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TX GA-0504 January 25, 2007

Does the Texas Open Meetings Act apply to a county jail population committee?

Short answer: The Attorney General concluded that an informal group of Nueces County officials and employees who called themselves the Jail Population Control Committee was not subject to the Open Meetings Act. The committee was not created by law, had no statutory duties, and had no power to supervise or control public business or public policy. Because it could only share information and offer advice (not control the jail or order anyone to act), its gatherings were not 'meetings' under the Act, so it was free to close them to the public if it chose, though it could also open them voluntarily.

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This page answers the general question as of 2007. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Texas law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 2007
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Texas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Texas courts but are not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Statutes can be amended; verify current law before relying on anything here. Consult a licensed attorney for advice on your specific situation.
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TX AG Opinion GA-0504: Does the Open Meetings Act apply to a county jail population committee?

Plain-English summary

The district attorney for Nueces County asked whether the Open Meetings Act (chapter 551 of the Government Code) applied to a group that called itself the Jail Population Control Committee. The committee had formed years earlier at the initiative of the local presiding judge. It was a voluntary mix of city and county officials and employees, including district judges, county court judges, the commissioners court, the county clerk, the sheriff's department, the local police, the City of Corpus Christi, the municipal court, and the county and district attorneys' offices. It met monthly for one purpose: to share information about the county jail population and watch for problems. The trigger for the question was a June 2006 meeting where a district judge called an emergency session about jail conditions, the local media asked to attend, and the presiding judge held part of the meeting behind closed doors.

The opinion did not rest on whether the committee was a "governmental body." Instead it focused on whether the committee held "meetings" as the Act defines them. A "meeting" under section 551.001(4)(A) has to concern public business or public policy "over which the governmental body has supervision or control." The committee, the opinion explained, did not include a quorum of a commissioners court or a city council, was not created by law, had no statutory authority or duties, and exercised no supervision or control over public business. Despite its name, it had no control over the county jail or its population. That control sits with the commissioners court (which must provide safe and suitable jails), the sheriff (the keeper of the jail), and the Commission on Jail Standards (which sets minimum standards and can order prisoner transfers when a jail is over capacity).

The opinion also addressed a claim that several judges at the meeting had ordered the sheriff to act, asserting supervisory authority over the commissioners court. A district court does have "general supervisory control" over a commissioners court under article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, but only when that jurisdiction is properly invoked by filing a lawsuit, not through an informal meeting. And the committee itself had no power to order the sheriff to do anything, though it could offer advice. So the opinion concluded the committee was an advisory group without control over public business, did not hold "meetings" under the Act, and was therefore not subject to it. It could still choose to open its meetings to the public.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2007. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The Open Meetings Act and the jail-standards statutes cited here have been amended since 2007. Anyone asking today whether a particular committee is covered by the Act should check the current text of chapter 551 and any later opinions rather than relying on the 2004 version cited in this opinion.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2007)

The Jail Population Control Committee and similar advisory groups: The opinion told them that an informal, voluntary group with no statutory creation, no duties set by law, and no power to supervise or control public business did not hold "meetings" under the Open Meetings Act and so was not required to comply with it.

County and city officials who sat on such groups: The opinion meant that gathering to share jail-population information and offer advice did not, by itself, trigger the Act's notice and open-meeting requirements, as long as the group had no supervisory or control authority.

Journalists and members of the public: The opinion meant that this kind of advisory committee was not legally required to admit the press or post notice, so being excluded from its June 2006 session was not an Open Meetings Act violation. The committee could open its meetings voluntarily, but the Act did not force it to.

Common questions

Was the Jail Population Control Committee required to follow the Open Meetings Act?
No. The opinion concluded the committee did not supervise or control public business or public policy, so its gatherings were not "meetings" under the Act and it was not subject to the Act.

Why did the committee's name not settle the question?
The opinion looked at what the group actually did, not its title. Despite being called the "Jail Population Control Committee," it had no control over the county jail or its population. Control rested with the commissioners court, the sheriff, and the Commission on Jail Standards.

Could the judges at the meeting order the sheriff to act?
The opinion explained that a district court's "general supervisory control" over a commissioners court under article V, section 8 of the Constitution exists only when a lawsuit is filed. Remarks at an informal meeting did not invoke that authority, and the committee itself had no power to order the sheriff to do anything (though it could offer advice).

Did the committee have to let the media in?
Not under the Act, as the opinion read it. Because the committee was not subject to the Open Meetings Act, it was not required to open its meetings, though it was free to do so.

Background and statutory framework

The Open Meetings Act requires that every regular, special, or called meeting of a governmental body be open to the public unless an exception applies. To be covered, an entity must be a "governmental body" as defined in the Act and must conduct "meetings" as the Act defines that term, and a "meeting" concerns public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control (Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 551.002, 551.001(3), 551.001(4)(A) (Vernon 2004); Sierra Club v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm., 146 S.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-395 (1996) at 4-5).

