Can a Texas school district run payroll deductions for its employees' political action committee (PAC) contributions?

TX AG Opinion GA-0774: Can a school district process payroll deductions for employees' political committee contributions?

Plain-English summary

A state representative forwarded a colleague's question: may a school district use its resources to process payroll deductions that fund political contributions? The concrete setup was that the Texas State Teachers Association gave members a form authorizing their school district employers to deduct monthly amounts from paychecks for the TSTA Political Action Committee (TSTA-PAC) and the National Education Association Fund for Children and Public Education (NEA-Fund), both political action committees. Districts received the forms, set up the deductions, and forwarded the money to the committees.

The opinion started from a basic rule of Texas school-district law: a district has only the powers the constitution or statutes expressly grant it, or that are necessarily implied from those grants. On express authority, the opinion looked at Education Code section 22.001, which entitles a school employee to have an amount deducted from salary for "membership fees or dues to a professional organization." For that statute to cover the PAC deductions, two things would have to be true: the PACs would have to be "professional organizations," and the contributions would have to be "membership fees or dues." Neither held. Using ordinary dictionary meanings, a professional organization is a group of professionals organized for a common purpose relating to their profession, which describes TSTA and NEA, but not their political committees, whose function is to collect contributions and make political expenditures to influence elections. And political contributions are not membership fees or dues, because they do not buy membership status; state and federal law, and even the teacher groups' own briefs, treat PAC contributions as separate from dues. So districts had no express authority under section 22.001.

On implied authority, the opinion reasoned that a district may do only what is necessary, not merely convenient, to carry out its express duties. Districts can process dues deductions without also processing PAC contributions, and the Legislature separately and expressly authorized deductions for things like health-care and child-care expenses, which shows it grants such powers item by item rather than leaving them to implication. Reading an implied power to process political deductions into section 22.001 would make those separate express grants pointless. The conclusion fit the Legislature's broader aversion to using public resources for politics, reflected in statutes barring districts from electioneering and barring state agencies from financing candidacies. The opinion added that a decision not to authorize political payroll deductions would likely survive a First Amendment challenge, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association that a state need not affirmatively assist political speech by administering such deductions. Finally, on the argument that processing these deductions could be a criminal abuse of office under Penal Code section 39.02, the opinion declined to decide: that offense requires proof of the public servant's culpable mental state, a fact question that cannot be resolved in the opinion process.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Education Code section 22.001 and the related deduction and election statutes may have been amended since 2010, and the Legislature later enacted further restrictions on public-employee payroll deductions for some purposes. Confirm the current statutes before relying on anything below.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2010)

School districts and their payroll staff: The opinion told them that Texas law did not authorize them to process payroll deductions for contributions to political committees like TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund, and that doing so was prohibited; their express deduction powers covered dues, health-care, child-care, and security for indebtedness, not political contributions.

Teacher associations and their political committees: The opinion distinguished the associations (which it treated as professional organizations whose dues districts could deduct under section 22.001) from their PACs (whose contributions districts could not process).

School employees who wanted to give to a PAC: The opinion noted, in a footnote, that neither it nor the Ysursa decision affected an employee's right to contribute to political committees through some method other than a publicly administered payroll deduction.

Common questions

Can my Texas school district deduct PAC contributions from my paycheck?
No. The opinion concluded districts have no express or implied authority to process payroll deductions for political-committee contributions, so Texas law prohibits it.

Doesn't the dues-deduction statute cover this?
No. Section 22.001 covers "membership fees or dues to a professional organization." The opinion found PACs are not professional organizations and political contributions are not membership fees or dues.

Is banning these deductions a First Amendment violation?
Likely not. The opinion relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, which held a state need not administer payroll deductions for political activities.

Could a district employee who processes these deductions be charged under Penal Code section 39.02?
The opinion did not decide. That offense requires proof of a culpable mental state, a fact question that cannot be resolved in an AG opinion.

Can I still give to a PAC?
Yes. The opinion said employees remained free to contribute to political committees through a method other than a publicly administered payroll deduction.

