Does a hospital district's own enabling law or the general Tax Code control what a county tax collector gets paid for collecting the district's taxes?

Texas AG Opinion JM-1132: Hospital District Tax Collection Fee, Enabling Act vs. Tax Code

Plain-English summary

The Reagan County Hospital District's 1977 enabling act set out a specific formula for how much the county tax assessor-collector could be paid for assessing and collecting the district's ad valorem taxes: up to 2% of the amount collected, but no more than $5,000 in any calendar year. The Property Tax Code, enacted two years later in 1979, set a different standard for the same kind of arrangement: a "reasonable fee" that cannot exceed the county's actual costs, with no percentage cap and no dollar cap. The Reagan County Attorney asked which provision actually governed.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1990. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.

Common questions

Which rule controlled: the hospital district's own fee cap, or the Tax Code's actual-cost standard?
The Attorney General concluded that Tax Code section 6.27(b) controlled, not the hospital district's 1977 fee formula.

Why would a later general law override an earlier special law written specifically for this district?
Normally a special law prevails over a conflicting general law unless the legislature clearly intended the general law to prevail. The opinion found that intent here: the bill enacting the Property Tax Code expressly repealed all other laws in conflict with it, and a separate Tax Code provision applied the code to taxing units created under earlier laws unless a later law said otherwise.

Did that mean the county could charge whatever it wanted?
No. The Tax Code standard is not unlimited: the fee still has to be "reasonable" and cannot exceed the county's actual costs of assessing and collecting the district's taxes.

Background and statutory framework

The hospital district was created in 1977 by special law (Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 29, at 45), which included its own fee provision in section 16(b): the county assessor-collector could deduct up to 2% of amounts collected as a fee, capped at $5,000 per calendar year, later amended in 1987 (Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1034, § 6, at 3489). Two years after the district's enabling act, the legislature adopted the Property Tax Code in 1979 (Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 841, § 6, at 2330), which included section 6.27(b): a county tax assessor-collector who collects for another taxing unit is entitled to a reasonable fee not to exceed actual costs.

The opinion applied the rule that a special law prevails over a later general law only absent clear legislative intent that the general law prevail (Gov't Code § 311.026), and found that intent present here in two places: the Property Tax Code's own repealer clause, and Tax Code section 1.02, which applies the code to taxing units created by earlier laws unless a law enacted after the code expressly opts out. Because the hospital district's enabling act had no such express opt-out, the Property Tax Code's actual-cost standard was found to supersede the district's fixed percentage-and-dollar cap.

Citations

Statutory provisions:

• TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 1.02, 6.27(b)
• TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.026
• Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 29, at 45 (hospital district enabling act)
• Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1034, § 6, at 3489
• Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 841, § 6, at 2330 (Property Tax Code enactment)

Prior Attorney General opinions cited: JM-996 (calculating "actual costs"); JM-655 (1987) (reasonable fee not to exceed actual costs); MW-388 (1981).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-1132
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1990/jm1132.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

January 4, 1990

Honorable Mark Edwards
Reagan County Attorney
P. O. Box 924
Big Lake, Texas 76932

Opinion No. JM-1132

Re: Compensation of the tax assessor-collector for the Reagan County Hospital District (RQ-1877)

Dear Mr. Edwards:

You ask what statute governs payment for the tax assessor-collector for the Reagan Hospital District of Reagan County. You state that there is a conflict between the provisions set out in the hospital district's enabling statute, Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 29, at 45, and the applicable provisions of the Tax Code.

Section 16 of the hospital district's enabling act governs the collection of taxes. Hospital district taxes are to be assessed and collected by the county tax assessor-collector unless the directors of the hospital district elect to appoint a tax assessor-collector. We understand from your brief that you are asking about payment for the services of the county tax assessor-collector rather than for an assessor-collector appointed by the board.

The two provisions in question are section 16(b) of the hospital district's enabling statute and section 6.27(b) of the Tax Code. Section 16(b) of the hospital district's enabling statute provides in part:

The assessor-collector of taxes [for the county] shall charge and deduct from payments to the hospital district an amount as fees for assessing and collecting the taxes, at a rate of up to two percent of the amounts collected, as determined by the board of directors, but the amount paid may not exceed $5,000 in any one calendar year. The fees shall be deposited in the officers salary fund of the county and reported as fees of office of the county tax assessor-collector.

Section 6.27(b) of the Tax Code[1] provides that a county tax assessor-collector who collects taxes for a taxing unit other than the county is entitled to a reasonable fee, not to exceed actual costs. Those two provisions conflict because they set different standards for determining the amount of payment for the services of the county tax assessor-collector.

Section 6.27(b) of the Tax Code is a more general provision than section 16(b) of the hospital district's enabling act, and section 6.27(b) is the later-enacted of the two statutes.[2] A special law prevails over a later general law on the same subject unless the manifest intent is that the general law prevail. Gov't Code § 311.026; see City of Lake Dallas v. ___, 555 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (must be clear evidence of legislative intent that general law prevail); see also Attorney General Opinion MW-388 (1981).

This is an instance in which the legislative intent is explicit that the general law should prevail. Section 6(b) of the bill enacting the Property Tax Code (Title 1 of the Tax Code) provided:

All other general, local, and special laws in conflict with this Act are repealed to the extent of the conflict, and the failure expressly to repeal or amend any law in conflict with this Act is not evidence of a legislative intent that the law not be repealed.

Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 841, § 6, at 2330. Also, section 1.02 of the Tax Code provides in part:

This title [the Property Tax Code] applies to a taxing unit that is created by or pursuant to any general, special, or local law enacted before or after the enactment of this title unless a law enacted after enactment of this title by or pursuant to which the taxing unit is created expressly provides that this title does not apply.

Those provisions leave no doubt that the legislature intended the provisions of the Property Tax Code to supersede conflicting provisions applicable to taxing units such as a hospital district. Therefore, we conclude that section 6.27(b) governs payment for the county tax assessor-collector for assessing and collecting taxes for the hospital district. See generally Attorney General Opinions JM-996 (calculating "actual costs"); JM-655 (1987) (reasonable fee not to exceed actual costs).

SUMMARY

The county tax assessor-collector for Reagan County is to be compensated for assessing and collecting taxes for the Reagan Hospital District in accordance with section 6.27(b) of the Tax Code.

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Sarah Woelk
Assistant Attorney General

[1] Section 6.27 is in Title 1 of the Tax Code. Title 1 is also called the Property Tax Code.

[2] The hospital district's enabling statute was adopted in 1977. Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 29, at 45; see also Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1034, § 6, at 3489 (deleting part of section 16(c) dealing with board of equalization). Section 6.27 of the Tax Code was adopted in 1979 as part of the bill enacting the Property Tax Code (Title 1 of the Tax Code). Section 6.27 was not derived from a statute of equally broad application. Rather, it was derived from several provisions in the Water Code. Derivation Table, 1 V.T.C.A. Tax Code, at XXVII (1982).