If Tennessee passes a law shielding pesticide manufacturers from failure-to-warn lawsuits when their labels comply with state and federal law (S.B. 527/H.B. 809), what tort claims would still survive, and would the law conflict with FIFRA?

Plain-English summary

Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti answered five questions from State Senator Mark Pody about Senate Bill 527 / House Bill 809, a 2025 proposal to shield pesticide manufacturers and sellers from certain civil suits. The bill says a manufacturer or seller of a pesticide registered with the state agriculture commissioner under Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and registered with the EPA under FIFRA "is not liable in a civil action related to the labeling of the pesticide, including a products liability action alleging a failure to warn under title 29, chapter 28, if the pesticide bore a label approved by the EPA under FIFRA at the time of sale." The bill carves out cases where the pesticide was manufactured or sold in violation of FIFRA or Tennessee's pesticide statute.

Senator Pody asked whether labeling is an "essential element" of standard product liability theories (negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, design defect, inadequate testing, inherently unsafe, deviation from intended design, breach of safety assurances), whether the bill provides a defense to such claims, whether injured persons could still sue, whether actions for damages discovered before vs. after EPA approval would be barred, and whether the bill violates 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2).

The AG declined to give absolute answers to most questions because, in his view, they all depend on the specific allegations a future plaintiff might bring. The bill targets civil actions "related to the labeling" of a pesticide; whether a given claim is "related to the labeling" depends on the underlying theory and the facts pleaded. A "true design defect" claim that does not turn on labeling would survive; a failure-to-warn theory based on the label's content would not.

On the federal preemption question, the AG made two affirmative points:

• The bill does not "violate" 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2). That federal provision says registration is not a defense to "any offense under this subchapter," meaning FIFRA's own enforcement scheme. It does not control state-law civil defenses. Plus, the proposed Tennessee bill explicitly does not apply if a pesticide is manufactured or sold in violation of FIFRA, so the registration-as-defense issue does not arise there either.
• Federal FIFRA preemption already gives compliant manufacturers a "powerful defense" against state failure-to-warn claims under Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). The Solicitor General reinforced that view in a December 2025 amicus brief in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell. So the bill operates against a backdrop where some state-law mislabeling claims are already preempted as a matter of federal law.

What this means for you

If you are a Tennessee legislator considering the bill

The AG declined to give categorical answers to most of the questions, concluding they depend on the specific allegations a future plaintiff would bring. As drafted, the opinion reads the bill to bar civil actions "related to the labeling" of a registered pesticide, including failure-to-warn claims, while the carve-out preserves liability where a pesticide is "manufactured or sold in violation of" FIFRA or Tenn. Code Ann. Title 43, Chapter 8. The AG noted that a Senate Judiciary amendment states that carve-out differently from the introduced version.

If you are a Tennessee farmer or pesticide applicator who has been injured

The opinion holds that whether the bill, if enacted in the introduced form, would bar a suit depends on the theory pleaded: claims that turn on the content of the EPA-approved label are the ones the bill addresses, while a true design-defect or manufacturing-defect claim that does not depend on the label would not be barred by the bill's terms.

If you are a pesticide manufacturer or distributor in Tennessee

The opinion describes the bill as adding a state-law defense on top of existing federal FIFRA preemption, with an EPA-approved label at the time of sale as the threshold for the bill's protection. It holds that the protection does not reach pesticides "manufactured or sold in violation of" FIFRA or § 43-8-104, and that claims not related to labeling fall outside the bill's bar.

If you are a tort attorney pleading or defending a Tennessee pesticide case

The opinion is fact-specific by design: the AG said evaluating the bill's scope and preemption requires "specific allegations detailed in a civil complaint or a robust factual record." On the federal question, the AG concluded the bill does not violate 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2) (which bars registration as a defense to FIFRA "offenses," not state-law civil defenses), and noted that Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), already gives compliant manufacturers a strong preemption defense against state failure-to-warn claims, a reading the Solicitor General reaffirmed in a December 2025 amicus brief in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell.

Common questions

Q: Is Tennessee's S.B. 527 / H.B. 809 already law?
A: No. The opinion was issued during the 114th General Assembly's consideration of the bill. Confirm current status in the Tennessee General Assembly's bill tracking before relying on this analysis as anything other than a description of the proposal as the AG saw it.

