Is a golf cart a 'motor vehicle' for a lawsuit against a Texas school district?

TX AG Opinion GA-0490: Is a golf cart a "motor vehicle" under the Texas Tort Claims Act?

Plain-English summary

State Senator Leticia Van de Putte, chair of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs and Military Installations, asked the Attorney General whether motorized equipment such as golf carts and tractors counts as a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act. The question mattered because of how the Act treats school districts. The Act generally waives a governmental unit's immunity for claims arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment. For school districts, the waiver is narrower: a district can be sued only for claims arising from the operation or use of a "motor vehicle," not the broader category of motor-driven equipment.

The Act does not define "motor vehicle," so the answer came from the courts. The opinion traced the history. An early case required that the device be designed to transport people or property on a public highway. The Texas Supreme Court later dropped that transport requirement and defined "motor vehicle" broadly as a generic term for all self-propelled vehicles that do not run on stationary rails or tracks, a term the court said was much broader than "automobile."

Applying that definition, the opinion noted that a tractor had already been held to be a motor vehicle, while a forklift had been held not to be one. A golf cart, the AG reasoned, is self-propelled, does not run on rails or tracks, and is more like a tractor than a forklift. The opinion concluded that a Texas court would likely find a golf cart, and other self-propelled electric or motorized carts, to be motor vehicles under section 101.051. The AG was careful to say the conclusion went only to the meaning of "motor vehicle" and did not resolve any actual question of liability.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2006. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The Tort Claims Act and the case law on what counts as a "motor vehicle" have continued to develop since 2006. Anyone evaluating a current claim against a school district should check the present statute and the latest court decisions rather than relying on this opinion.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2006)

School districts and their lawyers: The opinion signaled that a district's narrow immunity waiver under section 101.051 likely reached injuries arising from the operation or use of golf carts and similar self-propelled carts, because a court would probably treat them as "motor vehicles." It also reaffirmed that a forklift had been held not to be a motor vehicle.

People injured by district-operated equipment: The opinion meant that a claim tied to a golf cart or similar self-propelled cart was more likely to fall within the type of vehicle for which a school district's immunity is waived, though the AG did not decide whether any particular claim would succeed.

Legislators and policymakers: The opinion described how the courts, not the statute, supplied the definition of "motor vehicle," and how the school-district waiver is deliberately narrower than the general governmental waiver.

Common questions

Why does it matter whether a golf cart is a "motor vehicle"?
Because a Texas school district's immunity is waived only for claims arising from the operation or use of a "motor vehicle," a narrower category than the "motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment" standard that applies to other governmental units. If the golf cart is a motor vehicle, the claim can fall within the waiver; if it is only motor-driven equipment, it does not.

What did the opinion say about tractors and forklifts?
The opinion noted that courts had already held a tractor to be a motor vehicle and a forklift not to be one. The AG placed a golf cart on the tractor side of that line.

How did the courts define "motor vehicle"?
The Texas Supreme Court defined it broadly as a generic term for all self-propelled vehicles that do not operate on stationary rails or tracks, and said the term is much broader than "automobile." The court dropped an earlier requirement that the device be designed to transport people or property on a public highway.

Did the opinion decide whether a district could be held liable?
No. The AG said its conclusion was limited to the meaning of "motor vehicle" and did not address any question of liability under the Act.

Background and statutory framework

The Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for certain claims against governmental units, including liability under section 101.021, immunity to suit under section 101.025, and the definition of "governmental unit" in section 101.001(3) (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021, 101.025, 101.001(3) (Vernon 2005)). The general waiver reaches claims arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment (id. § 101.021(1)(A)). For school districts, section 101.051 narrows the waiver to claims arising from the operation or use of a "motor vehicle" (id. § 101.051). The Act does not define "motor vehicle" in its definitions section (id. § 101.001).

The school-district waiver and its limits were described in LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992), Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.), and Montoya v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 177 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The early, narrower definition of "motor vehicle" came from Brookshire v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). The Texas Supreme Court broadened the definition and dropped the transport-capability requirement in Slaughter v. Abilene State Sch., 561 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex. 1977), which held a tractor to be a motor vehicle and agreed that a forklift was more akin to motor equipment. A court of appeals later relied on the Slaughter definition to treat a tractor as a motor vehicle in Lipan Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bigler, 187 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed).

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.001, 101.001(3), 101.021, 101.021(1)(A), 101.025, 101.051 (Vernon 2005)

Cases:

• LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992)
• Montoya v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 177 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)
• Slaughter v. Abilene State Sch., 561 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex. 1977)
• Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.)
• Brookshire v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ)
• Lipan Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bigler, 187 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0490
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2006/ga0490.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain - the linked PDF is authoritative.

December 4, 2006

The Honorable Leticia Van de Putte, R.Ph.
Chair, Committee on Veterans Affairs and Military Installations
Texas State Senate
Post Office Box 12068
Austin, Texas 78711-2068

Opinion No. GA-0490

Re: Whether golf carts and tractors are "motor vehicles" for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act, chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code (RQ-0495-GA)

Dear Senator Van de Putte:

You ask whether "motorized vehicles like golf carts and tractors [are] considered 'motor vehicles' for which immunity does not apply . . . under the Tort Claims Act?" You inquire specifically about a "class of mobile motorized equipment" that school districts operate such as "golf carts and other electric or motorized carts and tractors, fork lifts and the like." Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.

