Can a Texas school district make employees attend charity fundraising meetings?

Plain-English summary

Section 22.011 of the Education Code says a school district's board or employees may not "directly or indirectly require or coerce" any district employee to make a charitable contribution, to respond to a fund-raiser, or to attend a meeting called to solicit charitable contributions. The same protection runs the other way: the district cannot coerce an employee to refrain from giving either. The chair of the House Public Education Committee told the Attorney General that districts had been applying this differently because they were unsure what counts as "direct" and "indirect" coercion, and asked five questions.

On the first question, the opinion concluded section 22.011 does not stop a district from running charitable campaigns. The statute does not address whether a district may conduct a campaign; it only restricts how district officials behave when soliciting. So authorizing a charitable campaign is not itself prohibited.

The second question was the heart of it: can a district let a charity make a "non-coercive request" at a meeting employees are required to attend? The opinion said no, and the framing as "non-coercive" did not save it. The statute bars requiring attendance at a meeting "called for the purpose of soliciting charitable contributions," and a meeting can have more than one purpose. Because the Legislature did not limit the ban to meetings called solely to solicit, the prohibition applies whenever solicitation is a purpose of a mandatory meeting, regardless of how the pitch is actually delivered. The opinion looked up the ordinary meanings of "require," "coerce," "directly," and "indirectly," and concluded a district may not, by itself or through a charity's representatives, solicit donations at a meeting where attendance is compulsory, instructed, expected, or forced in any way, if solicitation is a purpose of the meeting. If attendance is strictly voluntary, though, a solicitation presentation is not prohibited.

On the third and fourth questions, about distributing solicitation materials through internal mail or email and encouraging employees to give, the opinion concluded section 22.011 does not bar those activities. The statute does not regulate a district's mail or email systems and does not forbid general encouragement, as long as the district does not make a contribution compulsory or instruct, expect, or force an employee to give or not give. The opinion added a caution: because coercion can be subjective, even general encouragement could become coercive depending on the facts. The fifth question, about collecting donations in a way that could identify which employees participated, drew a similar answer: the statute does not expressly prohibit identifying donors, but to the extent identifying them amounts to requiring or coercing a contribution, that approach could run afoul of section 22.011 depending on the facts.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2012. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later Attorney General opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

The requesting committee chair and the Legislature (as the opinion described it): The opinion answered all five questions by construing section 22.011's text, treating the line between a permissible voluntary campaign and prohibited coercion as turning on whether attendance or giving is required and whether solicitation is a purpose of a mandatory meeting.

School districts and administrators (as the opinion described it): The opinion held that a district may run charitable campaigns, distribute materials, and offer general encouragement, but may not require employees to attend a meeting where solicitation is a purpose, and may cross the line if encouragement or donor identification becomes coercive on the facts.

School employees (as the opinion described it): The opinion read section 22.011 as protecting employees from being required or coerced, directly or indirectly, to give or to attend a solicitation meeting, and equally from being coerced to refrain from giving.

Charitable organizations (as the opinion described it): The opinion treated a charity's representatives the same as the district for these purposes: a solicitation at a mandatory meeting is prohibited regardless of who delivers it, but a presentation at a strictly voluntary meeting is allowed.

Common questions

Can a Texas school district require employees to attend a charity fundraising meeting?
No, if soliciting charitable contributions is a purpose of the meeting. The opinion read section 22.011 to bar requiring attendance at such a meeting even when fundraising is not the only purpose and even if the request is framed as non-coercive.

Can a charity present at a school staff meeting at all?
Yes, the opinion said, if attendance is strictly voluntary. Section 22.011 does not prohibit a presentation soliciting donations when employees are not required to be there.

Can the district email solicitation materials or encourage giving?
The opinion concluded the statute does not bar distributing materials or offering general encouragement, as long as the district does not make giving compulsory or pressure employees. It warned that encouragement could still become coercive depending on the facts.

Can the district track who donated?
The opinion said section 22.011 does not expressly prohibit identifying employee donors, but if identifying them operates to require or coerce a contribution, directly or indirectly, that practice could run afoul of the statute depending on the situation.

Background and statutory framework

Section 22.011 of the Education Code prohibits a school district board or employee from directly or indirectly requiring or coercing any district employee to make a charitable contribution, respond to a fund-raiser, or attend a meeting called to solicit charitable contributions, and likewise prohibits coercing an employee to refrain from doing those things. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.011 (West Supp. 2011). The meeting-attendance prohibitions are in § 22.011(a)(2) and (b)(2).

