discretion to oversee the county's fiscal operations and policies. Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189, 194-95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). Duties expressly assigned to the commissioners court include the implied authority to exercise powers necessary to accomplish those duties. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. 2003).

    At the same time, the constitution and statutes grant other independent, elected county officers a sphere of county authority "within which the Commissioners Court may not interfere or usurp." Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 350 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. 1961). This allocation of the county's authority to the commissioners court and to other county officers creates a "delicate system of checks and balances." Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1976, writ dism'd). The limitation on a commissioners court's powers with respect to other elected county officials derives from "the policy that elected officers ... discharge the public trust and carry the responsibility for the proper discharge of that trust." Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied). However, an elected county official's exclusive sphere of authority consists only of the officer's core duties under the Texas Constitution and statutes. See Griffin, 266 S.W.3d at 197.

    The constitution and statutes define the sphere of authority of a county sheriff. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 23; see generally Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0003 (2015) (discussing sheriff's constitutional and statutory powers). The sheriff's foremost responsibility is to enforce the law within the county as conservator of the peace and keeper of the county jail. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.17; TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 351.041. The sheriff's law enforcement authority implicitly includes "reasonable authority necessary to attain the end result." Fort Bend Cty. Wrecker Ass'n v. Wright, 39 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

    The commissioners court and the sheriff both possess authority concerning the county vehicles allocated to the sheriff, and to some degree, their respective spheres of authority intersect. The commissioners court's authority with respect to county vehicles derives primarily from its budgetary discretion to determine the vehicles and other equipment to be allocated to county officers such as the sheriff. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0480 (2006) at 2 (observing that "patrol vehicles allocated to a sheriff by a commissioners court are tools to be used by the sheriff to perform the sheriff's law enforcement duties"); JC-0214 (2000) at 2 ("The principal power of the commissioners court with respect to other county officers like the sheriff is the power of the purse strings."). A county vehicle allocated to a county officer or employee remains county property, and therefore the commissioners court's authority with respect to the county vehicle continues after the vehicle has been allocated to the sheriff. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0158 (2004) at 4 ("The sheriff's vehicles belong to the county, which acts through its commissioners court."); GA-0308 (2005) at 2-3 (determining that, in particular circumstances, a commissioners court may reduce the number of vehicles allocated to the sheriff). [2]

    In addition to a commissioners court's general fiscal authority, various statutes provide specific authority to commissioners courts concerning aspects of county vehicle ownership and use. For example, a commissioners court possesses general authority to provide insurance for county-owned vehicles. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.027(a), (c) (generally authorizing governmental units to purchase insurance but limiting its authority to require an employee to purchase liability insurance as a condition of employment); see generally Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. MW-490 (1982) (determining that counties with a population of less than 1.4 million have the authority but not the duty to purchase liability insurance for county motor vehicles). And the commissioners court has general authority to approve markings on county vehicles, consistent with statutory regulations. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 721.004(a), .005(b)(1)(B); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0158 (2004) at 4 (stating that "the commissioners court exercises ultimate authority over the content, design, or placement of any particular decal").

    However, a commissioners court's oversight authority does not permit it to interfere with or usurp the sheriff's authority to use the vehicles, personnel, and other resources that have been allocated to the sheriff to perform the duties of that office. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0480 (2006) at 4. In particular, a commissioners court generally may not interfere with the sheriff's responsibility to deploy law enforcement officers and vehicles. See Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, writ dism'd) (determining that the sheriff's "decisions as to the deployment of law enforcement officers within the county are left to his discretion and judgment since this matter is not specifically prescribed by law"); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0214 (2000) at 5 (determining that a commissioners court does not possess the authority to "micro-manage [the sheriff's] deployment of the fleet of cars placed at his disposal"). Disciplining deputies also falls within the sheriff's sphere of authority, regardless of whether a county vehicle is involved. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 85.003(c), (f) ("a deputy serves at the pleasure of the sheriff" with certain limitations). Thus, a commissioners court may not adopt a county vehicle policy that unreasonably interferes with or usurps the sheriff's authority to use the vehicles, personnel, and other resources allocated to the sheriff to perform the duties of that office. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0239 (2000) at 4 (stating that "[a] commissioners court that adopts a policy to keep employees from following their supervising county official's instructions [might] unlawfully interfere in the official's sphere of authority").

