Can any Texas peace officer enforce a city's ordinances?

Plain-English summary

A district attorney asked the Attorney General a clean statutory question: which of the many kinds of Texas peace officers are authorized by articles 2.12 and 2.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to enforce city ordinances? Article 2.12 is the long list (26 entries at the time) of who counts as a "peace officer," ranging from sheriffs and city police to Alcoholic Beverage Commission agents, racing commission investigators, medical-board investigators, and high-speed-rail authority officers. Article 2.13 spells out a peace officer's general duties: to preserve the peace in his jurisdiction, use all lawful means, interfere to prevent or suppress crime, execute lawful process, report offenses to a magistrate, and arrest offenders when authorized by law.

The Attorney General's answer was that these two articles, by themselves, do not authorize any peace officer to enforce city ordinances. The key words in article 2.13, "offenses" and "penal law," refer to state law, not to municipal ordinances, even when an ordinance carries a penalty. The office reinforced the point by noting that article 2.13 imposes a duty, not just a power: it would be strange, and the legislature surely did not intend, for every officer on the article 2.12 list (a racing commission investigator, say) to have a legal duty to go enforce a city's building-code ordinances anywhere within his jurisdiction.

City marshals and city police, of course, do enforce city ordinances. But the office located the source of that authority somewhere other than articles 2.12 and 2.13: it comes from the city's own charter and ordinances, working together with specific state statutes (for example, the Local Government Code provision on a type A general-law city marshal's powers, and the old uniform traffic act's authorization for local police to regulate traffic). The office also acknowledged that some other officers on the list could be given ordinance-enforcement authority under other laws in the right circumstances (it pointed to statutes on airport security officers and mutual law-enforcement-assistance agreements), but because the question was narrowly about articles 2.12 and 2.13, it did not try to map out which officers those were.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Article 2.12's list of peace officers has grown and been renumbered many times since 1995, and the old V.T.C.S. articles cited here (including article 6701d) were repealed and recodified into the Transportation Code and elsewhere. The core point, that the general peace-officer statutes do not by themselves authorize ordinance enforcement, should still be checked against the current versions of these statutes and any later authority before being relied on.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

For prosecutors and county officials: The opinion concluded that articles 2.12 and 2.13 alone were not a source of authority for any peace officer to enforce city ordinances, so a charge or enforcement action against an ordinance violation could not rest on those two articles standing alone.

For city marshals and city police: The opinion did not question their ability to enforce city ordinances; it located the source of that authority in the city's charter and ordinances plus specific state statutes, rather than in articles 2.12 and 2.13.

For other peace officers on the article 2.12 list: The opinion left open that some of them might be given ordinance-enforcement authority under other laws in particular circumstances, but it declined to decide which, because the question was limited to articles 2.12 and 2.13.

Common questions

Do articles 2.12 and 2.13 let any peace officer enforce city ordinances?
No. The Attorney General concluded those two articles do not, by themselves, authorize any peace officer to enforce municipal ordinances.

Why not, when ordinances can carry penalties?
Because the words "offenses" and "penal law" in article 2.13 refer to state law, not to municipal ordinances, even penal ones. The office also reasoned that article 2.13 creates a duty, and it would be anomalous for every listed officer to have a duty to enforce every city's ordinances.

How do city police and marshals enforce city ordinances, then?
Their authority comes from the city's charter and ordinances combined with specific state statutes (for example, the Local Government Code provision on a type A city marshal and the traffic-regulation statute), not from articles 2.12 and 2.13.

Could another kind of peace officer ever enforce a city ordinance?
Possibly, under other laws and in the right circumstances. The office pointed to statutes on airport security officers and mutual-assistance agreements, but did not decide the question because it was asked only about articles 2.12 and 2.13.

Background and statutory framework

Article 2.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists who is a "peace officer," including sheriffs and their deputies, marshals or police of an incorporated city, town, or village, Alcoholic Beverage Commission agents, General Services Commission officers, Texas State Board of Medical Examiners investigators, Texas Racing Commission investigators, and Texas High-Speed Rail Authority officers (subsections (1), (3), (6), (9), (17), (20), (23)). Article 2.13 sets the general duties of every peace officer: to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction by all lawful means, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime where the Code authorizes, execute lawful process, notify a magistrate of offenses he has good reason to believe violate the penal law, and arrest offenders without warrant where authorized.

