Can the Texas Legislature attach conditions when it lets someone sue the state, and how does it have to do it?

Texas AG Opinion JM-1061: How and When Can the State Waive Its Own Immunity?

Plain-English summary

Governmental immunity is the old idea that you cannot sue the sovereign without its consent. In Texas it comes in two layers that people constantly mix up, and the whole opinion turns on keeping them apart. The first layer is immunity from suit: unless the state agrees, you cannot even get in the courthouse door against it. The second is immunity from liability: even if you are allowed to file, the state may still be shielded from actually owing you money. The two are independent. When the Legislature lets someone sue the state, that permission does not automatically mean the state has agreed to pay if it loses.

Representative Dan Morales, who chaired the House Criminal Jurisprudence Committee, asked the Attorney General two things. Can the state attach strings to its waivers of immunity? And what is the correct legislative tool for waiving immunity in the first place?

The first answer was easy. Yes, the Legislature can place restrictions and conditions on any waiver of immunity. The Texas Supreme Court had said as much, and the statute governing permission-to-sue resolutions, chapter 107 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, spells it out: a resolution can further limit the relief a claimant may recover and can add conditions to the grant of permission. So the state is never in an all-or-nothing posture. It can open the door a crack and set the terms.

The second answer was where the care was needed, because the right tool depends on which layer of immunity is being waived. Immunity from suit can be waived two ways: by a statute that applies generally, or by a concurrent resolution aimed at a single claimant. The Legislature has long used individual resolutions to tell a particular person, you may sue the state over this dispute. That is constitutional.

Immunity from liability is different. It can be waived only by a general-application statute, never by a resolution singling out one individual. The AG walked through why. An act that hands one named person the privilege of collecting against the state runs into two constitutional walls: article III, section 56, which forbids special or local laws where a general law could do the job, and article I, section 3, the state equal protection clause, because it gives one injured person a remedy the law denies everyone else in the same position. The Supreme Court had struck down exactly that kind of individual waiver of liability. Tellingly, the courts did not extend the same logic to permission-to-sue resolutions; letting one person file suit, without promising to pay, does not offend those provisions the way a one-person liability waiver does.

There was one more limit, aimed at timing. The Legislature cannot wait until after an accident and then pass a law assuming liability for it. A statute that tries to recognize or take on responsibility for a tort after the tort has already happened violates article III, section 44, which says the state shall not pay a claim that was not provided for by pre-existing law. In other words, the state cannot retroactively volunteer to be liable for something that already went wrong.

The opinion added a footnote worth remembering: contracts work differently from torts. The state is liable on its contracts as if it were a private citizen, so the only thing standing between a contractor and a judgment is immunity from suit, not immunity from liability. Once the state consents to be sued on a contract, it can be held to the deal.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1989. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Texas sovereign immunity law has kept developing since 1989. The permission-to-sue provisions cited here as chapter 107 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the Texas Tort Claims Act provisions in chapter 101, have been amended, and the Texas Supreme Court has issued many later decisions refining the line between immunity from suit and immunity from liability, including in the contract-claims area. The constitutional provisions (article III, sections 44 and 56, and article I, section 3) remain, but their application has been shaped by newer case law. Anyone working on a present-day claim against the state, or drafting a waiver, should rely on the current statutes and the latest Supreme Court authority rather than the 1989 citations here.

Who this opinion affected (as of 1989)

State legislators and legislative drafters: The opinion gave them a clear map. Use a general statute to waive liability, reserve individual concurrent resolutions for permission to sue, attach whatever reasonable conditions you want, and never try to assume liability for a tort after it has happened.

People with claims against the state: The opinion explained why a special resolution passed just for them might get them into court but could not, by itself, guarantee a recovery. To reach the state's money for a tort, the claim generally had to fit a general waiver like the Tort Claims Act.

Contractors dealing with the state: The footnote reassured them that the state is liable on contracts like a private party, so consent to suit is the main hurdle, not a separate liability shield.

