Can a Texas juvenile court hear a truancy case against a 17-year-old?

Texas AG Opinion JC-0103: Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Over a 17-Year-Old Truant

Plain-English summary

Brazoria County Criminal District Attorney Jeri Yenne asked whether a juvenile court could conduct proceedings against a 17-year-old who had violated an order to attend school imposed by a justice or municipal court. The Attorney General concluded that the juvenile court had no such jurisdiction.

The problem came from a 1997 change in the law. The Education Code's truancy procedure (section 25.094) directs that when a child violates a justice-court or municipal-court order to attend school, the complaint is transferred to a juvenile court for an adjudication hearing under the Family Code. Separately, in 1997 the Legislature raised the age of compulsory school attendance by one year, so a "child" had to attend school until the 18th birthday. But the Family Code defined a "child," for juvenile-court purposes, as a person at least ten and under 17 (or 17-to-18 only for conduct committed before turning 17), and gave the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over those proceedings. By raising the attendance age without also extending juvenile-court jurisdiction, the Legislature created a gap: section 25.094(d) could call for transferring to juvenile court a person who had already turned 17.

The opinion declined to paper over the conflict by reading juvenile jurisdiction up to 18. A juvenile court is a statutory court of limited jurisdiction that can act only as the statute allows, and the jurisdictional age cut-off had been a fixture since juvenile courts were created in 1943, while the transfer provision dated only to 1995. Nothing in the legislative history of the bill that raised the attendance age (Senate Bill 247) suggested an intent to expand juvenile-court jurisdiction. The Attorney General would not infer so significant a change from such indirect means.

The opinion noted that an over-17 truant was not beyond the law's reach. That person could still be prosecuted under section 25.094 in justice or municipal court, where truancy was a class C misdemeanor, and the court could impose the sanctions listed in Family Code section 54.021(d), including high-school-equivalency preparatory classes, alcohol and drug abuse programs, community service, and driver's-license suspension. The statute also contemplated that a person could be prosecuted for truancy as often as once every four weeks.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could a juvenile court hear a truancy case against someone who was already 17?
No. The opinion concluded the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hold an adjudication hearing when the conduct that led to the referral happened after the person turned 17.

Why did the law seem to point the other way?
The Education Code's transfer provision (section 25.094(d)) could send a 17-year-old truant's case to juvenile court, but the Family Code defined a "child" as under 17 and gave the juvenile court jurisdiction only over that group. The Attorney General held that the Family Code's jurisdictional age controlled.

Did this leave an over-17 truant with no consequences?
No. Under the opinion, that person could still be prosecuted under Education Code section 25.094 in a justice or municipal court, where truancy was a class C misdemeanor, and the court could order the sanctions listed in Family Code section 54.021(d).

What caused the conflict in the first place?
A 1997 amendment raised the compulsory-attendance age to 18 without a matching change to the juvenile court's jurisdictional age, which had been set below 18 since 1943.

Background and statutory framework

The question sat at the intersection of two codes. Education Code section 25.085 set the compulsory-attendance requirement, and after the 1997 amendment, subsection (b) required attendance until a child's 18th birthday. Section 25.094 made truancy an offense, allowed prosecution in justice or municipal court, let that court enter an order with the requirements listed in Family Code section 54.021(d), and, on violation of such an order, directed transfer of the complaint to a juvenile court for an adjudication hearing under Family Code section 54.03.

The Family Code pointed the other way. Section 51.04(a) gave the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings involving a person who was a "child" when the conduct occurred, and section 51.02(2) defined "child" as a person at least ten and under 17, or 17-to-18 only for delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision committed before turning 17.

The Attorney General treated the juvenile court's limited, statute-derived jurisdiction as decisive, citing McAlpine v. State, In the Matter of J.T., and In the Matter of A.S. for the rule that a juvenile court can exercise only the jurisdiction the statute confers. Because the transfer provision (added in 1995) was newer than the long-standing jurisdictional age limits (dating to 1943), and because the legislative history of Senate Bill 247 showed no intent to expand juvenile-court jurisdiction, the opinion declined to read the jurisdictional age up to 18.

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 25.085(a), (b)
• Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 25.094
• Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.02(2)
• Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.03(b)(2)
• Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.04(a)
• Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.021(d)
• Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.03

Cases:

• McAlpine v. State, 457 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ)
• In the Matter of J.T., 526 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ)
• In the Matter of A.S., 875 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/john-cornyn/jc-0103
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1999/jc0103.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

September 1, 1999

The Honorable Jeri Yenne
Brazoria County Criminal District Attorney
111 East Locust, Room 408A
Angleton, Texas 77515

Opinion No. JC-0103

Re: Juvenile court jurisdiction over a 17-year-old who has violated a truancy order of a justice or municipal court (RQ-0021)

Dear Ms. Yenne:

You have requested our opinion regarding the authority of a juvenile court to conduct proceedings against a 17-year-old individual who has violated an order to attend school imposed by a justice or municipal court. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that a juvenile court is without jurisdiction to conduct such proceedings.

