Can off-duty Texas police officers work school security as a side job?

Plain-English summary

A Texas school district, Ector County ISD, ran its own school police force but needed extra security for football games, basketball games, and evening events. To fill the gap, it paid off-duty city police officers, sheriff's deputies, and state troopers to work those events directly for the district. The City of Odessa objected that this broke a rule in the Texas Constitution, article XVI, section 40, which says one person cannot hold two paid "civil offices" at the same time. The county attorney asked the Attorney General whether moonlighting as school security really put these officers on the wrong side of that rule.

The Attorney General said no, at least not automatically. The whole question turns on what counts as an "office." Under the test the Texas Supreme Court laid down in Aldine Independent School District v. Standley, a person is a government "officer" only if they wield some piece of the government's sovereign power largely on their own, free of anyone else's control. A worker who carries out government functions under someone else's direction is an employee, not an officer. Applying that test, the opinion concluded that city police officers, sheriff's deputies, and school-district security officers generally act under the control of their police department, their sheriff, or their school board, so as a matter of law they do not hold "civil offices" that section 40 would block. The opinion expressly overruled older Attorney General opinions that had treated all peace officers as office-holders.

There was an old case, Irwin v. State, that had pointed the other way, holding that one person could not be both a city police officer and a deputy sheriff. The Attorney General explained that Irwin no longer reflected Texas law: city police now have county-wide jurisdiction, and the reasoning in Irwin was out of step with the Aldine line of cases.

Two cautions came with the answer. First, "not as a matter of law" is not the same as "never." Depending on the exact duties and independence of a particular officer, that specific person might turn out to hold a civil office, and deciding that requires sorting out facts, which the Attorney General does not do in an opinion. Second, on the district's separate question, the opinion found nothing in Texas law stopping a school district from contracting with a private security company instead, as long as the contract follows the Education Code and the company is properly licensed.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The Education Code school-security provisions (then section 21.483), the Local Government Code police provisions, and the private-security licensing statute (then V.T.C.S. article 4413(29bb)) have been amended and recodified since 1993, so confirm current law before relying on anything described here.

Background and statutory framework

The Ector County Attorney asked, on behalf of the Ector County Independent School District, about the district's practice of hiring off-duty peace officers for security. The district maintained its own security department and officers under Education Code section 21.483, but often needed additional officers at school events (football games, basketball games, and play nights), which it obtained by contracting directly with off-duty officers in the community, including City of Odessa police officers, Ector County Sheriff's Department deputies, and Texas Department of Public Safety officers. The City of Odessa contended this violated article XVI, section 40 of the Texas Constitution, which prohibits one person from holding or exercising more than one "civil office of emolument."

The request raised three questions: whether a city police officer may contract directly with the school district to serve as a part-time security officer without violating section 40; the same question as to paid sheriff's deputies; and whether the district may contract directly with a private security service. Because section 40 reaches people who profit monetarily from "civil offices" (AG Opinion MW-450 (1982)), the AG assumed the officers were paid by both the city or county and the district, so the issue was whether a city police officer, sheriff's deputy, or school-district security officer holds a "civil office."

The conclusions. The AG concluded that, as a matter of law, neither city police officers, nor sheriff's deputies, nor security officers for school districts hold civil offices within section 40. Depending on the circumstances of their employment, however, some such individuals might, and that determination turns on factual issues not amenable to the opinion process.

Overruling the old rule. In the past, the office had concluded that city police officers, sheriff's deputies, and other peace officers held civil offices as a matter of law. Letter Advisory No. 63 (1973); AG Opinion V-70 (1947). The AG now believed the courts would apply the test from Aldine Independent School District v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. 1955), under which the decisive factor distinguishing a public officer from a public employee is "whether any sovereign function of the government is conferred upon the individual to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public largely independent of the control of others" (quoting Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd)). The Texas courts of appeals and the AG had used that test to decide whether a position is a civil office under section 40. See Ruiz v. State, 540 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); AG Opinion MW-415 (1981). Accordingly, the AG overruled its previous opinions to the contrary.

Independence is the key. More recent decisions held that an office requires not only authority to perform sovereign functions, but authority to perform them largely independent of others' control; a person who performs sovereign functions under another's direction is not an officer, as in Green v. Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1974), and Harris County v. Schoenbacher, 549 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (chief juvenile probation officer not an officer because he could not act largely independent of the juvenile board); see also Ruiz, 540 S.W.2d at 812 (teacher not an officer, with no voice in policy). Older cases like Murray v. State, 67 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933), and Rich v. Graybar Elec. Co., 84 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. 1935), described deputies as public officers, and Simpson v. State, 137 S.W.2d 1035, 1036 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), called a city police officer a public official for "official misconduct" purposes, but those cases addressed different questions.

