Can a Texas commissioners court remove people it appointed to a county district board?

Plain-English summary

Comal County's attorney had a practical problem. The commissioners court appoints the members of several local district boards, the county's emergency services district, its rural fire prevention districts, and the Water Oriented Recreation District (W.O.R.D.), a park district on the Guadalupe and Comal rivers. The statutes creating those districts say nothing about how to remove a board member. So when the county wanted to get rid of an appointee, who had the power to do it: the commissioners court that appointed them, or a court?

The Attorney General concluded that these board members are "county officers," which carried a specific legal consequence. Under article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution and chapter 87 of the Local Government Code, a county officer can be removed only by a district judge, after a jury trial, for causes like incompetency or official misconduct. The commissioners court has no power to fire them, and it does not matter that the court appointed them or that the statutes are silent on removal.

The reasoning ran through a definition the Texas Supreme Court has used for decades. A person is a "public officer," rather than an employee, when some sovereign function of government is conferred on them to exercise for the public's benefit, largely independent of the control of others. Each of these boards holds real governmental power delegated by statute, levying taxes, condemning and selling property, making contracts, issuing bonds, providing fire and emergency services, in its own right, not as the commissioners court's agent. Even the W.O.R.D. board, whose actions the commissioners court can veto within 30 days, exercises power that originates with the board, not the court. Because the boards exercise that power for residents of the county, and the commissioners court appoints them and oversees their finances, they are county officers, and the exclusive removal route is a district court proceeding.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The statutes governing these districts and county-officer removal have been amended since 1992, so confirm the current provisions before relying on this opinion.

Background and statutory framework

The question started from the removal statute itself. Article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution lets district judges remove county judges, county attorneys, clerks, justices of the peace, constables, "and other county officers" for incompetency, official misconduct, habitual drunkenness, or other causes defined by law, after the cause is set out in writing and found true by a jury. Local Government Code section 87.012 carries this forward, letting a district judge remove a county officer "not otherwise named by this section." Chapter 87, sections 87.001 through 87.032, supplies the procedure.

Two general rules framed the analysis. First, officers and employees may be removed only in the manner the statute designates, and removal statutes are strictly construed. State ex rel. Hickman v. Alcorn, 14 S.W. 663, 665 (Tex. 1890). An officer with a set term, rather than one serving at the appointing authority's pleasure, is not removable at that authority's will. Dorenfield v. State ex rel. Allred, 73 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1934). Where a valid statute prescribes a removal method for a county officer, that method is exclusive. State ex rel. Kelly v. Baker, 580 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); see also Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1955).

The opinion then had to decide whether these board members were officers at all, and county officers in particular. The controlling test came from Aldine Indep. School Dist. v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1955), where the Texas Supreme Court held a school board's tax assessor-collector was an employee, not an officer, because the statute did not fix a term, require an oath, provide for removal, or set qualifications, and the board itself held the taxing power. Quoting Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd), the court said the determining factor that distinguishes a public officer from an employee is whether any sovereign function of government is conferred on the individual to be exercised for the public's benefit largely independent of the control of others. That definition has two elements: authority to exercise governmental power for the public, and independence from the control of other governmental bodies. A fixed term and freedom from dismissal at another's discretion go to the second element.

To be removable under article V, section 24, a person must be both an "officer" and a "county officer." Lefevre v. Belsterling, 138 S.W. 571, 574 (Tex. 1911). School district trustees have long been held to be county officers, on the theory that districts are "subdivisions of the county," as are commissioners' and justices' precincts whose officers are county officers. Fowler v. Thomas, 275 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Hendricks v. State, 49 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); see Lefevre, 138 S.W. at 573; see also Engleman Land Co. v. Donna Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 209 S.W. 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1919, writ ref'd) (dicta that an elected irrigation-district director was a county officer).

Applying that test, the opinion worked through each district. The emergency services district (Health & Safety Code chapter 776, for counties of 125,000 or less, authorized by article III, section 48-e of the constitution) is created by petition, hearing, and election, governed by a board the commissioners court appoints to two-year terms. The board can acquire and sell property, hire staff, sue and be sued, impose and collect taxes, and contract, all governmental powers exercised for the public largely independent of others, so its members are public officers under Aldine. See City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 171 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1943) (fire protection is a governmental function); City of San Angelo v. Deutsch, 91 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1936) (tax collection); City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hiring and firing). They are also county officers: the district sits within the county, serves the county's people, is governed by court-appointed members, must report annually to the court, and cannot issue bonds without the court's approval. See Hendricks, 49 S.W. 705; Attorney General Opinion JM-1064 (1989) (county hospital district board of managers are county officers). So the commissioners court cannot remove them.

