Does a parole condition to register as a sex offender force local police to register the parolee?

Texas AG Opinion JC-0010: A Parole Condition to Register as a Sex Offender Does Not Bind Local Police

Plain-English summary

A parolee's release paperwork, the "Rules and General Conditions of Parole Release," included a condition requiring him to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program." The parolee went to the Arlington Police Department to register. The department gathered his information, fingerprints, and photograph, but after consulting the city attorney concluded that chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not actually require it to register him, and it did not. The request explained the tragic background: the parolee was later convicted of abducting and killing a young Arlington woman and sentenced to death. A state senator asked the Attorney General whether the parole condition, by itself, legally obligated the local police to register him.

The Attorney General concluded it did not. The parole contract is an agreement between the parolee and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Pardons and Paroles Division. The opinion declined to interpret what "comply" meant in that contract (the AG does not construe contracts), but said it did not matter: even assuming the contract required the parolee himself to register, a contract cannot impose duties on someone who never signed it, and the local law enforcement authority was not a party. Separately, chapter 62 requires a law enforcement authority to register only a person who has a "reportable conviction or adjudication," a category the legislature defined in article 62.01(5). The Pardons and Paroles Division has broad power to set reasonable parole conditions, but it cannot rewrite that statutory definition to manufacture a registration duty for police. The opinion pointed to Government Code section 508.186(a), which directs the Division to require registration for a person who already has a reportable conviction or adjudication, as confirming that the legislature, not the Division, decides which offenses trigger registration. Following its usual practice, the opinion answered only the question asked and expressly left several related questions open, including whether police may register such a parolee voluntarily and whether the parolee's prior juvenile adjudication was itself reportable. It also noted it could not answer two questions the Arlington Police Department had posed, because a police department is not among the officials authorized to request an Attorney General opinion.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. The Texas sex-offender registration statutes in chapter 62 have been reorganized and amended since 1999, so article numbers and specific requirements may differ today. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the parole condition force the police to register the parolee?
No. The opinion concluded that a parole contract requiring a parolee to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program" does not, by itself, impose a duty on a local law enforcement authority to register the parolee under chapter 62.

Why didn't the contract bind the police department?
Because the contract was between the parolee and the Pardons and Paroles Division. The opinion reasoned that, assuming it was a contract, nothing in it imposed duties on an entity that was not a signatory, and the local law enforcement authority had not signed it.

Who decides which offenses trigger a registration duty?
The legislature. A law enforcement authority must register only a person with a "reportable conviction or adjudication" as defined in article 62.01(5). The opinion concluded the Pardons and Paroles Division cannot amend that statutory definition through parole conditions, even though it may impose reasonable conditions of parole under Government Code section 508.221.

Did the opinion decide whether the police could have registered him anyway?
No. The opinion expressly declined to address whether a law enforcement authority may register a parolee who is not otherwise required by statute to register, any liability for doing so, and whether the parolee's earlier juvenile adjudication counted as a reportable conviction or adjudication.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion defined the registration "duty" at issue as a law enforcement authority's duty to forward a completed registration form to the Department of Public Safety (Code of Criminal Procedure article 62.03(c)) and, in some cases, to publish notice of the person's name and intended residence (article 62.03(e)). The facts: a person received a 1991 juvenile adjudication for a sex offense against a minor, was released by the Texas Youth Commission in 1992, was later imprisoned for burglary, and was paroled in 1997 with a condition to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program."

The parole document, titled "Rules and General Conditions of Parole Release," is an agreement signed only by the parolee and a representative of the Pardons and Paroles Division (see Government Code section 508.154(a), requiring that a parolee be furnished a contract stating the conditions and rules of parole). The opinion noted competing readings of the "comply" condition (the senator read it to require registration outright; the City of Arlington read it to require registration only if chapter 62 independently required it) but declined to choose between them, citing the long-standing rule that the office does not construe contracts (DM-494 (1998); DM-383 (1996); DM-192 (1992)).

