Can the mayor of a small Texas village veto an ordinance passed by the board of aldermen?

Texas AG Opinion JM-527: Village Mayor's Veto

Plain-English summary

A small Texas village had a mayor who kept vetoing ordinances and resolutions passed by the board of aldermen, using a statute (article 997) that lets some city mayors veto what the council does. The Brazoria County criminal district attorney asked the Attorney General whether the mayor actually had that power. The village was organized under chapter 11 of Title 28, the part of the old civil statutes governing the smallest general-law municipalities, and it had never adopted the fuller set of city powers in chapters 1 through 10. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

The Attorney General said the mayor had no veto power. Texas general-law cities can do only what the statutes expressly or impliedly let them do, and a power is implied only when it is reasonably incident to an express power or essential to the city's purposes. Article 997, the veto statute, sits in chapter 3 of Title 28, not in chapter 11. Chapter 11 lets a village adopt chapters 1 through 10, but this village had not done so, and nothing in chapter 11 itself gives the mayor a veto, expressly or by implication. So the mayor of a chapter 11 village could not use article 997 to veto the board of aldermen's ordinances and resolutions. The AG noted this matched an earlier opinion, MW-394 (1981), which said a chapter 11 town could not borrow other chapter 3 articles without first following the adoption steps in article 961. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Title 28 of the old Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes governing municipal corporations has since been recodified into the Texas Local Government Code, so the article numbers cited here (997, 961, and others) no longer match current law. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify the current Local Government Code provisions before relying on any specific article mentioned here.

Common questions

Does the mayor of a Texas general-law village have veto power over the board of aldermen?

Not automatically. The AG concluded that a village organized under chapter 11 of Title 28 that has not adopted chapters 1 through 10 has no statute giving its mayor a veto. Article 997, which grants a veto, is in chapter 3, and chapter 11 itself contains no veto provision. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

Why couldn't the mayor rely on article 997?

Because article 997 is located in chapter 3 of Title 28, and the village had not adopted the chapter 1 through 10 provisions that would bring it in. The AG explained that general-law cities exercise only the powers the law expressly or impliedly gives them, and nothing expressly or impliedly extended article 997's veto to a chapter 11 village. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

Could the village get a mayoral veto if it wanted one?

The opinion did not lay out a procedure, but it noted that chapter 11 authorizes a village to adopt chapters 1 through 10 (article 961), and that an earlier opinion (MW-394) held a chapter 11 town could not use other chapter 3 articles without following the prerequisites of article 961. The AG's holding here was limited to a village that had not taken that step. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

Background and statutory framework

Texas municipal corporations fall into three categories. Cities organized under chapters 1 through 10 or chapter 11 of Title 28, V.T.C.S., are "general law" cities, as distinguished from "home rule" cities organized under article XI, section 5, of the Texas Constitution (see Attorney General Opinion JM-169 (1984)). Villages incorporated under chapter 11 have more limited powers than those organized under chapters 1 through 10.

The governing principle is that general-law cities can exercise only those powers expressly or impliedly conferred by law, with a power implied only when it is reasonably incident to an express power or essential to the object and purposes of the corporation (City of West Lake Hills v. Westwood Legal Defense Fund). Article 997, V.T.C.S., which authorizes a mayor to veto resolutions and ordinances adopted by a city council, sits in chapter 3 of Title 28. Chapter 11 authorizes a village to adopt chapters 1 through 10 (article 961), but the village here had not done so, and chapter 11 contains no provision expressly or impliedly giving the mayor a veto. The AG's conclusion tracked Attorney General Opinion MW-394 (1981), which held that a chapter 11 town could not use articles 998, 999, and 999a of chapter 3 without following the prerequisites of article 961.

Citations and references

The opinion cited the following authorities. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

Constitutional and statutory provisions:

• Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 (home-rule cities)
• V.T.C.S. Title 28, chapters 1-10, chapter 11, and chapter 3
• V.T.C.S. arts. 1133-1153
• V.T.C.S. art. 997 (mayoral veto), art. 961 (chapter 11 adoption of chapters 1-10), arts. 998, 999, 999a

Cases:

• City of West Lake Hills v. Westwood Legal Defense Fund, 598 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1980, no writ)

Attorney General opinions:

• Attorney General Opinion JM-169 (1984)
• Attorney General Opinion MW-394 (1981)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-0527
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0527.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF text layer. Minor OCR errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

July 22, 1986

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General

Honorable Jim Mapel
Criminal District Attorney
Brazoria County Courthouse
Angleton, Texas 77515

Opinion No. JM-527

Re: Whether the mayor of a chapter 11 village is authorized to veto an ordinance or resolution adopted by the board of aldermen

Dear Mr. Mapel:

You have asked whether the mayor of a village organized pursuant to chapter 11 of Title 28, V.T.C.S., has the authority to "veto" an ordinance or resolution adopted by the board of aldermen. See V.T.C.S. arts. 1133-1153. You inform us that the village in question was organized pursuant to chapter 11, and that the board of aldermen of the village has never adopted the provisions of chapter 1 through 10 of Title 28, V.T.C.S. You also inform us that in the past the mayor of the village has utilized article 997, V.T.C.S., to "veto" ordinances or resolutions duly adopted by the board of aldermen.

As a preliminary matter, municipal corporations within this state are one of three types. Those municipal corporations organized under chapters 1 through 10 or chapter 11 of Title 28 are "general law cities" as distinguished from "home rule" cities that are organized pursuant to article XI, section 5, of the Texas Constitution. See Attorney General Opinion JM-169 (1984). Villages incorporated under chapter 11 have powers more limited than those organized under chapters 1 through 10. Id.

General law cities can exercise only those powers that are expressly or impliedly conferred by law, and such power will be implied only when such power is reasonably incident to those expressly granted or is essential to the object and purposes of the corporation. See City of West Lake Hills v. Westwood Legal Defense Fund, 598 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1980, no writ). Article 997, V.T.C.S., which authorizes a mayor to "veto" resolutions and ordinances adopted by a city council, is found in chapter 3 of Title 28. See V.T.C.S. art. 997.

Although chapter 11 authorizes the adoption of chapters 1 through 10, see V.T.C.S. art. 961, you have informed us that the village in question has not done so. Article 997 does not authorize the mayor of a chapter 11 village to "veto" resolutions and ordinances adopted by the board of aldermen. Chapter 11 of Title 28 is devoid of any provision which expressly or impliedly confers such "veto" power on the mayor. Consequently, we conclude that the mayor of a village organized pursuant to chapter 11 of Title 28, V.T.C.S., does not have the authority to "veto" resolutions and ordinances adopted by the board of aldermen. This conclusion is consistent with Attorney General Opinion MW-394 (1981). In that opinion, this office held that a town organized pursuant to chapter 11 of Title 28, V.T.C.S., cannot utilize articles 998, 999, 999a of chapter 3 of Title 28, without following the prerequisites of article 961. See generally Attorney General Opinion MW-394 (1981).

SUMMARY

The mayor of a village organized pursuant to chapter 11 of Title 28, V.T.C.S., may not utilize article 997, V.T.C.S., to "veto" resolutions and ordinances adopted by the board of aldermen.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Tony Guillory
Assistant Attorney General