Can a Tennessee local government enforce zoning against a sport shooting range that's no longer meeting the state's setback requirements?

Plain-English summary

Representative Richard Floyd asked what happens when a Tennessee sport shooting range stops meeting the requirements that exempt it from local zoning. Section 39-17-316(c) protects shooting ranges that have operated continuously for at least 30 years before December 16, 2008, but only if the range maintains specific setback distances (150-180 feet from various boundary lines and county roads) and leaves boundary vegetation undisturbed.

AG Robert E. Cooper, Jr. drew the line cleanly. The statute trades zoning protection for ongoing compliance with the setback and vegetation rules. If a range stops complying, it loses the zoning shield and becomes subject to whatever local land use planning and zoning rules apply to its location. The local government can amend, restrict, or terminate the range's operation under those local rules.

But that's not the end of the story. Section 39-17-316(b)(2) provides a separate, broader protection: a range that complied with local noise control requirements at the time it began operations cannot be the target of nuisance, abatement, or similar actions seeking to stop its operations. That protection is independent of subsection (c), so even a range that loses its zoning shield retains its noise-nuisance immunity, as long as it was noise-compliant when it opened.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What are the setback requirements?
A: Per § 39-17-316(c)(1), shooting positions must be at least:

• 150 feet from any adjoining boundary line or county road on the south side (southeast to southwest corner);
• 180 feet from any adjoining boundary line on the west side (southwest to northwest corner);
• 180 feet from any adjoining boundary line on the north side (northwest to northeast corner);
• 180 feet from any adjoining boundary line or county road on the east side (northeast to southeast corner);
• 180 feet from any adjoining residential property boundary line, regardless of which side.

Q: What's the vegetation rule?
A: Per § 39-17-316(c)(2), vegetation between the required setback distance and the adjoining boundary line or county road must remain undisturbed. The point is to maintain a natural sound buffer and visual screen.

Q: What happens if a range used to comply but stops?
A: It loses the zoning protection. A local government can then enforce its zoning rules and, depending on the local code, restrict or terminate range operations. The "30-year continuous operation before Dec. 16, 2008" element is a one-time qualifier; failing on setbacks or vegetation forfeits the protection that qualification originally earned.

Q: How is compliance determined?
A: A factual determination by the local government, per the opinion's footnote. The opinion did not specify procedures (notice, hearing, appeals); those would come from the local zoning ordinance.

Q: What about the noise-nuisance protection?
A: It's separate. Section 39-17-316(b)(2) bars nuisance, abatement, or similar actions against a range so long as the range was in compliance with the noise control laws that applied at the time it began operations. The statute uses the noise rules in effect at the time of opening, not the current rules.

Q: What if local noise rules have gotten stricter?
A: The protection is grandfathered to the noise rules in effect when the range opened. A range that was noise-compliant in 1985 retains protection even if the local noise ordinance was later tightened. The whole point of subsection (b)(2) is to prevent communities that grew up around an existing range from using nuisance claims to push it out.

Q: What's the difference between (b)(2) and (c)?
A: Subsection (c) protects against zoning restrictions, but only for ranges with 30+ years of continuous operation that meet specific setbacks and vegetation rules. Subsection (b)(2) protects against nuisance/abatement actions, but only against noise-based ones, and only if the range was noise-compliant at startup. Subsection (b)(1), referenced in the opinion, gives ranges and shooters protection from civil or criminal liability for shooting range activities, again subject to noise compliance at startup.

Q: Can a city ban shooting ranges entirely?
A: A general restriction or ban under zoning would be enforceable against ranges that don't qualify under § 39-17-316(c), unless other state law prevents it. The opinion did not analyze blanket prohibitions; it addressed only the operation of subsection (c).

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee shooting range protection sits in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316, which combines several distinct shields. Subsection (b)(1) gives general civil and criminal liability protection for shooting range activities to operators and users, conditioned on compliance with local noise rules at startup. Subsection (b)(2) extends that to a specific bar on nuisance/abatement actions targeting the range itself, again conditioned on noise compliance at startup. Subsection (c) is the most recent layer (added effective Dec. 16, 2008): it protects qualifying long-established ranges from local zoning amendments or restrictions, conditioned on continued compliance with specified setbacks and vegetation maintenance.

The structure reflects a common tension in shooting range law nationwide: ranges are often built in rural areas, then development encroaches and new neighbors complain about the noise. Without protective statutes, courts may declare the range a nuisance and shut it down even if it was lawful when established. The "shooting range protection" or "Sport Shooting Range" statutes in many states carve out immunity from after-arising nuisance actions to protect this preexisting use.

Tennessee's combined framework leaves four scenarios:

1. Range with 30+ years history, meeting current setbacks and vegetation rules: protected from both nuisance actions (if noise-compliant at startup) and zoning restrictions.
2. Range with 30+ years history, no longer meeting setbacks/vegetation: subject to zoning, but still protected from noise-nuisance actions (if noise-compliant at startup).
3. Range without 30+ years history but noise-compliant at startup: subject to zoning, but protected from noise-nuisance actions.
4. Range without 30+ years history and not noise-compliant at startup: no statutory protection; subject to zoning AND nuisance actions.

