When did the tougher teacher career ladder level three requirements take effect in Texas?

Texas AG Opinion JM-1086: When Did the Teacher Career Ladder Change Take Effect?

Plain-English summary

The Commissioner of Education asked the Attorney General to settle the effective date of one section of a 1989 education bill, House Bill 2566, which revised the teacher career ladder (the state system that raised teachers' pay as they moved up performance levels). Section 7 of the bill toughened the standard for reaching level three, requiring "clearly outstanding performance" during the current year and one of the two preceding years, instead of the older "performance exceeding expectations" during three of the preceding four years. The enrolled bill (the official signed version) said the whole act took effect September 1, 1989, except that section 7 took effect September 1, 1990.

The catch was that this appeared to be a drafting error. The conference committee report had actually put the September 1, 1990 delay on section 5 (level one entry), not section 7. A joint letter to the Commissioner from the Speaker, the Lieutenant Governor, and the two education committees explained that the reference to section 7 came in only through an editorial change made while the bill was being enrolled, and suggested the Education Agency could reasonably start applying the section 7 changes on September 1, 1989. The State Board of Education directed the Commissioner to get the Attorney General's opinion.

The Attorney General said the date stood as written: September 1, 1990. The reason is the "enrolled bill rule." A statute that has been signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, approved by the Governor, and filed with the Secretary of State imports absolute verity and is conclusive that the act passed as enrolled. Courts will not look behind the enrolled bill to the journals, the committee report, or other outside evidence to prove the legislature meant something different. So the AG could not rely on the conference committee report to move section 7's effective date to 1989. The opinion then checked whether the rest of the bill created an irreconcilable conflict that would force a different reading, and found it did not. In particular, a separate provision (section 21(a)) set a December 15, 1989 deadline for level three applications in the 1989-1990 school year "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary." The AG read that as a stand-alone one-year deadline, not as proof that section 7's October 1 deadline had to be in effect in 1989-1990. Both provisions could be harmonized: the December 15, 1989 deadline governed the 1989-1990 year, and section 7's October 1 deadline took effect September 1, 1990 for the 1990-1991 year and after.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1989. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The teacher career ladder statutes in chapter 13 of the Education Code have since been repealed and replaced by later school-finance and personnel legislation, and the Education Code was later recodified. The specific deadlines and level-three standards described here are historical. The durable point is the enrolled bill rule, which remains a feature of Texas law, but anyone with a present-day question about teacher compensation or an effective-date dispute should consult current statutes and case law.

Who this opinion affected (as of 1989)

The Texas Education Agency and the State Board of Education: The opinion told them to treat section 7's tougher level-three standard and its October 1 application deadline as effective September 1, 1990, not 1989, despite the drafting history suggesting otherwise.

Teachers seeking career ladder level three: For the 1989-1990 school year, the applicable deadline for a level three application was December 15, 1989 under section 21(a). The new October 1 deadline and the higher performance standard applied starting with the 1990-1991 school year.

Legislators and drafters: The opinion is a clean illustration of the enrolled bill rule's bite: once a bill is authenticated and filed, an acknowledged enrolling error in the effective-date section is not something the executive branch or the courts can correct by reference to the committee report.

Common questions

What is the enrolled bill rule?
It is the rule that a statute duly signed by the presiding officers of both houses, approved by the Governor, and filed with the Secretary of State is conclusive proof that the act passed as written. Courts will not consider journals, committee reports, or other outside evidence to contradict the enrolled text.

Everyone agreed the date was a mistake. Why couldn't it be fixed by opinion?
Because the enrolled bill rule barred looking behind the signed, filed version. The AG could not use the conference committee report or the legislative leaders' letter to override the effective date printed in the enrolled bill.

So what deadline applied for the 1989-1990 school year?
Section 21(a) set a December 15, 1989 deadline for level three applications submitted in the 1989-1990 school year. Section 7's October 1 deadline took effect September 1, 1990.

Did the higher level-three performance standard apply in 1989-1990?
No. Because section 7 took effect September 1, 1990, the amended level-three standard applied beginning with the 1990-1991 school year.

Background and statutory framework

House Bill 2566, adopted by the 71st Legislature, revised the teacher career ladder statutes. Section 23 of the enrolled bill provided that the act took effect September 1, 1989, except that section 7 took effect September 1, 1990. H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585, § 23, at 1946. Section 7 amended Education Code section 13.309 (level three entry), raising the required standard of performance. But the conference committee report had applied the September 1, 1990 delayed date to section 5 (which amends Education Code section 13.307, level one entry), not section 7. A letter to the Commissioner from the Speaker, the Lieutenant Governor, and the House and Senate education committees explained the reference to section 7 came about only through an editorial change made in enrolling the bill.

