Who could serve on a Texas county bail bond board, and when did a corporate surety become in default on a forfeited bond?

Texas AG Opinion JM-232: Bail Board Members and Default

Plain-English summary

Harris County asked three questions about bail-bond-board membership and corporate-surety default. The questions concerned a licensed individual who transferred an assumed-name business, a licensed corporation serving through a representative, and the time a forfeiture judgment placed a corporation in default. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

First, JM-232 concluded that an individual did not forfeit board membership by transferring the assumed-name business if the person "continues to be a licensed bondsman in Harris County." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Second, the opinion concluded that a licensed corporation could be a board member if elected by other county licensees. The corporation was the member; its representative was "an authorized agent of the corporation" and did not need to be a licensed bondsman personally. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

JM-232 expressly declined the constitutional issue, stating, "We do not address" whether a corporation could constitutionally be elected and serve on that kind of board. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Third, the opinion concluded that a corporate surety became in default when the final scire facias judgment was "entered in the minutes of the court." It distinguished a judgment's entry by the clerk from its rendition or signature by the judge. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did transferring an assumed-name bail-bond business remove the licensee from the board?

No, not on the facts presented. JM-232 said the individual did not forfeit the seat because the statutory requirement was that the elected member remain "a licensed bondsman who is licensed in the county." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Could a licensed corporation sit on a county bail bond board?

JM-232 said yes, if elected by other county licensees. The opinion treated a licensed corporation as "a legal entity which may be a member" under the act. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Did the corporation's representative need an individual bondsman license?

No under the opinion's statutory analysis. The representative acted as the corporation's agent and was "not a member of the board in his individual capacity." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Did the opinion decide whether corporate board membership was constitutional?

No. JM-232 stated that it did not address "whether it is constitutionally permissible" for a corporation to be elected and serve. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

When did a corporate surety become in default?

The opinion said default began when the clerk entered the final scire facias judgment "in the minutes of the court," and lasted until the judgment was satisfied or set aside. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Background and statutory framework

Article 2372p-3 required the elected bondsman member to be "a licensed bondsman, licensed in the county." The act defined a person as an individual or corporation and defined a bondsman by the compensated surety activity performed. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Section 14A barred a corporation in default on five or more bonds in a county from acting as a bondsman there. It said default began "from the time the trial court enters its final judgment on the scire facias." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

JM-232 used Burrell v. Cornelius to explain that judges render judgments while clerks "enter them on the minutes." That distinction controlled the meaning of entered in the default statute. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Citations and references

• Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 663 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ), appeared in the discussion of when a final scire facias judgment is entered. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf
• Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978), supplied the quoted distinction among rendition, signature, and entry of judgment. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf
• Coleman v. Zapp, Bostwick v. Bucklin, and Polis v. Alford appeared within the passage quoted from Burrell. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf
• Kittrell v. Fuller, 281 S.W. 575, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1926, writ ref'd), supplied a quoted explanation that rendition was judicial while entry was a ministerial act of the clerk. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf
• Morris v. State supported the conclusion that entered referred to "the ministerial act of the clerk in entering judgment in the minutes." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf
• The PDF cites Abarca v. Roadstar Corp. of America, 657 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). The citation lookup did not resolve that reporter citation, so it is preserved below but omitted from the case metadata. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-0232
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0232.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain. The linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

November 14, 1984

Honorable Mike Driscoll
Harris County Attorney
1001 Preston, Suite 634
Houston, Texas 77002

Opinion No. JM-232

Re: Eligibility for membership on the Harris County Bail Bond Board and related questions

Dear Mr. Driscoll:

You inquire about eligibility for membership on the Harris County Bail Bond Board and the finality of a judgment against a corporate surety. You first ask:

Does an individual who is licensed as a bail bondsman by the Harris County Bail Bond Board and who is authorized to do business under an assumed name, forfeit his position as a member of the bail bond board by conveying to a third party the business under which assumed name he has previously operated, even though he is presently sitting as a member of the bail bond board as a licensed bondsman, and is maintaining a bail bond license, and whose bonds the sheriff currently accepts, and whose collateral is still valid?

An individual described by your question does not forfeit his position as a member of the bail bond board by conveying to a third party a business which the individual previously operated under an assumed name. Article 2372p-3, section 5(b)(6), V.T.C.S., provides the following:

(b) The County Bail Bond Board shall be composed of the following persons:

. . . .

(6) a licensed bondsman, licensed in the county, elected by other county licensees. . . . (Emphasis added).

The statute's only requirement for a member elected by other county licensees is that the member be a licensed bondsman who is licensed in the county. The individual in question continues to be a licensed bondsman in Harris County. Cf. Attorney General Opinion MW-321 (1981).

Your second question inquires whether a corporation, if elected to the board, may designate as its representative a person who is not himself a licensed bondsman. Article 2372p-3 defines the relevant terms:

Sec. 2. In this Act:

(1) "Person" means an individual or corporation.

(2) "Bondsman" means any person who for hire or for any compensation deposits any cash or bonds or other securities, or executes as surety or cosurety any bond for other persons. (Emphasis added).

Under these definitions, a bondsman is an individual or corporation which for hire or for any compensation deposits any cash, bonds, or other securities or executes as surety or cosurety any bond for other persons. See also V.T.C.S. art. 2372p-3, section 14A(a) (referring to a corporation as a "bail bondsman"). Sections 3(b) and 3(d) of the act contain separate requirements of eligibility for the licensing of individuals and the licensing of corporations.

