Can a Tennessee corporation be criminally prosecuted for telling a sheriff or process server to stay off its property, and does 'person' in the obstructing-service statute include businesses?

Plain-English summary

State Representative Harry Brooks asked whether the word "person" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(c) (the misdemeanor offense of intentionally preventing or obstructing service of process) covered corporations and other business entities, and whether a corporation that refused to let a sheriff or process server onto its property to deliver papers committed the offense. The AG said yes to both.

The first question was a pure definitional matter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(27), which supplies the definitions for criminal offenses in Title 39, defines "person" to include "any individual, firm, partnership, copartnership, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, or other organization or other legal entity, or any agent or servant thereof." So "person" in § 39-16-602(c) was not limited to natural humans. Corporations and other legal entities fell within the term.

The second question was whether a corporation's refusal to allow service amounted to "preventing or obstructing" under the statute. § 39-16-602(c) makes it an offense to "intentionally prevent or obstruct an officer of the state or any other person known to be a civil process server in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any legal writ or process." The statute does not define "prevent" or "obstruct," so the AG turned to ordinary dictionary meanings: prevent meant "to keep from happening," obstruct meant "to impede, retard, or interfere with." A corporation that consciously kept process from being served, or impeded the process server's effort, fell within both definitions.

The bridge from corporate conduct to corporate criminal liability ran through § 39-11-404(a)(3)(A). That section makes a corporation responsible for an offense when the conduct is engaged in by an agent acting within the scope of employment and on behalf of the corporation, and the offense is a misdemeanor. § 39-16-602(c) violations are Class A or Class B misdemeanors depending on circumstances, which fits inside § 39-11-404(a)(3)(A). So an employee who, on the company's behalf, locked the gate or told the sheriff to leave could trigger criminal liability for the corporation itself.

The AG declined to answer Representative Brooks's third question (how should the statute be modified if it didn't reach corporate conduct), saying the first two answers made the third unnecessary.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's Title 39 (criminal offenses) starts with a set of universal definitions and rules of construction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-103 states that "every person, whether an inhabitant of this or any other state or country, is liable to punishment by the laws of this state, for an offense committed in this state." § 39-11-106(a)(27) makes "person" expansive enough to cover business entities by name.

Mens rea is also defined in Title 39. § 39-11-106(18) defines intentional conduct as conduct undertaken when "it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." A corporation's intent travels through its agents under § 39-11-404(a)(3)(A).

The obstruction offense itself, § 39-16-602(c), sits inside the chapter on offenses against the administration of government. The subsection is one of several that protect officers, judges, and other government actors from interference. The "civil process server" reference is meant to cover both sheriff's deputies serving civil papers and private process servers acting under court rules.

The criminal grading of § 39-16-602(c) violations as Class A or B misdemeanors matters because § 39-11-404(a)(3)(A) only attaches corporate liability for misdemeanor agent conduct. Felony corporate liability is governed by different subsections (with stricter triggers around authorization or recklessness by high managerial personnel).

Common questions

Q: Could a corporation be charged criminally if a single low-level employee turned a process server away?
A: Per the AG's reading, yes, if the employee acted within the scope of employment and on behalf of the corporation. The employee's individual liability under § 39-16-602(c) would be evaluated separately.

Q: Did the employee have to know it was a process server?
A: The statute requires the actor to know the target is "an officer of the state or any other person known to be a civil process server." So actual knowledge of process-server status was an element. A receptionist who turned away an unidentified visitor would not satisfy the knowledge requirement.

Q: How did courts determine whether the obstruction was "intentional"?
A: § 39-11-106(18) defines intent as a "conscious objective or desire." Tennessee criminal practice draws on the broader Title 39 mens rea framework, distinguishing intent from knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.

Q: What kind of conduct counted?
A: The opinion used dictionary definitions: "preventing" was keeping something from happening, "obstructing" was impeding, retarding, or interfering with it. Common examples in Tennessee practice include locking gates, refusing access, hiding employees, or actively misdirecting a process server.

Q: Could a corporate officer be charged personally as well as the corporation?
A: § 39-16-602(c) reaches "a person." Personal criminal liability for the officer would run on the same statute, separately from the corporation's. Both could be charged if both intentionally obstructed.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-103 (persons liable to punishment)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(27) (definition of "person" in Title 39)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(18) (definition of intentional conduct)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-404(a)(3)(A) (corporate criminal responsibility for misdemeanor agent conduct)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(c) (intentionally preventing or obstructing service of process)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-023.pdf

Original opinion text

March 1, 2010

Opinion No. 10-23

Corporate Criminal Responsibility under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(c)

QUESTIONS

1. Does the word "person" in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(c) include a corporation, business, or legal entity?

2. If so, and such a "person" refused to allow a sheriff or private process server onto its property to execute service, or refused to accept process executed upon the "person," would that conduct constitute "preventing or obstructing" service as prohibited by subsection (c)?

3. If not, why, and how should the statute be modified in order to cover that conduct?

OPINIONS

1. Under the proper circumstances, the statutory definition of "person" may include corporations, businesses, and other legal entities for all criminal offenses in Title 39.

2. Yes. It is an offense for any corporation, business, or other legal entity included in the definition of "person" to intentionally prevent or obstruct service of process.

3. The answer to the first two questions obviates the need to answer the third question.

ANALYSIS

1. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-103 states that "[e]very person, whether an inhabitant of this or any other state or country, is liable to punishment by the laws of this state, for an offense committed in this state, except where it is by law cognizable exclusively in the courts of the United States." As defined in Title 39, "[p]erson' includes the singular and the plural and means and includes any individual, firm, partnership, copartnership, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, or other organization or other legal entity, or any agent or servant thereof." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(27) (emphasis added). Accordingly, "person" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(c) would not be limited to an individual but would include a corporation or other legal entity.

2. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(c), "[i]t is an offense for a person to intentionally prevent or obstruct an officer of the state or any other person known to be a civil process server in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any legal writ or process." (Emphasis added). A person acts intentionally "when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(18). The terms "prevent" and "obstruct," however, are not defined by the statute. But, "prevent" generally means "[t]o keep from happening," and "obstruct" means "[t]o impede, retard, or interfere with." The American Heritage College Dictionary 859, 982 (2nd ed. 1985).

Therefore, it is the opinion of this office that, under the proper circumstances, a corporation or other legal entity consciously impeding an officer of the state or civil process server serving or attempting to serve process, or consciously keeping such process from being served, would be committing an offense under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(c) and may be subject to criminal prosecution.

It should be further noted that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-404(a)(3)(A), a corporation commits an offense when the conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation acting within the scope of the agent's employment and on behalf of the corporation, and the offense is a misdemeanor. A violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(c) is a Class A or B misdemeanor, depending on the circumstances. Therefore, a corporation could be committing an offense under Tennessee Code Annotated 39-16-602(c) when an agent of the corporation, acting within the scope of his employment and on behalf of the corporation, intentionally prevents or obstructs a legal process server in serving or attempting to serve process.

3. The answer to the first two questions obviates the need to answer the third question.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

LINDSY PADUCH STEMPEL
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Harry Brooks
State Representative
212 War Memorial Building
Nashville 37243-0119