Can a registered Tennessee sex offender enter a government office for services when the office sits within 1,000 feet of a school or park?

Plain-English summary

Tennessee's Sex Offender Act bars registered sex offenders whose victims were minors from being within 1,000 feet of certain protected locations (schools, day cares, parks, playgrounds, and similar places) when children are present. The statute, § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B), carves out an exception for a sex offender who has "a reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a child or any other specific or legitimate reason for being there."

A state representative asked whether visiting a government office to obtain services counts as a "legitimate reason." The AG said it can, depending on the facts. The "or any other legitimate reason" phrase is broad but is anchored by the immediately preceding example (a child-care relationship), so under the canon of ejusdem generis it applies to similar reasons rooted in legal responsibilities, duties, or obligations. A government office that helps the offender comply with supervision conditions, find housing, secure employment, or otherwise meet reentry obligations could fall within that exception. The AG flagged one important caveat: the exception does not apply to sex-offender treatment programs themselves, which are categorically barred from prohibited areas by § 40-39-211(a)(1).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Which sex offenders are subject to the 1,000-foot rule?
A: At the time of the opinion, the rule applied to sex offenders whose victims were minors, as defined in § 40-39-202. It bars them from standing, sitting idly, or remaining within 1,000 feet of the property line of schools, day care centers, parks, playgrounds, and similar properties when children are present.

Q: What does the "legitimate reason" exception actually say?
A: The statute permits the offender to be in the prohibited area when he has "a reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a child or any other specific or legitimate reason for being there." § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B).

Q: How did the AG read that broad phrase?
A: By applying ejusdem generis. When a general phrase follows a specific example, courts read the general phrase to cover things of the same kind. The specific example is a child-custody relationship, a legitimate, cognizable responsibility. So "any other legitimate reason" covers reasons of similar character: cognizable responsibilities, duties, or obligations the offender legitimately needs to perform in the prohibited area.

Q: Does going to a government office for help with parole compliance qualify?
A: It might. The AG specifically said visiting a government office that "assists offenders in complying with various aspects of their supervision or meeting their responsibility to reintegrate into society, such as assistance with securing employment or housing," could rise to the level of a legitimate reason. Whether it does in any specific instance turns on the facts.

Q: What about going to a sex-offender treatment provider that happens to be near a school?
A: That is explicitly out. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(a)(1) categorically prohibits sex offenders and violent sex offenders whose victims were minors from obtaining sexual-offender treatment or participating in a treatment program within a prohibited area. The "legitimate reason" exception does not override that direct prohibition.

Q: Does the exception cover routine errands like the DMV or a county clerk's office?
A: The opinion does not draw a bright line. It frames the exception as covering reasons tied to "legitimate, cognizable responsibilities, duties, or obligations." Renewing a driver's license required by parole conditions might look more like obligation; a casual visit might not. The fact-specific nature of the inquiry was the AG's whole point.

Background and statutory framework

The Tennessee Sex Offender and Violent Sex Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201 et seq.) imposes residential, work, and presence restrictions on registrants. Section 40-39-211(d)(1) prohibits a sex offender whose victim was a minor from being within 1,000 feet of certain places when children are present. Subsection (d)(1)(B) supplies the exception at issue here.

The AG's analysis applied two settled canons: ascertaining and effectuating legislative intent from the natural meaning of the statutory text, and ejusdem generis, which limits general terms following specific enumerations to things of the same general kind. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 828-29 (Tenn. 2005), is the leading modern Tennessee statement of the latter canon.

Citations

• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201 et seq. (Sex Offender Registration Act)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202 (definitions of sex offender, minor)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(a)(1) (categorical bar on offender treatment in prohibited areas)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) ("legitimate reason" exception)
• Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822 (Tenn. 2005) (ejusdem generis)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2016/op16-035.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
August 30, 2016
Opinion No. 16-35

Exception to Sex Offender Residential and Work Restrictions

Question
Would a registered sex offender's presence at a government office to avail himself of the services provided by that office be "any other legitimate reason" within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(d)(6)(B) sufficient to constitute an exception to the statutory location constraints imposed on sex offenders?

Opinion
Depending entirely on the particular facts in any given case, the "any other legitimate reason" exception in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) may apply to allow a sex offender to visit a government office to seek or receive services from that office, even if the office is located within 1,000 feet of a prohibited location.

ANALYSIS

The Tennessee Sex Offender Act restricts sex offenders whose victims were minors from living, working, or being present in various specified locations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201, et seq. In particular, a sex offender may not "stand, sit idly . . . or remain within one thousand feet . . . of the property line of" of schools, day care centers, parks, playgrounds, and similar properties when children are present, unless the sex offender has

a reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a child or any other specific or legitimate reason for being there . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

The question is whether visiting a government office to receive services may constitute "any other . . . legitimate reason" within the meaning of this statutory exception. Questions involving statutory construction, such as this one, must be answered in light of reason, bearing in mind the object and policy of the statute. State v. Netto, 486 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tenn. 1972). The basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, derived whenever possible from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995); Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). The doctrine of ejusdem generis offers further applicable guidance in construing statutory language. Under this doctrine, when general words follow the enumeration of specific things, the general words will be construed as applying to things of the same general class or nature as the enumerated specifics. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 828-29 (Tenn. 2005).

The phrase "or any other . . . legitimate reason," although not ambiguous, is broad and general. It follows a specific exception for child care responsibilities, to which it is connected by the coordinating conjunction "or." That grammatical structure makes clear that the General Assembly recognized the potential need for some reasonable exceptions in addition to the child care exception while also recognizing that it could not foresee, and therefore could not specifically enumerate, every possible exception. The general phrase "or any other specific or legitimate reason for being" in an otherwise prohibited area is intended to allow for such additional exceptions. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, those "legitimate reasons" should be similar to the child care exception, which is based on relationship and duty. Thus, the general phrase may be understood to allow for an exception when the sex offender has a reason to be in the prohibited area related to his legitimate, cognizable responsibilities, duties, or obligations.

Depending entirely on the specific facts and circumstances in any given case, visiting a government office that assists offenders in complying with various aspects of their supervision or meeting their responsibility to reintegrate into society, such as assistance with securing employment or housing, may rise to the level of a "legitimate reason" for being in an otherwise prohibited area and may, therefore, come within the statutory exception under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B). Accordingly, the "legitimate reason" exception could apply, depending on the particular facts and circumstances in any given case, to allow a sex offender to be in an otherwise prohibited area for the purpose of seeking or receiving such services from a government office.

This Opinion does not deal and shall not be read to deal with a government office that provides a sexual offender treatment program since Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(a)(1) specifically prohibits sex offenders and violent sex offenders whose victims were minors, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202, from obtaining sexual offender treatment or participating in a treatment program within a prohibited area.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

GRANT C. MULLINS
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Mark White
State Representative
217 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243