Common questions

What is the difference between immunity from suit and immunity from liability?
Immunity from suit means you cannot bring the lawsuit against the state at all without consent. Immunity from liability means you may be allowed to sue but the state can still avoid owing damages. Waiving one does not waive the other.

Can the Legislature put conditions on letting someone sue the state?
Yes. The Attorney General concluded the Legislature may place restrictions and conditions on a waiver of immunity, and chapter 107 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code lets a permission-to-sue resolution limit the relief available and add conditions.

Can the state waive its liability for just one person by a special resolution?
No. A resolution waiving immunity from liability on behalf of a single individual is unconstitutional under article III, section 56 (special or local laws) and article I, section 3 (equal protection). Liability can be waived only by a statute of general application.

Can the Legislature pass a law accepting responsibility for an accident that already happened?
No. A statute that tries to recognize or assume liability for a tort after the tort occurred violates article III, section 44, which bars the state from paying a claim not provided for by pre-existing law.

Background and statutory framework

Representative Dan Morales, chairman of the House Criminal Jurisprudence Committee, asked whether the state possesses legal authority to place limitations or restrictions on its waivers of immunity, and what legislative vehicle is appropriate when the state wishes to waive immunity. The opinion answered both through a general discussion of governmental immunity.

There are two types of governmental immunity, immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Adams v. Harris County, 530 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976). The state may waive either type, but a waiver of immunity from suit does not imply a waiver of immunity from liability. State v. Isbell, 94 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. 1936). The Texas Tort Claims Act is an example of a statute offering a limited waiver of both under certain circumstances. See Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, 101.025.

The Legislature has traditionally used concurrent resolutions to waive immunity from suit in individual cases. Contran Corp. v. Bullock, 567 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1978, no writ). The Civil Practice and Remedies Code now contains provisions governing resolutions waiving state immunity from suit. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 524, at 2133 (codified as one of two chapter 107s). Section 107.002 sets out the effects of a resolution granting permission to sue; section 107.003 provides that a resolution may grant permission only in accordance with the chapter and may not alter the effect of the permission except to further limit the relief to which the claimant may be entitled; and section 107.004 provides that a resolution may specifically provide additional conditions to which the grant of permission is subject. See Trinity River Auth. v. Williams, 689 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1985) (state's waiver of sovereign immunity may be made subject to restrictions and conditions); see generally Buford v. State, 322 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 837 (1959) (statutes cannot be amended by resolution). A resolution is used when the Legislature wishes to express an opinion on a matter that is to have temporary effect. State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76, 94-96 (1851); Conley v. Texas Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy, 164 S.W. 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1913, writ ref'd).

The Legislature has also used resolutions to waive immunity from liability in individual cases, but there are serious constitutional questions about doing so. Section 107.002(b) provides that a resolution granting permission to sue does not waive immunity from liability to any extent. The courts have held that a resolution waiving immunity from liability on behalf of an individual violates both article III, section 56, and article I, section 3, of the Texas Constitution. Article III, section 56, prohibits special or local laws on specified subjects, and although waiver of immunity is not among the listed subjects, the section also bars any local or special law "in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable." In State Highway Dep't v. Gorham, 162 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1942), the Texas Supreme Court held that an act granting an individual the privilege of suing the highway department violated article III, section 56, and also violated article I, section 3, the equal protection clause, though it invalidated the act on several grounds without elaborating. Three years later the court cited Gorham for the proposition that a waiver of liability as to an individual violates article I, section 3. Martin v. Sheppard, 201 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1947); see generally G. D. Braden, 1 The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 279 (1977) (questioning Gorham as an article III, section 56, case). In Martin, a collection suit, the court held the underlying judgment was not subject to collateral attack because the granting court had jurisdiction over the parties, reasoning that even striking the section that waived the state's immunity from liability, the act still granted express permission to sue and provided for service on the Governor and Attorney General, which was within the Legislature's power. The upshot was that the Legislature may grant an individual permission to sue but may not waive governmental immunity from liability as to an individual.