    Just as the commissioners court may not usurp or unreasonably interfere with the sheriff's core constitutional and statutory duties, however, the sheriff may not frustrate the commissioners court in the performance of its responsibilities. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JC-0214 (2001) at 6-7 (determining that a sheriff may not interfere with the commissioners court's budgetary authority by not turning in an old vehicle); JM-910 (1988) at 10 (determining that county officers were required to comply with requirements of a county personnel policies manual "so long as those requirements do not interfere with the proper operation of the other constitutional or statutory county ... offices"). In particular matters, a commissioners court may establish broad operational guidelines provided they do not unreasonably interfere with the performance of an independent officer's official duties. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-1018 (2013) at 2-3 (commissioners court may establish reasonable office use policy); JM-1098 (1989) at 2 (determining that whether a commissioners court may promulgate smoking regulations in county jail depends on particular facts); H-1190 (1978) at 2-3 (determining that a commissioners court may provide broad operational guidelines applicable to a jail).

    Both request letters ask about the commissioners court's authority to adopt the specific policies in the original and subsequent county driver and vehicle policy handbooks. McAfee Request Letter at 1; McAfee Brief at 3-5; Lange Request Letter at 1. We are unable to provide you with an item-by-item review of either handbook. In Attorney General Opinion GA-0994, this office observed that in the event the sheriff's office policy and the commissioners court's county policy conflict, determining which policy prevails "would require an analysis of the specific subject of the policies to determine whether, under the facts and applicable law, the sheriff or the commissioners court possesses final policymaking authority." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0994 (2013) at 2 n.2. Such an analysis is not within the scope of an attorney general opinion because this office does not construe county ordinances or policies or resolve fact questions, which are matters for the commissioners court to determine in the first instance, subject to judicial review. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1098 (1989) at 2-3 (declining to answer whether the commissioners court's broad operational guidelines prevail over the sheriff's rules concerning the operation of the jail); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-93-107 at 1 ("It is not within the purview of this office to construe local governmental bodies' personnel manuals[.]"). Ultimately, whether a particular county vehicle policy may apply to the sheriff's office depends on (1) whether the policy is within the authority of the commissioners court and, if so, (2) whether the policy usurps or unreasonably interferes with the performance of the sheriff's constitutional or statutory duties. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1018 (2013) at 2-3.

    Ms. Lange also asks whether a county auditor possesses the authority to access and examine county records and adopt and enforce regulations "to ensure" county vehicles are used for "legitimate public purposes" and "to protect the county against legal claims and excessive or improper use of county equipment." Lange Request Letter at 2. While not elected, a county auditor nevertheless possesses "an impressive array of independent administrative duties and discretionary powers." Comm'rs Ct. of Harris Cty. v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Like other county officials, county auditors have the powers the law expressly grants and the implied powers necessary to perform the powers expressly granted. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1002 (2013) at 1. The Local Government Code grants the auditor "general oversight of the books and records of a county, district, or state officer authorized or required by law to receive or collect money or other property that is intended for the use of the county or that belongs to the county." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 112.006(a). The auditor possesses a right of "continual access" to all records of officers concerning county financial matters. Id. § 115.001. The county auditor's oversight duties authorize the auditor to examine an officer's records concerning not only county money but also county property. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1002 (2013) at 2. The auditor must "see to the strict enforcement of the law governing county finances." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 112.006(b). The auditor may impose reasonable reporting requirements on county officers in aid of the auditor's fiscal examination and reporting duties. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1275 (1990) at 2-3.

