Can the City of Cleveland require Bradley County property owners to get a city plumbing permit just to hook up to city-owned sewer, even when the county now issues its own plumbing permits?

Subject

Opinion No. 13-56, Municipality's Extraterritorial Power to Require Plumbing Permits, July 22, 2013

Plain-English summary

Cleveland Utilities, owned by the City of Cleveland, provides sewer service to parts of Bradley County outside the City. For years, Cleveland's Building Department inspected and permitted plumbing for those out-of-city connections, because Bradley County didn't have certified plumbing inspectors. In 2010 Bradley County adopted its own building and plumbing codes and now has certified inspectors. The County took the position that it has exclusive authority to issue plumbing permits in the unincorporated county under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2) and Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 86-71 (Mar. 20, 1986).

Rep. Eric Watson asked whether the City could still require an additional city plumbing permit (separate from the County's permit) as a condition of connecting to Cleveland Utilities' sewer.

The AG concluded yes. § 68-120-101 doesn't preclude the City's additional permit requirement. The reasoning has two threads.

Cleveland's authority is police-power over its own sewer, not extraterritorial code enforcement. Tennessee statutes (Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-21-107(2), (8); § 7-34-104(a)(2), (5); § 7-35-201; § 7-35-401(a); § 7-51-401) authorize municipalities to operate sewers beyond their corporate boundaries and to impose charges on users. Patterson v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 267, 241 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1951); Warren v. Bradley, 284 S.W.2d 698, 704 (1955). The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that operating a sewer system is an exercise of municipal police power and includes the right to regulate and control its use. The right to require permits and fees for extraterritorial connections rests largely on the municipality's right of ownership of the sewer. 11 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 31:18 (3d ed. 2013); City Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pharr, 186 Tenn. 217, 209 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1948) (municipality may enforce police powers beyond geographical limits when public necessity requires).

The City's permit is distinct from the County's code enforcement. The factual situation in Op. 86-71 was different: Spring Hill had tried to extend its building codes (the Standard Building Code, Standard Plumbing Code, etc.) to property outside its limits. That conflicted with the predecessor of § 68-120-101(b)(2), which limited a local government's code authority to buildings within its jurisdiction. Cleveland's Municipal Code § 18-104(2) doesn't do that. It applies the City's plumbing permit and inspection requirement only as a condition of connecting to the city-owned sewer. It doesn't try to govern construction standards outside city limits.

Two systems can coexist. Under City of Bartlett v. Hoover, 571 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tenn. 1978), state regulations under the police power don't bar municipalities from exacting additional requirements so long as the local requirements are not unreasonable, discriminatory, or in conflict with the state law's spirit. As long as Cleveland's permit doesn't undermine Bradley County's building safety standards, both can run in parallel. Property owners would obtain both a Bradley County plumbing permit (under the County's authority to enforce its adopted codes) and a Cleveland plumbing permit (as a condition of sewer connection).

The AG also noted Cleveland's legitimate health-and-safety interest in confirming connections to its sewer are properly made, since the City is legally responsible for the system. Shaw v. Cleveland Utilities Water Div., 2009 WL 4250157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2009).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The statutory authority for municipalities to operate extraterritorial sewers and impose user fees has not materially changed, but the building-code section (§ 68-120-101 and surrounding) has been amended several times since 2013 to reflect newer International Code editions. Check the current version before relying on the specific subsection references.

Background and statutory framework

Authority structure. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(a) gives the State Fire Marshal initial authority to promulgate minimum statewide building construction safety standards. § 68-120-101(b) lets local governments opt out for their jurisdictions by adopting (and enforcing) the International Residential Code, International Building Code, and either the International Fire Code or the Uniform Fire Code. § 68-120-101(b)(2)(B) requires the local government to "adequately enforce" the codes it adopts.

Bradley County's election. In Resolution 2010-041 (Aug. 16, 2010), Bradley County adopted the 2006 International Residential Code, 2006 International Building Code, 2006 International Fire Code, and 2006 International Plumbing Code. According to the AG, Bradley County submitted only a "Local Government Residential Exemption Authorization" to the Fire Marshal for the IRC; the State retains concurrent jurisdiction with the County for commercial buildings under § 68-120-106(a).