The committee did not include a quorum of a commissioners court or a municipal governing body, was not created by law, and had no statutory authority or duties. Authority over the county jail is vested elsewhere: the commissioners court must provide safe and suitable jails, the sheriff is the keeper of the jail, each jail must meet the minimum standards and the rules of the Commission on Jail Standards, and counties must file monthly jail-population reports so the commission can act when a jail runs over capacity (Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 351.001(a), .041(a), 351.002 (Vernon 2005); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 511.0101(a), (b), 511.012(b) (Vernon 2004)).

On the claim that judges at the meeting had ordered the sheriff to act, the opinion noted that a district court's general supervisory control over a commissioners court under the Texas Constitution exists only when its jurisdiction is invoked by filing a lawsuit, and that the committee itself had no power to order the sheriff to take action. An advisory committee without authority to control or supervise public business does not hold "meetings" under the Act (Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.020 (Vernon 2004); Hooten v. Enriquez, 863 S.W.2d 522, 528 n.7 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0232 (2004) at 3-5).

Citations

Statutes and constitutional provisions:

  • Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 551.001(3), 551.001(3)(B)-(C), 551.001(4)(A), 551.002, 511.0101(a)-(b), 511.012(b), 24.020, 552.001-.353 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006)
  • Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 351.001(a), .041(a), 351.002 (Vernon 2005)
  • Tex. Const. art. V, § 8

Cases:

  • Sierra Club v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm., 146 S.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied)
  • Benavides v. Lee, 665 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ)
  • Hooten v. Enriquez, 863 S.W.2d 522, 528 n.7 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ)

Attorney General opinions and decisions referenced:

  • Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-395 (1996)
  • Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0232 (2004)
  • Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-657 (1997)

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain - the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

GREG ABBOTT

January 25, 2007

The Honorable Carlos Valdez
105th Judicial District District Attorney
Nueces County Courthouse
901 Leopard, Room 206
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401-3681

Opinion No. GA-0504

Re: Whether a group of local officials called the Jail Population Control Committee is subject to the Open Meetings Act, Government Code chapter 551 (RQ-0505-GA)

Dear Mr. Valdez:

You ask whether the Open Meetings Act, Government Code chapter 551 ("the Act"), applies to a meeting of a group that includes several district judges.[1] Your question relates to a group of elected and appointed officials and public employees who call themselves the Jail Population Control Committee (the "Committee"). Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.

You indicate that the Committee was formed several years ago at the initiative of the presiding judge of the local council of judges. See id. It is a voluntary association of city and county officials and employees, including representatives from the district courts, the county courts, the commissioners court, the county clerk's office, the sheriff's department, the local police department, the City of Corpus Christi, the municipal court, the offices of the county and district attorneys, and other departments that may have information useful in monitoring the jail population. See id. Its membership is not fixed at a certain number, and attendance varies from month to month. See id. The group meets each month for the sole purpose of sharing information about the jail population and "to monitor the population to avoid problems." Id. at 2. You state that the group has no power to supervise anyone or to issue orders, nor does it have enforcement or quasi-judicial authority over any person. See id.

You are particularly concerned about a meeting of the Committee on June 20, 2006. See id. The district judge who chairs the Committee called an emergency meeting to address concerns about the Nueces County jail, notifying only the district judges, the county court at law judges, and the county sheriff.[2] The meeting was attended by the district judges, the sheriff, and the sheriff's chief deputy, and its purpose was to view photographs depicting living conditions at the jail. See id. The local media appeared at the meeting and asked to be allowed to attend it, but the presiding judge denied this request and held a portion of the meeting behind closed doors. Id. In connection with these facts, you ask the following question:

Is a group of elected officials, appointed officials and government employees who call themselves the Jail Population Control Committee and who meet on a regular basis to monitor the county jail population and to share information with each other required to comply with the provisions of the Open Meetings Act?

Id. at 1.[3]

The Act provides that "[e]very regular, special, or called meeting of a governmental body shall be open to the public, except as provided by this chapter." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.002 (Vernon 2004). To be subject to the Act, an entity must be a "governmental body" as that term is defined in the Act. See id. § 551.001(3) (defining "governmental body"); Sierra Club v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm., 146 S.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied) (construing "special district," defined as a "governmental body" in the Act, to include a committee of state, county, regional and municipal public officials established pursuant to federal law); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-395 (1996) at 4-5 (a committee of judges exercising statutory duties with respect to a community supervision and corrections department is a "special district" within the Act).[4] In addition, an entity must conduct "meetings" as the Act defines this term. A "meeting" includes several elements, but for purposes of your question, the significant element is that a "meeting" concerns the "public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4)(A) (Vernon 2004).

