Must a Texas corporation give a discharged employee a written statement of the true reason for termination?

Griffin still controlled the Texas employee service-letter statute

Plain-English summary

Section 3 of article 5196 required a corporation, after a written demand, to give a discharged employee a true written statement of the cause of discharge within ten days. It also required a statement that an employee left voluntarily when that employee made a written demand. The forfeiture provision was article 5199, which imposed a one-thousand-dollar penalty for violations.

The Texas Supreme Court had held the service-letter provision unconstitutional in Saint Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Griffin in 1914. Griffin relied on federal freedom-of-contract and equal-protection grounds and on article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, reasoning that freedom of speech included a corporation's liberty to remain silent.

Later federal decisions displaced Griffin's federal constitutional analysis, and JM-623 had concluded that the statute did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection. JM-1116 therefore focused on Griffin's separate Texas free-speech holding.

The Attorney General predicted that, if the Texas Supreme Court reconsidered the issue, it would uphold the service-letter law under article I, section 8. Later cases recognized broader police power, allowed regulation of corporate commercial speech, upheld required disclosures, and rejected an absolute constitutional right to remain silent.

That prediction did not make the statute enforceable. An Attorney General opinion could not overrule the Texas Supreme Court. Until the court overruled Griffin, section 3 of article 5196 remained unconstitutional. The Legislature remained free to amend the statute, and JM-1116 modified JM-623's discussion of the Texas free-speech issue.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1989. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion said for affected groups in 1989

Corporate employers

The opinion predicted that compelled truthful service letters could fit within the state's police power and modern commercial-speech doctrine. It nevertheless treated Griffin as controlling, so the existing statute remained judicially invalid.

Discharged and departing employees

The statute promised a written explanation of discharge or confirmation of voluntary departure after a written demand. The opinion did not treat that promise as enforceable while Griffin remained unoverruled.

Courts and state officials

Only a court could overrule Griffin. The Attorney General could analyze later law and predict a new result, but could not validate a statute the Texas Supreme Court had held unconstitutional.

Legislature

Griffin did not prevent amendment of article 5196. The opinion said a statute held unconstitutional remained available for legislative amendment even though it could not be enforced as written.

Common questions

What was a service letter under article 5196?

It was a written statement from a corporation giving the true cause of an employee's discharge, or stating that an employee departed voluntarily, supplied within ten days after a written demand.

Why had Griffin invalidated the law?

Griffin treated compelled service letters as interfering with freedom of contract, federal equal protection, and the Texas constitutional freedom to speak or remain silent.

Why did the Attorney General think a later court might uphold it?

Later decisions recognized broader state police power, protected employees and consumers through economic regulation, permitted required corporate disclosures, and held that speech rights were not absolute when conduct and public welfare were involved.

Did JM-1116 make the statute enforceable?

No. It expressly said Griffin remained controlling until the Texas Supreme Court overruled it. The opinion's prediction could not substitute for a judicial holding.

Could the Legislature amend an unconstitutional statute?

Yes. The opinion said a judicially invalid statute remained on the books for amendment unless expressly repealed.

Background and legal framework

Griffin had described article I, section 8 as protecting both expression and silence. The opinion reviewed service-letter cases from other states, including Missouri decisions upholding a similar statute after the United States Supreme Court rejected the federal constitutional objections.

Texas cases after Griffin used a broader understanding of police power. They upheld laws protecting employee interests, preventing deceptive commercial communications, regulating conduct carried out through speech, requiring disclosures, and compelling evidence in judicial proceedings.

The opinion emphasized the difference between predicting that precedent would be overruled and having authority to overrule it. Attorney General opinions did not have the force of law and could not displace a controlling judicial decision.

Key citations

• Tex. Const. art. I, § 8
• V.T.C.S. art. 5196, § 3
• V.T.C.S. art. 5199
• Saint Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Griffin, 171 S.W. 703 (Tex. 1914)
• Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922)
• Hanch v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Corp., 615 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1981) (en banc)
• Rimmer v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 656 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1981)
• First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
• Town of Ascarate v. Villalobos, 223 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1949)
• Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
• Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
• Storrie v. Cortes, 38 S.W. 154 (Tex. 1896)
• Ex parte Hensley, 285 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-1116
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1989/jm1116.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Obvious character-level OCR errors have been corrected where verified against the scan and reporter citations; minor errors may remain. The linked PDF is authoritative.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS

JIM MATTOX November 14, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Honorable Bob McFarland Opinion No. JM-1116