The rural fire prevention district (Health & Safety Code chapter 794, authorized by article III, section 48-d) tracks the emergency services district almost exactly: court-appointed two-year board terms, the same package of governmental powers, the same reporting and bond-approval ties to the commissioners court. For the same reasons, its board members are county officers removable only by a district judge.

The W.O.R.D. (Local Government Code chapter 324) was the closest call because the commissioners court has a veto: under section 324.045, the court may disapprove a board action within 30 days, and a disapproved act is ineffective. But the opinion concluded the board still holds sovereign authority. Its powers, making contracts, adopting park rules enforceable by criminal penalty, acquiring and selling land, issuing revenue bonds, investing funds, are delegated to it by statute, not by the commissioners court, and it exercises them in its own right rather than as the court's agent. Green v. Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1974). Only the board can initiate the exercise of the district's powers, with its determinations governing unless vetoed. Board members take the constitutional oath and file a bond. They are public officers and, given the district's location in and close ties to the county, county officers, removable only by a district judge.

Common questions

Who can remove a Texas county officer from office?
Only a district judge, after a jury trial, for causes like incompetency or official misconduct, under article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution and chapter 87 of the Local Government Code. The opinion read that route as the exclusive one.

Could the Comal County commissioners court fire board members it had appointed?
No. The opinion concluded the members of the emergency services district, the rural fire prevention districts, and the Water Oriented Recreation District boards were county officers, so the commissioners court had no power to remove them, even though it appointed them.

Why did it matter that the district statutes said nothing about removal?
Because when a board member is a "county officer," the Constitution and chapter 87 already supply the removal method, and that method is exclusive. The statutory silence did not hand the removal power to the commissioners court; it left the constitutional district-court route in place.

What makes someone a "public officer" rather than an employee?
Under the Aldine test the opinion applied, it is whether a sovereign function of government is conferred on the person to exercise for the public's benefit, largely independent of the control of others. Holding delegated powers like taxing, contracting, and condemning property, exercised in one's own right, points to officer status.

Did the commissioners court's veto over the park district change the result?
No. Even though the commissioners court could disapprove a W.O.R.D. board action within 30 days, the opinion concluded the board's power came from statute, not the court, and only the board could initiate its exercise. That independence made the members public officers and, given their ties to the county, county officers.

Citations

• Tex. Const. art. V, § 24; art. III, §§ 48-d, 48-e; art. XVI, § 1
• Local Gov't Code §§ 87.001 through 87.032, 87.012; ch. 324, § 324.045
• Health & Safety Code ch. 776, § 776.033; ch. 794, § 794.033
• Natural Resources Code ch. 62
• Aldine Indep. School Dist. v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1955)
• Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd)
• Lefevre v. Belsterling, 138 S.W. 571, 574 (Tex. 1911)
• Hendricks v. State, 49 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ)
• Fowler v. Thomas, 275 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, writ dism'd w.o.j.)
• State ex rel. Hickman v. Alcorn, 14 S.W. 663, 665 (Tex. 1890)
• Dorenfield v. State ex rel. Allred, 73 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1934)
• State ex rel. Kelly v. Baker, 580 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ)
• State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.)
• Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1955)
• Green v. Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1974)
• Galveston County Commissioners' Court v. Lohec, 814 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ granted)
• City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 171 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1943)
• City of San Angelo v. Deutsch, 91 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1936)
• City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
• French v. State, 572 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
• Tex. Att'y Gen. Ops. H-137 (1973), MW-177 (1980), JM-1064 (1989)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0114
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1992/dm0114.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

May 4, 1992

Honorable Nathan B. Rheinlander
Comal County Attorney
150 N. Seguin, Suite 318
New Braunfels, Texas 78130

Opinion No. DM-114

Re: Whether persons appointed to boards and commissions by the commissioners court are subject to removal by the commissioners court (RQ-72)

Dear Mr. Rheinlander:

