After the 1976 private act transferred county-chairman judicial powers to Jackson County's General Sessions Court, who has probate jurisdiction there today?

Plain-English summary

Tennessee's county-court structure is a layered history of private acts (county-specific legislation) on top of public acts (statewide statutes). For decades, county courts and the county judges or chairmen who presided over them handled probate, guardianships, name changes, and similar matters under what was then Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709 (now § 16-16-107). When a 1978 constitutional amendment restructured county government to put county executives in place of county chairmen, the legislature tried to keep judicial functions running but the Tennessee Supreme Court in Waters v. State ex rel. Schmutzer, 583 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1979), held that those judicial functions could not constitutionally be lodged in the county executive (who is not required to satisfy Article VI, § 4's qualifications for judges of inferior courts).

The legislature responded in 1980 with Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(a), which by default puts probate and related jurisdiction in the chancery court of each county, unless a public, private, or special act otherwise provides.

Jackson County's situation came in two layers. First, Chapter 217 of the Private Acts of 1976 abolished the Jackson County Chairman and transferred "[a]ll judicial powers and duties" of that office to the Jackson County General Sessions Court. Because Chapter 217 specifically provided otherwise, it qualified as an exception under § 16-16-201(a), so the 1980 default to chancery court did not apply to Jackson County. The General Sessions Court held the probate function in Jackson County from 1977 forward.

Then Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1997 amended Chapter 217 to move all matters of probate to the Chancery Court and to make the Clerk and Master the clerk for probate, while keeping all other judicial matters at General Sessions. That 1997 amendment is what now governs Jackson County. So the 1976-transferred probate jurisdiction has moved on, but the rest of the 1976 transfer stayed in place.

The 2003 and 2005 amendments to § 16-16-107 (which narrowed that statute's reach to counties of specified population bands) did not change Jackson County's structure. Jackson County's 2000 census population was 10,984 (Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-116(a)), which is below the lowest band the amended statute covers.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: I have a will to probate in Jackson County. Which court do I file in?
A: According to this opinion, the Chancery Court for Jackson County, with the Clerk and Master as clerk. The 1997 amendment to the 1976 private act moved probate from General Sessions to Chancery. Verify with the Jackson County Clerk and Master before filing; private acts can be amended by subsequent legislation.

Q: What if I want to file something other than probate, like a guardianship or a name change?
A: Those are listed among the items that historically rode together with probate in old § 16-709. The opinion treats the 1997 amendment as transferring "all matters of probate" to Chancery, with everything else continuing at General Sessions. The line between "probate-related" matters and "other judicial matters" can be subtle (a name change is not a probate matter, for example), so check with local clerks before filing.

Q: Why does Jackson County have a different setup than most other Tennessee counties?
A: Because of Tennessee's private-acts tradition: the General Assembly can pass legislation specific to a particular county, and many counties have their own historical patches on the otherwise-statewide framework. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(a)'s default to chancery court applies only "unless otherwise specifically provided" by such a private act. In re Estate of Thompson (Blount County), In re Estate of O'Neal (Loudon County), and In re Estate of Graham (Sumner County) all illustrate similar county-specific arrangements.

Q: What is the significance of Waters v. State ex rel. Schmutzer?
A: When the 1978 constitutional amendment created the office of "county executive" in place of the county chairman, the legislature tried to keep the old judicial functions running by transferring them to the new office. Waters held this was unconstitutional, because Article VI, § 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requires that judges of inferior courts meet specified qualifications. The county executive did not have to. The result drove the 1980 enactment of § 16-16-201(a) and the chancery-court default.

Q: What does "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" have to do with this?
A: It is the maxim that the explicit inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of others. The legislature can pin judicial functions to a specific court through a private act and can move them around through later private acts. When it specifies a particular court in a private act, other courts do not get those functions by implication. Both moves (the 1976 transfer to General Sessions and the 1997 transfer to Chancery) were valid exercises of that legislative power.

Background and statutory framework

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709, the 1956 statute that governed county-court jurisdiction at the time Jackson County's 1976 private act was enacted, gave county courts original jurisdiction over twelve categories: probate of wills; letters testamentary and administration; right of executorship; settlement of executor accounts; partition and distribution of decedent estates; sale of real estate for payment of decedent debts; guardianship and guardian accounts; allotment of dower; partition, sale, or division of land; name changes and legitimation of children; inquisitions of unsoundness of mind; and apprenticeships. Johnson v. Brice, 112 Tenn. 59, 83 S.W. 791, 793 (1904), recognized that a county chairman or county judge exercised all jurisdiction belonging to the county court (other than the legislative business of the quarterly court).

