Do Texas juvenile probation officers have to supervise out-of-state juveniles sent here under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, even ones Texas couldn't have prosecuted as juveniles?

Plain-English summary

The administrator of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles in Texas asked the Attorney General a practical question. The compact is an agreement among all fifty states and the District of Columbia for handling juveniles who cross state lines: returning runaways and absconders to their home states, and arranging supervision of juvenile probationers and parolees who live in a different state from the one that put them on probation or parole. When another state sends Texas a juvenile to supervise under the compact, a Texas county probation department carries out that supervision. The problem was that at least one Texas probation department had refused to take some of these cases. Its reasoning: under Texas law, juvenile probation services are services ordered by a Texas juvenile court, and a Texas juvenile court only has jurisdiction over "children" within the meaning of chapter 51 of the Family Code, defined by a specific age range and specific conduct. If an out-of-state juvenile would have been too old, or had committed something that is not "delinquent conduct" under Texas law, the department argued it had no authority to supervise the person.

The Attorney General rejected that argument. The starting point is that the compact, once adopted, is the law of the state. Texas adopted it in 1965 and codified it (with supplements) as chapter 25 of the Family Code. Article VII of the compact, "Cooperative Supervision of Probationers and Parolees," is the provision in play. Under article VII, the state that adjudicated the juvenile (the "sending state") may let the juvenile live in another state (the "receiving state") while on probation or parole, and the receiving state agrees to supervise. The key point the probation department missed is what gets transferred. Article VII transfers the duties of supervision and visitation, not jurisdiction. The sending state's court keeps jurisdiction over the case and sets the terms of probation or parole; the receiving state merely acts as the sending state's agent, carrying out the terms of the foreign adjudication. The receiving state's day-to-day rules apply to operational matters, but it does not re-decide whether the youth should have been adjudicated in the first place.

That distinction answers the question. Because jurisdiction stays with the foreign court, the receiving state's own juvenile jurisdictional limits do not apply. The compact's own definition makes the point: a "delinquent juvenile" is one "adjudged delinquent" who is "still subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has made such adjudication." If a Texas probation department could supervise only cases referred through Texas's own juvenile system, it could not accept any compact cases at all, because none of them are adjudicated through the Texas juvenile system. That cannot be what the Legislature intended when it enacted the compact. The Attorney General found the duty squarely in the statute: Family Code section 25.08 directs the courts, departments, agencies, and officers of Texas to enforce the compact and do all things appropriate to effectuate its purposes within their jurisdictions, and the jurisdiction of a juvenile probation department is the provision of juvenile services under the orders of a juvenile court, which in a compact case is the adjudicating court of the sending state. The compact thus opens a separate avenue, distinct from title 3 of the Family Code, for juvenile probation departments to render services.

The opinion also drew a line between mandatory and voluntary acceptance. Article VII makes some cases mandatory (where the parent, guardian, or legal custodian lives in the receiving state) and lets the receiving state voluntarily accept others. In the voluntary cases, it is the state, not the individual probation department, that decides whether to accept. The bottom line: a Texas juvenile probation department must extend its services to any case properly referred through the compact, regardless of the referred individual's age or the nature of the adjudicating offense, and once the state accepts supervision, Family Code sections 25.02 and 25.08 require the officers to provide the services.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The Interstate Compact on Juveniles described here was later replaced nationally and in Texas by a successor compact, and the Family Code and Human Resources Code provisions cited have been amended and renumbered since 1992, so confirm the current compact and current statutes before relying on anything described here.

Background and statutory framework

The Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles deals with several distinct interstate matters, including the out-of-state placement of children on juvenile probation or parole and the cooperative supervision of probationers and parolees who reside outside the adjudicating state. Texas adopted the compact in 1965 and, together with supplementary enactments, codified it as chapter 25 of the Family Code. See Acts 1965, 59th Leg., ch. 324. Once executed by a state, the compact "shall have the full force and effect of law within such state." Family Code § 25.02, art. XIII.

Article VII of the compact, codified at Family Code § 25.02, governs cooperative supervision. It provides that the authorities of a sending state may permit a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole to reside in a receiving state, that the receiving state shall accept the juvenile when the parent, guardian, or legal custodian resides or undertakes to reside in the receiving state, and that the receiving state may, in its discretion, agree to accept supervision in other cases. Article VII(b) provides that each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation and supervision over any such delinquent juvenile and, in exercising those duties, will be governed by the same standards that prevail for its own juveniles released on probation or parole.