Concurrent jurisdiction. § 68-120-106(a) provides that the Fire Marshal, municipal fire prevention or building officials, county officers with jurisdiction, and state officials have "concurrent jurisdiction" to enforce Chapter 120. § 68-120-106(a) also bars any local regulation "in conflict with this chapter" and makes Chapter 120 supersede less stringent municipal ordinances.

Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2) requires anyone connecting to the utility sewer (city or non-city property) to (a) obtain a plumbing permit from the Cleveland Plumbing Inspector's Office, (b) use a plumber approved by the City and utility who signs the permit, (c) submit to inspection by both the City Plumbing Inspector and the utility, and (d) take the city plumbing permit to Cleveland Utilities and apply for service.

Op. 86-71 distinction. That opinion struck down a Spring Hill ordinance that purported to require new buildings outside Spring Hill to comply with city-adopted building/plumbing codes and to obtain city building permits, on the basis that § 68-18-101(b)(2) (the precursor of § 68-120-101(b)(2)) limited municipal code authority to the city's jurisdiction. The 2013 opinion distinguished that case because Cleveland isn't imposing building codes outside its limits; it's conditioning connection to the city-owned utility on a city-issued permit.

Reconciliation principle. Stuermer v. City of Chattanooga, 914 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); SPE, Inc. v. Metro Gov't, 817 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991): courts reconcile statutes and ordinances where possible. City of Bartlett v. Hoover, 571 S.W.2d at 293: state and local regulations can coexist if local doesn't conflict with state's spirit or general policy.

Common questions

I want to build a new house in Bradley County and connect to Cleveland Utilities' sewer. How many permits do I need?

Under the AG's reading: two. A Bradley County plumbing permit (because the County now enforces its own plumbing code), and a Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2) plumbing permit (as a condition of connecting to the city-owned sewer). You'll also pay both fees.

Isn't the City of Cleveland double-charging me?

Not legally. The two permits cover different things. The County's permit is enforcement of the building code under § 68-120-101(b)(2). The City's permit is the City's police-power oversight of connections to its own sewer. The AG concluded the dual structure isn't unreasonable or unconstitutional.

Could the City of Cleveland refuse to let me connect to its sewer at all because I'm outside its limits?

Not addressed in this opinion, but the underlying statutes (e.g., § 7-35-401(a)) generally authorize but don't require municipal sewer service outside the city. Practically, when the City has historically provided service, it cannot refuse on discriminatory grounds.

Does the City have to inspect through a Tennessee-certified plumbing inspector?

Yes, under § 68-120-118 (certification of municipal, county, and state plumbing inspectors). Both the City's inspector and the County's inspector must be certified. The historical reason Cleveland inspected county-side plumbing was that the County didn't yet have certified personnel; now both do.

What if the City's plumbing standards are stricter than the County's?

Then the City's standards (as a condition of sewer connection) effectively bind the connecting property, even though the County's permit alone wouldn't impose them. Hoover permits stricter local-on-local-on-local-property requirements. The opinion didn't reach a direct conflict scenario; if City standards directly contradicted County standards, the analysis would be different.

Could Bradley County refuse to issue permits unless the City stops requiring its own?

Probably not. The two authorities are independent. Refusing to issue permits to coerce the City would likely violate the County's own § 68-120-101(b)(2)(B) duty to "adequately enforce" its adopted codes, and could expose the County to other claims.

Citations

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101, including (a), (b), (b)(2), (b)(2)(B); § 68-120-106(a); § 68-120-107; § 68-120-118 (plumbing inspector certification). § 9-21-107(2), (8); § 7-34-104(a)(2), (5); § 7-35-201; § 7-35-401(a); § 7-51-401 (municipal sewer authority). Cases: Southern Railway Co. v. City of Knoxville, 223 Tenn. 90, 442 S.W.2d 619 (1968); Manning v. City of Lebanon, 124 S.W.3d 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Capitol News Co., Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 562 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1978); Patterson v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 267, 241 S.W.2d 291 (1951); Warren v. Bradley, 39 Tenn. App. 451, 284 S.W.2d 698 (1955); City Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pharr, 186 Tenn. 217, 209 S.W.2d 15 (1948); Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618 (Tenn. 2009); Stuermer v. City of Chattanooga, 914 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); SPE, Inc. v. Metro Gov't, 817 S.W.2d 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); City of Bartlett v. Hoover, 571 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn. 1978); Shaw v. Cleveland Utilities Water Div., 2009 WL 4250157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2009). Prior AG opinion: Op. 86-71 (Mar. 20, 1986).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2013/op13-056.pdf

Original opinion text

S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO BOX 20207
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37202

July 22, 2013

Opinion No. 13-56

Municipality's Extraterritorial Power to Require Plumbing Permits

QUESTION

Does Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101 preclude the City of Cleveland, a Tennessee municipality, from requiring property owners outside its corporate limits to obtain a plumbing permit from its Building Department in order to connect to Cleveland Utilities, a city-owned public utility?

