When can a Tennessee handgun permit holder carry a gun into a courthouse, and what counts as 'judicial proceedings in progress'?

Subject

Prohibition on handguns in buildings in which judicial proceedings are in progress

Plain-English summary

Representative Terri Lynn Weaver asked five interlocking questions about Tennessee's gun-free-courthouse statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a). The statute makes it a Class E felony to carry a handgun "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress," even with a handgun permit, unless one of the narrow exceptions in subsection (c) applies. The AG worked through each question by reading the statute's plain text against ordinary dictionary definitions and basic mens rea principles.

Question 1 (Building outside court hours). The prohibition applies only when judicial proceedings are actually in progress. A permit holder carrying a handgun into a building where the court is closed and no judicial business is happening would not be in violation. Plain reading of "in progress" governed: dictionary definition is "in the course of being done or carried out."

Question 2 (Permit holder without notice). Whether the permit holder commits an offense depends on whether they acted "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly," because § 39-17-1306(a) requires one of those mens rea states. The opinion declined to give a categorical answer because mens rea is fact-specific. The corollary, however (Question 4), is that no notice is required to be posted, and ignorance of the law is not a defense.

Question 3 (What counts as a "judicial proceeding"). Broad. Drawing on Black's Law Dictionary, the AG concluded "judicial proceeding" covers "any court proceeding," including informal proceedings like in-chambers conferences and conference-call hearings, not just formal courtroom sessions. Whether the clerk's office being open by itself counts depends on whether judicial business is being carried out at that moment.

Question 4 (Notice posting). No, the statute does not require any notice to be posted. The opinion noted that all persons are conclusively presumed to know the law (citing State ex rel. Lawrence County v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tenn. 1952)), so lack of a posted notice would not defeat the felony charge. Combined with the mens rea requirement, however, this means a defendant who genuinely did not know court was in session could potentially raise lack of "intentional, knowing, or reckless" conduct as a fact-bound defense.

Question 5 (Other officials covered by the same rule). Yes, other officials in or assigned to the building (like a mayor or a metropolitan-government legislator) are subject to the same rule and the same Class E felony exposure when judicial proceedings are in progress, unless they fit "squarely" within one of the § 39-17-1306(c) exceptions. The opinion specifically described the judge exception as requiring (1) actual discharge of judicial duties, (2) a valid handgun permit, (3) the handgun kept concealed at all times during such duties, and (4) judicial powers vested under § 16-1-101.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2019. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) prohibits a person from carrying any "weapon prohibited by § 39-17-1302(a)" inside a building "in which judicial proceedings are in progress" if done "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." For firearms specifically, the statute drops the "for the purpose of going armed" requirement, so possession of a firearm during a judicial proceeding (with the requisite mens rea) suffices to violate the statute even without specific intent to be armed.

The exceptions in § 39-17-1306(c) apply to judges, certain county commissioners, certain law enforcement officers, penal-institution guards, and court officers, with each exception having its own specific prerequisites. The opinion emphasized "carefully tailored" application: the person must come "squarely within" the exception.

The statutory construction approach applied:

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-105(b) (undefined words get natural and ordinary meaning).
• English Mtn. Spring Water v. Chumley, 196 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (dictionary as authority for ordinary meaning).
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301(b), 39-11-302 (definitions of mens rea states).
• State ex rel. Lawrence County v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tenn. 1952) (presumed knowledge of law).

Common questions

Could a Tennessee permit holder lawfully carry a handgun into a courthouse outside court hours under this opinion?

Per this opinion, yes, if "no judicial proceedings are being carried out in the building" at the time. The statute's trigger is judicial proceedings actually in progress, not the building's general function as a courthouse. Courthouse-specific local rules or court orders, however, could impose stricter requirements not covered by the AG opinion.

What about visiting the clerk's office during business hours?

That depends on whether a judicial proceeding is happening anywhere in the building at that moment. The opinion treated "judicial proceedings" broadly. If a judge was holding a hearing, even in chambers, while the clerk's office was open, the prohibition was triggered.

