Could a Texas county limit domestic-relations-office services by income or charge an income-based application fee?

Texas AG Opinion JM-249: Income Limits for County Services

Plain-English summary

Tarrant County asked whether its commissioners court or board of district judges could limit domestic-relations-office services to residents below an income ceiling. It also asked whether the county could use "a graduated application fee" based on the income of people seeking services. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

JM-249 answered both questions in the negative. It concluded that article 5142a-1 did not authorize the commissioners court to limit services to people below a county-selected income amount. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

The opinion also concluded that the statute did not authorize an income-based application-fee schedule. It said that power could not be "necessarily implied from those powers which are explicitly conferred." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

JM-249 rejected an inherent-power argument because a county had only powers conferred expressly or by necessary implication by the constitution and statutes. It found neither kind of authority for the proposed income restrictions. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could Tarrant County restrict domestic-relations-office services to lower-income residents?

No. JM-249 said article 5142a-1 conferred no authority to limit the class of service recipients to people whose income did not exceed a figure selected by the commissioners court. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Could the county charge a larger application fee to a higher-income applicant?

No. The opinion said the statute did not authorize "such a graduated fee schedule." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

What fees did article 5142a-1 expressly allow?

Section 6 listed a filing fee up to $5 for specified family-law suits, attorney fees and court costs in enforcement matters, an application fee for people seeking services, and a monthly charge up to $1 for each managing and possessory conservator receiving services. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Why did the county hospital district's income-based practice not supply authority?

The request pointed to section 14 of article 4494n, which permitted a hospital-district scheme. JM-249 said article 5142a-1 itself did not confer comparable authority on the domestic relations office. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Background and statutory framework

Article 5142a-1 provided for a county domestic relations office, described its duties and services, allowed certain courts to direct child-support payments to the office, and governed fees and costs. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Section 6 allowed the commissioners court to authorize listed fees and required those fees to be deposited in a special domestic relations office fund used for statutory services. It also allowed county general funds to support the services. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

JM-249 found the statute unambiguous and read its fee list according to the words the legislature used, without adding an income ceiling or graduated schedule. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Citations and references

• Railroad Commission of Texas v. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. 1968), quoting Texas Highway Commission v. El Paso Building & Construction Trades Council, 234 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1950), supplied the opinion's plain-meaning rule. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf
• Col-Tex Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 240 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. 1951), appeared in the opinion's conclusion that the statute was not ambiguous. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf
• Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. 1948), supported the rule that a county has only powers conferred expressly or by necessary implication. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-0249
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0249.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain. The linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

December 13, 1984

Honorable Tim Curry
Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County Courthouse
Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Opinion No. JM-249

Re: Whether a commissioners court or a board of district judges may limit the services of a county domestic relations office to persons having a particular income

Dear Mr. Curry:

You ask us the following two questions:

1. Does the Tarrant County Commissioners Court or the board of district judges of Tarrant County have the authority under article 5142a-1, V.T.C.S., to limit the services of the Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office to those citizens having an income which does not exceed a dollar figure to be determined by the commissioners court?

2. In the alternative, may a graduated application fee be implemented which would be based on the income of those persons seeking to utilize the services of the Domestic Relations Office, as is the practice of the Tarrant County Hospital District?

We answer both of your questions in the negative.

Article 5142a-1, V.T.C.S., provides for the establishment by commissioners court of a Domestic Relations Office administered either by the juvenile board of a county or multicounty area or otherwise provided by the commissioners court. V.T.C.S. art. 5142a-1, §§1, 2(a). The statute further provides for the continued operation of already existing domestic relations offices. Sections 3 and 4 of the act set forth the duties imposed upon, and additional services provided by, such domestic relations offices. Section 5 permits certain courts to order that court ordered payment for child support be made to the domestic relations office. Section 6 governs the fees and costs which may be charged. Section 6 of article 5142a-1, V.T.C.S., provides the following:

Sec. 6. (a) If a domestic relations office is in existence prior to or is established pursuant to this article, the commissioners court may authorize one or more of the following:

(1) A fee not to exceed $5 on the filing in the county of each suit for the dissolution of a marriage and each suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Such fee shall be paid as other costs in the suit and collected by the clerk of the court.

(2) The assessment of attorney fees and court costs incurred by the domestic relations office in enforcing an order for child support or visitation against the party found to be in violation of the order.

(3) An application fee to be charged to persons seeking services from the domestic relations office.

(4) A monthly charge of up to $1 per month to be paid by each managing and possessory conservator for whom services are provided by the domestic relations office.

(b) Fees authorized under this article shall be sent to the county treasurer or other officer performing the duties of the county treasurer for deposit in a special fund entitled the "domestic relations office fund." This fund shall be administered by the domestic relations office and shall be used to provide services by the domestic relations office as provided in this article. County general funds may also be used to provide these services.

We must interpret a statute in a way which expresses

only the will of the makers of the law, not forced nor strained, but simply such as the words of the law in their plain sense fairly sanction and will clearly sustain.

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. 1968) (quoting Texas Highway Commission v. El Paso Building & Construction Trades Council, 234 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1950)). Indeed in this instance, the statute itself is not ambiguous. See Col-Tex Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 240 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. 1951). No authority is conferred upon a commissioners court to limit the class of persons receiving services from a domestic relations office to persons whose income does not exceed a dollar figure to be determined by the commissioners court.

Nor do we accept the argument that a commissioners court possesses the inherent power to limit in such fashion the class of persons who may avail themselves of the services offered by a domestic relations office. A county has only those powers which are conferred either expressly or by necessary implication by the constitution and statutes of this state. Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. 1948). Such authority has neither expressly nor by necessary implication been conferred upon commissioners courts. Accordingly, we answer your question in the negative.

In your second question, you ask whether the commissioners court may adopt a graduated application fee schedule based upon the income of those persons seeking the services. You refer us to such a scheme permitted county hospital districts by section 14 of article 4494n, V.T.C.S. For the same reasons discussed in answer to your first question, we answer your second question in the negative. The statute simply does not authorize the implementation of such a graduated fee schedule, and the conferring of such authority cannot be necessarily implied from those powers which are explicitly conferred.

SUMMARY

1. A commissioners court is not authorized by article 5142a-1, V.T.C.S., to limit the class of persons who receive services offered by a Domestic Relations Office to persons whose income does not exceed a dollar figure determined by the commissioners court.

2. A commissioners court is not authorized by article 5142a-1, V.T.C.S., to adopt a graduated fee schedule based on the income of persons seeking to utilize the services of a Domestic Relations Office.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Jim Moellinger
Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE

Rick Gilpin, Chairman
Colin Carl
Susan Garrison
Tony Guillory
Jim Moellinger
Jennifer Riggs
Nancy Sutton
Bruce Youngblood