Irwin is no longer the law. The one recent decision suggesting a peace officer is an officer for section 40 purposes was Irwin v. State, 177 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944), which held that section 40 barred Houston police officers (carrying special Harris County deputy-sheriff commissions) from acting as both at once. The AG explained that Irwin no longer controls: city police officers now have county-wide jurisdiction, see Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), and Britt v. State, 768 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ) (both reading Local Government Code §§ 341.001(e)(1) and 341.021(e)), and Irwin's reasoning is inconsistent with Aldine and its progeny.

Police officers act under control. At least some city police officers perform their duties under others' direction. The Local Government Code lets general-law municipalities establish and regulate their police forces (§§ 341.001(a), 341.002) and empowers home-rule cities to provide for police departments (§ 341.003); nothing requires a city to let each officer act largely independent of control. The Texas Supreme Court had also held discharged Dallas police officers were not officers entitled to recover emoluments for unexpired terms. City of Dallas v. McDonald, 103 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1937). So the AG could not conclude, as a matter of law, that all city police officers are civil officers under section 40.

Deputies, too. The statute letting a sheriff appoint deputies gives them "the power and authority to perform all the acts and duties of their principal," which long ago was read to bar a sheriff from creating a "special deputy" limited to some acts. Trammel v. Shelton, 45 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898). But controlling the scope of the agency relationship does not change its basic nature: a deputy remains an agent of the sheriff, subject to the sheriff's orders (Naill v. State, 129 S.W. 630, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910); AG Opinion O-1263 (1939)), derives authority from the sheriff and may not perform duties the sheriff has not delegated (AG Opinion H-727 (1975)), and sheriffs answer for their deputies' official acts (Local Gov't Code § 85.003(d); Heye v. Moody, 4 S.W. 242, 243 (Tex. 1887)), with at least some deputies serving at the sheriff's pleasure (§ 85.003(c)). So deputies are not civil officers as a matter of law either, and the AG concluded the Odessa police and Ector County deputies were not, as a matter of law, barred from part-time school security work.

Security officers and the fact question. Likewise, nothing in the statutes governing district security officers requires the district to let each officer act largely independent of control. Section 21.483 lets a school board employ security officers vested with peace-officer powers on district property or in performing their duties, and the AG had read this as letting school boards define those officers' duties (AG Opinion JM-239 (1984)). So school boards retain control over how district security officers do their jobs, and such officers do not hold civil offices as a matter of law. Whether any particular police officer, deputy, or district security officer holds a civil office, however, raises fact questions the AG could not address. On the third question, the AG found nothing in Texas law preventing a school district from contracting with a private security service, so long as the contract complies with Education Code sections 21.308 and 21.483 and the service is licensed under V.T.C.S. article 4413(29bb).

Common questions

Does the Texas dual-office rule stop a cop from working school security on the side?
Not automatically. The opinion concluded that, as a matter of law, city police officers and sheriff's deputies do not hold "civil offices" under article XVI, section 40, so the constitution does not categorically bar them from part-time school-district security work.

Why aren't police officers and deputies "officers" for this rule?
Because, under the Aldine test, you are a government "officer" only if you exercise sovereign power largely free of anyone's control. Police officers and deputies generally work under the control of their department or sheriff, which makes them employees for this purpose, not independent office-holders.

Could a specific officer still run into the dual-office bar?
Yes. The opinion said "not as a matter of law," not "never." Whether one particular officer in one particular arrangement holds a civil office depends on the facts of the job, and the Attorney General does not resolve fact questions in an opinion.

Could the district just hire a private security company instead?
The opinion found nothing in Texas law preventing that, as long as the contract met Education Code sections 21.308 and 21.483 and the company was licensed under the private-security statute.