Background and statutory framework

School districts exercise only powers expressly granted or necessarily implied (Geffert v. Yorktown Indep. Sch. Dist., 290 S.W. 1083, 1084 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927); Fowler v. Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 232 S.W.3d 335, 338-39 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. denied)). Education Code section 22.001(a) entitles an employee to a deduction for "membership fees or dues to a professional organization" (Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.001(a) (Vernon 2006)). Construing the undefined term "professional organization" by its common meaning (Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005)), the opinion concluded the teacher associations qualify but their committees, TSTA-PAC (a general-purpose committee under Election Code section 251.001(14)) and NEA-Fund (a federally regulated separate segregated fund), do not (Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 251.001(14)(A)-(B) (Vernon 2010); 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 151101, 151102 (2001)). Political contributions are not membership fees or dues, because they confer no membership status (Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 251.001(3) (Vernon 2010); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2010)).

The opinion found no implied authority, since districts can process dues without processing PAC contributions and the Legislature granted separate express deduction powers for health-care, child-care, and security for indebtedness, which would be unnecessary if section 22.001 implied broader authority (Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 22.002(b), 22.005 (Vernon 2006); Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 3.51 (Vernon 2009); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 610.021 (Vernon 2004); Thompson v. Elmo Indep. Sch. Dist., 269 S.W. 868, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1925, no writ); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 636 (Tex. 2008); Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990)). That fit the Legislature's general aversion to public funds for politics (Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.169 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 556.004(a) (Vernon 2004)). A ban would likely survive First Amendment review (Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098, 1101 (2009)). Whether a particular deduction would violate Penal Code section 39.02(a)(2) turns on a culpable mental state and is a fact question outside the opinion process (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009)).

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 22.001(a), 22.002(b), 22.005 (Vernon 2006); § 11.169 (Vernon Supp. 2009)
• Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005), 610.021, 556.004(a) (Vernon 2004)
• Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 251.001(14)(A)-(B), 251.001(3) (Vernon 2010)
• Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 3.51 (Vernon 2009)
• Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009)
• 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 151101, 151102 (2001); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2010)

Cases:

• Geffert v. Yorktown Indep. Sch. Dist., 290 S.W. 1083 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927)
• Fowler v. Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 232 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. denied)
• Thompson v. Elmo Indep. Sch. Dist., 269 S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1925, no writ)
• City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008)
• Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990)
• Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0774
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2010/ga0774.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

GREG ABBOTT

May 14, 2010

The Honorable Rob Eissler
Chairman, Committee on Public Education
Texas House of Representatives
Post Office Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78768-2910

Opinion No. GA-0774

Re: Whether school district resources may be used to process payroll deductions to fund political donations (RQ-0688-GA)

Dear Representative Eissler:

You have requested that we answer the question submitted by your colleague, Representative Leo Berman, who asked, "Is it permissible for government resources to be utilized to process government paycheck deductions for political campaign donations?" He limited his analysis to whether a school district may process a payroll deduction for political contributions to a political committee. See Request Letter at 1-3. We limit our analysis accordingly. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0670 (2008) at 2 n.2, JC-0521 (2002) at 2, DM-42 (1991) at 1 (limiting analysis to issues discussed in the opinion request letter).

I. Background

The Request Letter notes that the Texas State Teachers Association ("TSTA") provides its members and prospective members a form on which they may authorize their school district employers to make automatic, monthly deductions from their paychecks for payment to the TSTA Political Action Committee ("TSTA-PAC") and the National Education Association Fund for Children and Public Education ("NEA-Fund"), which is also a political action committee. See Request Letter at 2 (citing Texas State Teachers Association/National Education Agency Enrollment Form and TSTA-PAC Direct Debit Authorization Form). Completed forms are forwarded to school districts, which process the authorizations and deduct the political contributions to TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund from employees' paychecks. Request Letter at 2. According to the Request Letter, school district resources are used to set up the deductions and facilitate the transfer of funds to TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund. Id.

II. Legal Analysis

School districts may process payroll deductions only if their authority to do so is expressly granted by the constitution or statutes or necessarily implied therefrom. See Geffert v. Yorktown Indep. Sch. Dist., 290 S.W. 1083, 1084 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927) (explaining that independent school districts have only those powers specifically given or implied as a necessary incident to those expressly conferred and that their powers must be exercised in strict conformity with the mandatory direction of the Legislature); Fowler v. Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 232 S.W.3d 335, 338-39 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. denied) (noting that a public school district exercises only those powers that the state delegates to it); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0596 (2008) at 2 n.2 (same).