The version of House Bill 2566 that postponed section 7 until September 1, 1990 was an enrolled bill, signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, approved by the Governor, and filed with the Secretary of State. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 38; Ellison v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 154 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1941, writ ref'd). Under the enrolled bill rule, a duly authenticated, approved, and enrolled statute imports absolute verity and is conclusive that an act passed according to constitutional requirements. Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 563 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1978); see also Jackson v. Walker, 49 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1932); Nueces County v. King, 350 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd); Falkner v. Memorial Gardens Assoc., 298 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Ellison itself illustrates the rule's conclusiveness: the court there refused to accept House Journal evidence that a Liquor Control Act amendment had not passed both houses in the same form. See Tex. Const. art. IV, § 14; art. III, §§ 30, 32, 39. The enrolled bill rule therefore prevented the AG from relying on the conference committee report to show section 7 was effective September 1, 1989.

The opinion then asked whether the rules of statutory construction required reading the delayed date as inapplicable to section 7. See Attorney General Opinions JM-1079 (1989); H-622 (1975). The Commissioner pointed to apparent conflicts with sections 19 and 21 of the bill. Section 19 applied the new eligibility requirements to all teachers beginning with the 1989-1990 school year. H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585, § 19, at 1945. Where two provisions of a statute apparently conflict, a court must reconcile them. Hill v. State, 114 S.W. 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908). The opinion read section 23 as excepting teachers ready to enter level three from the general rule in section 19, while section 19 kept effect because section 13.308 was amended to require current-year appraisals for level two entry. H.B. 2566, § 6, at 1942; see also id. § 9, at 1943 (delaying level four entry until after September 1, 1991, to be codified as Educ. Code § 13.3101).

On the apparent inconsistency between section 21 and section 23, the task was again to harmonize the provisions. See Gov't Code § 311.021(2) (Code Construction Act). Section 7 added a requirement that a teacher submit a level three application by October 1 of the school year. H.B. 2566, § 7, at 1943. Under section 23, that provision was effective September 1, 1990 for the 1990-1991 school year and after. Section 21(a) provided that "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary," a level three application for the 1989-1990 school year had to be submitted by December 15, 1989. The AG concluded the "notwithstanding" phrase did not expressly refer to section 13.309(b) and need not be read as if it did; it could refer to any provision authorizing the State Board or a district to set a different deadline for 1989-1990. See Educ. Code § 13.302(a) (appraisal process); see also Educ. Code § 23.26 (trustees' power to manage and govern schools). Section 21 was thus meaningful during 1989-1990 even if section 7's October 1 deadline was not yet in effect, so there was no need to decide whether section 21(a) could nullify the express effective date in section 23. See generally Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex. 1984) (the court must find a statute's intent in its language). The provisions were not in irreconcilable conflict: section 21(a) set a December 15, 1989 deadline for 1989-1990 applications, while section 7's October 1 deadline took effect September 1, 1990. Accordingly, the amendment to Education Code section 13.309 adopted by section 7 took effect September 1, 1990.

Citations

Statutory and constitutional authorities:

• Education Code § 13.309 (level three entry; amended by section 7); § 13.307 (level one entry; amended by section 5); § 13.308 (level two entry; current-year appraisals); § 13.302(a) (appraisal process); § 23.26 (trustees' authority)
• H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585: § 23, at 1946 (effective dates); § 19, at 1945 (application to 1989-1990 teachers); § 7, at 1943 (October 1 level three deadline); § 6, at 1942 (level two current-year appraisals)
• Texas Constitution art. III, § 38 (enrolled bill); art. IV, § 14 (approval of bills); art. III, §§ 30, 32, 39
• Government Code § 311.021(2) (Code Construction Act; give effect to all provisions)

Cases:

• Ellison v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 154 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1941, writ ref'd) (enrolled bill rule)
• Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 563 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1978)
• Jackson v. Walker, 49 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1932)
• Nueces County v. King, 350 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd)
• Falkner v. Memorial Gardens Assoc., 298 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
• Hill v. State, 114 S.W. 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (reconcile conflicting provisions)
• Davis v. State, 225 S.W. 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (clerical correction of a bill before signing)
• Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex. 1984) (statute's intent found in its language)

Attorney General materials referenced:

• Referenced: JM-1079 (1989); H-622 (1975)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-1086
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1989/jm1086.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor OCR errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative. Several garbled case names were confirmed by citation lookup and restored: Ellison v. Texas Liquor Control Bd.; Nueces County v. King; Seay v. Hall (which a citation index lists under a different name at this reporter, but which the opinion cites and quotes as Seay v. Hall).