Chairman

Criminal Justice Committee Re: Validity under article I,
Texas State Senate section 8, of the Texas Consti-
P. O. Box 12068 tution of article 5196, V.T.C.S.,
Austin, Texas 78711 which requires a corporation to

give a discharged employee a
statement of reasons for the
termination (RQ-1747)

Dear Senator McFarland:

You request an opinion on the constitutionality of
section 3 of article 5196, V.T.C.S. This provision reads in
part:

Either or any of the following acts shall
constitute discrimination against persons
seeking employment:

3. Where any corporation... doing
   business in this state... shall have
   discharged an employee and such employee
   demands a statement in writing of the cause
   of his discharge, and such corporation...
   fails to furnish a true statement of the
   same to such discharged employee, within ten
   days after such demand, or .. . shall fail,
   within ten days after written demand for the
   same, to furnish to any employee voluntarily
   leaving the service of such corporation or
   receiver, a statement in writing that such
   employee did leave such service voluntarily.

Statutes of this nature are commonly called "service
letter statutes." Annot., 24 A.L.R.4th 1115 (1983).
Violators of the Texas service letter statute are subject to
forfeiting one thousand dollars to the state. V.T.C.S. art.
5199. It is the duty of the attorney general, or the

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 2 (JM-1116)

district or county attorney under the direction of the
attorney general, to sue to recover the forfeiture. Id. A
private cause of action for damages may exist under service

letter statutes. See Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.W.
387, 393 (Mo. 1917).

The Texas service letter act was adopted in 1907 and
codified as section 3, article 594 of the 1911 code. See
Acts 1907, 30th Leg., ch. 67, § 1, at 142. Its title read
as follows: "An Act to define and prohibit discrimination
against persons seeking employment, and to prescribe
penalties for the breach of said act." In 1910 the court of
civil appeals identified the purpose of this provision as
follows:

The statute here under discussion was passed
to meet and remedy an evil that had grown
up in this state among railway and other
corporations to control their employees. It
seems that a custom had grown up among
railway companies not to employ an applicant
for a position until he gave the name of his
last employer, and then write to such company
for the cause of the applicant’s discharge,
if he was discharged, or his cause for
leaving such former employer. If the
information was not satisfactory to the
proposed employer, he would refuse to employ
the applicant. They could thus prevent the
applicant, by failing to give a true reason
for his discharge or blacklisting him, from
procuring employment in either instance.

Saint Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Hixon, 126 S.W. 338, 341
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, 137 S.W. 343

(Tex. 1911).

In Hixon, the former employee alleged that the corpora-
tion’s service letter did not state the true cause of his
discharge. The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of
$2,500 for the employee against the corporation, rejecting
various arguments for holding the statute unconstitutional.
The supreme court reversed on the ground that the former
employee had failed to establish that statements in the
service letter were untrue. See also Dickinson v. Perry

‘
181 P. 504 (Okla. 1919), aff’d, 259 U.S. 548, 550 (1922);
Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, at 389.

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 3 (JM-1116)

As you point out in your letter, the Texas Supreme
Court held the service letter provision unconstitutional
in Saint Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Griffin, 171 S.W. 703
(Tex. 1914). In Griffin, the court held that article 594,
section 3, of the 1911 code interfered with a corporation’s
right to discharge employees at will without cause, and
accordingly violated the corporation’s freedom of contract
under the United States Constitution. It found that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Griffin case
also held that the service letter requirement violated
article I, section 8, of the Texas Constitution, which
guarantees the freedom of the people to speak, write or

publish their opinions on any subject. The court stated as
follows:

The liberty to write or speak includes the
corresponding right to be silent, and also
the liberty to decline to write. To say that
one can be compelled at the instance of
another party to do what he has the constitu-
tional liberty to do or not is a_ contradic-
tion that is not susceptible of reconcilia-
tion. (Citations omitted.)

Griffin, supra, at 705. The supreme court concluded that
the provision could not be sustained as an exercise of the
police power, stating as follows:

The subject of legislation in this statute
and its various provisions, as stated above,
are purely personal as between the employee
and the corporation, and do not directly
affect the public, in health, safety,
comfort, convenience, or otherwise.

id. at 707.

Within a few years of the Griffin decision, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the Missouri service letter
statute was constitutional, finding that it did not
interfere with the corporation’s freedom to contract,
deprive it of any property or liberty without due process,
or deny it the privileges and immunities of citizens or the
equal protection of the laws. s ° h ’
259 U.S. 530 (1922). "The state with good reason might
regulate the terms and conditions of employment, including
the methods of accepting and dismissing employees, so as to

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Honorable Bob McFarland = Page 4 (JM-1116)

prevent the corporations from producing undue detriment to
the individuals concerned... ." Id. at 545.