Q: What does the bill actually say?
A: As introduced, it provides that a manufacturer or seller of a registered pesticide "is not liable in a civil action related to the labeling of the pesticide, including a products liability action alleging a failure to warn under title 29, chapter 28, if the pesticide bore a label approved by the EPA under FIFRA at the time of sale." It carves out pesticides "manufactured or sold in violation of" Tenn. Code Ann. Title 43, Chapter 8 or FIFRA. A Senate Judiciary amendment changes the carve-out's wording.

Q: Does the bill bar all lawsuits against pesticide makers?
A: No. It bars only civil actions "related to the labeling" of the pesticide. Claims that don't depend on what the label says, like a true design-defect claim, a manufacturing-defect claim, or a non-label-based express-warranty claim, would not be barred by the bill's terms.

Q: Why does the AG keep saying answers depend on the facts?
A: Because whether a given lawsuit is "related to the labeling" turns on what the plaintiff actually alleges. A "negligence" claim might rest on the label, or it might not. A breach-of-warranty claim might point to the label, or to a separate sales-pitch document, or to the product's actual performance. The AG explicitly said evaluating preemption and the bill's scope requires "specific allegations detailed in a civil complaint or a robust factual record."

Q: Does FIFRA already preempt state failure-to-warn claims?
A: Partly. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), held that FIFRA preempts state requirements that would impose labeling obligations diverging from FIFRA's own. The Solicitor General reaffirmed that reading in the December 2025 Monsanto v. Durnell amicus. State claims that effectively impose new labeling rules are preempted; some non-labeling state-law claims (true design defect, manufacturing defect) are not.

Q: Does the bill violate 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2)?
A: No, the AG concluded. That federal subsection prevents EPA registration from being raised as a defense to "any offense under this subchapter," meaning FIFRA enforcement actions. It does not regulate state-law civil defenses, and the bill itself does not let a manufacturer use registration to escape FIFRA non-compliance.

Q: What about Wyeth v. Levine?
A: The AG cited Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), to illustrate that federal regulatory approval (there, FDA) does not always preempt state failure-to-warn claims. The reference shows the AG aware of the tension between regulatory compliance and state tort liability; he did not say Wyeth controls FIFRA. Bates is the FIFRA-specific authority.

Background and statutory framework

FIFRA, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.), is the federal regime that registers and labels pesticides through the EPA. Tennessee maintains a parallel state-level pesticide labeling and registration scheme under Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104. The proposed Tennessee bill ties civil-liability protection to compliance with both regimes at the time of sale.

The AG's analysis frames the policy tension this way: regulators establish detailed pre-market rules for what a label must say, and tort plaintiffs later argue, often through state failure-to-warn claims, that the label was inadequate despite federal compliance. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC navigated that tension by holding that FIFRA preempts state requirements that would impose labeling obligations diverging from FIFRA's. The Solicitor General's December 2025 amicus brief in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell repeated that reading. The proposed Tennessee bill operates in the space Bates created: codifying a state-law defense for compliance, while acknowledging that some claims (those not tethered to labeling) remain viable.

The opinion also notes that Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 2-7-171) and North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.3-11) have enacted similar pesticide-labeling sufficient-warning statutes, suggesting Tennessee's bill is part of a broader state legislative trend.

Citations and references

Statutes and bills:

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 (state pesticide labeling)
• 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (FIFRA)
• 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2) (registration not a defense for FIFRA offenses)
• Tenn. S.B. 527 / H.B. 809, 114th Gen. Assem. (2025) (proposed Tennessee pesticide-labeling liability shield)
• Ga. Code Ann. § 2-7-171
• N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.3-11

Cases:

• Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (FIFRA preemption of state-law mislabeling claims)
• Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (FDA approval does not always preempt state failure-to-warn claims)
• Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) (Supremacy Clause as the rule of decision in federal-state conflicts)
• Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068 (U.S.) (Solicitor General amicus filed Dec. 1, 2025, on FIFRA preemption)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2026/op26-01.pdf