As compact administrator, Mr. Jackson referred out-of-state delinquent juveniles to county probation departments for supervision. See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 85.43; Texas Youth Commission, 16 Tex. Reg. 4476 (1991). The probation department that declined certain cases pointed to the definition of "juvenile probation services" in Human Resources Code § 142.001, which describes services provided by or under the direction of a juvenile probation officer in response to an order issued by a juvenile court and under the court's direction. Under Family Code § 51.04(a), the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings involving the delinquent conduct, or conduct indicating a need for supervision, of a person who was a "child" within the meaning of title 3 at the time. Section 51.02(1) defines "child" by age (generally ten to seventeen, and in some circumstances seventeen to eighteen for conduct committed before age seventeen), and § 51.03(a) defines "delinquent conduct." Section 54.04(d)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to place a child found to have engaged in delinquent conduct on probation. From these provisions the department reasoned that probation services may go only to those who could have been within Texas juvenile-court jurisdiction.

The Attorney General concluded that this argument overlooks the nature of article VII supervision and the obligations the compact imposes. The juvenile jurisdictional limits of a receiving state are irrelevant to its article VII responsibilities, because article VII transfers the duties of supervision and visitation, not jurisdiction. The sending state sets the terms of probation or parole, which bind the receiving state's authorities; the receiving state acts as the sending state's agent in carrying out the foreign adjudication. Jurisdiction always remains with the foreign court, a point reflected in the compact's definition of "delinquent juvenile" as one "adjudged delinquent" and "still subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has made such adjudication." Family Code § 25.02, art. III. The responsibilities of probation officers to delinquent juveniles referred through the compact are established in Family Code §§ 25.02 and 25.08; the latter directs that the courts, departments, agencies, and officers of the state and its subdivisions shall enforce the compact and do all things appropriate to effectuate its purposes that are within their respective jurisdictions. The compact thus establishes an avenue for juvenile probation services distinct from title 3 of the Family Code. Because article VII both determines when a state must accept supervision and provides for voluntary acceptance in other cases (with the decision resting on the state rather than the individual department), the Attorney General concluded that juvenile probation departments must extend their services to any case referred through the compact, and that once the state accepts supervision, even where acceptance is not mandatory, Family Code §§ 25.02 and 25.08 require officers to provide the services.

Common questions

What is the Interstate Compact on Juveniles?
It was an agreement among all the states and the District of Columbia to cooperate on juveniles who cross state lines, including returning runaways and supervising juvenile probationers and parolees who live in a state other than the one that adjudicated them. Texas adopted it in 1965 as chapter 25 of the Family Code.

Could a Texas probation department turn down a compact case because the youth was too old or the offense wasn't a Texas juvenile crime?
No. The opinion concluded that the receiving state's juvenile jurisdiction limits do not apply to compact supervision, because what the compact transfers is the duty to supervise, not jurisdiction. A department had to take any case properly referred through the compact, regardless of the youth's age or the adjudicating offense.

Who keeps control of the case, Texas or the sending state?
The sending state. Its court keeps jurisdiction and sets the terms of probation or parole, and Texas acts as its agent in carrying them out.

Where did the duty to supervise come from?
From the compact itself, enacted as Family Code chapter 25. The opinion pointed to Family Code sections 25.02 and 25.08, which require Texas courts, agencies, and officers to enforce the compact and provide the services it calls for once the state accepts supervision.