OPINION

No.

ANALYSIS

The following facts were set forth in the opinion request submitted to this Office. Cleveland Utilities is a public utility owned by the City of Cleveland ("City"), a Tennessee municipality. See http://www.clevelandutilities.com/ (Cleveland Utilities website). Bradley County, in which the City of Cleveland is located, recently informed the City that it intends to require all plumbing permits outside the City's corporate limits, including those where Cleveland Utilities is the service provider, to be purchased from the Bradley County Building Inspection Department. Historically, the City has performed plumbing inspections in Bradley County when Cleveland Utilities is the service provider. This arrangement began at a time when Bradley County did not have certified plumbing inspectors that were qualified to perform plumbing inspections. Bradley County, however, now employs personnel that are certified and qualified to perform plumbing inspections. Bradley County also recently adopted its own building and plumbing codes, as permitted under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101. Having taken these measures, Bradley County asserts that it now has the "sole" authority to issue plumbing permits to county property owners pursuant to Tennessee statute and Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 86-71 (Mar. 20, 1986). The City acknowledges that Bradley County has authority to issue plumbing permits outside the City's corporate limits but maintains that the City also has the authority to require property owners outside its corporate limits to obtain a plumbing permit from its Building Department in order to connect to Cleveland Utilities.

The question presented is whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101 precludes the City from requiring property owners outside its corporate limits to obtain an additional plumbing permit in order to connect to Cleveland Utilities. Chapter 120 of Title 68 of the Tennessee Code establishes various building regulations in Tennessee. Building construction safety standards are addressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101. This statutory provision gives initial authority to the State fire marshal to promulgate rules establishing the minimum state-wide building construction safety standards. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(a). Local governments, though, are authorized to enact their own building construction and fire safety codes, subject to certain constraints. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-106(a).

Local government officials have concurrent jurisdiction with State officials to enforce the provisions of Chapter 120 of Title 68. The statute specifically states:

The state fire marshal, such fire marshal's deputies and assistants, including all municipal fire prevention or building officials in those municipalities having such officers, and where no such officer exists, the chief of the fire department of every incorporated city or place in which a fire department is established, and the mayor of each incorporated place in which no fire department exists, and all state officials, now having jurisdiction or as directed by the governor, or county officers having jurisdiction in regard to any matter regulated in this chapter, shall have concurrent jurisdiction.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-106(a); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-107 ("state fire marshal or other official having jurisdiction" is authorized to direct discontinuance of action or remedying of condition in violation of Chapter 120).

Local government officials, however, are restrained from issuing or enforcing regulations that are in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 120. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-106(a) (stating that "[n]o regulation shall be issued or enforced by any . . . official that is in conflict with this chapter" and that this "chapter shall supersede all less stringent provisions of municipal ordinances").

The City of Cleveland's requirement that property owners outside its corporate limits, who reside in Bradley County, obtain a plumbing permit from the City's Building Department in order to connect to the city-owned Cleveland Utilities does not appear to conflict with Chapter 120. Initially, as permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2), Bradley County has adopted the 2006 International Residential Code, the 2006 International Building Code, the 2006 International Fire Code, and the 2006 International Plumbing Code, among others. See Bradley County Commission Resolution 2010-041 (Aug. 16, 2010) (copy attached). The relevant provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2) state:

[Standards established by the state fire marshal] do not apply to any building, other than state buildings, educational occupancies or any other occupancy requiring an inspection by the state fire marshal for initial licensure, located within the jurisdiction of a local government that certifies in writing to the state fire marshal that:

(A) The local jurisdiction has chosen to adopt and enforce building construction and fire safety codes for construction of all buildings, for construction of all buildings other than one-family and two-family dwellings, or for construction of one-family and two-family dwellings only; and

(i) For one-family and two-family construction, it has adopted the International Residential Code, published by the International Code Council, Inc.; or

(ii) For construction other than one-family and two-family dwellings, it has adopted a building construction safety code consisting of the International Building Code, published by the International Code Council, Inc., and either:

(a) The international fire code, published by the International Code Council, Inc.; or

(b) The uniform fire code, published by the National Fire Protection Association, Inc., if adopted on or after July 1, 2006; and

(B) It is adequately enforcing its code and performing any reviews of construction plans and specifications and inspections required by the state fire marshal under this section.