The opinion read the meeting-purpose language by comparison to statutes where the Legislature did limit a provision to a single-purpose meeting, citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 209.014(h) and Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 313.025(d-1)(1), and relying on FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin for the principle that the Legislature knows how to say "sole purpose" when it means it. Because "require," "coerce," "directly," and "indirectly" are undefined, the opinion used their plain meanings, drawing on State v. K.E.W. for the plain-meaning approach. It cited Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. for the point that a voluntary presence on campus is not coercion, and noted the Comptroller's definition of "coercive activity" in 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.48(w)(1) as a comparison.

Citations

Cases:

• FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 884-85 (Tex. 2000)
• State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 21-22 (Tex. 2010)
• Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1050-53 (5th Cir. 1985)

Statutes:

• Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.011 (West Supp. 2011)
• Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2011)
• Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 209.014(h) (West Supp. 2011)
• Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 313.025(d-1)(1) (West Supp. 2011)
• 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.48(w)(1) (2011)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0949
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2012/ga0949.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from the official PDF. Minor extraction artifacts were corrected; the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

June 12, 2012

The Honorable Rob Eissler Opinion No. GA-0949
Chair, Committee on Public Education
Texas House of Representatives Re: Whether, under particular circumstances, a
Post Office Box 2910 school district may, pursuant to section 22.011,
Austin, Texas 78768-2910 Education Code, permit charities to participate in
campaigns to solicit contributions (RQ-1031-GA)

Dear Representative Eissler:

You ask five questions regarding section 22.011 of the Education Code, which prohibits school districts from requiring or coercing school district employees to make charitable contributions. You explain that school districts' implementation of section 22.011 has varied widely because of confusion over what constitutes "direct" and "indirect" coercion, both of which the statute prohibits. Request Letter at 1.[1] Section 22.011 provides:

(a) A school district board of trustees or school district employee may not directly or indirectly require or coerce any school district employee to:

(1) make a contribution to a charitable organization or in response to a fund-raiser; or

(2) attend a meeting called for the purpose of soliciting charitable contributions.

(b) A school district board of trustees or school district employee may not directly or indirectly require or coerce any school district employee to refrain from:

(1) making a contribution to a charitable organization or in response to a fund-raiser; or

(2) attending a meeting called for the purpose of soliciting charitable contributions.

TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West Supp. 2011).[2]

You first ask whether the statute prohibits a school district from authorizing charitable campaigns to be conducted as part of its operations. Request Letter at 1. Section 22.011 does not address the general authority of a school district to conduct a charitable campaign. Instead, it merely restricts a school district board of trustees' or district employees' conduct when soliciting charitable contributions. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West Supp. 2011). Thus, in response to your first question, section 22.011 does not prohibit a school district from authorizing charitable campaigns to be conducted as part of its operations.

You next ask whether a school district may allow a charitable campaign representative to make a "non-coercive request" for donations at a meeting of school district personnel, including meetings where employees' attendance is compulsory. Request Letter at 2. Further, you specifically ask about a compulsory meeting held for some other principal purpose that also includes a presentation by representatives of a charitable campaign wherein donations are solicited. See id. The plain language of section 22.011 prohibits a school district from requiring or coercing, whether directly or indirectly, either the attendance or nonattendance of employees at a meeting "called for the purpose of soliciting charitable contributions," regardless of how donations are actually solicited. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2011). Section 22.011 specifies that the type of meeting to which the prohibition in subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) applies is one that is "called for the purpose of soliciting charitable contributions." Id. To be sure, a meeting can have multiple purposes. Nothing in the plain language of section 22.011 suggests that the Legislature intended to limit the statute's application to meetings called solely for the purpose of soliciting charitable contributions. Indeed, when the Legislature wants to specify that a prohibition is limited to meetings with a singular purpose, it knows how to do so. See FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 884-85 (Tex. 2000) (relying on the principle of statutory construction that the Legislature knows how to enact law effectuating its intent); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 209.014(h) (West Supp. 2011) (stating that an election committee of a property owners' association may call meetings of certain owners "for the sole purpose of electing board members"); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 313.025(d-1)(1) (West Supp. 2011) (authorizing the governing body of a school district to approve a certain tax relief application if it holds a public hearing "the sole purpose of which is to consider the application"). Thus, if a purpose of the meeting is to solicit charitable contributions—even if soliciting contributions is not the sole purpose of the meeting—then mandating attendance at such a meeting is prohibited by section 22.011(a)(2).