August 18, 1989

W. N. Kirby, Ph.D.
Commissioner of Education
Texas Education Agency
1701 North Congress Ave.
Austin, Texas 78701-1494

Opinion No. JM-1086

Re: Effective date of section 7 of House Bill 2566, which revises the teacher career ladder statutes (RQ-1773)

Dear Dr. Kirby:

You inquire about the effective date of one section of House Bill 2566, adopted by the 71st Legislature to revise the statutes governing the teacher career ladder. A copy of the bill signed by the Governor includes the following provision:

SECTION 23. This Act takes effect September 1, 1989, except that Section 7 takes effect September 1, 1990.

H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585, § 23, at 1946.

Section 7 of House Bill 2566 amends section 13.309 of the Education Code, the provision stating the requirements for entering level three of the teacher career ladder, by raising the standard of performance required to achieve level three. The amended version requires a "clearly outstanding performance" during the current year and one of the preceding two years, where the original version requires only "performance exceeding expectations" during three of the preceding four years. Section 23 as quoted above would delay the imposition of the new criteria until September 1, 1990.

However, the effective date provision included in the conference committee report for House Bill 2566 provides that "Section 5 . . . takes effect September 1, 1990." Section 5 amends section 13.307 of the Education Code, which states the requirements for entering level one of the teacher career ladder. A letter to you from the Speaker of the House, the Lieutenant Governor, the House Public Education Committee and the Senate Education Committee accounts for this discrepancy as follows:

An examination of the files on this bill shows that the text of the conference committee report as laid before and adopted by both houses applied the September 1, 1990, effective date to Section 5 of the bill rather than Section 7. The reference to Section 7 came about exclusively as a result of an editorial change made in the process of enrolling the bill. But for that editorial change, there would be no internal inconsistencies in the text of the bill.

The letter suggests that the Texas Education Agency could reasonably begin to implement the changes in level three made by section 7 on September 1, 1989. The State Board of Education has directed you to request our opinion as to the effective date of section 7.

The version of House Bill 2566 that postpones the effective date of section 7 until September 1, 1990, is an enrolled bill. It was signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, approved by the Governor, and filed in the Office of the Secretary of State. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 38; Ellison v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 154 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1941, writ ref'd). In reviewing statutes, the Texas courts follow the "enrolled bill rule," which holds that a duly authenticated, approved, and enrolled statute imports absolute verity and is conclusive that an act was passed according to constitutional requirements. Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 563 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1978). One court has stated the rule as follows:

[A]n act passed by the Legislature, signed by the proper officers of each house, approved by the Governor, or passed notwithstanding, and filed in the office of the Secretary of State, constitutes a conclusive record of the passage of the act as enrolled. As against this record resort may not be had to a proclamation of the Governor, to the terms of the bill as originally introduced or amendments thereto, to the journal of the Legislature, nor to parol evidence for the purpose of impeaching or invalidating the law.

Ellison, supra, at 326 (citing Texas Jurisprudence); see also Jackson v. Walker, 49 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1932); Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., supra; Nueces County v. King, 350 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd); Falkner v. Memorial Gardens Assoc., 298 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill rule is well illustrated by the case of Ellison, supra, at 326. An amendment to the Texas Liquor Control Act was claimed to be unconstitutional because the House and the Senate did not pass the same bill. The Senate amended the version passed by the House, but the House refused to concur in the amendments. The bill was not returned to the Senate and the Senate never adopted the House version. The Senate did adopt a resolution stating that it receded from the amendments and declaring that the bill had passed the Senate in the same form in which it was received from the House. The House version was approved by the Governor. Because of the enrolled bill rule, the court refused to accept evidence from the House Journal to prove that the law was not passed by both houses of the Legislature, as required by the Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. IV, § 14; see also Tex. Const. art. III, §§ 30, 32, 39; Ellison, supra, at 327 (dissenting opinion).

The enrolled bill rule prevents us from looking to parol evidence to prove that House Bill 2566 did not pass the legislature in the form approved by the Governor. We cannot rely on the conference committee report to show that section 7 of House Bill 2566 is effective on September 1, 1989.1

We next consider whether the rules of statutory construction require us to read the delayed effective date as inapplicable to section 7. See, e.g., Attorney General Opinions JM-1079 (1989); H-622 (1975). You point out an apparent conflict between section 23, the effective date provision, and sections 19 and 21 of the enrolled bill, and you suggest resolving this conflict by reading the delayed effective date provision as applicable to section 5, not section 7.

Section 19 of the enrolled bill reads as follows:

SECTION 19. The changes in the eligibility requirements for entry to a career ladder level made by this Act, including the required use of current year appraisals, apply to all teachers beginning with the 1989-1990 school year, regardless of whether a teacher was qualified for entry to a career ladder level in the 1989-1990 school year before the effective date of this Act.