A. Express Statutory Authority

We have not found, and no briefing to this office has identified, any statute specifically authorizing a school district to provide payroll deductions for political contributions to political committees. The Request Letter discusses section 22.001 of the Education Code, which provides, "A school district employee is entitled to have an amount deducted from the employee's salary for membership fees or dues to a professional organization." TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (Vernon 2006). We review section 22.001 to determine whether it authorizes payroll deductions for political contributions to political committees. School districts would have express statutory authority to utilize governmental resources to process such deductions for contributions to TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund under section 22.001 if TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund were "professional organizations" and the deductions were "membership fees or dues."

No statute, rule, or appellate court opinion defines the term "professional organization" as used in section 22.001(a). Nor were we provided any information, briefing, or analysis attempting to define the term. When statutory terms are undefined, they are to be construed according to their common meaning. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). Texas courts rely on dictionaries to determine the meaning of terms not defined in statute. See Ctr. Point Energy Entex v. R.R. Comm'n, 208 S.W.3d 608, 619 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. dism'd) (explaining that Texas courts may rely on commonly-used dictionaries to discern the plain meaning of statutory terms) (citing Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005)); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0577 (2002) at 2 (relying on a dictionary to determine the meaning of an undefined term in the Texas Education Code). A commonly-used dictionary defines a "professional association" as "[a] group of professionals organized for education, social activity, or lobbying, such as a bar association." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). The noun "organization" means: "A body of persons (such as a union or corporation) formed for a common purpose. — Also termed society." Id. at 1210. The adjective "professional" means "of, relating to, or characteristic of a profession." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 991 (11th ed. 2004); see also id. (defining the noun "profession" as "a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation"). These definitions suggest that the term "professional organization" could be defined as a group of professionals organized for a common purpose relating to their profession.

In order to determine whether TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund are groups of professionals organized for a common purpose relating to their profession for purposes of Education Code section 22.001, we contrast the functions of TSTA and NEA from those of TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund. TSTA-PAC is a general purpose political committee under chapter 251 of Texas Election Code. See supra note 5. Section 251.001 describes a "general-purpose committee" as a "political committee that has among its principal purposes: supporting or opposing: two or more candidates who are unidentified or are seeking offices that are unknown; or one or more measures that are unidentified; or assisting two or more officeholders who are unidentified." TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 251.001(14)(A)-(B) (Vernon 2010) (internal notations omitted). NEA-Fund is a political committee and separate segregated fund ("SSF") regulated by the FEC. See supra note 5. NEA-Fund collects contributions to make contributions, expenditures, and political communications to influence federal elections. See FEC, SEPARATE SEGREGATED FUNDS AND NON-CONNECTED PACs. Thus, political committees perform a somewhat narrow range of state and federally-regulated political functions.

NEA is a federally-chartered corporation formed to advance the profession of teaching and promote the cause of education in America. 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 151101, 151102 (2001). TSTA is a non-profit corporation organized for educational and scientific purposes. TSTA performs many functions associated with professional organizations, such as offering its members teaching workshops, online classes through the NEA Academy, and summer leadership academies. See About TSTA/NEA. TSTA also offers Educational Support Professional Conferences and professional awards programs. See TSTA LOCAL ASSOCIATIONS. In addition to its educational programs, TSTA offers its members access to discounted products and services, the ability to purchase health-care coverage, legal liability coverage, and access to NEA programs. See ABOUT TSTA/NEA, supra note 11. In summary, TSTA and NEA appear to be groups of professionals organized for a purpose relating to their profession, while TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund appear merely to collect contributions and make contributions, expenditures, and political communications to influence elections.