The opinion noted the apparent asymmetry: one might argue that if an individual liability waiver is an unconstitutional special law or equal protection violation, so too would be an individual waiver of immunity from suit. But that was not the Supreme Court's view. See State v. Isbell, supra, at 425; Adams v. Harris County, supra, at 608 (both holding consent to sue may be given by concurrent resolution, but waiver of tort liability only by general law); see also Thomas v. Government of Virgin Islands, 333 F. Supp. 961 (D.V.I. 1971), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (1975) (individual waiver of sovereign immunity violates federal equal protection); Krause v. Ohio, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972) (withholding a remedy from some tort victims but not others does not violate federal equal protection); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 429 S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968, no writ); State v. McDonald, 220 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1949, writ ref'd). Thus a resolution waiving immunity from liability for an individual is unconstitutional, while a resolution waiving immunity from suit for an individual is not.

A resolution waiving immunity from tort liability after the tort has occurred has likewise been held unconstitutional. In Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.), the court held that a statute passed after the commission of a tort that attempts to recognize or assume liability for the tort violates article III, section 44, of the Texas Constitution, which provides that the state shall not pay a claim not provided for by pre-existing law.

The opinion added, in a footnote, that the state is liable on contracts as if it were a private citizen, so the only impediment to a contract suit is the state's immunity from suit. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Camarena, 710 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. App. - Austin 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 754 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1988). It has been suggested the state is not immune from liability when acting in a proprietary rather than governmental capacity, State v. Morgan, 170 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. 1943), but also suggested that the state, unlike a municipality, acts only in a governmental capacity and, absent a valid waiver, enjoys immunity from liability for all torts. State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347, 348-49 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, writ ref'd); see also Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. App. - Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jones v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 397 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

In summary, the Legislature may place restrictions on a waiver of immunity. Trinity River Auth. v. Williams, supra, at 885. It may waive immunity from suit either by a statute of general application or by concurrent resolution, but it may waive immunity from liability only by a statute of general application. The constitution does not permit waiving immunity from liability by resolution applicable to an individual, nor after the occurrence of the events giving rise to liability.

Citations

Constitutional and statutory authority:

• Tex. Const. art. III, § 56 (prohibition on special or local laws)
• Tex. Const. art. III, § 44 (no payment of a claim not provided for by pre-existing law)
• Tex. Const. art. I, § 3 (equal protection)
• Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, 101.025 (Texas Tort Claims Act)
• Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 107, §§ 107.002, 107.003, 107.004 (resolutions granting permission to sue the state)
• Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 524, at 2133

Cases cited:

• Adams v. Harris County, 530 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976)
• State v. Isbell, 94 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. 1936)
• Contran Corp. v. Bullock, 567 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1978, no writ)
• Trinity River Auth. v. Williams, 689 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1985)
• Buford v. State, 322 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 837 (1959)
• State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76, 94-96 (1851)
• Conley v. Texas Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy, 164 S.W. 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1913, writ ref'd)
• State Highway Dep't v. Gorham, 162 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1942)
• Martin v. Sheppard, 201 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1947)
• Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.)
• Thomas v. Government of Virgin Islands, 333 F. Supp. 961 (D.V.I. 1971), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (1975)
• Krause v. Ohio, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972)
• Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 429 S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968, no writ)
• State v. McDonald, 220 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1949, writ ref'd)
• Texas Employment Comm'n v. Camarena, 710 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. App. - Austin 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 754 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1988)
• State v. Morgan, 170 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. 1943)
• State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347, 348-49 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, writ ref'd)
• Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. App. - Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
• Jones v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 397 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Secondary authority referenced:

• Comment, Governmental Immunity from Suit and Liability in Texas, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 337 (1949)
• Comment, Legislative Resolutions: Their Function and Effect, 31 Tex. L. Rev. 417 (1953)
• G. D. Braden, 1 The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 279 (1977)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-1061
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1989/jm1061.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor OCR errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

June 20, 1989

Honorable Dan Morales
Chairman
Criminal Jurisprudence Committee
Texas House of Representatives
P. O. Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78768-2910

Opinion No. JM-1061

Re: Whether the state may restrict its waiver of immunity (RQ-1662)

Dear Representative Morales:

You ask the following questions about waiver of governmental immunity:

(1) Does the state possess the legal authority to place any limitations or restrictions upon its waivers of immunity?