The office read "offenses" and "penal law" in article 2.13 as state law, not municipal ordinances, and treated article 2.13 as imposing a duty rather than conferring a general ordinance-enforcement power. It found no reported case in which a peace officer other than a city's own marshal or police enforced municipal ordinances, and traced city officers' authority to do so to the city charter and ordinances together with specific statutes, citing Local Government Code section 341.021 (a type A general-law municipality's marshal has a sheriff's powers to execute warrants, prevent and suppress crime, and arrest offenders, and performs other duties not inconsistent with state law that the governing body confers by ordinance) and former V.T.C.S. article 6701d, section 27 (local authorities may regulate traffic by means of police officers). It noted that other listed officers might be given ordinance-enforcement authority under other laws, pointing to V.T.C.S. article 46g (airport security personnel commissioned by a political subdivision operating an airport) and Local Government Code chapter 362 (mutual law-enforcement-assistance agreements among counties, municipalities, and joint airports), but declined to decide which officers because the question was confined to articles 2.12 and 2.13.

Citations

Statutory provisions discussed:

• Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.12 (who are peace officers); art. 2.13 (general duties of peace officers)
• Local Gov't Code § 341.021 (powers and duties of a type A general-law municipality's marshal)
• V.T.C.S. art. 6701d, § 27 (local authorities may regulate traffic by means of police officers)
• V.T.C.S. art. 46g (airport security personnel commissioned by a political subdivision operating an airport)
• Local Gov't Code ch. 362 (mutual law-enforcement-assistance agreements)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0318
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1995/dm0318.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

January 19, 1995

Honorable Lynn Ellison
District Attorney
Atascosa County Courthouse
Circle Drive, No. 5A
Jourdanton, Texas 78026

Opinion No. DM-318

Re: whether articles 2.12 and 2.13, Code of Criminal Procedure, authorize peace officers to enforce city ordinances (RQ-719)

Dear Mr. Ellison:

You ask "[w]hich peace officers are authorized by Articles 2.12 and 2.13, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to enforce city ordinances." Article 2.12, captioned "Who are peace officers," contains 26 entries including "sheriffs and their deputies," "marshals or police officers of an incorporated city, town, or village," "law enforcement agents of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission," "officers commissioned by the General Services Commission," "investigators commissioned by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners," "investigators employed by the Texas Racing Commission," and "officers commissioned by the Texas High-Speed Rail Authority." Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.12 subsecs. (1), (3), (6), (9), (17), (20), (23). Article 2.13 provides:

It is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction. To effect this purpose, he shall use all lawful means. He shall in every case where he is authorized by the provisions of this Code, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime. He shall execute all lawful process issued to him by any magistrate or court. He shall give notice to some magistrate of all offenses committed within his jurisdiction, where he has good reason to believe there has been a violation of the penal law. He shall arrest offenders without warrant in every case where he is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the proper magistrate or court and be tried.

In our opinion articles 2.12 and 2.13 do not in themselves authorize any "peace officers" to "enforce city ordinances." The terms "offenses" and "penal law" in article 2.13 must, we think, refer to state law and not to municipal ordinances even where the latter are penal in nature.

Notably, article 2.13, rather than merely "authorizing," imposes a duty on "every peace officer" to enforce the law as provided there. We think it would be anomalous and that the legislature could not have intended that "every peace officer" listed in article 2.12, for example, a racing commission investigator, have a "duty" by virtue of article 2.13 to enforce ordinances of municipalities within his "jurisdiction," for example, ones pertaining to building code violations. We find no reported cases involving the enforcement of municipal ordinances by peace officers other than the marshals or police of the city itself. The authority of the latter to enforce city ordinances derives not, we think, from articles 2.12 and 2.13, but from the charter and/or ordinances of the city in conjunction and consistent with state law provisions specific thereto. See, e.g., Local Gov't Code § 341.021 (marshal of type A general law municipality has same powers and jurisdiction to execute warrants, to prevent and suppress crime, and to arrest offenders as a sheriff, and "shall" perform other duties, not inconsistent with state law, that the governing body confers by ordinance); V.T.C.S. art. 6701d, § 27 (local authorities may regulate traffic by means of police officers).

It may be that certain other peace officers on the article 2.12 list can be given authority to enforce certain city ordinances under the proper circumstances, but again we do not think that this authority would derive from articles 2.12 and 2.13. See, e.g., V.T.C.S. art. 46g (airport security personnel commissioned by political subdivision operating airport); Local Gov't Code ch. 362 (mutual law enforcement assistance provided for by agreement of counties, municipalities, and/or joint airports). Since your question is limited to the effect of articles 2.12 and 2.13, we do not attempt here to resolve which peace officers may under other laws, ordinances, etc. be lawfully given authority to enforce municipal ordinances.

SUMMARY

Code of Criminal Procedure articles 2.12 and 2.13 do not in themselves authorize peace officers to enforce city ordinances.

DAN MORALES
Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA
First Assistant Attorney General

SARAH J. SHIRLEY
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by William Walker
Assistant Attorney General