Citations

• Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 40 (one person may not hold two civil offices of emolument); art. XVI, § 30 (term of office); art. V, § 24 (removal) (the last two in the Aldine discussion)
• Education Code § 21.483 (school-district security officers); § 21.308 (contract compliance)
• Local Government Code § 341.001, § 341.003 (municipal police forces; county-wide jurisdiction); § 85.003 (sheriff responsible for deputies; deputies serve at pleasure)
• Code of Criminal Procedure art. 2.12 (peace officers)
• V.T.C.S. art. 4413(29bb) (private security service licensing)
• Aldine Independent School District v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1955); Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd)
• Green v. Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1974); Harris County v. Schoenbacher, 549 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); Ruiz v. State, 540 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ)
• Murray v. State, 67 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933); Rich v. Graybar Elec. Co., 84 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. 1935); Simpson v. State, 137 S.W.2d 1035 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
• Irwin v. State, 177 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944); Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Britt v. State, 768 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ)
• City of Dallas v. McDonald, 103 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1937); Trammel v. Shelton, 45 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Naill v. State, 129 S.W. 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910); Heye v. Moody, 4 S.W. 242 (Tex. 1887)
• Attorney General Opinions MW-450 (1982), V-70 (1947), MW-415 (1981), JM-239 (1984), O-1263 (1939), H-727 (1975); Letter Advisory No. 63 (1973)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0212
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1993/dm0212.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain; garbled case names were verified against the official reporters (for example the source scan rendered "Britt v. State" and "Trammel v. Shelton" as "Brin" and a garbled spelling). One quotation fragment that the scan split across a page break is noted in brackets. The linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 29, 1993

Honorable Tracey Bright
County Attorney
Ector County Courthouse, Room 201
Odessa, Texas 79761

Opinion No. DM-212

Re: Whether a school district may contract with off-duty police officers and deputy sheriffs for security services, and related questions (RQ-427)

Dear Ms. Bright:

You have requested an opinion from this office regarding the Ector County Independent School District's practice of hiring off-duty peace officers to provide security services. You indicate that the district maintains its own security department and officers under section 21.483 of the Education Code, but that it often needs additional officers to provide security at various school events, including football games, basketball games, and play nights. The district obtains the additional officers by contracting directly with off-duty peace officers in the community, including off-duty City of Odessa police officers, Ector County Sheriff's Department deputies, and Texas Department of Public Safety officers. The City of Odessa contends that this practice violates article XVI, section 40 of the Texas Constitution, which prohibits one person from holding or exercising more than one "civil office of emolument."

Your request raises three specific questions. The first question is whether a city police officer may contract directly with the school district to serve as a part-time security officer without violating article XVI, section 40 of the Texas Constitution. The second question raises the same issue with respect to paid deputies. Because you have not described police officers or sheriff's deputies who occupy any particular rank, we will assume that you are asking whether all city police officers and sheriff's deputies are prohibited as a matter of law from serving as part-time security officers for the school district by article XVI, section 40. Your third question is whether the school district can contract directly with a private security service.

Article XVI, section 40 applies to people who profit monetarily from "civil offices." Attorney General Opinion MW-450 (1982) at 1. We assume that the police officers and sheriff's deputies involved here are paid both by the city or county and by the school district. Thus, to answer the first two questions raised by your request we must determine whether the city police officers or sheriff's deputies hold "civil offices" as that term is used in article XVI, section 40. We must also address whether security officers for school districts hold "civil offices."

We conclude that neither city police officers nor sheriff's deputies hold civil offices within the meaning of article XVI, section 40 as a matter of law. We also conclude that security officers for school districts do not hold civil offices as a matter of law. Depending on the circumstances of their employment, however, some such individuals may hold civil offices. As will be discussed below, the determination whether a particular police officer, sheriff's deputy, or security officer holds a civil office depends upon the resolution of factual issues and is therefore not amenable to the opinion process.

In the past, this office has concluded that city police officers and sheriff's deputies, as well as other peace officers, [1] hold civil offices within the meaning of article XVI, section 40 as a matter of law. Letter Advisory No. 63 (1973) (overruled on other grounds); Attorney General Opinion V-70 (1947). However, we now believe that the Texas courts would apply the test adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Aldine Independent School District v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. 1955), and would conclude that at least some city police officers, sheriff's deputies, and security officers do not hold civil offices. Therefore, we overrule our previous opinions to the contrary.

The Texas Supreme Court has held that the decisive factor distinguishing a public officer from a public employee is "whether any sovereign function of the government is conferred upon the individual to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public largely independent of the control of others." Aldine, 280 S.W.2d at 583 (quoting Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd)) (emphasis supplied by the court in Aldine). In Aldine, this factor led to the conclusion that the tax assessor-collector of a school district was a public officer with a two-year term of office under article XVI, section 30 of the Texas Constitution and who could be removed only as provided in article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution. Aldine, 280 S.W.2d at 585. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that an assessor-collector of taxes appointed by a school board not only acts as a part of the taxing power and shares with the trustees, but, as the assessor, only exercises a part of such power for the school board at its discretion. Id. at 582-83 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court acknowledged that taxation is a part of the sovereign powers of the state, but concluded that the constitution had given this power to the school board, not to the assessor-collector of taxes for the school district. Id. at 583. Although the court in Aldine talks about "public officers" rather than persons who hold "civil offices," both the Texas Courts of Appeals and this office have used this test to determine whether a particular position is a civil office under article XVI, section 40 of the Texas Constitution. See Ruiz v. State, 540 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Attorney General Opinion MW-415 (1981).