In Attorney General Opinion JM-623 (1987), this office
concluded that section 3 of article 5196, V.T.C.S., did not
violate the due process clause or the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Thus, developments in federal constitutional
law since Griffin have shown its reasoning and conclusion on
the federal issues to be incorrect.

The Griffin court’s holding that the service letter
statute violated article I, section 8, of the Texas
Constitution has never been challenged in our court systen.
Attorney General Opinion JM-623 (1987), at 5. In addressing
this aspect of Griffin, Attorney General Opinion JM-623
stated as follows:

Even though we may disagree with this
interpretation, we are not at liberty to
modify or overrule the Texas Supreme Court’s
holding in Griffin. This is especially true
since our legislature and courts have not
done so.

Id. at 6.1

1. In 1929, the legislature reenacted article 594 as
   article 5196, V.T.C.S. Acts 1929, 41st Leg., ch. 245, at
2. The emergency clause stated that "the codifiers of the
   Revised Civil Statutes of Texas of 1925, omitted from the
   definition of discrimination many of the material provisions
   of the former law on that subject as set out in Article 594
   of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1911... ." A prior
   epinion of this office stated, without mentioning any
   federal cases, that the codifiers of the 1925 statutes had
   obviously omitted article 594 because it had been declared
   unconstitutional in Griffin. Attorney General Opinion
   0-3562 (1941) (overruled by Attorney General Opinion JM-623
   (1987)). However, the legislature’s reenactment of the
   provision omitted from the 1925 code could also mean that
   the legislature was aware of the Prudential case and thought
   that it had overruled the reasoning of Griffin.

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 5 (JM-1116)

It is well established that opinions of the attorney

general do not have the force of law. See, e.g., Travis
County v. Matthews, 235 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin
1951, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Gaynor Const. Co. v. Board of
Trustees, Ector County Indep. School Dist., 233 S.W.2d 472

(Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1950, writ ref’d). As stated in
Attorney General Opinion JM-623, we cannot overrule a
judicial decision. We can, however, review developments in
the law since Griffin was decided, and attempt to predict
whether the Texas courts, if faced with this issue in the
future, would find that the service letter requirement
violated a corporation’s free speech rights under article I,
section 8, of the Texas Constitution.

In 1914, when the Texas Supreme Court ruled in Griffin,
the First Amendment had not yet been held to be applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, supra, at 542-43. Thus, the court could not have
based its decision about corporate speech rights on the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Instead,
it followed two state cases that found service letter
statutes unconstitutional under the freedom of expression

provisions of their respective constitutions. See Wallace
v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry., 22 S.E. 579 (Ga. 1894); Atchison,
fT. & S. Fe. Ry. v. Brown, 102 P. 459 (Kan. 1909). In

enti n Oe V ek, the United States Supreme

Court commented as follows on this aspect of Griffin and the
Kansas and Georgia cases it relied on:

The cases cited from Georgia, from Kansas,
and from Texas place material dependence upon
provisions of the several state Constitutions
guaranteeing freedom of speech, from which is
deduced as by contrast a right of privacy
called the ‘liberty of silence’; and it seems
to be thought that the relations between a
corporation and its employees and former
employees are a matter of wholly private
concern. But, as we have stated, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision
of the Constitution of the United States
imposes upon the states any restrictions
about ‘freedom of speech’ or the ‘liberty of
silence’ ....

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 6 (JM-1116)

Prudential, supra, at 542-43.2

In a 1983 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri
concluded that the state service letter statute did not
violate corporate rights of free speech under the First
Amendment. Hanch v. K.F.C. Nat’l Management Corp., 615
S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). The court stated:

The statute’s mandate affects corporate
rights of free speech no more than the
plethora of state and federal statutes and
regulations that require corporations to
keep the governments to which they owe
their existence appraised [sic] of their
activities. Few are the cases raising first
amendment challenges to tax, corporate or
securities laws requiring corporations to
speak truthfully. The compulsion to speak
truthfully to a former employee would appear
to be a small price to pay for the benefits
gained by corporations, and their owners, for
the enjoyment of their statutory franchises.

Id. at 36.

The Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals also found the Missouri statute constitutional,
reversing a federal district court decision that found it to
violate the free speech provision of the First Amendment.

