Besides the $10 teen court fee, can a Texas municipal court charge a juvenile other court costs?

Plain-English summary

A "teen court" is a diversion program in which a young offender's case is handled by a court staffed largely by other teenagers, as an alternative to ordinary punishment. In Texas, the teen-court statute in effect in 1996 (Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.55) let a justice or municipal court defer proceedings and grant probation to a juvenile who pleaded guilty or no contest and asked to attend a teen court, and it allowed the court to charge a fee of up to $10 to cover the cost of running the program. The Gregg County district attorney asked the Attorney General whether the $10 fee was the only money a municipal court of record could charge, or whether it could also impose other regular court costs.

The district attorney's argument was that the $10 fee, plus the statute's silence about other costs, showed the Legislature meant to bar other court costs, especially because a neighboring statute (article 45.54) expressly required "payment of all court costs" as a condition of deferral. If the Legislature wanted court costs in teen-court cases, the argument went, it would have said so.

The Attorney General disagreed. Court costs in criminal cases are generally not collected until they are assessed as part of the punishment, so the express cost language in article 45.54 served a specific purpose there: it required those costs to be paid before or when the court granted deferral. That special role meant the absence of similar language in article 45.55 did not imply the Legislature wanted to forbid other costs. The office found stronger evidence the other way in a 1995 amendment that added a new subsection (g) to article 45.55. That subsection lets a court "exempt a defendant for whom proceedings are deferred under this article from the requirement to pay a court cost or fee that is imposed by another statute." The power to exempt someone from other costs would be meaningless if no other costs could be charged. So the office concluded that for offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, the court is not required to charge other court costs, but it may do so. For everything else, nothing in article 45.55 removed a court's existing obligation or discretion to impose costs chargeable under other law.

Finally, the district attorney asked whether charging court costs in a teen-court case would be unconstitutional, citing an earlier opinion (JM-1124) that had found a due-process problem with assessing costs where a court could defer proceedings and treat a person as convicted without any plea or trial. The office distinguished article 45.55: under that statute the juvenile must plead no contest or guilty in open court, with a parent or guardian present, and must request the teen-court program. Because the juvenile can choose to go to trial instead, costs are not forced on an assumption of guilt without a trial, so there is no due-process violation.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

This opinion construes the teen-court statute as it existed in 1996 (Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.55), which has since been recodified and amended; the teen-court provisions were later renumbered within chapter 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the fee amounts and procedures have changed. Read this page for the office's 1996 reasoning about the relationship between the program fee and other court costs, and verify the current teen-court statute and cost provisions before relying on any specific rule or amount here.

What the opinion meant at the time

For municipal and justice courts running teen-court programs: The opinion meant the $10 program fee did not displace a court's authority to impose other court costs chargeable under other law. For offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, the court had discretion: it could charge other court costs or exempt the deferred juvenile from them, but it was not required to charge them.

For juveniles in teen court and their parents: At the time, the opinion meant a juvenile placed in a teen-court program could be charged regular court costs in addition to the up-to-$10 program fee, unless the court used its discretion (for post-September 1995 offenses) to exempt the juvenile.

For criminal-law practitioners: The opinion is a statutory-construction and due-process holding. It rejected a negative-implication argument (that silence plus a neighboring express provision barred costs), relied on the 1995 exemption amendment as proof that other costs are chargeable, and distinguished a prior opinion's due-process concern on the ground that teen-court deferral follows a plea and preserves the right to trial.

Common questions

Is the $10 teen-court fee the only charge a court can impose on a juvenile in the program?
No, according to this opinion. The office concluded the $10 fee covers the cost of administering the teen-court program and does not bar a court from imposing other court costs that are chargeable under other law.

Does the court have to charge those other costs?
For offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, no. The office read the 1995 amendment (subsection (g)) to mean the court is not required to charge other court costs but may do so, and may exempt a deferred juvenile from costs imposed by another statute.

Why didn't the silence in the teen-court statute mean "no other costs"?
Because the office found the silence did not carry that meaning. It explained that the express cost language in the neighboring article 45.54 had its own purpose (requiring costs to be paid before or when deferral is granted), so its absence in article 45.55 did not imply a ban. The 1995 amendment confirmed that other costs are chargeable.