In more recent decisions, both the Texas Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have found that an office involves not only the authority to perform certain sovereign functions, but also the authority to perform these functions largely independent of the control of others. In other words, individuals who perform sovereign functions under the direction of another are not officers. See, e.g., Green v. Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1974); Harris County v. Schoenbacher, 549 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). For example, in Schoenbacher, the court held that a chief juvenile probation officer was not an officer for the purposes of a statute authorizing a county commissioners' court to deduct amounts from the salary of an officer who is charged with collecting fees and negligently fails to collect them. Although the court acknowledged that the statute conferred upon the chief juvenile probation officer the authority to perform certain sovereign functions, it concluded that he could not exercise these functions largely independent of the control of the juvenile board and thus was not an officer within the meaning of the Texas Constitution. Similarly, in Ruiz, 540 S.W.2d at 812, the court held that a teacher was not an officer, in part on the grounds that he had no voice in establishing policy and was merely to carry out the policy of the school board and the school principals.

It is well settled that a deputy sheriff is a public officer. He is invested by law with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. Deputy constables are provided for by law and qualify in the manner of deputy sheriffs. They are also vested by law with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by them for the benefit of the public. They are public officers of the state, subject to the authority and the orders of their principals.

Murray v. State, 67 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Rich v. Graybar Elec. Co., 84 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. 1935) (holding that the sureties on the official bond of the constable were held liable for the failure or refusal of a deputy of the constable to levy upon or seize property subject to execution).

[The source scan places the following clause, evidently the tail of the preceding quotation, at the top of the next page: ". . . any other judicial or ministerial officer of any county in the state."]

In Murray, 67 S.W.2d at 274, the court addressed whether a deputy constable was an officer under article 365 of the 1925 Penal Code, which prohibited any officer from collecting a fee not allowed by law, a fee for any service not performed, or any fee in excess of the fee allowed by law for a service. In Rich, 84 S.W.2d at 714, the commission of appeals concluded that a constable was responsible for the failure of a deputy constable to perform the duties required of him and, thus, that sureties on the constable's official bond could be held liable for the deputy's failure. In the course of reaching this conclusion, the commission cited Murray for the proposition that a deputy constable is a public officer. Finally, in Simpson v. State, 137 S.W.2d 1035, 1036 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), the court held that a city police officer was a public official who could be guilty of "official misconduct."

The only recent decision suggesting that a peace officer is an officer for the purposes of article XVI, section 40 is Irwin v. State, 177 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944). In Irwin, the defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the police officers executing the search warrants and making the searches were not authorized to do so and that, as a result, the searches constituted illegal searches and seizures under the state and federal constitutions. The defendant resided in Harris County, outside of Houston, and the search warrants were addressed to the "Sheriff or any Constable of Harris County." The particular police officers involved were, however, Houston city police officers, two of whom carried commissions as special Deputy Sheriffs of Harris County. These two police officers argued that they conducted the searches as deputy sheriffs under their special commissions. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that article XVI, section 40 prevented one person from holding both a city police officer and a deputy sheriff at the same time.

The reasoning reached in Irwin is no longer the law in Texas; city police officers now have county-wide jurisdiction. See Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that V.T.C.S. articles 998, 999, now sections 341.001(e)(1) and 341.021(e) of the Local Government Code, give city police officers and city marshals county-wide jurisdiction for warrantless arrests); Britt v. State, 768 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ) (holding that sections 341.001(e)(1) and 341.021(e) of the Local Government Code give city police officers and city marshals county-wide jurisdiction to execute search warrants). Moreover, the reasoning in Irwin is inconsistent with Aldine and its progeny.

At least some city police officers perform their duties under the direction and control of others. The Local Government Code gives municipalities organized and operating under general law the authority to establish and regulate their own police forces. See Local Gov't Code §§ 341.001(a), 341.002. Similarly, home-rule cities are empowered to provide for police departments. See id. § 341.003. Nothing in the statutes requires municipalities to permit each police officer to exercise his or her functions largely independent of the control of others. Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court has held that Dallas police officers were not officers who could recover emoluments for unexpired terms after being discharged without formal removal proceedings. City of Dallas v. McDonald, 103 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1937), rev'g 69 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1934). Thus, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that all city police officers are civil officers under article XVI, section 40 of the Texas Constitution.