You inquire about the removal of individuals from certain boards and commissions whose members are appointed by the commissioners court. The entities in question are the Comal County Water Oriented Recreation District (W.O.R.D.), see Local Gov't Code ch. 324, the four Fire Prevention Districts, see Health & Safety Code ch. 794, and the Emergency Services District, see Health & Safety Code chs. 775, 776 (counties of 125,000 or less). The statutes governing these entities are silent as to removal of board members. You wish to know whether the board members are county officers, subject to removal by the district judge after a jury trial, as set out in article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution and sections 87.001 through 87.032 of the Local Government Code. You also suggest that the appointees serve at the pleasure of the commissioners court, subject to dismissal by the court at any time.[1]

Article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution provides as follows:

County Judges, county attorneys, clerks of the District and County Courts, justices of the peace, constables, and other county officers, may be removed by the Judges of the District Courts for incompetency, official misconduct, habitual drunkenness, or other causes defined by law, upon the cause therefor being set forth in writing and the finding of its truth by a jury.[2] (Footnote added.)

See also Local Gov't Code § 87.012 (district judge may remove county officers from office, including "a county officer, not otherwise named by this section").

As a general rule, officers and employees may be removed only in the manner designated by statute. 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 12.255 (3d ed. 1985); see also State ex rel. Hickman v. Alcorn, 14 S.W. 663, 665 (Tex. 1890) (removal statutes are subject to strict construction). Thus, when an officer has a set term, as opposed to serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority, the officer is not subject to removal at the will of the appointing authority. Dorenfield v. State ex rel. Allred, 73 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1934); Attorney General Opinion JM-1064 (1989). Where a valid statute prescribes the removal method for a county officer, that method is deemed exclusive. State ex rel. Kelly v. Baker, 580 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); see also Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1955).

In Aldine Indep. School Dist. v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1955), the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the tax assessor-collector appointed by a school board was an employee and not an officer subject to removal only under the constitutional provision. The applicable statute authorized, but did not require, the school board to appoint its own tax assessor-collector. Moreover, it did not fix a term of office for the assessor-collector, require him to take the oath of office, provide for removal, or establish his qualifications. Finally, the statute vested in the school board the authority to determine rendition procedures and to adopt measures for assessing property and collecting taxes. The court concluded that "the governing body of the taxing district is the agency which is vested by the Legislature with the sovereign powers of the State in assessing and collecting taxes." 280 S.W.2d at 581. The tax assessor-collector was only an agent or employee of the school board. Id. at 582-83.

The supreme court in Aldine Independent School District quoted the following definition of "public officer" from Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd), which concluded that the county road engineer was not a "public officer" for purposes of article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution:

[T]he determining factor which distinguishes a public officer from an employee is whether any sovereign function of the government is conferred upon the individual to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public largely independent of the control of others.

280 S.W.2d at 583 (citing 224 S.W.2d at 740-41) (emphasis added by supreme court). This definition summarizes the essential elements of public office: the officeholder's authority to exercise governmental power for the benefit of the public and his independence from the control of other governmental entities.[3] The nature of the power conferred upon the individual is relevant to the first element, while the fixed term and freedom from dismissal at another's discretion are relevant to the second.

A board member must meet this definition of "officer," and be a "county officer" as well, to be subject to removal by the district judge pursuant to article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution and chapter 87 of the Local Government Code. Lefevre v. Belsterling, 138 S.W. 571, 574 (Tex. 1911). Trustees of school districts have been held to be "county officers," subject to removal in accordance with the statutes adopted under article V, section 24. Fowler v. Thomas, 275 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Hendricks v. State, 49 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); see Lefevre, 138 S.W. at 573 (expressly approving holding in Hendricks). The court in Hendricks determined that for purposes of removing school district trustees, districts were "subdivisions of the county,[4] as are commissioners' and justices' precincts," and that precinct officers were "county officers." 49 S.W. at 705-06 (footnote added). It concluded that trustees of school districts were county officers, and this conclusion was approved by the Texas Supreme Court in Lefevre, 138 S.W. at 573. See also Engleman Land Co. v. Donna Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 209 S.W. 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1919, writ ref'd) (stating in dicta that elected director of irrigation district was county officer within removal statute).

We will examine the statutes governing the three districts in question to determine whether members of their governing boards are "county officers" within the statute and constitutional provision governing removal of county officers. Both an emergency services district and a fire protection district may be created wholly in one county or in territory located in more than one county. Health & Safety Code §§ 776.011, 776.012, 794.011, 794.012. However, the districts you inquire about are all located wholly within Comal County; thus, we will address only those provisions applicable to districts located wholly within one county.