(2) What is the appropriate legislative vehicle for the legislature to utilize when the state wishes to waive its immunity?

The following general discussion of governmental immunity will provide answers to both of your questions.

There are two types of governmental immunity: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Adams v. Harris County, 530 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976). The state may waive either type of immunity. A waiver of immunity from suit does not, however, imply a waiver of immunity from liability. State v. Isbell, 94 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. 1936). The Texas Tort Claims Act is an example of a statute that offers a limited waiver from suit and immunity from liability under certain circumstances. See Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, 101.025.

The legislature has traditionally employed concurrent resolutions to waive immunity from suit in individual cases.1 Contran Corp. v. Bullock, 567 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1978, no writ). The Civil Practices and Remedies Code now contains provisions governing resolutions waiving state immunity from suit. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 524, at 2133 (codified as one of two chapter 107s of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code). Section 107.002 of the code sets out the effects of a resolution that grants a person permission to sue the state. Section 107.003 provides:

(a) A resolution may grant permission to sue the state only in accordance with this chapter.

(b) A resolution may not alter the effect of the permission as described by Section 107.002, except that a resolution may further limit the relief to which the claimant may be entitled.

Section 107.004 provides:

A resolution may specifically provide additional conditions to which a grant of permission to sue is subject.

See Trinity River Auth. v. Williams, 689 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1985) (holding that the state's waiver of sovereign immunity can be made subject to restrictions and conditions); see generally Buford v. State, 322 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 837 (1959) (holding that statutes cannot be amended by resolution).

Not only has the legislature used resolutions to waive immunity from suit in individual cases, but it has also used them to waive immunity from liability in individual cases. See Comment, Governmental Immunity from Suit and Liability in Texas, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 337 (1949); see also Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 107.002(b) (providing that a resolution granting permission to sue does not waive to any extent immunity from liability). There are, however, serious questions about the constitutionality of waiving immunity from liability in individual cases. The courts have held that a resolution waiving immunity from liability on behalf of an individual violates both article III, section 56, and article I, section 3, of the Texas Constitution.

Article III, section 56, prohibits the enactment of special or local laws on specified subjects. Waiver of governmental immunity is not among the subjects listed. However, article III, section 56, also contains the following proviso: "And in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted." In State Highway Dep't v. Gorham, 162 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1942), the Texas Supreme Court held that an act granting an individual the privilege of bringing a suit against the highway department violated article III, section 56. The court also held that the act at issue in Gorham violated article I, section 3, the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. The court held the act in question invalid for several other reasons as well and did not elaborate on its statements about article III, section 56, or article I, section 3.

Three years later, the supreme court cited Gorham for the proposition that a waiver of liability in regard to an individual would violate article I, section 3, of the Texas Constitution. Martin v. Sheppard, 201 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1947). The court did not mention article III, section 56. See generally G. D. Braden, 1 The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 279 (1977) (questioning the correctness of Gorham as an article III, section 56, case). Although Martin v. Sheppard was a collection suit based on a judgment in a suit involving just such a waiver, the court held that the judgment was not subject to collateral attack because the court granting the judgment had jurisdiction over the parties. In so holding, the court wrote:

And, further, it is provided in Section 5 of the act that, if any paragraph, clause, or provision thereof should be held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the validity of the other provisions of the act shall not be affected thereby. Striking from the act the third section [waiving the state's immunity from liability], there remains an express permission granted to relators to bring suit in the district court of Liberty County for damages on account of the injuries sustained by A. J. Martin which resulted in his death and the further provision that process might be served upon the Governor and Attorney General. It cannot be questioned that the legislature had the power to grant relators permission to sue the State and to provide the manner of service. By virtue of that act and by the service of process and the appearance of the State through its Attorney General, the court clearly acquired jurisdiction of the parties to the litigation. (Emphasis added.)