Section 25.085(a) of the Education Code provides that "[a] child who is required to attend school under this section shall attend school each school day for the entire period the program of instruction is provided." TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.085(a) (Vernon 1996). Section 25.094 states that "a child commits an offense if the child is required to attend school under Section 25.085" and fails to do so "for the amount of time specified under section 51.03(b)(2), Family Code, and is not excused under Section 25.087." Such an offense "may be prosecuted in a justice court in the county in which the child resides or in which the school is located or in a municipal court in the municipality in which the child resides or in which the school is located." Id. § 25.094(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999). If the justice or municipal court finds that the child has committed a truancy offense, "the court may enter an order that includes one or more of the requirements listed in Section 54.021(d), Family Code." Id. § 25.094(c) (Vernon 1996). If the court subsequently finds that the individual "has violated an order under Subsection (c)," the court is directed to "transfer the complaint against the child, together with all pleadings and orders, to a juvenile court for the county in which the child resides," and the juvenile court is required to "conduct an adjudication hearing as provided by Section 54.03, Family Code." Id. § 25.094(d).

In 1997, the legislature increased the age of compulsory school attendance by one year, so that section 25.085(b) of the Education Code now provides:

Unless specifically exempted by Section 25.086, a child who is at least six years of age, or who is younger than six years of age and has previously been enrolled in first grade, and who has not yet reached the child's 18th birthday shall attend school.

Id. § 25.085(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999).

Thus, section 25.094(d) now requires, in some instances, the transfer to a juvenile court of proceedings against an individual who will have attained his 17th birthday prior to his first appearance in juvenile court. The Family Code does not permit this possibility.

Section 51.04(a) of the Family Code provides:

This title covers the proceedings in all cases involving the delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision engaged in by a person who was a child within the meaning of this title at the time he engaged in the conduct, and the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings under this title.

A "child" is defined for purposes of the Family Code as a person who is:

(A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age; or

(B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2) (Vernon 1996). By increasing the age of compulsory school attendance past an individual's 17th birthday, and by neglecting to simultaneously extend juvenile court jurisdiction beyond the age of 17, the legislature has created a conflict between the definition of "child" under the Family Code-a person under the age of 17-and the meaning of "child" for purposes of the Education Code, which at least for some purposes means an individual under the age of 18.

In the usual situation, we might be inclined to attempt to harmonize these two provisions, and conclude that, in these limited circumstances, a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who has attained his 17th birthday. To do so, however, would require that we impute to the legislature an intent to alter a jurisdictional requirement that has remained a constant for a very long time. Section 25.094(d) of the Education Code, the provision that requires transfer to a juvenile court, was enacted only in 1995, as part of the revision of titles 1 and 2. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207, 2294. By contrast, the jurisdictional age restrictions of juvenile courts have been a feature of the law since 1943, when juvenile courts were first created. Act of Apr. 21, 1943, 48th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 313. In our opinion, the legislature did not intend to change by such indirect means the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As the court said in McAlpine v. State, 457 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ), the juvenile court is "a statutory court of limited jurisdiction." It "can exercise no jurisdiction other than that conferred on it by the statute by which it is established." Id. at 427. Section 51.02 of the Family Code "defines a jurisdictional prerequisite for juvenile court proceedings." In the Matter of J.T., 526 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ). "Because the juvenile court is not one of general jurisdiction, its power to act is derived exclusively from the statutory grant of authority delineated in the Family Code." In the Matter of A.S., 875 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).

Nothing in the legislative history of Senate Bill 247, which raised the age of compulsory school attendance, indicates that the legislature intended to change the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Nor is it the case that a person who violates the truancy law for the first time after his 17th birthday is beyond the law's authority. Such an individual may still be prosecuted under section 25.094 of the Education Code, and, upon a finding of truancy by the justice of the peace or municipal judge, the court may impose any or all of the sanctions provided in section 54.021(d) of the Family Code, including attendance at preparatory classes for the high school equivalency examination and alcohol and drug abuse programs, community service, and suspension of the truant's driver's license. An offense under section 25.094 is a class C misdemeanor. Furthermore, the statute clearly contemplates that a person may be prosecuted for truancy as often as once every four weeks. Section 25.094 indicates that a truancy offense occurs when an individual "fails to attend school for the amount of time specified under Section 51.03(b)(2), Family Code," i.e. "the unexcused voluntary absence of a child on 10 or more days or parts of days within a six-month period or three or more days or parts of days within a four-week period from school without the consent of his parents."

We conclude that a juvenile court is without jurisdiction to conduct an adjudication hearing for a person referred as a truant by a justice or municipal court if the conduct that forms the basis for the referral occurred after the person attained the age of 17.

SUMMARY

A juvenile court is without jurisdiction to conduct an adjudication hearing for a person referred as a truant by a justice or municipal court if the conduct that forms the basis for the referral occurred after the person attained the age of 17.

JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas

ANDY TAYLOR
First Assistant Attorney General

CLARK KENT ERVIN
Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel

ELIZABETH ROBINSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General - Opinion Committee