The opinion then resolved the question on two independent grounds. First, a contract imposes no duties on a non-signatory, so even if the contract obligated the parolee to register, it could not obligate the local law enforcement authority. Second, chapter 62 requires registration only for a person with a "reportable conviction or adjudication" under article 62.01(5) (see also articles 62.02(c) and 62.03(e)), and the opinion assumed, as the request posited, that the parolee had none. While Government Code section 508.221 lets the Division impose any reasonable parole condition (compare Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12, § 11(a), for community supervision), it does not let the Division amend the statutory definition of reportable convictions and adjudications. Government Code section 508.186(a), which directs the Division to require registration of a person who has a reportable conviction or adjudication, confirmed that the legislature defines those triggering circumstances. Finally, applying its policy of answering only the question asked (JM-567 (1986)), the opinion left open the voluntary-registration and juvenile-adjudication questions, and declined the Arlington Police Department's own questions because a police department is not an authorized requestor under Government Code sections 402.042 and 402.043, so section 402.045 barred answering them.

Citations

Statutory provisions:

• TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.01(5), .02(c), .03(c), .03(e) (Vernon Supp. 1999)
• TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999)
• TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 508.154(a), 508.186(a), 508.221 (Vernon 1998)
• TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 402.042, 402.043, 402.045

Prior Attorney General opinions cited: DM-494 (1998); DM-383 (1996); DM-192 (1992); JM-567 (1986).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/john-cornyn/jc-0010
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1999/jc0010.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF TEXAS

JOHN CORNYN

March 5, 1999

The Honorable Florence Shapiro
Chair, State Affairs Committee
Texas State Senate
P.O. Box 12068
Austin, Texas 78711

Opinion No. JC-0010

Re: Whether a "Rules and General Conditions of Parole Release" contract that requires the parolee to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program" in and of itself obligates a local law enforcement authority to register the parolee (RQ-1113)

Dear Senator Shapiro:

You ask whether a local law enforcement agency must as a matter of law register a parolee as a sex offender on the sole ground that the parolee's parole contract mandates that he or she "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program." In this opinion a law enforcement agency's duty to register a parolee as a sex offender refers to the agency's duty to forward a completed registration form to the Department of Public Safety, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999), and in certain cases to publish notice of the person's name and intended residence, see id. art. 62.03(e). We conclude that a contract between the parolee and a representative of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Pardons and Paroles Division (the "Pardons and Paroles Division") setting out the conditions of parole does not by itself obligate the local law enforcement authority to register the parolee. You do not ask, and we do not consider, whether the law precludes a local law enforcement authority from registering a parolee in these circumstances.

Your request derives from the following facts. In March 1991, an individual received a juvenile adjudication for delinquent conduct involving a sex offense against a minor. The Texas Youth Commission released this person from custody for that offense in December 1992. Two years later this same person was imprisoned for a burglary conviction. He was paroled in June 1997. As one of the conditions of his parole, the Pardons and Paroles Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice required the individual, and he agreed, to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program." Apparently in compliance with the conditions of his parole, the parolee appeared at the Arlington Police Department ("police department") to register as a sex offender. The police department gathered from the parolee the information required by the Sex Offender Registration Program set forth in chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including his fingerprints and photograph. After consulting the Arlington City Attorney, the police department determined that it was not required under the provisions of chapter 62 to register the parolee and, in fact, did not do so. In February 1998, the parolee allegedly abducted and killed a young Arlington woman. The parolee has been convicted of the crime and has been sentenced to death by lethal injection.

In our opinion, the parole contract between a parolee and the Pardons and Paroles Division, which requires a parolee to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program," does not obligate a local law enforcement authority to register the parolee as a sex offender. The contract, partly titled "Rules and General Conditions of Parole Release," represents an agreement between the Pardons and Paroles Division and the parolee. Accord TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.154(a) (Vernon 1998) (requiring that inmate who is to be released on parole be furnished a contract clearly and intelligibly stating conditions and rules of parole). In a nutshell, the contract sets out the conditions the parolee agrees to and the penalties upon the parolee's failure to comply with the agreed upon conditions:

In consideration of the parole granted to me by the Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) I do hereby accept such parole. I recognize that my parole release is conditional and agree to abide by the following terms and conditions:

M. Releasee shall comply with Sex Offender Registration Program.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I fully understand and accept each of the above conditions under which I am being released and agree that I am bound to faithfully observe each of the same. I fully understand and agree that a violation of or refusal of or refusal to comply with any of the conditions of Parole shall be sufficient cause for revocation of Parole

This agreement is signed by only the parolee and a representative of the Pardons and Paroles Division.

