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TX JM-514 July 10, 1986

Can a Texas city make a school district apply for a use permit and follow zoning rules to turn a school building into administrative offices?

Short answer: Yes, within reason. JM-514 concluded a city may require a school district to comply with reasonable zoning ordinances and a specific-use permit process to convert a school facility into an administrative office, as long as the requirements are reasonably related to health, safety, and welfare and do not amount to totally excluding the district's facility.

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This page answers the general question as of 1986. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Texas law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1986
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Texas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Texas courts but are not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. The opinion dates from 1986; consult current statutes and case law before relying on it.
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Texas AG Opinion JM-514: City Use Permits and School District Facilities

Plain-English summary

The chairman of the House State Affairs Committee asked, on facts from Beaumont, whether a city may require a school district to comply with city zoning ordinances and apply for a specific-use permit in order to convert a school facility into an administrative office. Beaumont ISD had operated an elementary school in a residential area and in 1985 voted to turn it into a central administrative office building. The city granted the permit but insisted the district follow the permit procedures; the district objected that the city had no authority over it. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

JM-514 concluded the district had to comply with reasonable city requirements. The opinion rejected the idea that a school district's property is state property exempt from municipal zoning. Under Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, school buildings of an independent school district are subject to the city's reasonable ordinances. Under Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset Valley, a city cannot totally exclude schools from areas zoned residential, but the reasonableness of a district's own action was not at issue there. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

The AG noted that Beaumont had not excluded the administrative facility at all; it had granted the permit. Its permit procedures were designed to protect the health, safety, property, and welfare of affected people, and Groves made clear a district's facilities are subject to reasonable city ordinances. So long as a city's specific-use permit procedures do not try to totally exclude a district's facilities and are reasonably related to protecting community health, safety, and welfare, the district must comply. The city may not, however, use zoning powers unreasonably to prohibit the conversion. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Texas law on the interaction between municipal zoning and school district facilities has continued to develop since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice, and verify current law before relying on any rule mentioned here.

Common questions

Is a school district exempt from city zoning because it is a government entity?

No. JM-514 explained that a school district's property is not classified as state property, so it is not exempt from municipal zoning the way state property is. The Texas Supreme Court in the Groves case rejected the argument that a district's independent-political-subdivision status put it beyond the city's police power. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Can a city flatly prohibit a school district from using a building a certain way?

No. The opinion read Groves, Sunset Valley, and City of Addison v. Dallas Independent School District together to mean a city cannot totally exclude or foreclose a legitimate school district use. A city cannot, for example, simply declare a legitimate district action a nuisance per se to prohibit it. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Then what can the city require?

Compliance with reasonable ordinances. A specific-use permit process is allowed as long as it does not attempt to totally exclude the district's facilities and is reasonably related to protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the community. If those conditions are met, the district must go through the permit process and meet its conditions. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Does it matter that the building is offices rather than classrooms?

The opinion noted that school facilities traditionally get special treatment in zoning law, and the earlier Supreme Court cases involved actual school buildings rather than administrative offices. Even so, it concluded the same principle applies: the city cannot exclude the district's administrative offices, but it can require reasonable permit compliance. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Background and statutory framework

The opinion is grounded almost entirely in Texas Supreme Court case law rather than a specific statute. Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves held that school buildings of an independent school district are subject to reasonable city ordinances, because a district's property is not state property exempt from municipal zoning. Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset Valley held that a city could not, through zoning, totally prohibit locating school facilities within its boundaries, while noting that the reasonableness of the district's own action was not before the court. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

For the specific question of converting a school to administrative offices, the AG drew on City of Addison v. Dallas Independent School District, a nuisance case in which a city tried to block a district's bus-parking use. Although that case turned on nuisance law rather than zoning, the AG read it, together with Groves and Sunset Valley, to stand for the proposition that a city cannot totally foreclose a district's use. The through-line is a balance: districts must follow reasonable, health-and-safety-related city requirements, but cities cannot wield zoning to exclude district facilities outright. The opinion also cited Attorney General Opinions JM-180 (1984) and JM-117 (1983) (the latter for the rule that state property is exempt from municipal zoning). Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Citations and references

The opinion cited the following authorities. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0514.pdf

Cases:

  • Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d 330, 333-34 (Tex. 1964)
  • Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670, 671-72 (Tex. 1973)
  • City of Addison v. Dallas Independent School District, 632 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

The opinion also cited Attorney General Opinions JM-180 (1984) and JM-117 (1983).