Did "judicial proceedings" include in-chambers or conference-call hearings?

Yes. The opinion said the phrase was not limited to formal courtroom sessions and could include "proceedings that are carried out in a judge's chambers or elsewhere in a building, whether in person with litigants or attorneys or by conference call or other electronic means."

Was a courthouse required to post a notice?

No. The opinion concluded § 39-17-1306 contained no notice-posting requirement, and the longstanding rule is that ignorance of the law is not a defense. The mens rea requirement of "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly" provided some protection for genuinely unaware permit holders, but it was a fact-bound defense, not a categorical safe harbor.

Did a county mayor or commissioner with a handgun permit have a special exception?

Only if they fit squarely within one of the § 39-17-1306(c) exceptions. A mayor as such was not exempt. A county commissioner had a specific exception, but only if the statutory prerequisites were met. The opinion was careful to note that whether a particular official qualified depended on the specific facts.

How was the judge exception structured?

A judge could carry only if all four prerequisites were met: actual discharge of judicial duties, valid handgun permit, handgun concealed at all times, and judicial powers vested under § 16-1-101. A judge running personal errands at the courthouse on a non-court day, for example, would not satisfy "actual discharge of judicial duties."

Did this opinion bind the courts?

No. AG opinions in Tennessee are persuasive authority. The dictionary-driven reading here closely tracked the statutory text, but a court interpreting "judicial proceedings are in progress" in a contested case was free to do its own analysis, especially on the mens rea questions where facts dominate.

Citations

Statutes

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 (gun-free-courthouse statute; (a) prohibition, (c) exceptions)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (handgun carry permit framework)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302 (prohibited weapons cross-reference)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-105 (statutory construction; ordinary meaning rule)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106 (definitions for title 39)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (mens rea: intentional, knowing)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302 (mens rea: reckless)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-101 (judicial powers; cross-referenced for judge exception)

Cases

• English Mtn. Spring Water v. Chumley, 196 S.W.3d 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)
• State ex rel. Lawrence County v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn. 1952)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2019/op19-07.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
June 18, 2019

Opinion No. 19-07

Prohibition on handguns in buildings in which judicial proceedings are in progress

Question 1

Is it an offense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) for a person who has a handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 to carry a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings take place if no judicial proceedings are in progress at the time that the person is in the building?

Opinion 1

No. The statutory prohibition against carrying a handgun "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" would not apply during a time when no judicial proceedings are being carried out in the building.

Question 2

Is it an offense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) for a person who has a handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 to carry a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress if that person has no notice that judicial proceedings are taking place in the building?

Opinion 2

Because an offense occurs under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) only if the person carrying a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress acts "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly," the answer to this question necessarily depends on the specific facts and circumstances in each case.

Question 3

What is the meaning and scope of the phrase "judicial proceedings are in progress" as used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a)? Does it, for example, include times when the clerk's office is open even if the judicial officer is not in formal session? Does it include times when the judicial officer is in chambers but not necessarily conducting formal courtroom proceedings? Does it include times when the judicial officer is conducting business by conference call (such as hearing motions) but no litigants are physically present?

Opinion 3

The phrase "judicial proceedings are in progress" as used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) refers broadly to any court proceeding that is currently underway or being carried out. Depending on the specific facts and circumstances in any given case, "judicial proceedings" are not limited to formal courtroom proceedings but may include proceedings that are carried out in a judge's chambers or elsewhere in a building, whether in person with litigants or attorneys or by conference call or other electronic means.

Question 4

Is anyone required to post any type of notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) to indicate to the public that firearms are or may be prohibited during specific times?

Opinion 4

No. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 contains no such notice-posting requirement.

Question 5

If a building is a gun-free zone under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) because "judicial proceedings are in progress," are other employees or government officials who work in or are assigned to the building and who are eligible to carry a handgun under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (e.g., a mayor or a member of a legislative body of a metropolitan government) subject to criminal prosecution if they possess the firearm in the building at the time that "judicial proceedings are in progress"?