Martin, supra, at 812. In other words, the court took the position that it was within the legislature's power to grant an individual permission to sue but that it was not within the legislature's power to waive governmental immunity from liability in regard to an individual. One could argue that if a waiver of immunity from liability in regard to a single individual is either an unconstitutional special law or a violation of the equal protection clause, a waiver of immunity from suit in regard to a single individual would also be either an unconstitutional special law or a violation of the equal protection clause. That was not, however, the view of the Supreme Court in Gorham. See State v. Isbell, supra, at 425; Adams v. Harris County, supra, at 608 (both expressly holding that consent to sue may be given by concurrent resolution, but that waiver of immunity from tort liability can be given only by general law); see also Thomas v. Government of Virgin Islands, 333 F. Supp. 961 (D.V.I. 1971), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (1975) (holding that waiver of sovereign immunity on behalf of individual violates equal protection clause of federal Constitution); Krause v. Ohio, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972) (holding that withholding remedy from some persons injured by governmental torts but not from others does not violate equal protection clause of federal Constitution); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 429 S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968, no writ); State v. McDonald, 220 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1949, writ ref'd). The courts have held that a resolution attempting to waive governmental immunity from liability on behalf of an individual is unconstitutional but that a resolution waiving immunity from suit on behalf of an individual is not.

A resolution waiving immunity from tort liability2 after the tort has occurred has also been held to be unconstitutional. In Matkins v. State, 123 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.), the court held that a statute that is passed after the commission of a tort and that attempts to recognize or assume liability for the tort by the state violates article III, section 44, of the Texas Constitution, which provides that the state shall not pay a claim not provided for by pre-existing law.

In summary, the answer to your first question is clear: The legislature may place restrictions on a waiver of immunity. Trinity River Auth. v. Williams, supra, at 885. The answer to your second question is more complex. The legislature may waive immunity from suit either by a statute of general application or by concurrent resolution. The legislature may waive immunity from liability only by a statute of general application. The constitution does not permit the legislature to waive immunity from liability by resolution applicable to an individual, nor does it permit the legislature to waive immunity from liability after the occurrence of the events that would give rise to liability.

1. A resolution is used when the legislature wishes to express an opinion as to a given matter or thing which is to have a temporary effect. State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76, 94-96 (1851); Conley v. Texas Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy, 164 S.W. 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1913, writ ref'd); see generally Comment, Legislative Resolutions: Their Function and Effect, 31 Tex. L. Rev. 417 (1953).

2. The state is liable on contracts as if it were a private citizen. Therefore, the only impediment to a suit against the state on a contract is the state's immunity from suit. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Camarena, 710 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. App. - Austin 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 754 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1988). Also, it has been suggested that the state is not immune from liability when it acts in a proprietary, rather than a governmental, capacity. State v. Morgan, 170 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. 1943). It has also been suggested, however, that the state, in contrast to a municipality, acts only in a governmental capacity and, in the absence of a valid waiver, enjoys immunity from liability for all torts. State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347, 348-49 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, writ ref'd); see also Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. App. - Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jones v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 397 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Comment, Governmental Immunity from Suit and Liability in Texas, supra, at 344.

SUMMARY

The legislature may place restrictions on a waiver of governmental immunity. The legislature may waive immunity from suit either by a statute of general application or by concurrent resolution. The state may waive immunity from liability by a statute of general application. The constitution does not permit the legislature to waive immunity from liability after the occurrence of the events that give rise to liability.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Sarah Woelk
Assistant Attorney General