Can a Texas court order emergency medical treatment of a jail inmate under Health and Safety Code 773.008?

Plain-English summary

Tarrant County faced a practical problem: some people held in its local jail refused to take medication they needed, and the county wanted a lawful, efficient way to administer treatment. The Criminal District Attorney asked the Attorney General whether one specific statute, section 773.008(2) of the Health and Safety Code, by itself lets a court of record order emergency medical treatment of a jail detainee, and if so, what procedures would protect the detainee's rights.

The Attorney General read the statute in the context of the whole chapter it sits in. Chapter 773 is the Emergency Health Care Act, whose purpose is the prompt transportation of sick and injured patients. Section 773.008 is titled "Consent for Emergency Care," and it lists situations in which consent for emergency care is not required. One of those, subsection (2), is when a court of record orders treatment of a person in an imminent emergency to prevent serious bodily injury or loss of life.

The key insight was that this subsection only removes a consent requirement; it does not create a court's power to order treatment in the first place. Nothing in the subsection or anywhere else in the Act says which courts of record would have jurisdiction, what kind of proceeding would be involved, or what evidence and procedures would be needed. The opinion contrasted that silence with other statutes where the Legislature clearly authorized courts to order medical treatment and spelled out the procedures. Reading subsection 773.008(2) as a hidden, procedure-free grant of authority would not fit that pattern. So the Attorney General concluded the subsection, standing alone, neither expressly nor impliedly authorizes courts of record to order emergency medical treatment of local jail detainees. Having answered that, the opinion did not reach the second question about procedures, did not address other possible sources of a court's authority, and applied judicial restraint to avoid the constitutional questions in the request.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later Attorney General opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

Counties and jail officials (as the opinion held for them): The opinion told them they could not treat section 773.008(2) as a standalone authorization for a court to order medical treatment of a detainee. The subsection waives the consent requirement once a court has ordered treatment, but the authority to issue such an order has to rest on some other legal source.

Courts of record (as the opinion described it): Under the opinion, section 773.008(2) does not by itself confer jurisdiction or procedures for ordering a detainee's treatment, and the Act gives no guidance on which court, what proceeding, or what evidence would apply.

On the limits of the opinion (what the AG did not reach): The opinion expressly declined to address the procedures asked about in the second question, other potential sources of a court's authority, and the constitutional issues, resolving the matter on the narrow ground of the statute's text.

Common questions

Does section 773.008(2) let a court order a jail inmate's treatment on its own?
No. The opinion concluded the subsection does not, in and of itself, grant a court of record that authority.

What does section 773.008(2) actually do?
The opinion explained it provides that consent for emergency care is not required when a court of record orders treatment of a person in an imminent emergency to prevent serious bodily injury or loss of life.

Why did the AG read it that way?
The opinion reasoned that when the Legislature wants to authorize court-ordered treatment, it does so expressly and with procedures, and the Act contains no such procedures or jurisdictional guidance.

Did the opinion say where a court's authority could come from instead?
No. The opinion limited itself to section 773.008(2) and did not address other potential sources of authority or the constitutional questions raised.

Background and statutory framework

A statute is construed in the context of the entire statutory scheme in which it appears. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. 2000). Chapter 773 of the Health and Safety Code is the Emergency Health Care Act, whose stated purpose is the prompt and efficient transportation of sick and injured patients. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 773.002 (West 2010). Section 773.008, "Consent for Emergency Care," lists circumstances in which consent is not required, including, in subsection (2), when a court of record orders treatment of a person in an imminent emergency to prevent serious bodily injury or loss of life. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 773.008(2). A statute's caption provides some indication of legislative intent. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308-09 (Tex. 2010).

The opinion contrasted the Act's silence with statutes that expressly authorize court-ordered treatment and supply procedures, such as the provision for medicating a defendant found incompetent to stand trial, court-ordered care for certain older children, treatment for chemical dependency, court-ordered mental health services, and emergency protective services for elderly or disabled persons. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.086 (West Supp. 2010); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 266.010(d), (g) (West 2008); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 462.061, .075 (West 2010); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 48.208 (West Supp. 2010). Because the statute's text resolved the question, the opinion applied judicial restraint and did not reach the constitutional issues. VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2007).

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 773.008(2)
• Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 773.002 (West 2010)
• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.086 (West Supp. 2010)
• Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 266.010(d), (g) (West 2008)
• Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 462.061, .075 (West 2010)
• Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 48.208 (West Supp. 2010)

Cases:

• Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. 2000)
• In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308-09 (Tex. 2010)
• VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2007)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0855
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2011/ga0855.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from the official PDF. Minor extraction artifacts were corrected; the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

April 28, 2011

The Honorable Joe Shannon, Jr. Opinion No. GA-0855
Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney
Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center Re: Whether Texas Health and Safety Code
401 West Belknap section 773.008(2) authorizes a court of record,
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201 independently of any other source of authority, to
order emergency medical treatment of a local jail
detainee (RQ-0915-GA)

Dear Mr. Shannon:

You inform us that Tarrant County is seeking an efficient but legal method for administering appropriate medical treatment to local jail detainees who are uncooperative in taking necessary medication.[1] You ask whether subsection 773.008(2) of the Texas Health and Safety Code authorizes a court of record, independently of any other source of authority, to order emergency medical treatment of a local jail detainee and, if so, what procedures should be followed to protect the procedural and substantive rights of the detainee and other affected parties. Request Letter at 2.