Opinion 5

Yes, they may be subject to criminal prosecution for a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) unless they come squarely within one of the exceptions specified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(c).

ANALYSIS

The statute in question, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a), makes it a Class E felony for a person to

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carry on or about their person while inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress any weapon prohibited by § 39-17-1302(a), for the purpose of going armed; provided, that if the weapon carried is a firearm, the person is in violation of this section regardless of whether the weapon is carried for the purpose of going armed.

1. In general, this prohibition against carrying a handgun inside a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress applies to a person who has a valid handgun carry permit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351. (The limited and very specific exceptions to this general prohibition are discussed below in 5.)

The phrase "judicial proceedings are in progress" is not specifically defined in the statute. The legislature itself has decreed that, "[a]s used in [the Tennessee Code], undefined words shall be given their natural and ordinary meaning, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language, except where a contrary intention is clearly manifest." Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-105(b). "In seeking to determine the 'natural and ordinary meaning' of statutory language, the usual and accepted source for such information is a dictionary." English Mtn. Spring Water v. Chumley, 196 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) defines a "proceeding" broadly as the "regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and entry of judgment," "[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency," and "an act or step that is part of a larger action." (Emphasis added.) It defines "judicial proceeding" similarly broadly as "[a]ny court proceeding; any proceeding initiated to procure an order or decree, whether in law or in equity." (Emphasis added.) The phrase "in progress" commonly means "in the course of being done or carried out." New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010).

Thus, a "judicial proceeding in progress" refers to any court proceeding that is currently underway or being carried out anywhere in the building at issue. It follows that if and when no judicial proceeding is being carried out anywhere in a building, then the statutory prohibition against carrying a handgun "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" would not apply.

2. A violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) is a Class E felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(b). The statute does not require that any notice be posted or otherwise given regarding the proscribed acts. Moreover, all persons are conclusively presumed to know the law. For that reason, a criminal defendant may not raise as a defense that he did not know the act that he committed was a crime. State ex rel. Lawrence County v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549, 553 (1952). Thus, lack of a posted notice would not be a defense to a felony charge under subsection (a).

At the same time, because an intentional, knowing, or reckless act is an element of the crime under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a), conviction will require proof that the person acted "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" as those mental states are defined for purposes of title 39. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301(b) and 39-11-302 (defining these three mental states for purposes of title 39). But whether a person has acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, since that determination depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

3. As discussed above in 1., the phrase "judicial proceedings are in progress" as used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) encompasses, broadly, any court proceeding that is currently underway or being carried out. And as its dictionary definition makes clear, a "judicial proceeding" includes much more than just formal trials and hearings conducted in a courtroom. The legislature has instructed, and longstanding principles of statutory construction dictate, that statutory language not be construed in a way that limits its natural and ordinary meaning. Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-105(b). Thus, depending on the specific facts and circumstances in any given case, "judicial proceedings" are not limited to courtroom proceedings but may include proceedings that are carried out in a judge's chambers or elsewhere in a building, whether in person with litigants or attorneys or by conference call or other electronic means.

4. See analysis in 2., above.

5. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1306(c) specifies certain limited exceptions to the general prohibition established in subsection (a). Subsection (c) provides exceptions for judges, county commissioners, as specifically defined in the statute, certain law enforcement officers, guards employed by penal institutions, and court officers. Each exception is carefully tailored and will apply only if all the statutory prerequisites for that exception are met. For instance, the exception for judges applies only to a person who (1) is engaged in the "actual discharge of official duties as a judge," (2) has a valid handgun permit, (3) keeps the handgun concealed at all times when in the discharge of such duties, and (4) "is vested with judicial powers under § 16-1-101."

Unless a person comes squarely within one of the specifically listed exceptions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(c), that person is subject to criminal prosecution if he or she violates subsection (a). Whether a particular county commissioner, for example, is excepted from the general prohibition of subsection (a) will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, i.e., whether that county commissioner satisfies all the prerequisites for exemption that are specified in subsection (c).

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

DIANNA BAKER SHEW
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Terri Lynn Weaver
State Representative
554 Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243