The decision by Bradley County to exercise the authority granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2), thereby excluding certain buildings within Bradley County's jurisdiction from meeting building standards established by the State fire marshal, does not necessarily provide Bradley County with the exclusive authority to issue plumbing permits to county property owners. In Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 86-71 (Mar. 20, 1986), this Office considered Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-101(b)(2) (1982), the statutory precursor to Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2), which provided in relevant part:

[Standards established by the state fire marshal] shall not apply to any building, other than state buildings or educational occupancies, located within the jurisdiction of a local government which certifies in writing to the state fire marshal that:

(A) It has adopted a building construction safety code consisting of the Standard Building Code (published by the Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.) and either:

(i) The Standard Fire Prevention Code (published by the Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.); or

(ii) The Fire Prevention Code (published by the National Fire Protection Association, Inc.); and

(B) It is adequately enforcing its code and performing any reviews of construction plans and specifications and inspections required by the state fire marshal under subsection (d) of this section.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-101(b)(2) (1982).

Opinion 86-71 addressed the validity of a Spring Hill, Tennessee municipal ordinance that sought to impose building construction safety standards outside Spring Hill's municipal limits. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 86-71 at 1-2. The ordinance amended Spring Hill's zoning ordinance to require that all new construction, excepting agricultural construction, conform to meet the requirements of the Standard Building Code, the Standard Fire Prevention Code, the Standard Plumbing Code, and the Standard Housing Code as published by Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. of Birmingham, Alabama. Id. at 1. Prior to obtaining a building permit, the ordinance provided that the Building Inspector collect a fee. Id.

The opinion observed that when a local government adopts a building construction safety code pursuant to the statute, it is required to enforce the building code by performing reviews of construction plans and specifications. Id. at 2. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-101(b)(2)(B) (1982). Further, the opinion noted that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-101(d) (1982) permitted the charging of a fee to cover the costs of a review for compliance but the statute's authority was limited to "buildings 'located within the jurisdiction of a local government.'" Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 86-71 at 2. Thus, the opinion concluded that the ordinance was valid within Spring Hill's limits since it adopted building construction standards permitted by statute but it was invalid to the extent it applied to areas outside the municipal limits. Id.

In sum, Opinion 86-71 found the Spring Hill ordinance to conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-101(b)(2) (1982). Municipal corporations may not enact ordinances that are in conflict with the general laws of Tennessee. Southern Railway Co. v. City of Knoxville, 223 Tenn. 90, 442 S.W.2d 619, 621 (1968); Manning v. City of Lebanon, 124 S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). A conflict exists if the municipal regulation infringes on the general law or if the municipal regulation is repugnant to the general policy of Tennessee law. Capitol News Co., Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 562 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tenn. 1978). Because Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-101(b)(2) (1982) only granted local governments the ability to establish construction safety standards for buildings located in their jurisdiction, Opinion 86-71 reasoned that allowing Spring Hill to impose construction safety standards on buildings outside its municipal limits would infringe on State law. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 86-71 at 2.

The factual situation discussed in Opinion 86-71 is different from the one posed with this opinion request. Here, the City of Cleveland is not seeking to extend its building standards outside its territory, rather the City is seeking to assure that an owner outside its jurisdiction wishing to connect to the city-owned Cleveland Utilities applies for and obtains a plumbing permit as part of the process for obtaining service from Cleveland Utilities. As the Cleveland Municipal Code states:

(a) Before the owner of any property connects such property into the utility sewer, the owner or the owner's agent shall make application to and be issued permits by both the city and the utility. The work shall be performed only by a plumber approved by the city and utility who has also signed the permits. All connections shall be inspected and approved by both the City of Cleveland Plumbing Inspector and the utility.

(b) In order to secure the required connection permits, the owner or owner's agent shall:

(1) Make application for a plumbing permit to the City of Cleveland Plumbing Inspector's Office. The permit application shall be supplemented by any plans, specifications, or other information considered pertinent in the judgment of the Plumbing Inspector. A permit and inspection fee shall be paid to the City of Cleveland at the time the application permit is filed.