Is it constitutional to charge court costs to a juvenile in a teen-court program?
The office concluded it is. Unlike the statute criticized in an earlier opinion, article 45.55 required the juvenile to plead no contest or guilty in open court and to request the program, and the juvenile could choose a trial instead, so costs were not imposed on an assumption of guilt without a trial.

Background and statutory framework

Under Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.55 as it stood in 1996, a justice or municipal court could defer proceedings and place a juvenile in a teen-court program if the defendant, among other things, pleaded nolo contendere or guilty in open court with a parent, guardian, or managing conservator present (art. 45.55(a)(2)) and requested the program (art. 45.55(a)(3)). Subsection (e) allowed the court to require "a fee not to exceed $10 that is set by the court to cover the costs of administering this article." The district attorney argued that fee, combined with the statute's silence about other costs and the express "payment of all court costs" requirement in article 45.54(l), showed the Legislature intended to bar other costs in teen-court cases.

The office rejected the negative inference. It noted that costs in criminal cases generally are not collected until assessed as part of the punishment (Ex parte Carson, 159 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942); see generally Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 102), so the express cost language in article 45.54 had the independent function of specifying that those costs be paid before or when deferral is granted (citing Attorney General Opinion JM-526). The office then relied on the 1995 addition of subsection (g) to article 45.55 (effective September 1, 1995, for offenses committed on or after that date), which lets a court exempt a deferred defendant from "a court cost or fee that is imposed by another statute." Because an exemption power presupposes chargeable costs, the office concluded other costs remain chargeable, with the court not required to charge them for post-September 1995 offenses.

On the constitutional question, the office distinguished Attorney General Opinion JM-1124, which had found a due-process problem with Senate Bill 1085 (1989) as applied to V.T.C.S. article 6701d, section 143A(a)(1), a provision under which a court could defer proceedings and treat a defendant as convicted without a plea, judgment, or application by the defendant. Assessing costs on that statutory assumption of guilt, without any semblance of a trial, deprived the defendant of property without due process. Article 45.55 was different because it required a plea in open court and a request for the program and left the juvenile free to choose a trial, so it did not impose costs without the opportunity for a trial.

Citations

Statutes and authorities discussed:

• Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.55 (teen court program; subsection (a) plea and request requirements; subsection (e) up-to-$10 administrative fee; subsection (g) (1995) court may exempt deferred defendant from other statutory costs)
• Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.54 (deferral and probation; subsection (l) payment of all court costs)
• Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 102 (court costs payable by a convicted defendant)
• V.T.C.S. article 6701d, § 143A(a)(1) (driving-safety-course deferral, at issue in JM-1124)
• Attorney General Opinion JM-526 (1986); Attorney General Opinion JM-1124 (1989) (distinguished)

Case cited:

• Ex parte Carson, 159 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) (costs in criminal cases generally are not collected until assessed as part of the punishment)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0372
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1996/dm0372.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain (including footnote numbering) — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

January 10, 1996

The Honorable David Brabham
Gregg County Criminal District Attorney
101 East Methvin Street, Suite 333
Longview, Texas 75601

Opinion No. DM-372

Re: Whether a municipal court of record must impose court costs upon a juvenile offender who participates in a "teen court" program (RQ-751)

Dear Mr. Brabham:

You ask whether a municipal court of record must impose, upon a juvenile offender who participates in a "teen court" program pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure ("code") article 45.55, any court costs other than the ten-dollar administrative fee that the court may impose under subsection (e) of that article. We believe that nothing in article 45.55 negates a court's obligation or discretion to impose court costs that are chargeable by other law, except that for offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, the court is not required to charge any other court costs, but it may do so.

You contend that the provision in subsection (e) for a maximum ten-dollar fee that a justice or municipal court may require of a person who requests a teen court program operates to exclude the imposition of any other court costs. The first sentence of subsection (e) reads as follows: "The justice or municipal court may require a person who requests a teen court program to pay a fee not to exceed $10 that is set by the court to cover the costs of administering this article." The legislature thus expressed its intent that the ten-dollar fee is to cover the administrative costs of a teen court program under article 45.55, not to cover other court costs. Article 45.55 is silent as to the imposition of other court costs.