A statute is construed in the context of the entire statutory scheme in which it appears. See Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. 2000). Chapter 773 of the Health and Safety Code codifies the Emergency Health Care Act (the "Act"), the stated purpose of which "is to provide for the prompt and efficient transportation of sick and injured patients, after necessary stabilization, and to encourage public access to that transportation in each area of the state." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 773.002 (West 2010); see also id. § 773.001 (stating the Act's popular name). Section 773.008, entitled "Consent for Emergency Care," provides that "[c]onsent for emergency care of an individual is not required if" circumstances exist as described in one of three subdivisions. Id. § 773.008.[2] Subsection 773.008(2), the subject of your question, provides that "[c]onsent for emergency care of an individual is not required if . . . a court of record orders the treatment of an individual who is in an imminent emergency to prevent the individual's serious bodily injury or loss of life." Id. § 773.008(2). No other provision in the Act mentions or refers to court-ordered treatment. See generally id. §§ 773.001-.205.

Subsection (2) of section 773.008 provides only that consent is not required if a court of record orders treatment under the circumstances described. Id. § 773.008(2). Subsection (2) does not expressly purport to be the source of a court's authority to issue such an order. Nor does the subsection or any other provision in the Act imply that the subsection, in and of itself, constitutes a grant of authority. Notably absent from the Act is any guidance about which courts of record would have jurisdiction to issue such an order, the nature of proceeding in which such an order might be warranted, or the evidence and procedures necessary to support such an order.

In other statutes, the Legislature has repeatedly demonstrated that when it wishes to authorize a court to order medical treatment, it does so expressly in statutes that include specific procedural requirements. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.086 (West Supp. 2010) (authorizing the court in the county in which a criminal proceeding is pending to issue an order authorizing the administration of medications to a defendant determined to be incompetent to stand trial); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 266.010(d), (g) (West 2008) (provision authorizing court-ordered medical care for child over the age of sixteen who has refused treatment); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 462.061, .075 (West 2010) (proceedings for court-ordered treatment of chemical dependency); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 574 (West 2010) (provisions for court-ordered mental health services); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.208 (West Supp. 2010) (authorizing court in county in which elderly or disabled person resides to issue an emergency order for protective services including medical care). It is unlikely that the Legislature intended subsection 773.008(2) to grant courts of record the authority to order medical treatment, doing so only by implication and without any guidance about its proper application. We therefore conclude that Health and Safety Code subsection 773.008(2) neither expressly nor impliedly grants authority to courts of record, without regard to any other source of authority, to order emergency medical treatment of local jail detainees.[3] Having so concluded, we need not address your second question.

SUMMARY

Texas Health and Safety Code section 773.008(2) does not, in and of itself, grant authority to courts of record to order emergency medical treatment of local jail detainees.

Very truly yours,

DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID J. SCHENCK
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JASON BOATRIGHT
Chair, Opinion Committee

William A. Hill
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

[1] See Letter from Honorable Joe Shannon, Jr., Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas at 1 (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opin/index_rq.shtml ("Request Letter").

[2] While a statute's caption or title does not limit or expand a statute's meaning, it provides some indication of the Legislature's intent. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308-09 (Tex. 2010).

[3] We conform our analysis to the precise question you ask about the scope of Health and Safety Code subsection 773.008(2) and do not address any other potential source of authority for a court to issue such an order. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 24.008 (providing that a "district court may hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could be granted by either courts of law or equity"); 24.011 (authority of district judge to "grant writs of mandamus, injunction, sequestration, attachment, garnishment, certiorari, and supersedeas and all other writs necessary to the enforcement of the court's jurisdiction"); 26.050 (providing that, subject to certain limitations, "a county court may hear and determine any cause in law or equity that a court of law or equity recognizes and may grant any relief that may be granted by a court of law or equity"); 26.051 (authority of county judge to "grant writs of mandamus, injunction, sequestration, attachment, garnishment, certiorari, and supersedeas and all other writs necessary to the enforcement of the court's jurisdiction") (West 2004). Moreover, because we are able to answer your question from a construction of the language of section 773.008(2), we do not address the extensive constitutional issues you discuss in your request letter. See Request Letter at 2-4; see also VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2007) (stating a principle of judicial restraint that "when a case may be decided on a non-constitutional ground, we should rest our decision on that ground and not wade into ancillary constitutional questions").