The opinion's main job is to clarify the boundary between scenarios 1 and 2: failing the setbacks and vegetation rules moves a range into scenario 2, which loses zoning protection but keeps noise immunity.

Citations and references

Statutes (as of 2010):

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316 (sport shooting range protection)

Cases (Tennessee Supreme Court unless noted):

• 421 Corp. v. Metro Gov. of Nashville, 36 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (Tennessee Court of Appeals): zoning authority delegation
• City of Norris v. Bradford, 321 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. 1958): local police power scope
• Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. 1995): statutory construction
• State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn. 2000): statutory construction
• State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2001): avoiding absurd results

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-050.pdf

Original opinion text

Application of Zoning to Sport Shooting Ranges under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c)

QUESTION

If a sport shooting range fails to comply, or discontinues compliance with, one or more of the requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c)(1) and (c)(2), does the sport shooting range become subject to land use planning or zoning applicable to the shooting range's location?

OPINION

In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c)(1) and (c)(2), a sport shooting range that fails to meet the specific requirements of the statute becomes subject to the land use and zoning restrictions that apply to its location, except that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(2) would still guarantee the right of such a shooting range to operate if it is in compliance with all noise control requirements of local government that applied to the shooting range at the time it began operations.

ANALYSIS

The General Assembly has delegated to local governments certain express authority to enact zoning ordinances and general police power regulations. 421 Corp. v. Metro Gov. of Nashville, 36 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that the local government's authority to exercise the police power of the sovereign is necessarily broad so as to meet the needs of our "complex civilization." City of Norris v. Bradford, 321 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tenn. 1958). This broad authority notwithstanding, there are also several significant limitations to local government regulatory power, the most basic of which is that a local government may not exceed the power expressly granted to it by the General Assembly. Id. Thus, while granted "considerable discretion" in the exercise of its delegated regulatory authority, a local government's actions must not conflict with state law. Id.

In enacting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c), the General Assembly has limited the power of local government to amend, restrict or terminate the operations of a sport shooting range under certain conditions. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

[W]ith respect to any sport shooting range that is open to the public and was in continuous operation for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding December 16, 2008, the right to operate as a shooting range shall not be amended, restricted or terminated due to any land use planning or zoning applicable to the shooting range's location if:
(1) The shooting positions operate no closer than:
(A) One hundred fifty feet (150') from any adjoining boundary line or county road that extends from the southeast corner to the southwest corner;
(B) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line that extends from the southwest corner to the northwest corner;
(C) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line that extends from the northwest corner to the northeast corner;
(D) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line or county road that extends from the northeast corner to the southeast corner; and
(E) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining residential property boundary line, notwithstanding subdivisions (c)(1)(A)-(D).
(2) Any vegetation between the appropriate distance requirement described in subdivision (c)(1) and the adjoining boundary line or county road remains undisturbed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that in interpreting statutes, courts are to "give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). Moreover, intent is to be derived "from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning." State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000). The rules of statutory construction prevent the assignment of "a particular interpretation to a statute if that interpretation would yield an absurd result." State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. 2001).

There can be little doubt from the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c) that the intent of the General Assembly was specifically to restrict local government's regulatory authority to amend, restrict or terminate the operation of any sport shooting range which meets the specific statutory requirements regarding the placement of shooting positions and the maintenance of boundary vegetation. In so doing, the General Assembly did not otherwise limit a local government's regulatory authority. A local government's delegated authority includes the enforcement of land use planning and zoning regulations applicable to a specific shooting range's location. In such cases, local government has the authority to amend, restrict, or terminate the operations of a sport shooting range that does not comply, or ceases to comply, with these above-mentioned statutory requirements.

Nevertheless, the General Assembly has provided some protections for sport shooting ranges that fall outside Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c), thereby further limiting the authority of local governments. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(2) provides:

A person or entity that operates or uses a sport shooting range is not subject to an action for nuisance, abatement, or any other type of action or proceeding which would have the effect of limiting, reducing, eliminating or enjoining the use or operation of the sport shooting range as a sport shooting range if the sport shooting range is in compliance with any applicable noise control laws, resolutions, ordinances or regulations issued by a unit of local government, that applied to the range and its operation at the time that the range began operation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(2). Under this statute, local government would be barred from bringing a nuisance, abatement, or similar action to terminate a shooting range's operations because of noise pollution so long as the shooting range is in compliance with the noise control laws and regulations that applied to the shooting range's location at the time the shooting range began operations. In addition, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(1) provides considerable protection from civil or criminal liability for operators and users of a sport shooting range if the range complies with the local noise control provisions that were in effect when it began operation.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

BRIAN J. RAMMING
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Richard Floyd
State Representative, 27th Legislative District
Suite G-24, War Memorial Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243