H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585, § 19, at 1945.

Where there is an apparent conflict between two provisions of a statute, a court must give the statute a construction that will reconcile the provisions. Hill v. State, 114 S.W. 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908).

Section 23 excepts teachers who are ready to enter level three from the general requirement stated in section 19. Section 19 still has effect, because section 13.308 of the Education Code has been amended to require use of current year appraisals for teachers entering level two of the career ladder. H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585, § 6, at 1942; see also id. § 9, at 1943 (delaying entry of any teacher to level four until after September 1, 1991, to be codified as Educ. Code § 13.3101).

We next consider the apparent inconsistency between section 21 and section 23 of House Bill 2566. Our task is, again, to harmonize the provisions of the statute so that all provisions will be effective. See Gov't Code § 311.021(2) (Code Construction Act). Section 7 adds the following provision to section 13.309 of the Education Code:

(b) To enter level three, a teacher must submit a written application to be considered for placement on career ladder level three to the board of trustees of the school district or its designee not later than October 1 of the school year for which the application is made.

H.B. 2566, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 585, § 7, at 1943.

In accordance with section 23, this provision is effective September 1, 1990, and applies to the 1990-1991 school year and subsequent school years.

Section 21(a) of House Bill 2566 provides in part:

Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, for the 1989-1990 school year an application for placement on career ladder level three must be submitted not later than December 15, 1989.

Id. § 21(a), at 1946. (Emphasis added.)

The apparent conflict between section 21(a) and the deferred effective date provided for section 7 by section 23 is found in the language of section 21(a), emphasized above: "Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary . . . ." We assume you read section 21(a) as making a one-year exception to the October 1 application date established by section 7 and that you believe it will be meaningless if section 7 is not in effect during the 1989-1990 school year.

The "notwithstanding" phrase does not, however, expressly refer to section 13.309(b) of the Education Code, and it need not be read as if it does. It could refer to any provision of law that would authorize the State Board of Education or the board of trustees of a school district to establish a different deadline for submitting applications for level three in the 1989-1990 school year. See Educ. Code § 13.302(a) (State Board of Education shall adopt appraisal process); see also Educ. Code § 23.26 (power of trustees to manage and govern schools). Section 21 of House Bill 2566 will be meaningful during the 1989-1990 school year even if the October 1 deadline for level three applicants is not yet in effect. We need not consider whether section 21(a) could be construed as nullifying the express effective date that section 23 provides for section 7. See generally Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex. 1984) (the court must find a statute's intent in its language).

Accordingly, section 21(a) is not in irreconcilable conflict with the deferred effective date provision in section 23 of House Bill 2566. Both provisions can be harmonized and given effect. Section 21(a) establishes a December 15 deadline for applications for career ladder level three submitted in the 1989-1990 school year, while the October 1 deadline adopted by section 7 becomes effective on September 1, 1990, and applies to the 1990-1991 school year and subsequent years. The language of section 23 of House Bill 2566 is clear. The amendment to section 13.309 of the Education Code adopted by section 7 of House Bill 2566 takes effect September 1, 1990.

SUMMARY

The amendment to section 13.309 of the Education Code adopted by section 7 of House Bill 2566 takes effect September 1, 1990.

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Susan Garrison
Assistant Attorney General

Footnotes

[1] If we were allowed to consider evidence that House Bill 2566 was not adopted in accordance with correct procedures, we would have to discuss the possibility that the conference committee report, in placing a delayed effective date on section 5 of House Bill 2566, violated House and Senate rules. The rules of both houses provide that a conference committee shall have no authority to add text which is not included in either the House or Senate version of the bill. House Rule 14, 71st Leg., § 9(a)(4); Senate Rule 12.03(4). The House version provided for a September 1, 1990 effective date for section 5, the Education Code provision on level two entry, while the Senate version applied the delayed effective date to section 7, pertaining to level three entry. C.S.H.B. 2566, 71st Leg., § 22 (as passed by the House on May 9, 1989); C.S.H.B. 2566, 71st Leg., § 23 (as passed by the Senate on May 24, 1989). The conference committee report, however, delayed implementation of section 5, the provision on level one entry. Conference Committee Report H.B. 2566, 71st Leg., § 23. In this respect, the Conference Committee Report departed from both the House and the Senate versions of House Bill 2566. Because of the enrolled bill rule, however, we need not consider the effect of this departure, nor whether the change made during enrolling was intended as correction of an error. Cf. Davis v. State, 225 S.W. 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (clerical correction of a bill by resolution before bill was signed by presiding officers of each house).