In order for a school district to have authority to process the payroll deductions for contributions to TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund, not only would those political committees have to be "professional organizations" for purposes of section 22.001, but school district employees' contributions to them would also have to be membership fees or dues. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (Vernon 2006) (providing a school district employee is entitled to have an amount deducted from the employee's salary for membership fees or dues to professional organizations). The Education Code does not define the terms "membership fees" and "dues" and we received no briefing that attempted to define them. However, the terms "membership fees" or "dues" commonly denote a fixed amount of money due or owed in exchange for membership status. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 740 (9th ed. 1990) (defining the noun "membership" as "the state or status of being a member"), id. at 454 (defining the noun "fee" as a "fixed charge"), id. at 387 (defining the noun "due" as "something due or owed . . . a payment or obligation required by law or custom").

In contrast to the fixed amount of money due or owed in exchange for membership in a professional organization, political contributions do not confer membership status on the contributor. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 251.001(3) (Vernon 2010) (defining a "campaign contribution" as a contribution to a "political committee offered or given with the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign for elective office or on a measure") (emphasis added). See also 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2010) (requiring that contributions to SSFs be voluntary). Accordingly, the FEC contrasts membership fees or dues to a professional organization from contributions made to political committees. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION CAMPAIGN GUIDE, CORPORATIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS at 19 (Jan. 2007) (noting that an "SSF may not use dues or fees obtained as a condition of membership or employment in the connected organization, even if the dues or fees are refundable upon request").

We note that briefs received by our office arguing that school districts have authority to process the payroll deductions for contributions to political committees do not claim that such deductions constitute membership fees or dues. Instead, like state and federal law, the briefs consistently distinguish political-committee contributions from membership fees and dues. See Brief of Texas State Teachers Association/National Education Association at 3 (Apr. 21, 2008) (noting that "TSTA has the responsibility of separating dues and PAC deductions in accordance with state and federal election laws. Thus, school districts do not expend any other effort or resources to process a PAC contribution than what they are already required to do by law for a dues deduction.") [hereinafter TSTA Brief]; Brief of Texas Classroom Teachers Association at 10 n.3 (May 5, 2008) (distinguishing "contributions to the political action committee affiliated with the Texas Classroom Teachers Association" from "association dues that members can have withheld from their paychecks pursuant to Section 22.001, Texas Education Code"); Brief of Texas American Federation of Teachers at 2 (May 5, 2008) ("No Texas statute prohibits an independent school district from including an authorized contribution to a political action committee when it makes the authorized deduction for membership dues.").

Accordingly, a court would likely conclude that contributions to political committees such as TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund are not membership fees or dues to professional organizations. As a result, a school district would not have express authority to process payroll deductions for contributions to TSTA-PAC or NEA-Fund under section 22.001 of the Education Code.

B. Implied Authority

Having concluded that school districts do not have express authority to process payroll deductions for political contributions, we turn to the question of their implied authority. School districts have implied authority to perform acts that are reasonably necessary to carry out their expressly-granted duties. Geffert, 290 S.W. at 1084. A court would determine whether a statute impliedly authorizes a school district's act by determining whether the act would be necessary in order for the district to use its statutorily-prescribed powers. See Thompson v. Elmo Indep. Sch. Dist., 269 S.W. 868, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1925, no writ) (noting that a school district has implied powers that are indispensable, rather than merely convenient, to its declared objects and purposes) (citing Foster v. City of Waco, 255 S.W. 1104, 1105-06 (Tex. 1923)).

In determining whether school districts' express authority to process payroll deductions for membership fees or dues to professional organizations necessarily implies authority to process contributions to political committees, we first note that TSTA appears to conclude that districts may process membership dues without processing contributions to political committees. Furthermore, school districts may process expressly-authorized deductions for their employees' health-plan expenses and child-care expenses without any apparent need to also process deductions for contributions to political committees. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.005 (Vernon 2006), TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51 (Vernon 2009) (authorizing school districts to deduct health-care expenses from their employees' paychecks); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 610.021 (Vernon 2004) (authorizing school districts to enter into agreements with their employees to reduce their employees' periodic compensation by an amount to be paid for child-care expenses). Compare TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.002(b) (Vernon 2006) (requiring, upon satisfaction of certain requirements, a school district to honor its employees' assignment, pledge, or transfer of salary or wages as security for indebtedness). Thus, the Legislature's decision to grant school districts express power to process payroll deductions for specific purposes indicates that it did not necessarily grant school districts the power to process payroll deductions for non-specified purposes. See Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2004) (presuming that every word of a statute is included or excluded for a reason); see also Brookshire v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (finding that a law did not apply to a school district beyond the specified terms of the law because "the 'inclusion of the specific limitation excludes all others'") (citing Harris County v. Crooker, 248 S.W. 652, 655 (Tex. 1923)).