Article III, section 48-e of the Texas Constitution[5] authorizes the enactment of legislation providing for the creation of special districts for emergency services, such as emergency medical services, emergency ambulance services, and rural fire prevention and control services. Chapter 776 of the Health and Safety Code, which provides for the creation of emergency services districts in counties of 125,000 or less, governs the Comal County district. An emergency services district is established by election after a petition is filed with the county judge and the commissioners court holds a public hearing on the pros and cons of creating a district. Id. §§ 776.011, 776.013-.016, 776.019. If the commissioners court finds that creation of the district is feasible and will promote the public safety, welfare, health, and convenience of persons residing in the proposed district, it must grant the petition and order an election to confirm the district's creation and authorize it to impose a tax. Id. §§ 776.017-.019.

The commissioners court of the county appoints the board members that govern an emergency services district located wholly in one county. Id. § 776.033. Board members serve two-year terms, except for two members of the initial board appointed to one-year terms. Id. § 776.033(b). The board is required to administer the district in accordance with chapter 776 of the Health and Safety Code, id. § 776.035(a)(5), which authorizes it to exercise various governmental powers. The district may acquire and sell real and personal property; appoint officers, agents, and employees; sue and be sued; impose and collect taxes; exercise certain specific powers relevant to providing emergency services; and enter into contracts. Id. § 776.031. Because these governmental powers are conferred upon the board, to be exercised for the benefit of the public largely independent of the control of others, the board members are public officers within the definition in Aldine Independent School District. See City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 171 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1943) (providing fire protection is governmental function); City of San Angelo v. Deutsch, 91 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1936) (tax collection); City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hiring and firing employees).

We believe that the members of the board of the emergency services district for Comal County are county officers. The district is located within the county, and its purpose is to provide emergency services for the people of the county. Board members are appointed and vacancies are filled by the commissioners court. Health & Safety Code § 776.033. The board must file an annual report with the court on the district's administration and financial condition, id. § 776.035(a)(4), and cannot issue bonds without the court's approval. Id. § 776.076. Thus, the commissioners court has a significant role in its creation as well as a continuing role in its operation. Based on these relationships between the emergency services district and the county, the members of the district board are county officers for purposes of the removal statute. See Hendricks, 49 S.W. 705; Attorney General Opinion JM-1064 (members of board of managers of county hospital district are county officers). Therefore, board members may be removed only by trial in accordance with the provisions of article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution, and chapter 87 of the Local Government Code; the commissioners court has no power to remove them.

Article III, section 48-d of the Texas Constitution authorizes legislation providing for the creation of rural fire prevention districts. The provisions on the creation and governance of a fire protection district located wholly within one county track the provisions applicable to an emergency services district. See, e.g., Health & Safety Code §§ 794.013-.020 (creation of district by election following petition procedure). For example, the commissioners court appoints the members of the governing board to two-year terms and fills vacancies on the board. Id. § 794.033. The board has power to acquire and sell real and personal property, enter into contracts, appoint officers, agents, and employees, sue and be sued, levy and enforce the collection of taxes, and to "perform other acts necessary to carry out the intent of . . . chapter [794 of the Health and Safety Code]." Id. § 794.031. The board of the rural fire prevention district must also report to the commissioners court, id. § 794.035(a)(4), and may not issue bonds or notes without the approval of the commissioners court, id. § 794.076.

The provisions applicable to the rural fire protection districts in Comal County are virtually identical in relevant aspects to the provisions governing the emergency services districts. For the reasons discussed in connection with the officers of the emergency service districts, the members of the board governing the fire prevention district are also county officers within article V, section 24 of the constitution and section 87.012 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, they too may only be removed by a district judge in accordance with those procedures.

The Comal County W.O.R.D. is a park district created pursuant to chapter 324 of the Local Government Code, which authorizes creation of a park district in the unincorporated area of a county that has river frontage on both the Guadalupe and Comal rivers. Local Gov't Code § 324.001. A district is created by an election ordered by the commissioners court, and it may be dissolved by order of the commissioners court. Id. §§ 324.024, 324.124. The district governing board is appointed to two-year terms by the commissioners court. Id. § 324.041. Board members take the official oath, see Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 1, and file a bond with the county clerk. Local Gov't Code § 324.042. In addition to these indicia of office, the statute confers several governmental powers upon the board. See, e.g., id. §§ 324.064 (enter into contracts), 324.066 (adopt rules for use of park, enforceable by criminal penalty), 324.067, 324.068 (acquire and sell land), 324.091 (issue revenue bonds after authorization by bond election), 325.068 (invest the district's funds).