The statute permitting a sheriff to appoint deputies makes the position of deputy sheriff slightly different from that of a city police officer. The statute provides that deputies "have the power and authority to perform all the acts and duties of their principal." Nearly a century ago, this language was interpreted to mean that a sheriff could not appoint a "special deputy" with the authority to perform only some acts. Trammel v. Shelton, 45 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898). Thus, the statute restricts a sheriff's authority to define the agency relationship with his or her deputies.

We do not believe, however, that this makes either the sheriff's deputies or the sheriff's deputies civil officers as a matter of law for the purposes of article XVI, section 40. Although the statute controls the scope of the agency relationship between a sheriff and his or her deputies, it does not alter the basic nature of the relationship. A deputy sheriff is still an agent of the sheriff and subject to the orders of the sheriff. Naill v. State, 129 S.W. 630, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910) (defining deputy as "a person appointed to act for another, a substitute, a delegate, an agent"); Attorney General Opinion O-1263 (1939) at 1. A deputy sheriff still derives his or her authority from the sheriff and is not authorized to perform duties not assumed by the sheriff and delegated to the deputy. Attorney General Opinion H-727 (1975). In addition, sheriffs are responsible for the official acts of their deputies. Local Gov't Code § 85.003(d); Heye v. Moody, 4 S.W. 242, 243 (Tex. 1887). Furthermore, at least some deputy sheriffs serve at the pleasure of the sheriff. Local Gov't Code § 85.003(c). Thus, although no sheriff can limit the authority of a deputy sheriff to only certain functions, some sheriffs can summarily fire a deputy who attempts to exercise such authority improperly.

For these reasons, we believe that the Texas courts would no longer follow the reasoning in Irwin to conclude that city police officers and deputy sheriffs hold civil offices as a matter of law under article XVI, section 40 of the Texas Constitution. Thus, we conclude that the Odessa City Police Officers and Ector County Sheriff's Deputies are not as a matter of law prohibited from serving as part-time security officers for the Ector County Independent School District.

We also conclude that security officers for school districts do not as a matter of law hold civil offices under article XVI, section 40. Like the statutes governing city police officers, nothing in the statutes governing security officers for school districts requires the district to permit each officer to exercise his or her functions largely independent of the control of others. The statute provides that a school board may employ security officers "for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of [subchapter M of chapter 21 of the Education Code]" and that these officers are "vested with all the powers, privileges, and immunities of peace officers . . . on the property under the control and jurisdiction of the district or . . . in the performance of his duties." Educ. Code § 21.483. This office has interpreted this language as giving the school boards the authority to define the duties of district security officers. Attorney General Opinion JM-239 (1984) at 4. Thus, the school boards retain the authority to control the manner in which district security officers perform their duties.

We are unable to determine, however, whether any particular police officer, sheriff's deputy, or security officer for a school district holds a civil office as that term is used in article XVI, section 40. Making this determination raises fact questions, which we cannot address in the opinion process. Therefore, even if we had the relevant facts, we would be unable to tell you whether a particular city police officer or deputy sheriff is prohibited from serving as a security officer for the Ector Independent School District.

In response to your third question, we can find nothing in Texas law that would prevent a school district from contracting directly with a private security service for security officers. Of course, the contract must comply with sections 21.308 and 21.483 of the Education Code, and the security service must be licensed under article 4413(29bb), V.T.C.S.

SUMMARY

Article XVI, section 40 does not as a matter of law prohibit city police officers and sheriffs deputies from serving as part-time security officers for a school district. City police officers, sheriff's deputies, and school-district security officers do not hold "civil offices" as a matter of law as that term is used in article XVI, section 40. Previous attorney general opinions concluding to the contrary are overruled. We cannot determine, however, whether article XVI, section 40 prohibits any particular police officer or sheriff's deputy from serving as a security officer for a school district. Determining whether a particular city police officer, sheriff's deputy, or school-district security officer holds a civil office is a question of fact, which cannot be addressed in the opinion process.

We can find nothing in Texas law that would prevent a school district from contracting with a private security service for security officers.

DAN MORALES
Attorney General of Texas

WILL PRYOR
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Deputy Attorney General for Litigation

RENEA HICKS
State Solicitor

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Footnote:

[1] City police officers, sheriff's deputies, and security officers for school districts are all peace officers. See Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.12; Educ. Code § 21.483; Attorney General Opinion JM-239 (1984) at 3.