The 1976 Jackson County private act (Chapter 217 of the Private Acts) abolished the Jackson County Chairman and moved the chairman's judicial powers wholesale to the Jackson County General Sessions Court, effective January 1, 1977.

In 1978, Article VII of the Tennessee Constitution was amended to restructure county government. The legislature enacted Chapter 934 of the Public Acts of 1978 to vest the old judicial functions in the new "county executive." The Tennessee Supreme Court in Waters v. State ex rel. Schmutzer, 583 S.W.2d 756, 759-60 (Tenn. 1979), held that transfer unconstitutional. The General Assembly responded in 1980 by enacting Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(a) (1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 875, § 1), which made chancery the default probate court but expressly preserved exceptions specified by "public, private, special or local acts." Jackson County's 1976 private act was such an exception.

The 1997 amendment to Chapter 217 (1997 Tenn. Priv. Acts 16) overlaid Jackson County with a new arrangement: probate goes to Chancery (Clerk and Master is clerk), and other former-chairman judicial matters stay at General Sessions. The 2003 and 2005 amendments to § 16-16-107 narrowed the statewide statute's reach to a handful of counties identified by population bands (12,800-12,900; 27,100-27,200; 43,100-43,200; 62,300-62,400; 182,000-182,100, with a separate clerk provision for 39,050-39,150). Jackson County, with 10,984 residents per the 2000 census, falls in none of these bands. So those amendments do not affect Jackson County's structure either way.

Citations and references

Statutes and acts:

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-116(a) (population figures by county from 2000 census)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709 (1956) (former county-court jurisdiction, recodified as § 16-16-107)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 (current county-court jurisdiction statute)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(a) (default vesting of probate jurisdiction in chancery court, subject to private-act exceptions)
• 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts 529, § 5 (deletion of dower allotment from county-court jurisdiction)
• 1976 Tenn. Priv. Acts 217, § 4 (Jackson County: abolition of County Chairman, transfer of judicial powers to General Sessions)
• 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 875, § 1 (default to chancery court for probate jurisdiction)
• 1997 Tenn. Priv. Acts 16 (Jackson County: transfer of probate to Chancery)
• 2003 Tenn. Pub. Acts 310; 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 24 (population-band amendments to § 16-16-107)

Cases:

• Johnson v. Brice, 112 Tenn. 59, 83 S.W. 791 (1904) (county chairman holds county court jurisdiction)
• Waters v. State ex rel. Schmutzer, 583 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1979) (vesting judicial power in county executive unconstitutional)
• In re Estate of Stocks, 1997 WL 437215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (chancery default unless otherwise specifically provided)
• In re Estate of Thompson, 952 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (Blount County General Sessions probate via private act)
• In re Estate of O'Neal, 1998 WL 10214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (Loudon County General Sessions probate via private act)
• In re Estate of Graham, 1986 WL 3156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (Sumner County General Sessions probate via private act)
• Moore v. Love, 171 Tenn. 682, 107 S.W.2d 982 (Tenn. 1937) (legislative power to set court jurisdiction)
• State v. Keller, 813 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (legislative power to define court jurisdiction)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-080.pdf

Original opinion text

June 3, 2010
Opinion No. 10-80

General Sessions Court of Jackson County

QUESTIONS

1. Did Chapter 217, § 4, of the Private Acts of 1976 provide the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County with all judicial powers that were previously provided to county court judges by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709?

2. If so, are those powers still granted to the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County in light of subsequent amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 [formerly Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709]?

OPINIONS

1. Yes.

2. The 2003 and 2005 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 do not have any bearing on the judicial powers that were bestowed upon the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County by Chapter 217, § 4, of the Private Acts of 1976; however, Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1997 does. All jurisdiction for probate and related matters that was transferred to the Jackson County General Sessions Court by Chapter 217, § 4, of the Private Acts of 1976 is now bestowed upon the Chancery Court for Jackson County by Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1997.

ANALYSIS

This opinion request concerns the judicial powers of the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County. In 1976, the General Assembly passed a private act that abolished the office of County Chairman of Jackson County and transferred the judicial powers exercised by that official to the Judge of the Jackson County General Sessions Court. Specifically, Chapter 217, § 4, of the Private Acts of 1976 ("Chapter 217") provided:

The office of County Chairman of Jackson County is abolished, effective January 1, 1977. All judicial powers and duties exercised prior to the effective date of this act by the County Chairman of Jackson County, whether pursuant to general law or private act, are transferred, effective January 1, 1977, to the Judge of the Court of General Sessions of Jackson County. The Clerk of the County Court shall continue to be the clerk for all matters of probate but all other judicial matters shall be the duty of the Clerk of the General Sessions Court.