Since a corporation is a person, it is a bondsman, and if a corporation is licensed in the county, we believe it is a licensed bondsman within the meaning of section 5(b)(6). Thus, we conclude that a corporation licensed under the act is a legal entity which may be a member of a county bail bond board if elected by other county licensees.

The Texas Business Corporation Act directs the board of directors to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, art. 2.31. The act also provides that the officers and agents of a corporation shall perform duties in the management of the corporation which are provided in the bylaws or which are determined and delegated by the board of directors in accordance with the bylaws. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, art. 2.42.B. Since a corporation functions through its directors, officers, and agents, we believe a corporation serving as a member of a bail bond board does so through the individual who represents it on the board. The corporation is the board member. Its representative on the board is an authorized agent of the corporation and is not a member of the board in his individual capacity. We do not address the question of whether it is constitutionally permissible for a corporation to be elected and serve as a member of a board of this nature. With this caveat, we conclude that a licensed corporation may be a licensed bondsman and a member of a bail bond board and that such a corporation's authorized agent is the representative of the corporation and not the member of the board, regardless of whether the agent representing the corporation is a licensed bondsman.

Your third question asks when a judgment against a corporate surety becomes final. Article 22.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the following:

When a forfeiture has been declared upon a bond, the court or clerk shall docket the case upon the scire facias or upon the civil docket, in the name of the State of Texas, as plaintiff, and the principal and his sureties, if any, as defendants; and the proceedings had therein shall be governed by the same rules governing other civil suits.

Article 22.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads, in part, as follows:

When, upon a trial of the issues presented, no sufficient cause is shown for the failure of the principal to appear, the judgment shall be made final against him and his sureties, if any, for the amount in which they are respectively bound. . . .

Section 14A of article 2372p-3, however, includes the following requirements:

(a) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a corporation that is in default on five or more bail bonds in a county may not act as a bail bondsman in that county.

(b) The clerk of the court in which the corporation is in default on a bail bond shall deliver a written notice of the default to the sheriff, chief of police, or other appropriate peace officer in the county in which the bond is forfeited.

(c) A corporation is considered in default on a bail bond from the time the trial court enters its final judgment on the scire facias until the judgment is satisfied or set aside. (Emphasis added).

Also, section 2 of article 17.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that

any person who has signed as a surety on a bail bond and is in default thereon shall thereafter be disqualified to sign as a surety so long as he is in default on said bond. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court wherein such surety is in default on a bail bond, to notify in writing the sheriff, chief of police, or other peace officer, of such default. A surety shall be deemed in default from the time the trial court enters its final judgment on the scire facias until such judgment is satisfied or set aside. (Emphasis added).

You indicate that your third question results from the fact that a corporate surety that is in default on five or more bail bonds in a county may not act as a bail bondsman in that county. Hence, we believe that the issue is not when the scire facias judgment against the surety is final but when the court enters its final judgment on the scire facias. See Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 663 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).

In 1978, the Texas Supreme Court said:

Judges render judgment; clerks enter them on the minutes. Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912). The entry of a judgment is the clerk's record in the minutes of the court. "Entered" is synonymous with neither "Signed" nor "Rendered." Bostwick v. Bucklin, 144 Tex. 375, 190 S.W.2d 818 (1945); Polis v. Alford, 267 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1954, no writ). The day a judge signs an order is frequently, perhaps usually, after the time the judgment is rendered and surely it is before the judgment is entered.

Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978). A recent court of appeals case, holding that a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially announced, quoted from Kittrell v. Fuller, 281 S.W. 575, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1926, writ ref'd), as follows:

There is a distinction between the rendition of the judgment and its entry in the minutes of the Court; each representing a distinct occurrence of fact in the trial of a case. The judgment is that which the Court pronounces, and its rendition is the judicial act by which the Court settles and declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue. The entry of the judgment is the ministerial act performed by the Clerk of the Court, and by means of which permanent evidence of the judicial act in rendering the judgment is made a record of the Court.

Abarca v. Roadstar Corp. of America, 657 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). See also Morris v. State, 539 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Rosenfield v. Hull, 304 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1957, writ dism'd).

Morris v. State, supra at 216, held that the term "entered" in article 5547-39a, V.T.C.S., providing that a person ordered committed could appeal an order of temporary hospitalization by filing written notice of appeal within five days after the "order is entered," referred to the ministerial act of the clerk in entering judgment in the minutes. Likewise, we conclude that the statutes providing that a corporate surety is in default on a bail bond "from the time the trial court enters its final judgment on the scire facias" refers to the time at which the judgment is entered in the minutes of the court. Of course, once a trial court enters a final judgment of default, a corporate surety can presumably suspend the execution of the judgment pending appeal by filing a supercedeas bond. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(a). Like any judgment, a judgment revoking a license may be suspended when a supercedeas bond is filed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(e). Setting bond is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus. Continental Oil Co. v. Lesher, 500 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ). An appellate court can review the bond for excessiveness. Tex. R. Civ. P. 365(b).

SUMMARY

An individual who continues to be a licensed bondsman in the county does not forfeit his position as a member of the bail bond board by conveying to a third party a business which the individual previously operated under an assumed name. A corporation licensed in the county is a licensed bondsman which may be a member of a county bail bond board if elected by other county licensees. Such a corporation's representative on the board is an agent of the corporation and is not a member of the board in his individual capacity. A corporate surety is in default on a bail bond from the time of entry of the scire facias judgment in the minutes of the court.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Nancy Sutton
Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE

Rick Gilpin, Chairman
Colin Carl
Susan Garrison
Tony Guillory
Jim Moellinger
Nancy Sutton