(2) Take the plumbing permit to Cleveland Utilities and make application for service and pay the appropriate connection charge and inspection fee.

Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2), located at http://www.clevelandtn.gov/DocumentCenter/View/13.

Thus, the overarching purpose of Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2) is to require property owners to obtain a plumbing permit and pay a fee in order to connect to Cleveland Utilities. Like many municipalities in Tennessee, the City operates a sewer beyond its corporate limits. Tennessee statutes authorize municipalities to operate sewers beyond their corporate boundaries and impose charges upon users of their systems. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-21-107(2), (8); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-34-104(a)(2), (5); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-35-201; Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-35-401(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-401. See also Patterson v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 267, 241 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1951) (city may own and operate a sewer beyond its corporate limits); Warren v. Bradley, 39 Tenn. App. 451, 284 S.W.2d 698, 704 (1955) (municipal corporation may fix the charges for using or connecting with its sewers).

Further, Tennessee courts have recognized that the establishment and maintenance of a sewer system by a municipality is regarded as an exercise of its police power. Patterson, 241 S.W.2d at 294; Warren, 284 S.W.2d. at 701. Included within this police power is a municipality's right to regulate and control the use of its sewers; the right is a necessary incident of its ownership. 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1965 (2013). Consequently, when a municipal sewer extends beyond the corporate limits, the municipal power to regulate and control the sewer rests largely upon the right of ownership. 11 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 31:18 (3d ed. 2013). Accordingly, a municipal corporation has the power to authorize the extraterritorial connection and use of its sewers under permits or licenses and to impose fees and charges for such privileges. Id. See City Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pharr, 186 Tenn. 217, 209 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1948) (municipality may enforce police powers beyond geographical limits when public necessity so requires).

In short, the City has the power to enact an ordinance that requires property owners outside its corporate boundaries to obtain a plumbing permit before connecting to Cleveland Utilities' sewer. See Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tenn. 2009) (municipalities may exercise express or necessarily implied powers delegated to them by the General Assembly in their charters or under statutes). Bradley County, though, has authority, by statute, to require these same property owners to obtain plumbing permits from its Building Inspection Department because Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2)(B) requires Bradley County to enforce the building and plumbing codes it has adopted.

In determining whether the City's ordinance and Bradley County's issuance of plumbing permits under Tennessee statute are in conflict, Tennessee courts direct that statutes and ordinances are to be reconciled where possible and effect given to both. Stuermer v. City of Chattanooga, 914 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); SPE, Inc. v. Metro Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 817 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). In addressing the question of conflict between municipal ordinances and State statutes, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held:

The mere fact that the state, in exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does not . . . prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict between the two, and the requirements of the municipal by-law are not pernicious, as being unreasonable or discriminatory, both will stand, but municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state.

City of Bartlett v. Hoover, 571 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tenn. 1978) (citing Capitol News Co., Inc., 562 S.W.2d at 434).

Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2) does not appear to conflict with the authority Bradley County exercises pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-101(b)(2). Unlike the Spring Hill ordinance at issue in Opinion 86-71, the City of Cleveland's municipal code provision does not establish building and plumbing codes for buildings outside the City's corporate limits. It merely requires property owners to obtain a plumbing permit and pay a fee in order to connect to Cleveland Utilities, a utility district owned and operated by the City. As long as the municipal code provision is enforced against property owners outside its corporate limits in a manner that does not contravene or undermine the building construction safety standards adopted by Bradley County, Bradley County's authority granted under the statute and Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2) can coexist and be effective.

Furthermore, the requirements of Cleveland Municipal Code § 18-104(2) apply to all property owners, within and without the City's corporate boundaries. Additionally, the City, as owner of Cleveland Utilities, has legitimate public health and safety interests in confirming that connections to its sewer system have been properly made since the City is legally responsible for Cleveland Utilities. See Shaw v. Cleveland Utilities Water Div., No. E2009-00627-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4250157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable that the City would retain oversight of connections to its sewer system through a city-operated permit process.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

WILLIAM E. YOUNG
Solicitor General

LAURA KIDWELL
Senior Counsel

Requested by:

The Honorable Eric Watson
State Representative
112 War Memorial Bldg.
Nashville, TN 37243