Indeed, if school districts' express authority to process payroll deductions for membership fees or dues to professional organizations granted districts implicit authority to process deductions for other purposes, the Legislature would not have granted districts express authority to process deductions for other purposes, including health-care and child-care expenses. See City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 636 (Tex. 2008) (explaining that the Legislature is presumed not to have done a useless act). See also Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) (noting that the Legislature is presumed to have enacted a statute with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it). Accordingly, a court would likely find that school districts do not have implied statutory authority to process payroll deductions for political committee contributions.

The conclusion that the Legislature did not impliedly grant districts authority to process payroll deductions for contributions to political committees is consistent with the Legislature's general aversion to the use of public funds for political purposes. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.169 (Vernon Supp. 2009) ("Notwithstanding any other law, the board of trustees of an independent school district may not use state or local funds or other resources of the district to electioneer for or against any candidate, measure, or political party."); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 556.004(a) (Vernon 2004) (noting that "[a] state agency may not use any money under its control, including appropriated money, to finance or otherwise support the candidacy of a person for an office in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state government or of the government of the United States").

C. First Amendment Freedom of Speech

We received several briefs that questioned whether prohibiting payroll deductions for political contributions would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., TSTA Brief at 4-7. The United States Supreme Court recently considered this question. It ruled that a state's "ban on political payroll deductions" is "justified by the State's interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics." Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (2009). In the Ysursa case, the question before the Court was "whether the State must affirmatively assist political speech by allowing public employers to administer payroll deductions for political activities. For the reasons set forth in [the] opinion, the answer is no." Id. at 1101. The Supreme Court found that the state's ban on political payroll deductions did not infringe the exercise of First Amendment rights. Id. at 1098. Consequently, the Legislature's decision not to authorize school districts to process deductions for contributions to political committees would likely withstand a constitutional challenge.

D. Penal Code Section 39.02

Finally, it is argued that the "use of public resources to collect and distribute political donations would appear to be a criminal misapplication of state resources which violates Penal Code [section] 39.02." Request Letter at 2-3. In order to commit an offense under section 39.02 of the Penal Code, a public servant would have to "with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another . . . intentionally or knowingly . . . misuse[] government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Proof of a public servant's culpable mental state is a fact question that cannot be resolved in the opinion process. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0326 (2005) at 6. Thus, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the processing of payroll deductions for contributions to political committees by school district staff on school district computers would violate Penal Code section 39.02(a)(2).

SUMMARY

Under longstanding Texas case law, school districts have only that authority expressly or impliedly granted by the Legislature.

The Legislature expressly authorizes school districts to process school district employees' payroll deductions for health-care expenses, child-care costs, security for indebtedness, and membership fees or dues to professional organizations. However, the Legislature has not expressly authorized school districts to process payroll deductions for contributions to political committees such as TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund.

The Legislature impliedly authorizes school districts to undertake those activities that school districts would need to do in order to exercise the authority that the Legislature expressly granted them. However, the Legislature has not impliedly authorized school districts to process payroll deductions for contributions to political committees such as TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund because doing so would not be necessary to perform school districts' expressly authorized functions.

Because the Legislature has not expressly or impliedly authorized school districts to process payroll deductions for contributions to political committees such as TSTA-PAC and NEA-Fund, Texas law prohibits school districts from processing such contributions.

The Legislature's decision not to authorize school districts to process payroll deductions for contributions to political committees would likely withstand a constitutional challenge.

Proof of a public servant's culpable mental state is a fact question that cannot be resolved in the opinion process. Thus, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the processing of payroll deductions for contributions to political committees by school district staff on school district computers would violate section 39.02(a)(2) of the Penal Code.

Very truly yours,

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

ANDREW WEBER
First Assistant Attorney General

JONATHAN K. FRELS
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Christy Drake-Adams
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee