Can a Tennessee parent get a texting-while-driving ticket for using a phone in a school parking lot or while sitting in the school pick-up line?

Plain-English summary

Rep. William Lamberth asked AG Slatery whether Tennessee's texting-while-driving law applies in a school parking lot or in the pick-up line where parents wait for their kids.

The statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-199(b)(1), says: "No person while driving a motor vehicle on any public road or highway shall use a hand-held mobile telephone or a hand-held personal digital assistant to transmit or read a written message." Section 55-8-199(c) limits the ban to vehicles "in motion at the time a written message . . . is transmitted or read."

So the texting prohibition has two key thresholds: the vehicle must be (1) on a public road or highway, and (2) in motion. If both are met, the driver may not text.

A school parking lot is neither a road nor a highway. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-101(29) defines "highway" as "the entire width between the boundary lines of every way when any part thereto is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel." A "road" is, in the dictionary's words, "a wide way leading from one place to another." Roads and highways are designed for travel; a parking lot is a place where vehicles park once they have arrived.

Two separate statutory clues confirm the AG's reading. When the General Assembly wants a traffic rule to apply in parking lots, it lists parking lots specifically. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-193(a) (sound-amplification rules) covers "any public street, highway, alley, parking lot, or driveway." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(a) (DUI) covers "public roads and highways" and "premises generally frequented by the public at large," with parking lots covered through that second phrase under State v. Dobbins, 265 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). The texting statute names neither parking lots nor "premises generally frequented by the public at large," so under expressio unius (Womack v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 374 (Tenn. 2014)) parking lots are excluded.

The pick-up line answer turns on physical location. If the line is entirely inside the school parking lot, the statute does not apply. If the line backs up onto a public road or highway, the statute does apply for any driver whose vehicle is in motion while texting on the road portion of the line.

The opinion notes that a separate statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-207(b)(1), prohibits "talk[ing] on a hand-held mobile telephone while the vehicle is in motion" in "any marked school zone in this state." That is a separate prohibition focused on talking and on marked school zones, not on texting in school parking lots.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2018. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. Tennessee's distracted-driving statutes have been amended since 2018, so confirm the current text of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-199 and § 55-8-207 before relying on the rules described below.

Common questions

Q: Can I text in a stopped car in the pick-up line on a public street?
A: Under § 55-8-199(c) as the opinion read it, the texting ban applied "only" to a vehicle "in motion at the time a written message is transmitted or read." A vehicle stopped in the line is not in motion, so the 2018 statute did not reach the texting at that moment. The statute has since been amended, so verify current law.

Q: What if my pick-up line crosses both the parking lot and the public street?
A: The line of cars is one queue, but the statute applies based on where the vehicle is when the texting happens. A driver inching forward in the parking-lot portion is not on a public road or highway. The same driver, when their vehicle reaches and moves on the street portion, is. The 2018 statute treats each location independently.

Q: Is a private driveway a "public road or highway"?
A: A private driveway is generally not a public road or highway under the same logic the AG applies here. The texting statute requires the way to be "open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel."

Q: Are there other Tennessee phone-use rules I should know about?
A: As of this 2018 opinion, Section 55-8-207(b)(1) barred hand-held cell phone talking in marked school zones (vehicle in motion), and Section 55-10-401 (DUI) covered parking lots through the "premises generally frequented by the public" phrasing. These statutes have been amended since 2018, so check the current text.

Q: Does this opinion mean police never enforce the texting ban in parking lots?
A: It means the AG concluded the statute does not authorize a citation under § 55-8-199(b)(1) for texting in a parking lot. An officer who issues such a citation would face a defense based on this opinion. AG opinions are persuasive but not binding on courts; the issue would ultimately be decided in court if challenged.

Q: What about texting in a private school's parking lot?
A: Same analysis: a private school's parking lot is not a public road or highway, so the texting statute does not reach it.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's distracted-driving framework as of 2018 had three main pieces. Section 55-8-199 was the texting-while-driving ban for public roads and highways, focused specifically on transmitting or reading written messages on hand-held devices, and only when the vehicle was in motion. Section 55-8-207 was a separate ban on hand-held talking in marked school zones. Section 55-10-401, the DUI statute, used a broader "premises generally frequented by the public" phrasing that pulled parking lots in.

Statutory construction principles do most of the work in this opinion. Plain-meaning analysis (State v. Henderson) controls "road" and "highway." In pari materia (In re Kaliyah S.) compares the texting statute to other rules-of-the-road statutes that explicitly mention parking lots. Expressio unius (Womack) treats the texting statute's silence on parking lots as a deliberate exclusion.

Citations

• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-101(29); 55-8-193(a); 55-8-199(b)(1), (c); 55-8-207(b)(1); 55-10-401(a)
• State v. Henderson, 531 S.W.3d 687 (Tenn. 2017)
• State v. Dobbins, 265 S.W.3d 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007)
• In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2015)
• Womack v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2014)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2018/op18-25.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
June 13, 2018
Opinion No. 18-25

Text Messaging While Operating a Motor Vehicle in a School Parking Lot or Pick-up Line

Question
Does Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-199(b)(1), which prohibits a person from using a "hand-held mobile telephone or a hand-held personal digital assistant to transmit or read a written message" while that person is "driving a motor vehicle on any public road or highway," apply to a person driving a vehicle in a school parking lot or pick-up line?

Opinion
Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-8-199(b)(1) does not apply to a person driving a vehicle in a school parking lot because a parking lot is not a "public road or highway" within the meaning of the statute. Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-199(b)(1) applies to a person driving a vehicle in a school pick-up line depends on the location of the pick-up line. If the pick-up line is located on a "public road or highway" rather than in a parking lot, then the statute would apply.

ANALYSIS

Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-8-199(b)(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person while driving a motor vehicle on any public road or highway shall use a hand-held mobile telephone or a hand-held personal digital assistant to transmit or read a written message." This prohibition "only appl[ies] to a person driving a motor vehicle that is in motion at the time a written message . . . is transmitted or read." Id. § 55-8-199(c).

Whether the prohibition in § 55-8-199(b)(1) applies to a person driving a vehicle in a school parking lot or pick-up line depends on whether a parking lot or pick-up line is a "public road or highway" within the meaning of the statute. The words of a statute must be given "their natural and ordinary meaning." State v. Henderson, 531 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tenn. 2017). Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-8-101 defines the term "highway" to mean "the entire width between the boundary lines of every way when any part thereto is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel." Id. § 55-8-101(29). Section 101 does not define "road," but dictionaries define that term to mean "a wide way leading from one place to another." New Oxford American Dictionary 1509 (3d ed. 2010). The terms "road" and "highway" are therefore most naturally understood as referring to a way by which vehicles travel from one location to another.

So defined, the terms "road" and "highway" would not include a school parking lot. In contrast to a road or highway, which individuals use to travel by vehicle from one location to another, a parking lot is an area where individuals leave their vehicles once arriving at their destination. The purpose of a parking lot is not to facilitate the movement of vehicles from one point to another, but to provide a place for vehicles to remain while their occupants are at a particular location.

A couple of additional considerations reinforce this conclusion. First, when the legislature has intended that rules of the road apply to vehicles in parking lots, it has specifically enumerated parking lots separately from roads and highways. For example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-193(a), which prohibits the operation of certain "sound amplification system[s]," applies to any "person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on any public street, highway, alley, parking lot, or driveway." And the statute prohibiting driving under the influence, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(a), applies to both "public roads and highways" and to "premises generally frequented by the public at large," a phrase that has been interpreted to include parking lots. State v. Dobbins, 265 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). Because other laws governing the use of motor vehicles make clear that a parking lot is something different from a "road" or "highway," the phrase "public road or highway" in § 55-8-199(b)(1) likewise should be construed to exclude a parking lot. See In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015) ("Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or have a common purpose must be read in pari materia so as to give the intended effect to both.").

Second, the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-199(b)(1) expressly applies only to individuals driving a motor vehicle on a "public road or highway," without any mention of parking lots. The omission of any reference to parking lots is significant because, as a matter of statutory construction, "the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of all things not mentioned." Womack v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 374 (Tenn. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, by naming "roads and highways" but not "parking lots" in § 55-8-199(b)(1), the legislature has presumptively excluded parking lots.

Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-199(b)(1) applies to a person driving a vehicle in a school pick-up line depends on whether the pick-up line at issue is located on a "public road or highway." Because a school parking lot is not a "public road or highway," the statute would not apply to persons driving in a pick-up line located in a school parking lot. But the statute would apply if the pick-up line were located on the road or highway itself, provided the vehicle "is in motion at the time a written message . . . is transmitted or read." Id. § 55-8-199(c).

[Footnote 1: Another statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-207(b)(1), specifically prohibits a person from "talk[ing] on a hand-held mobile telephone while the vehicle is in motion" in "any marked school zone in this state." But that statute sheds no light on whether § 55-8-199(b)(1), which prohibits text messaging on any "public road or highway," applies to the driver of a vehicle in a school parking lot or school pick-up line.]

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

SARAH K. CAMPBELL
Special Assistant to the Solicitor General and the Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable William Lamberth
State Representative
Cordell Hull Building
425 5th Ave. North, Suite 636
Nashville, TN 37243