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 26-01
Scope of Proposed Legislation to Limit Civil Liability for Pesticide Manufacturers and
Is the presence, absence, or content of pesticide labeling in accordance with Tenn. Code
Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") an
essential element of a claim against a manufacturer or seller of a pesticide that is based on one or
more of the following theories of liability: negligence; strict liability; breach of warranty; design
defect; inadequate testing; inherently unsafe for the intended use; deviation from intended design
during production; and assurances of product quality or safety?
Would passage of Senate Bill 527/House Bill 809 allow manufacturers to use labeling of a
pesticide in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA as a defense against
If Senate Bill 527/House Bill 809 becomes law, will a person who is injured by a pesticide
that is labeled in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA be able to maintain
a claim against the pesticide manufacturer? If yes, under which cause(s) of action and what
elements would the injured person have to prove to establish a claim under such cause of action
compared to the elements the injured person would have to prove to establish a claim based on
See response to Question 2. The viability of a given cause of action would depend on what
STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
January 13, 2026
Opinion No. 26-01
Scope of Proposed Legislation to Limit Civil Liability for Pesticide Manufacturers and
Sellers
Question 1
Is the presence, absence, or content of pesticide labeling in accordance with Tenn. Code
Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") an
essential element of a claim against a manufacturer or seller of a pesticide that is based on one or
more of the following theories of liability: negligence; strict liability; breach of warranty; design
defect; inadequate testing; inherently unsafe for the intended use; deviation from intended design
during production; and assurances of product quality or safety?
Opinion 1
It depends on the specific allegations asserted against the manufacturer or seller.
Question 2
Would passage of Senate Bill 527/House Bill 809 allow manufacturers to use labeling of a
pesticide in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA as a defense against
theories listed in Question 1?
Opinion 2
It depends on the specific allegations asserted against the manufacturer.
Question 3
If Senate Bill 527/House Bill 809 becomes law, will a person who is injured by a pesticide
that is labeled in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA be able to maintain
a claim against the pesticide manufacturer? If yes, under which cause(s) of action and what
elements would the injured person have to prove to establish a claim under such cause of action
compared to the elements the injured person would have to prove to establish a claim based on
negligence for failure to warn?
Opinion 3
See response to Question 2. The viability of a given cause of action would depend on what
is alleged.
Question 4
Does Senate Bill 527/House Bill 809 bar civil actions for damages caused by a pesticide
that are discovered before a pesticide's label was approved or updated in accordance with Tenn.
Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA? After a pesticide's label was approved or updated in
accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA?
Opinion 4
As specifically phrased, we do not think that either of the respective queries posed through
the above question admit definitive answers.
Question 5
Does Senate Bill 527/House Bill 809 violate 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2)?
Opinion 5
No. The proposed legislation would not "violate" the referenced federal provision.
ANALYSIS
Like other measures recently enacted or considered in other States, the legislative proposal
at the center of the request seeks to provide civil liability protection related to pesticides. See
generally S.B. 527/H.B. 809, 114th Gen. Assem. (2025). The proposed legislation specifically
addresses "[t]he manufacturer or seller of a pesticide registered with the commissioner [of
agriculture] in accordance with § 43-8-104 and with the federal environmental protection agency
(EPA) under the federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (7 U.S.C. § 136 et
seq.)." Id. And it substantively provides that such a manufacturer or seller "is not liable in a civil
action related to the labeling of the pesticide, including a products liability action alleging a failure
to warn under title 29, chapter 28, if the pesticide bore a label approved by the EPA under FIFRA
at the time of sale." Id. Through a separate subsection, however, the proposed legislation states
that it "does not apply if a pesticide is manufactured or sold in violation of [Tennessee Code
Annotated, Title 43, Chapter 8] or FIFRA." Id.
This proposed law reflects a broader tension between holding a company accountable
through agency rules established before the company acts or through tort liability applied
retrospectively. In heavily-regulated industries in the United States, manufacturers often find
themselves in perilous waters between the Scylla of regulation and the Charybdis of litigation. Cf.,
e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (permitting tort claims against drug manufacturer
based on failure to warn even though the drug's labeling had been deemed sufficient by the federal
Food and Drug Administration). Regulators mandate in advance what companies should do, often
in great detail with respect to labeling, and trial lawyers spring into action on the back end to tell
the companies that what they did was not good enough to satisfy state law requirements. How this
tension plays out in practice depends heavily on the specific laws at issue and the specific facts in
a given case.
Questions of federal preemption are frequently at the center of this tension. Notably, the
United States Solicitor General was recently invited to offer his views on FIFRA preemption in a
failure to warn case and argued that the federal statute preempts a state law claim based on alleged
mislabeling. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, 10, Monsanto Co. v. Durnell,
No. 24-1068 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2025). As he specifically explained, "FIFRA 'pre-empts any statutory
or common-law rule that would impose a labeling requirement that diverges from those set out in
FIFRA and its implementing regulations.'" Id. at 11 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005)). This line of analysis affords a powerful defense to manufacturers who
comply with their federal regulatory burden.
Here, the instant request poses several questions for our consideration against the backdrop
of the pending legislative proposal and FIFRA, but it does so, necessarily, in the absence of
specific allegations detailed in a civil complaint or a robust factual record. While we have carefully
considered the questions and attempted to answer them to the extent possible, the granular analysis
ultimately necessary to resolve the questions posed makes it regrettably difficult to provide useful
answers under these circumstances. We address the questions in turn below.