Citations

• Family Code ch. 25 (Interstate Compact on Juveniles); § 25.02 (arts. III, VII, XIII); § 25.08
• Family Code §§ 51.02(1), 51.03(a), 51.04(a), 54.04(d)(1)
• Human Resources Code § 142.001
• 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 85.43; 16 Tex. Reg. 4476 (1991)
• Acts 1965, 59th Leg., ch. 324

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0147
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1992/dm0147.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain. The linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 4, 1992

Mr. Ron Jackson
Compact Administrator
Interstate Compact on Juveniles
Texas Youth Commission
P. O. Box 4260
Austin, Texas 78765

Opinion No. DM-147

Re: Whether the Uniform Compact on Juveniles by Texas authorizes and requires Texas juvenile probation officers to supervise delinquent juveniles as defined by the compact who would not be defined as juvenile delinquents under chapter 51 of the Texas Family Code (RQ-106)

Dear Mr. Jackson:

You have requested an opinion from this office concerning the effect of the Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles ("the ICJ" or "the compact") on the authority and duty of Texas juvenile probation officers to supervise individuals from other states who could not have been adjudicated as juveniles under Texas law. We conclude that the adoption of the ICJ by Texas both authorizes and requires these officers to supervise such individuals if they are within the ICJ definition of "delinquent juvenile," and otherwise meet the conditions of article VII of the compact.

As you inform us, "[t]he purpose of [the ICJ] is to establish uniform procedures for returning juvenile runaways and absconders to their homes and to provide appropriate supervision for juvenile delinquents on probation or parole who reside outside the state where they were adjudicated." See also Damon, Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167 (1990).[1] All fifty states and the District of Columbia have now adopted the ICJ. Texas adopted the compact in 1965 and, together with supplementary enactments, codified it as chapter 25 of the Texas Family Code. See Acts 1965, 59th Leg., ch. 324, § 1, at 676.

Your question concerns article VII of the ICJ, "Cooperative Supervision of Probationers and Parolees." Fam. Code § 25.02. In that article compact signatories agree in part to the following:

  (a) That the duly constituted judicial and administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (herein called "the sending state") may permit any delinquent juvenile within such state, placed on probation or parole, to reside in any other state party to this compact (herein called "receiving state") while on probation or parole, and the receiving state shall accept such delinquent juvenile, if the parent, guardian, or person entitled to the legal custody of such delinquent juvenile is residing or undertakes to reside within the receiving state. . . . A receiving state, in its discretion, may agree to accept supervision of a probationer or parolee in cases where the parent, guardian, or person entitled to the legal custody of the delinquent juvenile is not a resident of the receiving state, and if so accepted the sending state may transfer supervision accordingly.

  (b) That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation and of supervision over any such delinquent juvenile and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards of visitation and supervision that prevail for its own delinquent juveniles released on probation or parole.

Fam. Code § 25.02, art. VII(b) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, in your capacity as administrator of the compact in Texas,[2] you refer out-of-state "delinquent juveniles" under the ICJ to county probation departments for supervision under this provision. See 37 T.A.C. § 85.43; Texas Youth Commission, 16 Tex. Reg. 4476 (1991). At least one probation department has declined to accept supervision of individuals who would not be considered delinquent juveniles under title 3 of the Texas Family Code, chapters 51 et seq. relating to delinquent children, either because of their age or the offense committed. That probation department contends that its statutory authority is limited to cases within juvenile jurisdiction as defined in Family Code chapter 51.

Chapter 142.001 of the Human Resources Code defines "juvenile probation services" to mean the following:

         (1) services provided by or under the direction of a juvenile probation officer in response to an order issued by a juvenile court and under the court's direction, including:
            (A) protective services;
            (B) prevention of delinquent conduct and conduct indicating a need for supervision;
            (C) diversion;
            (D) informal adjustment;
            (E) foster care;
            (F) counseling;
            (G) supervision; and
            (H) diagnostic, correctional, and educational services; and
         (2) services provided by a juvenile probation department that is related to the operation of a juvenile detention facility.

Hum. Res. Code § 142.001 (emphasis added). Under Family Code section 51.04(a), the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over

       proceedings in all cases involving the delinquent conduct [of a child] or conduct indicating a need for supervision engaged in by a person who was a child within the meaning of this title at the time he engaged in the conduct.

Section 51.02(1) defines "child" as a person

           (A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age; or
           (B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age.

"Delinquent conduct" is defined as conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates

      (1) a penal law of this state punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail, or
      (2) a reasonable and lawful order of a juvenile court entered under Section 54.04 or 54.05 of this act, including an order prohibiting conduct referred to in Subsection (b)(4) of this section.