    A county auditor's authority to impose requirements on other county officers is limited to that necessary to the performance of the auditor's duties, however. A county auditor may not access records of a county officer that do not pertain to the auditor's duty to investigate and report on county financial matters. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1186 (1990) at 4-5 (determining that county auditor could not require a constable to provide a monthly record of civil papers received and served when no fee was involved). Also, a county auditor may not exercise the right of access to an officer's records in a manner that divests the officer of reasonable control over the records. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1002 (2013) at 2-3. Finally, a county auditor's authority to "see to the strict enforcement of the law" is limited to laws governing county finances. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 112.006(b); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JM-1186 (1990) at 4 ("[I]t is not generally within the province of the auditor to ensure that county officers and employees are complying with the duties of their office or employment imposed on them by law where such efforts are not necessary to the accomplishment of the auditor's statutory duties."); M-756 (1970) at 5 (county auditor not entitled to examine a sheriff's records to determine whether prisoners were released before their sentences ended). Thus, whether a county auditor may impose a requirement on other county officers depends on whether the requirement (1) is reasonably necessary to the performance of an auditor's duties and (2) does not usurp or unreasonably interfere with the performance of the officer's constitutional or statutory duties. [3] See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0744 (2009) at 3 (determining that an auditor may not adopt requirements that would usurp or unreasonably interfere with another county officer's statutory authority).

                                  SUMMARY

                  A commissioners court may enact county vehicle policies applicable to a vehicle used by the sheriff only to the extent that it does not unreasonably interfere with the sheriff's constitutional or statutory duties. Whether the sheriff or the commissioners court possesses final policymaking authority with respect to a specific vehicle policy will depend on specific facts and applicable law, the determination of which is not within the scope of an attorney general opinion.

                  A county auditor may access county records pertaining to the use of county vehicles and impose vehicle use requirements on other county officers only in aid of the auditor's fiscal examination and reporting duties and only to the extent the requirements do not unreasonably interfere with the officer's constitutional or statutory duties.

                                         Very truly yours,

                                        KEN PAXTON
                                        Attorney General of Texas

JEFFREY C. MATEER
First Assistant Attorney General

BRANTLEY STARR
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
Chair, Opinion Committee

WILLIAM A. HILL
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

[1] See generally Letter & Brief from Honorable Wiley B. McAfee, Dist. Att'y, 33rd and 424th Jud. Dists. to Tex. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 26, 2016), ("McAfee Request Letter" & "McAfee Brief," respectively); Letter from Honorable Rebecca Lange, Llano Cty. Att'y, to Tex. Att'y Gen. (June 14, 2016) ("Lange Request Letter") https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinion/requests-for-opinion-rqs.

[2] While a commissioners court assigns county vehicles to the sheriff, a sheriff may also receive a vehicle forfeited to the state under chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "to maintain, repair, use, and operate [the vehicle] for official purposes," pursuant to an agreement between the attorney representing the state and the law enforcement agency. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.06(b). Article 59.06 assigns duties to a commissioners court but does not address formulation of policy concerning such a vehicle. See id. art. 59.06(b-1) (commissioners court may revoke a sheriff's loan of a forfeited vehicle to another agency or district), (d) (forfeiture proceeds budget to be submitted to the commissioners court). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a sheriff's use of a forfeited vehicle could implicate matters within the commissioners court's authority, particularly if such use impacts the fiscal operations of the county.

[3] A commissioners court may assign appropriate responsibilities to a county auditor in addition to the auditor's statutory duties. See Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80-81 (determining that a commissioners court could delegate to a county auditor "a function that the Legislature has not exclusively delegated to ... another appropriate county official"). However, a commissioners court may not grant a county auditor authority that usurps or unreasonably interferes with another independent officer's performance of constitutional or statutory duties. See id. at 82; Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1074 (1989) at 4 (determining that a commissioners court cannot confer on an agent or officer authority the court itself cannot exercise).