At the time of the passage of Chapter 217, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709 provided original jurisdiction to the county courts for certain cases. The statute provided:

The county court has original jurisdiction in the following cases:

(1) The probate of wills.
(2) The granting of letters testamentary and of administration, and the repeal and revocation thereof.
(3) All controversies in relation to the right of executorship or of administration.
(4) The settlement of accounts of executors or administrators.
(5) The partition and distribution of the estates of decedents; and for these purposes, the power to sell the real and personal property belonging to such estates, if necessary to make the partition and distribution, or if manifestly for the interest of the parties.
(6) To sell real estate for the payment of debts of a decedent as provided in §§ 30-602, 30-603.
(7) The appointment and removal of guardians for minors and persons of unsound mind, and all controversies as to the right of guardianship, and the settlement of guardian accounts.
(8) The allotment of dower in lands.
(9) The partition, sale, or division of land.
(10) The changing of names and the legitimation of children.
(11) The issuance of inquisitions of unsoundness of mind.
(12) The binding out of apprentices, and all controversies between master and apprentice.

In counties having a county judge, he shall have the powers above enumerated.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709 (1956).

A county chairman was entitled to exercise all jurisdiction belonging to a county court. See Johnson v. Brice, 112 Tenn. 59, 83 S.W. 791, 793 (1904) ("the county judge or chairman has all jurisdiction belonging to the county court, except such as is expressly or by reasonable implication devolved upon the quarterly court," the duties of which are essentially legislative). Thus, in response to your first question, Chapter 217 provided the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County with all judicial powers that were previously provided to the Jackson County Chairman by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709 because Chapter 217, § 4, clearly provides that "[a]ll judicial powers and duties exercised prior to the effective date of this act by the County Chairman of Jackson County, whether pursuant to general law or private act, are transferred, effective January 1, 1977, to the Judge of the Court of General Sessions of Jackson County."

Your second question is whether subsequent amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 [formerly Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709] disturb the judicial powers bestowed upon the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County by Chapter 217. We note the passage of three amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 since the enactment of Chapter 217. We assume that your question pertains to the amendments that occurred in 2003 and 2005, respectively. Before discussing these two amendments, other intervening legislation must first be addressed.

In 1978, the traditional structure of county government in Tennessee was substantially altered by the adoption of an amendment to Article VII of the Tennessee Constitution. The Amendment provided, in part, the following:

Sec. 1. County government - Elected officers - Legislative body - Alternate forms of government. - The qualified voters of each county shall elect for terms of four years a legislative body, a county executive, a Sheriff, a Trustee, a Register, a County Clerk and an Assessor of Property. Their qualifications and duties shall be prescribed by the General Assembly. Any officer shall be removed for malfeasance or neglect of duty as prescribed by the General Assembly.

While this amendment did not vest any judicial authority in the county executive, the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that the General Assembly sought to vest such authority in that officer by the enactment of Chapter 934, § 17, of the Public Acts of 1978, which provided that "the judicial authority formerly exercised by the county judge, county chairman, or other elected official of county government shall be vested in the county executive." Waters v. State ex rel. Schmutzer, 583 S.W.2d 756, 759-760 (Tenn. 1979). The Waters Court stated that "[t]he judicial authority referred to [in Chapter 934, § 17, of the Public Acts of 1978] is that of the county court, T.C.A. §§ 16-701, Et seq., and the juvenile court, T.C.A. §§ 37-201, Et seq." Id. at 760. The Waters Court determined that the General Assembly's attempt to bestow judicial powers upon county executives was unconstitutional because those holding the offices of juvenile court judge and county court judge must meet the requirements contained in Article VI, § 4, of the Tennessee Constitution governing qualifications of judges of "inferior" courts. Id. at 760-761.

As a result of Waters, the General Assembly passed an act in 1980 that granted all probate and related jurisdiction formerly vested in county judges and chairmen to the chancery court, unless otherwise provided by legislative enactment. In pertinent part, the act provided:

In all counties where not otherwise specifically provided by public, private, special or local acts, all jurisdiction relating to the probate of wills and the administration of estates and related matters heretofore vested in the county court, the county judge or county chairman, is hereby vested in the chancery court of the respective counties. The chancery court in such counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration of estates, and all matters relating thereto, heretofore vested in the county court, the county judge or county chairman.

1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 875, § 1 (emphasis added). This act is codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(a), and it has been interpreted to vest all judicial powers under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 [formerly Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709] in the chancery court of each county unless "otherwise specifically provided." See In re Estate of Stocks, No. 02A01-9612-CH-00310, 1997 WL 437215, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 80-395 (August 5, 1980).