Fam. Code § 51.03(a). Section 54.04(d)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to place a child found to have engaged in delinquent conduct on probation upon making the appropriate findings. Apparently, the probation department contends that since probation services are those provided by order of a juvenile court, i.e., a court with juvenile jurisdiction, they may be provided only to those within Texas juvenile court jurisdiction as delineated in chapter 51 of the Family Code. The corollary of this argument is that probation officers may accept supervision under the ICJ only of out-of-state probationers or parolees who could have been subject to juvenile court jurisdiction in Texas. We believe that this argument overlooks both the nature of supervision under article VII of the ICJ and the obligations imposed by the compact.

The juvenile jurisdictional limits of a receiving state are irrelevant to its responsibilities under article VII of the ICJ. By adopting article VII, states agree to a transfer of the duties of supervision and visitation of juvenile probationers and parolees from the authorities of the sending state to those of the receiving state, but not to a transfer of jurisdiction. Although laws and regulations of the receiving state determine the day-to-day operational matters of the probation or parole, the sending state sets the terms of probation or parole, and these are binding upon the authorities of the receiving state. 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1671. The receiving state merely acts as the sending state's agent in carrying out the terms of the foreign adjudication. Article VII thus "authorizes only courtesy supervision by the receiving state of probation or parole that is structured and enforced by the sending state." Id. (emphasis added).

In effect, jurisdiction of a case always remains with the foreign court that adjudicated the youth a delinquent. This point is evident in the definition of "delinquent juvenile" as a juvenile "adjudged delinquent" and "still subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has made such adjudication." Fam. Code § 25.02, art. III (emphasis added).[3] If juvenile probation departments could accept supervision only of cases referred through title 3 of the Family Code, one could argue that they could not accept any cases under the ICJ, for none of those cases are adjudicated through the Texas juvenile system. Clearly, such a result would not reflect the intention of the Texas Legislature in enacting the compact as chapter 25 of the Family Code.

Instead, we believe that the responsibilities of probation officers to "delinquent juveniles" referred through the ICJ are clearly established in Family Code sections 25.02 and 25.08. The latter provision states the responsibility of the member state to carry out compact provisions:

          The courts, departments, agencies, and officers of this State and its subdivisions shall enforce this compact and shall do all things appropriate to effectuate its purposes and intent which are within their respective jurisdictions.

Fam. Code § 25.08 (emphasis added). The jurisdiction of juvenile probation departments is the provision of juvenile services pursuant to the orders and direction of a juvenile court. In the context of the ICJ, the juvenile court issuing the order for and directing probation services for an individual is the court having jurisdiction over the "delinquent juvenile" as defined by the compact, i.e., the adjudicating court of the sending state. The ICJ thus establishes an avenue for the rendition of juvenile probation services by juvenile probation departments distinct from that delineated in title 3 of the Family Code. See Fam. Code § 25.02, art. XIII (once ICJ is executed by a state "it shall have the full force and effect of law within such state").

As discussed above, article VII not only determines when a state must accept supervision under the ICJ, but also provides for a state's voluntary acceptance of supervision in other cases. In the latter cases, the "state," and not the individual probation department, decides whether or not to accept supervision. We conclude that juvenile probation departments must extend their services to any case referred to them through the ICJ. We emphasize that once the state accepts supervision, even where such acceptance would not be mandatory under the ICJ, Family Code sections 25.02 and 25.08 require juvenile probation officers to provide services under the compact.

                               SUMMARY

          By adopting the Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles (the ICJ) as Family Code chapter 25, the legislature authorized juvenile probation departments to extend their services to any case properly referred to them through the ICJ, regardless of the age of the individual so referred or the nature of the adjudicating offense. Once the state accepts supervision of an out-of-state delinquent juvenile under article VII of the ICJ, Family Code section 25.08 requires juvenile probation officers to provide the mandated services.

                                            DAN MORALES
                                            Attorney General of Texas

WILL PRYOR
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Faith S. Steinberg
Assistant Attorney General

[Footnote 1: The Interstate Compact on Juveniles deals with four distinct interstate proceedings: (1) the out-of-state placement of children on juvenile probation or parole; (2) the return of juveniles who have absconded from probation, parole, or an institution to another state; (3) the return from another state of runaways; and (4) cooperative supervision of probationers and parolees.]

[Footnote 2: Citation to the compact administrator's role.]

[Footnote 3: Fam. Code § 25.02, art. III.]