Can a Texas budget rider change how emergency medical services and trauma funds are divided among counties?

Plain-English summary

Dallas County District Attorney Bill Hill asked whether a single line in the state budget could lawfully change how Texas hands out money for emergency medical services and trauma care. In 1997 the Legislature created a special account in the state treasury for that purpose, and section 773.122 of the Health and Safety Code told the Department of Health how to spread the money among counties: by each county's relative geographic size and population and by the number of emergency or trauma care runs eligible providers performed there. Rider 61, attached to the Department's appropriation in the General Appropriations Act for the 2000-01 biennium, declared it the Legislature's intent that at least 60 percent of the funds go to rural and frontier counties and at least 40 percent to urban counties. A proposed Department rule put the rider into practice by first splitting the money 60-40 rural-urban and only then applying the statutory size-and-population formula within each group.

The Attorney General concluded that Rider 61 violated article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution, the provision that says a bill (other than a general appropriations bill) may contain only one subject. Texas courts have long allowed a budget rider to detail, limit, or restrict the use of appropriated funds, or to implement existing law, but not to enact general legislation or rewrite a substantive statute. Rider 61 did the latter: it inserted a rural-urban allocation step that the distribution statute did not contain, changing the formula the Legislature had already enacted in section 773.122. Because the rider attempted to alter existing substantive law, the opinion held it was general legislation that could not ride along in an appropriations act, and it therefore contravened the single-subject rule.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The dispute sat at the intersection of an appropriations rider and a substantive distribution statute. Section 773.122 of the Health and Safety Code directs the commissioner of health, with advice from the chairpersons of the trauma service area regional advisory councils, to use money in the emergency medical services and trauma care account to fund county and regional EMS and trauma care systems. It requires a $250,000 reserve for extraordinary emergencies and directs that at least 70 percent of the remaining appropriated money go toward supplies, operations, education and training, equipment, vehicles, and communications for local EMS, distributed to regional advisory councils (or to counties where the council is not a tax-exempt entity under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code). Critically, the statute fixes the share each county's eligible recipients receive "based on the relative geographic size and population of the county and on the relative number of emergency or trauma care runs performed by eligible recipients in the county."

Rider 61, in the 1999 General Appropriations Act, layered a different allocation on top: "It is the intent of the Legislature that the Department of Health allocate at least 40 percent to urban counties and at least 60 percent of the Emergency Medical Services allotment to rural and frontier counties." A proposed Department of Health rule, published at 24 Texas Register 8088, adopted that 60-40 split and applied the statutory size-and-population formula only afterward, within each classification.

The constitutional rule the opinion applied comes from article III, section 35(a): "No bill (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject." The appropriation of funds counts as a single subject for this purpose, as the Texas Supreme Court held in Jessen Assoc., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d at 600. The opinion drew the line between valid and invalid riders from its own precedent, Attorney General Opinion JM-1151: a rider may detail, limit, or restrict the use of appropriated funds, or merely implement or declare existing general law, but it may not embody general legislation or alter existing substantive law. Riders that amend, modify, repeal, or conflict with existing general law are invalid, a principle the opinion traced through Moore v. Sheppard, Strake v. Court of Appeals, and Linden v. Finley, 49 S.W. 578. Measured against that standard, Rider 61's new rural-urban step was an attempt "to alter existing substantive law," and so it was general legislation that could not appear in an appropriations act.

Common questions

What did the rider try to do?
Rider 61 directed the Department of Health to give at least 60 percent of the EMS allotment to rural and frontier counties and at least 40 percent to urban counties, a split that was applied before the statutory distribution formula.

Why was that a problem?
Section 773.122 already set the distribution formula, based on relative geographic size, population, and the number of emergency or trauma care runs. The opinion concluded the rider changed that formula, which is a change to substantive general law.

What is the single-subject rule?
Article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution says a bill, other than a general appropriations bill, may contain only one subject. A rider that smuggles general legislation into an appropriations act runs afoul of it.

Are budget riders always invalid?
No. The opinion restated the settled rule that a rider may detail, limit, or restrict how appropriated funds are used, or implement existing law. It becomes invalid only when it enacts general legislation or alters existing substantive law, as Rider 61 did.

Citations

Statutes and constitutional provisions: Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 773.122(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000); Tex. Const. art. III, § 35(a); General Appropriations Act, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1589, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 5446, 5603 (Rider 61); Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1157, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4360. The opinion also cited the proposed Department of Health rule at 24 Tex. Reg. 8088 (1999) (to be codified as an amendment to 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 157.130).

Cases: Jessen Assoc., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1975); Moore v. Sheppard, 192 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1946); Strake v. Court of Appeals, 704 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1986); Linden v. Finley, 49 S.W. 578 (Tex. 1899).

Prior Attorney General opinions discussed: JM-1151 (1990), DM-93 (1992), V-1254 (1951), JM-786 (1987), JM-343 (1985), MW-585 (1982), MW-51 (1979), JM-885 (1988), H-1158 (1978), and M-1199 (1972).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/john-cornyn/jc-0178
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2000/jc0178.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

February 7, 2000

The Honorable Bill Hill
Dallas County District Attorney
Civil Section
Administration Building
411 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75202

Opinion No. JC-0178

Re: Validity of a rider that allocates monies from the emergency medical services and trauma care system fund of the Texas Department of Health (RQ-0132-JC)

Dear Mr. Hill:

You have requested our opinion regarding the constitutionality of a rider to the General Appropriations Act for the 2000-01 biennium. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the rider violates article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution.