The Texas Tort Claims Act (the "Act") waives sovereign immunity for certain kinds of claims against governmental units. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021 (Vernon 2005) (waiving immunity for liability), 101.025 (waiving immunity to suit), 101.001(3) (defining "governmental unit"). Generally, a governmental unit's sovereign immunity is waived for claims arising from the "operation or use of . . . motor-driven vehicle[s] or motor-driven equipment." Id. § 101.021(1)(A). The waiver of sovereign immunity for a school district is more narrow: a school district is liable only for claims arising from the operation or use of "motor vehicles." See id. § 101.051; see also id. § 101.021 (general waiver provision); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) ("School districts are immune from liability for personal injuries under the Texas Tort Claims Act, unless the injury arises from a governmental employee's operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.").

The Act does not define the term "motor vehicle." See generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001 (Vernon 2005) (definitions). An initial judicial definition of the term in the context of school district immunity was restrictive and required a transport capability component. See Brookshire v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (stating that the definition of motor vehicle "implicitly contain[s] the concept that the device was [d]esigned to transport people or property upon the public highway"). The Texas Supreme Court subsequently applied the term more broadly and dropped the transport capability component. See Slaughter v. Abilene State Sch., 561 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex. 1977). The state's highest court noted that under common usage "motor vehicle" is a "generic term for all classes of self-propelled vehicles not operating on stationary rails or tracks." Id. at 792. The court added that the term is "much broader than the word 'automobile' and includes various vehicles which cannot be classified as automobiles." Id.

You inquire about a "class of mobile motorized equipment" such as "golf carts and other electric or motorized carts and tractors, fork lifts and the like." Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. A tractor has already been determined to be a "motor vehicle" under section 101.051 of the Act. See Slaughter, 561 S.W.2d at 792 (holding "the tractor involved in this accident is a motor vehicle"); see also Lipan Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bigler, 187 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed) (relying on the Slaughter definition to determine that a tractor is a motor vehicle under section 101.051 of the Act). A forklift, on the other hand, has been held not to be a motor vehicle. See Brookshire, 508 S.W.2d at 678; see also Slaughter, 561 S.W.2d at 792 (agreeing with holding in Brookshire that forklift was more akin to motor equipment than a motor vehicle).

Thus we need only consider whether "golf carts and other electric or motorized carts" are motor vehicles. The state's highest court characterizes "motor vehicle" broadly as a "self-propelled vehicle[] not operating on stationary rails or tracks," and does not require that it possess transport capability. See Slaughter, 561 S.W.2d at 791-92. A golf cart is self-propelled. And a golf cart does not operate on stationary rails or tracks. Moreover, we believe a golf cart is more like a tractor than a forklift. We therefore conclude that a Texas court, using the broad scope of the term "motor vehicle" from Slaughter, would likely find that a golf cart is a motor vehicle under section 101.051. See id. Similarly, to the extent "other electric or motorized carts" are self propelled and do not operate on stationary rails or tracks, we believe a court would find them to be motor vehicles under section 101.051. Our conclusion is limited to the term "motor vehicle" and does not address any questions of liability under the Act.

SUMMARY

Texas courts have determined under section 101.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that a tractor is a motor vehicle but that a forklift is not. Texas courts would likely determine that a self-propelled golf cart that does not operate on stationary rails or tracks is a motor vehicle under section 101.051. Similarly, Texas courts would likely determine that other "electric or motorized carts" that are self propelled and do not operate on stationary rails or tracks are motor vehicles.

Yours very truly,

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

KENT C. SULLIVAN
First Assistant Attorney General

ELLEN L. WITT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Charlotte M. Harper
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

Footnotes

1. Letter from Honorable Leticia Van de Putte, R.Ph., Chair, Committee on Veterans Affairs and Military Installations, Texas State Senate, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas (May 19, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

2. Some Texas courts appear to construe the term "motor vehicle" in section 101.051, which pertains only to school districts, to broadly refer back to and encompass the "motor-driven" aspects ("motor-driven vehicle and motor-driven equipment") of the provisions in section 101.021 that apply to all governmental entities. See LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992) (citing sections 101.021 and 101.051 and stating "[a] school district is not liable for a personal injury proximately caused by a negligent employee unless the injury 'arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment'"); see also Montoya v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 177 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating "pursuant to this limited waiver, a school district is liable for a personal injury proximately caused by a negligent employee only if the injury arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment"). But see Slaughter v. Abilene State Sch., 561 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex. 1977) (agreeing with a lower court's holding that sovereign immunity is not waived where the motorized item is closer to motorized equipment than to a motor vehicle). You ask only about the scope of the term "motor vehicle," so we do not address this issue or consider the scope of motor-driven equipment.