Based on the information you have provided us, the Committee does not include a quorum of a commissioners court or a municipal governing body, and it is accordingly not subject to the Act as one of these entities. See id. § 551.001(3)(B)-(C). The Committee was not created by law. It has no statutory authority or duties, nor does it exercise supervision or control over public business or public policy. Despite its title, "Jail Population and Control Committee," the Committee has no control over the county jail or its population. It is the commissioners court's duty to "provide safe and suitable jails for the county," while the county sheriff "is the keeper of the county jail [and] . . . shall safely keep all prisoners committed to the jail by a lawful authority, subject to an order of the proper court." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 351.001(a), .041(a) (Vernon 2005). Each county jail must comply with the minimum standards for county jails set by Local Government Code chapter 351, subchapter A and with "the rules and procedures of the Commission on Jail Standards." Id. § 351.002. Each county must submit to the commission a jail population report every month. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 511.0101(a) (Vernon 2004). If the report shows that the county jail has been operated in excess of its capacity for three consecutive months, "the commission may consider adoption of an order to prohibit confinement of prisoners in the county jail under Section 511.012." Id. § 511.0101(b); see id. § 511.012(b) (on issuance of commission's order, the sheriff must transfer to another facility the number of prisoners necessary to bring the county jail into compliance). Thus, authority to control the jail and its population is vested in the commissioners court, the sheriff, and the Commission on Jail Standards, not in the Committee.

A brief alleges that several judges at the meeting ordered the sheriff to take immediate action to address jail conditions, stating that they had supervisory authority to make the commissioners court act.[5] The Texas Constitution provides that "[t]he District Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.020 (Vernon 2004) (tracking Texas Constitution article V, section 8). However, a district court's "general supervisory control" over a commissioners court exists only when the district court's jurisdiction is properly invoked by the filing of a lawsuit. See Hooten v. Enriquez, 863 S.W.2d 522, 528 n.7 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ) (citation omitted). Nor does the Committee have the authority to order the sheriff to take action, although it could offer him advice. Thus, the judges' remarks at the meeting do not indicate that any supervision or control over public business or public policy is vested in the Committee. An advisory committee without authority to control or supervise public business or policy does not hold "meetings" under the Act and thus is not subject to the Act. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0232 (2004) at 3-5.

In conclusion, the Committee does not supervise or control public business or public policy and is accordingly not subject to the Open Meetings Act. The Committee may, of course, open its meetings to the public if it wishes to do so.

SUMMARY

A group of elected and appointed officials and public employees in Nueces County who call themselves the Jail Population Control Committee and meet to share information about jail conditions does not supervise or control public business or public policy and is accordingly not subject to the Open Meetings Act.

Very truly yours,

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

KENT C. SULLIVAN
First Assistant Attorney General

ELLEN L. WITT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee


Footnotes

[1] See Letter from Honorable Carlos Valdez, District Attorney, 105th Judicial District, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, at 1 (June 21, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

[2] See Memorandum from Honorable Nanette Hasette, District Judge, 28th Judicial District, to All District Judges, All County Court at Law Judges, and Sheriff Rebecca L. Stutts (June 16, 2006) (attached to Request Letter, supra note 1).

[3] A brief suggests that the June 20 meeting was actually a meeting of judges during which they performed administrative, as opposed to judicial functions. See Brief from Jorge C. Rangel, The Rangel Law Firm, P.C., to Nancy S. Fuller, Chair, Opinion Committee, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, at 2 (Aug. 18, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee). Because the brief provides no information indicating that any administrative functions were performed, we have accepted the requestor's characterization of the meeting.

[4] Attorney General Opinion DM-395 based its conclusion on Sierra Club and on the distinction in Benavides v. Lee between a judge's judicial functions and his administrative functions for purposes of the Open Records Act, now the Public Information Act. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-395 (1996) at 4-5 (citing Benavides v. Lee, 665 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ)); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001-.353 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) (Texas Public Information Act). This office subsequently issued Open Records Decision 657, which relied on the distinction between the judicial and administrative functions of the judiciary to conclude that records of telephone calls to Texas Supreme Court justices and their staff members were public records under the Public Information Act. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-657 (1997) at 1, 4-5. The Texas Supreme Court issued an order stating that Open Records Decision 657 was incorrect and rejecting its distinction between a court's administrative and judicial functions. See Order and Opinion Denying Request Under Open Records Act, at 1-6, 1997 WL 583726 (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (Tex. Sup. Ct. Order No. 97-9141). The supreme court's rejection of the distinction between a judge's administrative and judicial functions raises an issue as to the correctness of Attorney General Opinion DM-395. We need not reach this issue, because we base our conclusion on the meaning of "meeting" rather than "governmental body."

[5] See Brief from Joel R. White, Attorney at Law, to Nancy S. Fuller, Chair, Opinion Committee, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, at 1 (Aug. 21, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee).

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