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF via OCR. Minor OCR errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

July 10, 1986

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General

Honorable Mark W. Stiles
Chairman
State Affairs Committee
Texas House of Representatives
P. O. Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78769

Opinion No. JM-514

Re: Whether a city may require a school district to apply for a special building use permit in order to convert a school facility to an administrative facility

Dear Representative Stiles:

You inform us that the Beaumont Independent School District has operated an elementary school in a residential area of the city of Beaumont. In June, 1985, however, the board of trustees voted to convert that facility to a central administrative office building for the school district. In order to obtain the requisite building permits for the conversion, the city required that the school district comply with city zoning ordinances requiring it to make application for a specific use permit.

Although the school board complied with all city fire and building codes, it objected to the city's requirements on the ground that the city has no authority to require the school district to follow the specific use application process. The city has, in fact, granted the required permit, but asserts that it has the authority to require the school district to comply with the permit procedures and conditions. In that regard you ask whether a municipality may require a school district to comply with city zoning ordinances requiring the school district to apply for a specific use permit in order to convert a school facility to an administrative facility.

The issue as presented is governed by the principles of Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1964), and Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973); see also Attorney General Opinion JM-180 (1984). In Groves, supra, the issue was whether a school district had to comply with the city's building regulations in constructing a school facility on school property located within the boundaries of a home rule city. The school district in Groves contended that the city could not exercise its police power against the school district because a school district is an independent political subdivision of the state. State property is exempt from municipal zoning. Attorney General Opinion JM-117 (1983). The Texas Supreme Court rejected the school district's contention because a school district's property should not be classified as state property. 376 S.W.2d at 333. The court held that school buildings of an independent school district are subject to reasonable ordinances of the city. 376 S.W.2d at 334.

The Texas Supreme Court in Sunset Valley considered whether the city could, through its zoning regulations, wholly prohibit the location of school facilities within its boundaries. 502 S.W.2d at 671. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the school district's action was not before it. 502 S.W.2d at 672. Relying on well-established principles of zoning law, the court held that the city could not totally exclude schools from areas zoned residential. Id. In both Groves and Sunset Valley, the proposed buildings were school facilities, not administrative offices. School facilities traditionally receive special treatment in zoning law. See 502 S.W.2d at 672.

At issue here is the transformation of a school facility into an administrative office building. The court of appeals in City of Addison v. Dallas Independent School District, 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), held that a city cannot declare a legitimate school district action to be a nuisance per se and thereby prohibit the action. At issue was the school district's use of its property for a bus-parking facility. The court left open the possibility that the activity could become a nuisance by reason of its locality, surroundings, or manner of operation. 632 S.W.2d at 774. In essence, the court held that the city could not totally foreclose this use of the property simply by declaring the use to be a nuisance per se. Although the case is not directly applicable because it turned on nuisance law rather than on zoning law, we believe that, when it is read with Groves and Sunset Valley, it stands for the proposition that the city cannot exclude the school district's administrative offices.

As indicated, however, the city has not totally excluded the school district's administrative facility. The city has, in fact, granted the specific use permit. The city's permit procedure and conditions are designed to provide a reasonable means to assure that the health, safety, property and welfare of the people affected by the proposed land use are protected. The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Groves makes it clear that a school district's facilities are subject to reasonable city ordinances. 376 S.W.2d at 334. As the court stated: "To hold otherwise would be to leave a hiatus in regulation necessary to the health and safety of the community." Id.

Accordingly, so long as a city's specific use permit procedures and conditions do not attempt to totally exclude a school district's facilities and are reasonably related to the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the community, the school district must comply with those procedures and conditions.

SUMMARY

The Beaumont Independent School District must comply with reasonable city of Beaumont's zoning ordinances in order to convert a classroom facility to an administrative facility. The city may not, however, use its zoning powers unreasonably to prohibit the conversion.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Tony Guillory and Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorneys General

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