1. As phrased, the first question inquires into a hypothetical claim against a manufacturer
   or seller of a pesticide that might be based on one or more of several listed legal theories. It
   specifically asks whether the presence, absence, or content of pesticide labeling in accordance with
   Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA would be an essential element of the asserted claim.
   Although some of the listed legal theories might be predicated on the presence, absence, or content
   of pesticide labeling when invoked in a lawsuit against a manufacturer or seller of a pesticide,
   whether a given legal action would be somehow tethered to pesticide labeling would inevitably
   depend on the specific allegations against the defendant.
   2-3. Through its next two questions, the request seeks general guidance concerning the
   proposed legislation's impact on state causes of action and whether the legislation would afford
   pesticide manufacturers with a defense to liability. In short, although the proposed legislation
   provides that manufacturers of registered pesticides are not liable in certain civil actions, it only
   does so in relation to civil actions that are "related to the labeling" of a pesticide. Id. Therefore,
   if an action against a manufacturer of a registered pesticide were not related to the labeling of the
   pesticide, the proposed legislation would not work to prevent liability. But if an action were related
   to the labeling of the pesticide, the proposed legislation might well prevent liability. Of course, a
   civil action's relation to pesticide labeling would ultimately depend on the specifics of what a
   given plaintiff might allege.
2. The fourth question poses two queries concerning whether the proposed legislation
   would bar "civil actions" for damages "caused by a pesticide." The first query asks whether the
   proposed legislation would bar actions when damages "are discovered before a pesticide's label
   was approved or updated" in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-104 and/or FIFRA. The
   second query then asks whether the proposal would bar actions when damages are discovered
   "[a]fter a pesticide's label was approved or updated."
   We do not think that either query yields an absolute answer. Each would depend on the
   facts of a given case. As stated in the proposed legislation, a manufacturer or seller of a registered
   pesticide will not be liable in a civil action related to the labeling of the pesticide if the pesticide
   bore an EPA-approved label under FIFRA "at the time of sale." Id. But such liability protection
   wouldn't apply "if a pesticide is manufactured or sold in violation of [Tennessee Code Annotated,
   Title 43, Chapter 8] or FIFRA." Id.
3. The final question in the request asks whether the proposed legislation violates 7 U.S.C.
   § 136a(f)(2), a statute which provides that "[i]n no event shall registration of an article be construed
   as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter." 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2). It
   doesn't. Setting aside the question's premise that a state statute can "violate" a federal one, §
   136a(f)(2) simply speaks to whether something can be considered a defense "under" the federal
   statutory scheme. Id. That § 136a(f)(2) forecloses a registration-based defense under the federal
   scheme says nothing of state law actions and defenses. Moreover, the version of the proposed
   legislation referenced within the request specifically states that its liability protection "does not
   apply if a pesticide is manufactured or sold in violation of . . . FIFRA." S.B. 527/H.B. 809, 114th
   Gen. Assem. (2025).
   JONATHAN SKRMETTI
   Attorney General and Reporter
   J. MATTHEW RICE
   Solicitor General
   MATTHEW KERNODLE
   Assistant Attorney General
   Requested by:
   The Honorable Mark A. Pody
   State Senator
   425 Rep. John Lewis Way North
   Nashville, Tennessee 37243