The board is, however, subject to the supervision of the commissioners court in accordance with the following provision:

(a) The board is subject to the supervision of the commissioners court in the exercise of all its rights, powers, and privileges and in the performance of its duties.

(b) Not later than the 30th day after the date on which the board acts, the commissioners court may approve or disapprove the action. If the court disapproves the act, the act is ineffective. Otherwise, the act becomes effective on the date that the commissioners court approves the act or on the 31st day after the date on which the board acted, whichever is first.

Id. § 324.045.

Thus, the commissioners court is authorized to veto exercises of governmental power by the Comal County W.O.R.D. Board. Nonetheless, the W.O.R.D. Board is the entity upon which is conferred some part of the sovereign authority of the state. Its powers are delegated to it by statute and not by the commissioners court. It exercises these powers in its own right, and not as an agent of the commissioners court. See Green v. Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1974) ("One who acts in his own right is, in the words of Aldine and Dunbar, largely independent of the control of others"). Only the board may initiate the exercise of the district's powers, and its determinations will govern the district unless disapproved within 30 days by the commissioners court.[6] We believe that the board's authority to initiate the exercise of governmental powers is a "sovereign function of the government" conferred upon it to be exercised "largely independent of the control of others." Accordingly, board members are public officers within the test set out in Aldine Independent School District.

We also conclude that they are county officers. The district was created within the boundaries of Comal County, and its relationship to the county governing body is even closer than that of the emergency services district board or the rural fire prevention district board. Members of the Comal County W.O.R.D. Board are county officers subject to removal only in accordance with article V, section 24 of the constitution and section 87.012 of the Local Government Code.

In conclusion, the commissioners court does not have authority to discharge members of the governing boards of the emergency services district in the county, the fire prevention districts in the county, or the members of the Comal County Water Oriented Recreation District. Members of these boards are county officers, subject to removal only by a district court judge pursuant to article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution, and chapter 87 of the Local Government Code. They are not subject to dismissal by the commissioners court.

                               SUMMARY

        County officers may be removed from office only by the district judge after a trial, in accordance with article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution and sections 87.001 through 87.032 of the Local Government Code. Members of the governing board of an emergency services district established wholly in one county under chapter 776 of the Health and Safety Code, members of the governing board of a rural fire prevention district established wholly within one county under chapter 794 of the Health and Safety Code, and members of the board of the Comal County Water Oriented Recreation District established under chapter 324 of the Local Government Code, are county officers within article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution.

                                             DAN MORALES
                                             Attorney General of Texas

WILL PRYOR
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General

[1] Attorney General Opinion H-137 (1973), which is the basis of this suggestion, actually relied on a statute expressly authorizing the removal of port commissioners by the authority that appointed them.

[2] Article XV of the Texas Constitution provides for removal of state officers.

[3] Since article XVI, section 1 of the Texas Constitution requires elected and appointed officers to take an oath of office, this requirement will apply to a public officer even if the applicable statute is silent as to an oath. French v. State, 572 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Attorney General Opinion MW-177 (1980).

[4] In Galveston County Commissioners' Court v. Lohec, 814 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ granted), the county auditor sought a declaration that a beach park board established by a county under chapter 62 of the Natural Resources Code was a county department required to make purchases and pay claims through the county auditor and its purchasing agent. The court of appeals ruled that beach park boards were not departments or subdivisions of the county, but independent entities separate from the county; thus, they were not required to use the county auditor or purchasing agent.

[5] The text of this constitutional provision was adopted at the November 3, 1987 election pursuant to S.J.R. No. 27, Acts 1987, 70th Leg., § 1. Another section 48-e, which authorizes the creation of jail districts, was adopted at the November 3, 1987 election pursuant to H.J.R. No. 18, Acts 1987, 70th Leg., § 1.

[6] The allocation of power between the W.O.R.D. board and the commissioners court is somewhat like the allocation of power between the legislature and the governor in the adoption and veto of legislation. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 14.