Can a Tennessee city pass an ordinance that prevents courts from sending school-zone speeders to driver education in lieu of conviction?

Subject

Opinion No. 15-35, Conflict of City Ordinance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-301, April 17, 2015

Plain-English summary

In 2014 Oak Ridge enacted an ordinance prohibiting deferred judgment or diversion programs (including driver education) for speeding in a school zone. The stated goal: make sure school-zone violations always end up on the driver's record. A state senator asked whether the ordinance was preempted by state law.

The AG said yes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301(b)(1) gives the court discretion to send a violator to a driver education course "in addition to or in lieu of any portion of other penalty imposed." If the violator finishes the course, the court can dismiss the charge and it stays off the record (Metro. Gov't of Nashville v. Stark, 2008 WL 276005 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). The Oak Ridge ordinance disallowed that discretion entirely for school-zone violations. That is a direct conflict, not an "additional regulation." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-307 lets cities adopt additional traffic regulations but only if they do not conflict with the listed state statutes, and § 55-10-301 is one of the listed statutes. So the ordinance was preempted.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301(b)(1) gives Tennessee trial courts discretion to require a traffic offender to complete a driver-education course approved by the Department of Safety "in addition to or in lieu of any portion of other penalty imposed." Successful completion typically results in dismissal and no entry on the driving record, with certain exceptions like commercial license holders (Metro. Gov't of Nashville v. Stark, 2008 WL 276005).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-307 grants municipalities power to enact "additional regulations" for the operation of vehicles in the municipality, "which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of the listed sections." Section 55-10-301 is among the listed sections.

Tennessee follows the standard preemption doctrine for local-vs.-state conflict: an ordinance that contradicts a state statute is invalid. City of Knoxville v. Currier, 1998 WL 338195 (Tenn. Ct. App.); Southern Ry. Co. v. The City of Knoxville, 442 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1968). Cities cannot "adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state." Southern Ry., 442 S.W.2d at 622.

The Oak Ridge ordinance left no room for judicial discretion. It blocked every school-zone speeding case from diversion. That is not a regulation "additional" to state law; it is a direct override.

Common questions

Did the city have a good reason for the ordinance?
The ordinance recited a public-safety rationale: school zones protect children, and keeping violations on driving records was thought to deter speeders. Whatever the merits, the AG's analysis was about legal authority, not policy.

Can a city ever restrict diversion for traffic offenses?
Not by ordinance, when the state statute gives courts discretion. The city cannot strip that discretion away. The legislature could amend § 55-10-301 to carve out school-zone violations, but until then, the discretion stays with the court.

What's the practical effect of preemption?
A driver cited under the Oak Ridge ordinance could argue in court that the diversion-ban provision is invalid, and the court could still send the driver to driver education and dismiss the charge under § 55-10-301(b)(1). The fine and other penalties under the underlying speeding law would still apply.

Does this apply to other cities with similar ordinances?
The AG addressed only the Oak Ridge ordinance, but the analysis would apply equally to any Tennessee city ordinance that overrides the trial court's diversion-to-driver-education discretion under § 55-10-301.

Citations

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301; Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-307; Metro. Gov't of Nashville v. Stark, 2008 WL 276005 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); City of Knoxville v. Currier, 1998 WL 338195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Southern Ry. Co. v. The City of Knoxville, 442 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1968); B.F. Nashville, Inc. v. City of Franklin, 2005 WL 127082 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Manning v. City of Lebanon, 124 S.W.3d 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2015/op15-35.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
April 17, 2015
Opinion No. 15-35

Conflict of City Ordinance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-301

Question

Is an Oak Ridge City Council ordinance that prohibits the dismissal of traffic tickets issued in school zones following completion of a driver education training course preempted by state law?

Opinion

Yes.

ANALYSIS

Oak Ridge City Council Ordinance 08-2014, Section 15-502, which took effect on August 21, 2014, reads as follows:

For speeding violations occurring during school zone speed limits, the City shall not defer imposition of judgment or allow the defendant to enter into a diversion program, including but not limited to a driver education training course, that would prevent such defendant's conviction for the violation from appearing on the person's driving record with the Tennessee Department of Safety.

The City Council's stated intent for enacting the new section was "to protect the health, safety, and welfare of students, school personnel, and other persons present during school zone speed limit hours of operation by mandating the reporting of an offender's violation to the Tennessee Department of Safety and disallowing a judicial diversion program or deferment that would remove the violation from an offender's driving record." Oak Ridge, Tenn., Ordinance 08-2014 §15-502 (Aug. 21, 2014).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-301(b)(1) addresses the same subject and explicitly and unambiguously grants courts discretion to send a violator to a driver education course "in lieu of any portion or other penalty imposed." It provides that "[a]ny person violating any of the provisions of chapters 8 and 9 of this title and parts 1-5 of this chapter may be required, at the discretion of the court, to attend a driver education course approved by the department of safety in addition to or in lieu of any portion of other penalty imposed . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). If the violator completes the driver education course, the court may then dismiss the charge and it will not appear on the violator's driving record. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Co. v. Stark, 2008 WL 276005 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008) (Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301(b)(1) provides the basis for a court to grant deferred judgment or dismissal of a violator's offense following completion of a driver education course, although it does not apply to violators who hold commercial licenses). Thus, the Ordinance directly conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301 because it completely disallows the judicial discretion that the statute specifically permits.

A basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, derived whenever possible from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995); Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will find the intent in the plain and ordinary meaning of its language. Brown v. Erachem Comilog, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tenn. 2007).

Tennessee Code § 55-10-307 provides that "[a]ny incorporated municipality . . . may by ordinance provide additional regulations for the operation of vehicles within the municipality, which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of the listed sections." (Emphasis added.) Section 55-10-301 is one of the listed sections. Because the Ordinance conflicts with § 55-10-301, it is not a valid "additional regulation" of the kind permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-307.

Indeed, the Ordinance is preempted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-307. Although municipalities have broad power to enact ordinances to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their residents, municipal ordinances that conflict with a state law "are universally held to be invalid." City of Knoxville v. Currier, 1998 WL 338195, at 2 (Tenn. Ct. App., June 26, 1998) (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. The City of Knoxville, 223 Tenn. 90, 442 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1968)). The subject matter of ordinances and state statutes may overlap "as long as there is no conflict between the two." Southern Ry., 442 S.W.2d at 622. In fact, municipal ordinances and state statutes should be read harmoniously when possible so that both can stand. Id. However, municipalities "cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state." Id. When a statute and an ordinance "are in irreconcilable conflict . . . the ordinance must give way to the imperatives of the statute." B.F. Nashville, Inc. v. City of Franklin, 2005 WL 127082, at 15 (Tenn. Ct. App., Oct. 8, 2003) (citing Manning v. City of Lebanon, 124 S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).

Here, the City Council Ordinance directly conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301 because it completely disallows the judicial discretion that the statute specifically permits. The Ordinance and the statute cannot be reconciled. Accordingly, Oak Ridge City Council Ordinance 08-2014, Section 15-502, is preempted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-301 because it expressly contradicts the language and intent of the state statute.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

SARA BETH MYERS
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Randy McNally
State Senator
307 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243