You further contend that this silence indicates legislative intent to disallow the imposition of any other costs of court on a person who requests a teen court program under article 45.55 because code article 45.54(l) expressly provides for the defendant's "payment of all court costs" as a condition to the court's authority to defer proceedings and grant probation under that article. Your reasoning is that "[i]f the Legislature had intended to assess court costs under Art. 45.55, it surely could have stated that requirement clearly, as it did in Art. 45.54(l)."

We do not believe this reasoning is correct. Costs in criminal cases generally are not collected until after they are assessed as part of the punishment, see Ex parte Carson, 159 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942); see generally Code Crim. Proc. ch. 102 (containing various provisions for costs payable by convicted defendant), so the purpose of the addition of the aforementioned language to article 45.54 is to specify that costs under that article must be paid before or at the same time as the court grants deferral and probation. See Attorney General Opinion JM-526 (1986) at 5. Thus, the presence of an express provision for payment of costs in article 45.54 has an independent significance that makes it unnecessary to make a strained inference that the legislature intended that costs not be chargeable in other articles where such a provision is absent.

A recent amendment to article 45.55 makes clear that the legislature did not intend to disallow the imposition of other costs of court on a person who requests a teen court program under article 45.55. The Seventy-fourth Legislature added a new subsection (g) to article 45.55, see Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 598, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3436, 3436, which applies only to offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, id. § 2, at 3436, the effective date of the statute, id. § 3, at 3436. This subsection (g) provides as follows: "A justice or municipal court may exempt a defendant for whom proceedings are deferred under this article from the requirement to pay a court cost or fee that is imposed by another statute." Id. § 1, at 3436. This provision would be meaningless if other costs were not chargeable. Therefore, for offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, the court is not required to charge any other court costs, but it may do so.

Finally, you question whether the imposition of any court costs under article 45.55 would be constitutional in light of Attorney General Opinion JM-1124. In that opinion we held that another statutory provision, section 2 of the Seventy-first Legislature's Senate Bill 1085, Act of May 28, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1316, 1317, was unconstitutional as applied to V.T.C.S. article 6701d, section 143A(a)(1), which grants discretion to a court to defer criminal proceedings without the necessity of a plea, a judgment, or an application for deferral by the defendant. Attorney General Opinion JM-1124 (1989) at 6-7. In that opinion we explained the constitutional problem with Senate Bill 1085 as follows:

Under Senate Bill 1085 a person may be considered convicted where the "court defers final disposition of the case." [Act of May 28, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1316, 1317.] If applied to subsection (a)(1) of section 143A of article 6701d, the result would be that a judgment reflecting guilt of the defendant would be entered without the defendant having received any semblance of a trial. Instead, under subsection (a)(1) the court merely defers proceedings to allow the defendant time to complete a driving safety course. No plea is required nor is there any adjudication of guilt or entry of judgment. We believe that to allow court costs to be assessed upon the basis of a statutory assumption of guilt of a defendant under these circumstances is to deprive the defendant of property without due process of law. Such a procedure allows a conviction to be entered against a defendant without having afforded the defendant his constitutional right to a trial.

Id. at 7.

Article 45.55 is easily distinguished from the statute held unconstitutional in Attorney General Opinion JM-1124. Subsection (a) of the article permits deferral and probation only if the defendant, among other things, "pleads nolo contendere or guilty to the offense in open court with the defendant's parent, guardian or managing conservator present," Code Crim. Proc. art. 45.55(a)(2), and "presents to the court an oral or written request to attend a teen court program," id. art. 45.55(a)(3). Thus the defendant may choose to go to trial; the defendant is not forced to suffer punishment in the form of court costs without a trial, as was the case with the statutes analyzed in Attorney General Opinion JM-1124. Article 45.55 therefore does not deprive the defendant of property without due process of law.

SUMMARY

Nothing in article 45.55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure negates a court's obligation or discretion to impose court costs that are chargeable by other law, except that for offenses committed on or after September 1, 1995, the court is not required to charge any other court costs, but it may do so.

DAN MORALES
Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA
First Assistant Attorney General

SARAH J. SHIRLEY
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by James B. Pinson
Assistant Attorney General