To fully answer your second question, we next examine the meaning of the terms "require" and "coerce," which are not defined in the Education Code. Similarly, the Code also does not define the terms "directly" or "indirectly." When a word is not defined by statute, we look to its plain meaning, beginning with the commonly understood definition. See State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 21-22 (Tex. 2010). The common understanding of "require" is "specify as compulsory" or "instruct or expect (someone) to do something." NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1447 (2001). To "coerce" means to "persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by using force or threats." Id. at 331. The term "directly" is defined as "with nothing or no one in between" while the term "indirectly" is defined as "not done directly; conducted through intermediaries." Id. at 483, 865. Thus, in response to your second question, under the plain language of the statute a school district may not, directly or through representatives of a charitable campaign, solicit donations at a meeting where employees' attendance is compulsory, instructed, expected, or forced in any manner if the solicitation of charitable donations is a purpose—even if not the sole purpose—of the meeting. On the other hand, if meeting attendance is strictly voluntary, nothing in the statute prohibits a presentation wherein a charity's representatives solicit donations. See Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1050-53 (5th Cir. 1985) (analyzing the predecessor to a similar provision in Education Code, now section 21.407,[3] providing that school districts may not "directly or indirectly require or coerce any teacher" to join any particular organization and rejecting the contention that the mention of an organization on campus during school hours would be seen as "coercion" to join that organization).

Because we use similar analysis to evaluate your third and fourth questions, we address them together. Citing section 22.011, you ask whether a district may "allow written or electronic materials soliciting charitable contributions to be distributed through internal mail or email systems." You also ask whether district personnel may "encourage employees in any way to contribute to a charitable campaign." Request Letter at 2. Section 22.011 does not address the general authority of a school district to regulate the use of school mail operations or email systems. Similarly, nothing in the plain language of section 22.011 prohibits school district officers from generally offering encouragement to district employees with respect to potential charitable donations. Thus, in response to your third and fourth questions, we conclude that section 22.011 does not prohibit a school district from sending solicitation materials or offering general encouragement as long as the school district and its officers neither make a contribution compulsory, nor instruct, expect, or force an employee to make—or refrain from making—a charitable contribution. However, because coercion can be subjective, offering general encouragement could rise to the level of coercive activity, depending on the facts of a particular situation. Cf. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.48(w)(1) (2011) (Comptroller of Public Accounts, Deductions for Contributions to Charitable Organizations) (defining "coercive activity" in connection with state employee charitable campaigns).

Finally, you ask whether section 22.011 permits "district personnel [to] collect charitable contributions on behalf of a charitable campaign if doing so could identify which employees participated." Request Letter at 2. Section 22.011 does not address the general authority of a school district to collect charitable donations on behalf of charitable campaigns. Nor does it expressly prohibit the identification of district employees who have contributed to a charitable campaign. However, to the extent that identifying employee donors could constitute requiring or coercing a charitable contribution—whether directly or indirectly—that particular approach to soliciting donations could be construed to run afoul of section 22.011, depending on the facts of the situation.

SUMMARY

The plain language of section 22.011 of the Education Code does not prohibit school districts from authorizing charitable organizations to solicit donations from employees.

Under section 22.011, a school district may not, directly or through representatives of a charitable campaign, solicit donations during meetings wherein school district employees' attendance is compulsory, instructed, expected, or forced in any manner if the solicitation of charitable donations is a purpose of the meeting. Section 22.011's prohibition applies even if the solicitation of charitable contributions is not the sole purpose of the meeting. If meeting attendance is strictly voluntary, section 22.011 does not prohibit presentations soliciting charitable donations.

Nothing in section 22.011 prohibits charitable donation solicitation materials from being distributed, nor does it prevent district employees from being generally encouraged to participate in a charitable campaign as long as the school district does not make a contribution compulsory, or otherwise instruct, expect, or force an employee either to make—or refrain from making—a contribution in any manner.

To the extent that identifying employee donors could constitute direct or indirect coercion, section 22.011 could be construed to preclude that activity, depending on the facts of the situation.

DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General

JAMES D. BLACKLOCK
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JASON BOATRIGHT
Chair, Opinion Committee

Becky P. Casares
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

[1] See Letter from Honorable Rob Eissler, Chair, House Comm. on Pub. Educ., to Honorable Greg Abbott, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1 (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opin ("Request Letter").

[2] Because all of your questions concern section 22.011, we limit our analysis to the construction of this statute and do not address other provisions that may impact your questions.

[3] See Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, §§ 1, 58, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207, 2280, 2498 (enacting section 21.407 and repealing section 21.904 in the reenactment and revision of Education Code Titles 1 and 2).