Rimmer v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 656 F.2d 323 (8th

2. In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548,
   555 (1922), the United States Supreme Court stated that
   Prudential had overruled the contention that the service

letter statute denied the right of free speech, “upon
the ground that the right did not exist under the state
Constitution in the absolute form in which it was asserted."
It also stated that the "decisions by the Supreme Courts of
Georgia, Kansas, and Texas .. . were disapproved." Id.
This commentary on state court interpretations of state
constitutional provisions is dicta, since the United States
Supreme Court looks to the decisions of a state’s courts to

determine the meaning of its laws. See Clay _v. Sun _ JIns.
Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960). This dicta is nonetheless of

interest because it shows how the United States Supreme
Court thought about the issue before us.

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 7 (JM-1116)

Cir. 1981), rev’g, 495 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D. Mo. 1980). The
court of appeals noted that in First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Supreme Court held that speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment does not lose
that protection simply because its source is a corporation.
The eighth circuit concluded, however, that the First Nat’l
Bank decision did not shield corporations from state
statutes that require them to make truthful statements or
take actions that effectuate legitimate legislative goals.
Rimmer, supra, at 328. "There are numerous statutes that
similarly, and nevertheless constitutionally, restrict the
‘free speech’ rights of corporate employers." Jd, (citing
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)
(1976); Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act, Mo.Ann.Stat.
§ 287.380 (Vernon Supp. 1981)). The statute was adopted to
protect certain economic and social interests and was
properly characterized as economic or social legislation
enacted for the general public welfare. Id. at 328-29. It
did not affect any "fundamental" First Amendment rights.
Id. at 329 (analyzing service letter statute in terms of
equal protection clause and First Amendment of the United
States Constitution).

Texas cases decided more recently than Griffin rely on
a broader conception of the police power than did that case.
The Supreme Court of Texas has stated that "the very
foundation of the police power is the control of private

interests for the public welfare... ." Town of Ascarate
v. Villalobos, 223 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. 1949) (quoting 16
c.J.S. Constitutional Law § 199, at 581). The court has

recognized the validity of legislation that protects
employee rights in disputes with the employer. See
Construction & General Labor Union v. Stephenson, 225 S.W.2d
958 (Tex. 1950) (picketing). The police power authorizes
the adoption of legislation designed to prevent deceitful
communications in a commercial setting. “A state statute
designed to prevent the deception of consumers of particular
goods is recognized as a valid exercise of police power."
Majestic Indus. v. Saint Clair, 537 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Tex.
Civ. App. - Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also
Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (the First
Amendment does not protect intentionally false or misleading
statements made in a commercial context).

Exercises of the police power that involve restraints
on freedom of speech are not for that reason necessarily

invalid. See Allen v. State, 604 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (discussing First Amendment of United States

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 8 (JM-1116)

Constitution). In upholding a provision of the Alcoholic
Beverage Code that prohibited solicitation of drinks by a
beer retailer’s employee, the court of criminal appeals
quoted the United States Supreme Court as follows:

It has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed. . .. Numerous examples
could be cited of communications that are
regulated without offending the First Amend-
ment, such as the exchange of information
about securities, ... corporate proxy
statements, .. . the exchange of price and
production information about competitors,

• . . and employers’ threats of retaliation
  for the labor activities of employees.

Id. at 192 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978)).

The court of criminal appeals quoted the United States
Supreme Court in answering an argument based on the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, not article I,
section 8, of the Texas Constitution. However, decisions of
Texas courts that deal with the Texas constitutional
provision also recognize that permissible regulations of
conduct may sometimes include regulation of speech. our
courts have upheld statutes that require persons to
communicate information or that limit some kinds of
communications, finding them consistent with article I,
section 8, of the Texas Constitution.

In finding that an injunction to prevent untrained
layman from advertising and selling blank will forms did not
violate article I, section 8, of the Texas Constitution, the
court pointed out that constitutional rignts of speech and

publication are not absolute. Palmer v. Unauthorized
Practice Comm. of State Bar, 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.

• Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ). In a given case
  where the public interest is involved, courts may strike a
  balance between fundamental constitutional freedoms and the
  state’s interest in the welfare of its citizens. Id.

The court of criminal appeals has held that a statute

proscribing harassing and threatening telephone calls did
not violate article I, section 8, of the Texas Constitution

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 9 (JM-1116)

or the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Schuster v. State, 450 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)
(applying Penal Code article 476 (1925)).

In another case, an injunction prohibiting a 40 percent
shareholder of a corporation from writing letters to
corporate clients asking for assistance in a liquidation
suit was upheld as not violative of article I, section 8, of
the Texas Constitution. Karamchandani v. Ground Technology,
Inc., 678 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ dism’d). The injunction was granted to prevent inter-
ference to the contractual relationships of the corporation
and interference from private communication. Id.