With respect to Jackson County, it is our opinion that Chapter 217, § 4, of the Private Acts of 1976 "otherwise specifically provided" because it stated that "[a]ll judicial powers and duties exercised prior to the effective date of this act by the County Chairman of Jackson County, whether pursuant to general law or private act, are transferred, effective January 1, 1977, to the Judge of the Court of General Sessions of Jackson County." Thus, the Jackson County General Sessions Judge's authority to exercise the judicial powers contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-709 was unaffected by the enactment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thompson, 952 S.W.2d 429, 431-432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (General Sessions Court of Blount County could exercise probate jurisdiction because it was the type of exception contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201 since there were private acts vesting the Blount County General Sessions Court with probate jurisdiction and all jurisdiction and authority conferred upon the County Judge or County Chairman); In re Estate of O'Neal, No. 03A01-9706-CH-00214, 1998 WL 10214, at 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (General Sessions Court of Loudon County was an exception contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201 because private act vested jurisdiction in such court over all matters related to probate); In re Estate of Graham, App. No. 85-114-II, 1986 WL 3156, at 1 n. 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (General Session Court of Sumner County found to have jurisdiction over probate matter because private act vested such jurisdiction in this court).

Further, the 2003 and 2005 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 do not have any bearing on the judicial powers of the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County. As a result of these amendments, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 currently provides:

(a)(1) The county court has original jurisdiction in the following cases:
(A) The probate of wills;
(B) The granting of letters testamentary and of administration, and the repeal and revocation of letters testamentary and of administration;
(C) All controversies in relation to the right of executorship or of administration;
(D) The settlement of accounts of executors and administrators;
(E) The partition and distribution of the estates of decedents; and for these purposes, the power to sell the real and personal property belonging to the estates, if necessary to make the partition and distribution, or if manifestly for the interest of the parties;
(F) To sell real estate for the payment of debts of a decedent as provided in former §§ 30-602 and 30-603;
(G) The appointment and removal of guardians for minors and persons of unsound mind, and all controversies as to the right of guardianship, and the settlement of guardian accounts;
(H) The partition, sale or division of land;
(I) The changing of names and the legitimation of children;
(J) The issuance of inquisitions of unsoundness of mind; and
(K) The binding out of apprentices, and all controversies between master and apprentice.

(2) In counties having a county judge, the county judge shall have the powers enumerated in subdivision (a)(1).

(b) Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

not less than not more than
12,800 12,900
27,100 27,200
43,100 43,200
62,300 62,400
182,000 182,100

(c) In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

As evidenced above, the 2003 and 2005 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 did not diminish the jurisdiction of county courts. The result of these amendments is that Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 now applies to certain counties that have population figures within certain ranges. According to the 2000 federal census, Jackson County has a population of 10,984. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-116(a). Thus, Jackson County is not one of the counties to which Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 currently applies, and the 2003 and 2005 amendments to the statute did not affect the judicial powers of the General Sessions Judge of Jackson County. A county court did not cease to exist in Jackson County because Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 was amended in 2003 and 2005; it had already ceased to exist when Chapter 217 of the Private Acts of 1976 abolished the office of Jackson County Chairman. This private act transferred all judicial powers and duties exercised by that official to the Judge of the General Sessions Court of Jackson County. It is well established that the General Assembly has the power to determine how many and what kinds of courts are required for the administration of justice, including the power to fix the limits of each court's jurisdiction. See Moore v. Love, 171 Tenn. 682, 107 S.W.2d 982, 985 (Tenn. 1937); State v. Keller, 813 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Accordingly, the 2003 and 2005 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 did not disturb the judicial powers bestowed upon the Jackson County General Sessions Judge by Chapter 217.

But Chapter 217 was later amended by Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1997 to place all matters of probate under the jurisdiction of the chancery court:

The office of County Chairman of Jackson County is abolished, effective January 1, 1977. All judicial powers and duties exercised prior to the effective date of this act by the County Chairman of Jackson County, whether pursuant to general law or private act, are transferred, effective January 1, 1977, to the Judge of the Court of General Sessions of Jackson County. All matters of probate are placed under the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court and the Clerk and Master shall be the clerk for all matters of probate, but all other judicial matters shall be the duty of the Clerk of the General Sessions Court.

1976 Tenn. Priv. Acts 217, § 4, as amended by 1997 Tenn. Priv. Acts 16.

The passage of Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1997 evidences the General Assembly's intent to bring Jackson County in conformity with the general rule under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-201(a) that all jurisdiction for probate and related matters is vested in the chancery court. Consequently, the authority of the Jackson County General Sessions Judge to exercise the judicial powers listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-16-107 ceased as the result of the passage of Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1997.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

BARRY TURNER
Deputy Attorney General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Senior Counsel

Requested by:

Honorable Tiffany Gentry Gipson
General Sessions Judge, Jackson County
P.O. Box 675
101 Hull Avenue
Gainesboro, TN 38562