Your question, we note, depends in part on the construction of the terms of the parole contract between the parolee and the Pardons and Paroles Division, which requires a parolee to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program." You appear to construe the contract's sex offender registration requirement to require the parolee to register as a sex offender, independent of any statutory obligation to register imposed by chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The City of Arlington articulates another plausible interpretation of the same provision: "The City of Arlington believes that [this condition] requires a parolee to register as a sex offender only if the parolee is required to do so by the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Law." Letter from Gregory S. Norris, Assistant City Attorney, City of Arlington, to The Honorable Dan Morales, Texas Attorney General 1 (Apr. 27, 1998) (on file with the Opinion Committee). In other words, the term "comply" may be read to require registration or, alternatively, to require registration only if the parolee is required to do so under the Sex Offender Registration Program, chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We do not construe contracts and cannot in this opinion choose between the possible constructions of the sex offender registration requirement in the parole contract. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. DM-494 (1998) at 5 n.22; DM-383 (1996) at 2; DM-192 (1992) at 10.

Even if we assume, as you do, that the parole contract requires a parolee who is not otherwise required by statute to register as a sex offender to do so, the parole contract does not obligate a law enforcement agency to register that person as a sex offender under chapter 62. Initially, assuming the parole contract is indeed a contract, nothing in it imposes or purports to impose duties upon any entity not a signatory to the contract, including a local law enforcement authority.

A law enforcement authority is required by the state to register only a person having a "reportable conviction or adjudication" as that phrase is defined by article 62.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.01(5), .02(c), .03(e), (f) (Vernon Supp. 1999). We do not know whether it is true, but we assume as you have requested that the parolee does not have a reportable conviction or adjudication. Absent a reportable conviction or adjudication, we know of no law requiring a law enforcement authority to register an individual as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Program in chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, the Pardons and Paroles Division may not amend the definition of "reportable conviction[s] or adjudication[s]" in article 62.01(5) to include additional offenses for which the Pardons and Paroles Division may deem sex offender registration a fitting condition for parole. Reportable convictions and adjudications are defined in the statute by the legislature. While section 508.221 of the Government Code authorizes the Pardons and Paroles Division to impose any reasonable condition upon a parolee, it does not purport to amend the statutory definition of "reportable conviction or adjudication" under article 62.01(5), which would in turn trigger a law enforcement agency's duty to register an individual as a sex offender. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.221 (Vernon 1998); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999) ("The judge may impose any reasonable condition that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.").

The legislature implicitly has recognized that the power to define the term "reportable convictions or adjudications" lies with it and not with the Pardons and Paroles Division. Section 508.186(a) of the Government Code directs the Division to require, as a condition of parole or mandatory supervision, a person with a reportable conviction or adjudication to register as a sex offender. This provision presumes that the legislature has defined for the Division the circumstances in which sex offender registration must be imposed as a condition of parole or mandatory supervision. We therefore infer that the legislature defines what is a reportable conviction or adjudication and that it did not intend to permit the Division to define alternative circumstances that require sex offender registration as a condition of parole or mandatory supervision.

Consistent with our long-standing policy, we answer only the question you ask. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-567 (1986) at 2. You do not ask several questions that may be pertinent. You do not ask, and we do not address, whether a law enforcement authority may register a parolee who otherwise is not required by statute to register as a sex offender under chapter 62. Nor do we address the liabilities, if any, for doing so. You also do not ask whether the parolee's prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a reportable conviction or adjudication, and if so, whether a law enforcement agency has any discretion in registering that person as a sex offender.

We also do not consider two questions the Arlington Police Department asked regarding a parolee's obligation to register as a sex offender when chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not require the parolee to register. A police department is not among those authorized to request an opinion of this office, as listed in sections 402.042 and 402.043 of the Government Code. Consequently, section 402.045 of the Government Code precludes this office from rendering an opinion in answer to the police department's questions.

SUMMARY

A parole contract that obligates a parolee to "comply with Sex Offender Registration Program" does not in and of itself impose a duty on a local law enforcement authority to register the parolee as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Program in chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas

ANDY TAYLOR
First Assistant Attorney General

CLARK KENT ERVIN
Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel

ELIZABETH ROBINSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Kymberly K. Oltrogge
Assistant Attorney General