You indicate that, in 1997, the legislature created an emergency medical services and trauma care system fund as a special account in the state treasury.[1] As amended in 1999, section 773.122, Health and Safety Code, now provides, in relevant part:

(a) The commissioner, with advice and counsel from the chairpersons of the trauma service area regional advisory councils, shall use money in the account established under Section 771.072(f) to fund county and regional emergency medical services and trauma care systems in accordance with this section.

(b) The commissioner shall maintain a reserve of $250,000 of money appropriated from the account for extraordinary emergencies.

(c) In any fiscal year the commissioner shall use at least 70 percent of the appropriated money remaining in the account, after any amount necessary to maintain the reserve established by Subsection (b) is deducted, to fund, in connection with an effort to provide coordination with the appropriate trauma service area, the cost of supplies, operational expenses, education and training, equipment, vehicles, and communications systems for local emergency medical services. The money shall be distributed on behalf of eligible recipients in each county to the trauma service area regional advisory council for that county, if the regional advisory council is incorporated as an entity that is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a), Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and its subsequent amendments, by being listed as an exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the code. For a county for which the regional advisory council is not incorporated as such an entity, the money shall be distributed to the county on behalf of eligible recipients. The share of the money allocated to the eligible recipients in a county's geographic area shall be based on the relative geographic size and population of the county and on the relative number of emergency or trauma care runs performed by eligible recipients in the county. Money that is not disbursed by a regional advisory council or a county to eligible recipients for approved functions by the end of the fiscal year in which the funds were disbursed shall be returned to the account to be used in accordance with Subsection (t).

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 773.122(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).

In 1999, there was also enacted a rider to the appropriation for the Department of Health that bears on the allocation formula. Rider 61 provides:

Trauma Formula Distribution. It is the intent of the Legislature that the Department of Health allocate at least 40 percent to urban counties and at least 60 percent of the Emergency Medical Services allotment to rural and frontier counties.

General Appropriations Act, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1589, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 5446, 5603. A proposed rule of the Department of Health adopts the 60-rural/40-urban requirement of the rider and only then applies the statutory formula based on "relative geographic size and population":

(t) Calculation of county shares

(1) EMS allotment

(A) Counties will be classified as urban or rural based on the latest official federal census population figures.

(B) The EMS allotment will be divided into a 40% allocation for urban counties and a 60% allocation for rural counties.

(C) An individual county's share of the EMS allotment shall be based on its relative geographic size and population as compared to all other counties of its classification.

24 Tex. Reg. 8088 (1999) (to be codified as an amendment to 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.130(l)(1)(A)-(C)) (proposed Sept. 10, 1999) (Tex. Dep't of Health) (emphasis added). You suggest that the modification required by Rider 61 violates article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution which provides, in relevant part: "No bill (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject." TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35(a). The appropriation of funds from the state treasury is considered a single subject for purposes of this provision. Jessen Assoc., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 1975).

The law with regard to riders has long been settled in Texas, as summarized in Attorney General Opinion JM-1151:

A valid rider may detail, limit, or restrict the use of appropriated funds. Attorney General Opinion V-1254 (1951). A rider that qualifies or directs the use of appropriated funds or that is merely incidental to an appropriation is valid. Jessen Assoc., Inc., supra, at 599. So, too, is a rider that merely implements or is declarative of existing general law. See Attorney General Opinions JM-786 (1987); JM-343 (1985).

A rider may not, however, embody matters of general legislation. Moore v. Sheppard, 192 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1946); see also Attorney General Opinions MW-585 (1982); MW-51 (1979). A rider that attempts to alter existing substantive law is a matter of general legislation that may not be included in a general appropriations act. Strake v. Court of Appeals, 704 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1986). Thus, a rider that amends, modifies, repeals, or conflicts with existing general law or that attempts to nullify a constitutional provision other than article III, section 35, is invalid. See id.; Linden v. Finley, 49 S.W. 578 (Tex. 1899); see also Attorney General Opinions JM-885 (1988); H-1158 (1978); M-1199 (1972); V-1254 (1951).

Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1151 (1990) at 5-6; see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-93 (1992).

Under these standards, we conclude that Rider 61 is invalid. As we have noted, section 773.122(c) establishes a formula for distribution of emergency medical services/trauma care funds "based on relative geographic size and population of the county and on the relative number of emergency or trauma care runs performed by eligible recipients in the county." The rider imposes an intervening layer on this formula by requiring that the funds first be allocated on a 60-40 rural-urban basis. As interpreted by the Department of Health, the statutory formula will be imposed only after this initial allocation. In our opinion, Rider 61 represents an attempt "to alter existing substantive law," and, as such, "is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act." See Strake v. Court of Appeals, 704 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1986). We conclude therefore that Rider 61 contravenes article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution.

SUMMARY

Rider 61 to the appropriation for the Department of Health in the General Appropriations Act for the 2000-01 biennium attempts to amend general law and therefore contravenes article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution.

JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas

ANDY TAYLOR
First Assistant Attorney General

CLARK KENT ERVIN
Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel

ELIZABETH ROBINSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General - Opinion Committee

[1] Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1157, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4360.