Finally, a recent decision of the court of criminal
appeals indicates that the free speech clause of the Texas
Constitution does not create an absolute privilege to be
Silent. Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). In a prosecution
for obstructing a public passageway where the key issue was
whether the defendant had chained himself to a doorway
during the protest, the defendant sought to subpoena a
newspaper photographer who had photographed the incident.
The photographer refused to make his photographs available
and was held in contempt. The court held that neither the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution nor
article I, section 8, of the Texas Constitution created a
privilege that would excuse the photographer from testifying
and producing photographs. Id. at 737.

The Texas legislature has enacted numerous’ statutes
that require corporations and others to disclose information
to governmental agencies, to employees, or to shareholders.
See, e.g., V.T.C.S. arts. 5221b-14(b) (employers prohibited
from making false statements or failing to disclose material
fact to prevent payment of unemployment benefits), 5221k,
§ 8.0l(a) (record-keeping and reporting requirement applic-
able to persons under investigation by Texas Human Rights
Commission); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act arts. 2.44 (right of
shareholders to examine corporate books and records), 9.01
(corporation, officers, and director shall answer interroga-
tories propounded by secretary of state to enable him to
determine whether corporation is in compliance with Business
Corporation Act); Agric. Code ch. 125 (duty of certain
employers of agricultural laborers to make information about
their use of toxic chemicals available to employees and
others); Health & Safety Code ch. 502 (employers must make
available to employees information about certain hazardous
chemicals stored or used in the workplace). Thus, a statute

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 10 (JM-1116)

requiring a corporation to disclose information is no longer
the novelty it appeared to be in 1914, when Griffin was
decided.

Based on our review of decisions of the Texas courts
subsequent to Griffin and the cases on service letters from
other states, we believe that the Supreme Court of Texas, if
it were to reconsider section 3 of article 5196, V.T.C.S.,
would find that it did not violate article I, section 8, of
the Texas Constitution. Until the supreme court overturns
its decision in Griffin, however, section 3 of article 5196,
V.T.C.S., will be unconstitutional. Following a judicial
decision that a statute is unconstitutional, the statute
remains on the books unless expressly repealed by the
legislature. 39 Op. [(U.S.] Att’y Gen., 22 (1937). When a
court overrules a prior judicial decision that held a
statute unconstitutional, the statute will be held valid

from its effective date. Storrie v. Cortes, 38 S.W. 154,
158 (Tex. 1896); see also State ex rel. Badgett v. Lee, 22
So.2d 804 (Fla. 1945); Christopher v. Mungen, 55 So. 273
(Fla. 1911). But see Chavers v. Harrell, 166 So. 261 (Fla.

1935) (state may not prosecute for conduct in violation of
statute during time it was held unconstitutional). As we
have already stated, an opinion of the attorney general
cannot overrule a judicial decision, and therefore cannot
validate the service letter statute.

A statute held unconstitutional by the courts does not
cease to exist for the purpose of amendment by the legisla-
ture. Ex parte Hensley, 285 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App.
1956). The Griffin decision does not prevent the legisla-
ture from amending article 5196, V.T.C.S. The legislature
may update this statute or make the changes, if any, it
deems necessary due to the passage of time since its re-
enactment in 1929. Attorney General Opinion JM-623 is
modified with respect to its discussion of article I,
section 8, of the Texas Constitution.

SUMMARY
In Saint Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Griffin,

171 S.W. 703 (Tex. 1914), the Texas Supreme
Court held that section 3 of article 5196,
V.T.C.S., was invalid because it was inconsis-
tent with article I, section 8, of the Texas
Constitution. On the basis of judicial
decisions of Texas courts and the courts of
other jurisdictions, we predict that the Texas

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Honorable Bob McFarland - Page 11 (JM-1116)

Supreme Court, if it again considered this
question, would find section 3 of article
5196, V.T.C.S., consistent with article I,
section 8, of the constitution. Until the
Texas Supreme Court overrules its decision in
Griffin, however, section 3 of article 5196,
V.T.C.S., will be unconstitutional. The

decision in Griffin does not prevent the
legislature from amending section 3 of article
5196, V.T.C.S. Attorney General Opinion
JM-623 (1987) is modified with respect to its
discussion of article I, section 8, of the
Texas Constitution.

Very truly yours,
JIM MATTOX

Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General

p. 5871