Do South Carolina public colleges have to let service-animals-in-training on campus, and can they set rules for them?

Official title

Opinion addressing the accessibility and regulation of service animals-in-training in public colleges and universities.

Requester

Requested by W.C. Hood, Jr., Esquire, General Counsel, Clemson University.

Plain-English summary

Clemson University's general counsel asked the Attorney General three questions about service-animals-in-training on campus. The answers turn on two South Carolina laws: Chapter 33 of Title 43, which gives blind and physically disabled persons (and trainers of assistance or guide dogs) the right to be accompanied by the dog in certain public places, and Layla's Law (§§ 47-3-910 et seq.), which protects guide dogs and service animals.

First, does basic puppy raising, bladder-control, and general obedience training make a dog an "assistance or guide dog in training"? The AG said no. Reading § 43-33-20 together with Layla's Law, the office concluded the protected training means teaching the dog to do work or perform tasks for a disabled person (the kind of tasks listed in § 47-3-920(4)(a), like guiding, alerting, or retrieving), not general obedience or house training. So a trainer gets the same access rights as a disabled person only when training the dog to perform disability-related tasks.

Second, are colleges and universities "places of public accommodation" that must grant access to service-animal trainers, and if so across the whole campus? The AG concluded a court would likely say no for the institution as a whole. Section 43-33-20 lists covered places but does not define "place of public accommodation," so the office borrowed the definition from the Public Accommodations Act (§ 45-9-10) and the 2019 Layla's Law amendments, which point to specific establishments like hotels and restaurants. Colleges and universities are not listed. The office cautioned, though, that some facilities on a campus, like restaurants or retail establishments, could individually qualify as places of public accommodation.

Third, can Clemson require trainers to verify a dog's in-training status and impose rules like age limits, obedience verification, and registration? The AG split this. On inquiries: under § 47-3-980 and the federal regulation it references (28 C.F.R. § 36.302), public accommodations may ask only two questions about an actual service animal. But service-animals-in-training are not addressed by federal law, and those two questions do not even fit an in-training animal (which is not yet required by a disability or performing tasks). So the office concluded a facility is not limited to the two federal questions and may make the inquiries it deems necessary to determine whether an animal is genuinely a service-animal-in-training. On additional requirements: the AG found no authority in either § 43-33-20 or Layla's Law for a facility to impose its own conditions like age limits, training verification, or registration, and concluded the Legislature would need to clarify the issue before such requirements could be imposed.

What this means for you

Public colleges and universities: Based on this opinion, you are probably not a "place of public accommodation" as a whole for purposes of the state disability-access statutes, though individual facilities on campus (restaurants, retail) might be. You may ask questions to confirm a dog is actually a service-animal-in-training, and you are not limited to the two federal service-animal questions. But the AG found no statutory authority for you to impose extra rules like age limits or registration on in-training animals.

Service-animal trainers and programs: The opinion ties your access rights to training the dog for disability-related tasks. General obedience or house training does not, by itself, give you the same access rights as a disabled person under § 43-33-20.

People with disabilities and disability offices: The AG reaffirmed (consistent with a 2015 opinion) that an "assistance dog" is equivalent to a "service animal," and that misrepresenting a pet as a service animal is unlawful under § 47-3-980. The decision is limited to South Carolina law and does not address federal law such as the ADA.

Common questions

Does basic obedience or house training make a dog a service-animal-in-training in South Carolina?
No. The AG concluded the training must be teaching the dog to do work or perform tasks for a disabled person, not general obedience or house training, for the trainer to get the same access rights as a disabled person.

Must a South Carolina college let service-animals-in-training anywhere on campus?
Probably not campus-wide. The AG concluded a court would likely not treat a college or university as a whole as a "place of public accommodation" under the disability statutes, though some specific facilities on campus could qualify.

Can a college ask whether a dog is really a service-animal-in-training?
Yes. Because service-animals-in-training are not covered by federal law, the AG concluded a facility is not limited to the two federal questions and may make the inquiries it deems necessary to verify the animal's status.

Can a college require age limits, proof of training, or registration for these animals?
The AG found no statutory authority for those requirements. It concluded the Legislature should clarify the issue, so such rules are on uncertain footing under current state law.

Background and statutory framework

S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-20 gives disabled persons and trainers of assistance or guide dogs the right to be accompanied by the dog in listed places, and § 43-33-40 makes interference unlawful. Layla's Law, §§ 47-3-910 et seq., protects guide dogs and service animals; § 47-3-920 defines "guide dog" and (after 2019) "service animal" and "service animal-in-training" by reference to doing work or tasks for a person with a disability. Section 47-3-980 makes it unlawful to misrepresent an animal as a service animal and, in subsection (C), limits enforcement inquiries to those allowed under 28 C.F.R. § 36.302, the federal regulation permitting two questions about a service animal.

The "place of public accommodation" analysis draws on § 45-9-10 (the Public Accommodations Act) and the 2019 Layla's Law amendments, which the AG read together to supply a common definition. On statutory construction, the office relied on Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 712 S.E.2d 416 (2011), as quoted in In re Manigo, 398 S.C. 149, 728 S.E.2d 32 (2012), and on the in pari materia principle from Beaufort Cnty. v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 395 S.C. 366, 718 S.E.2d 432 (2011). It used the preamble to the 2019 Layla's Law amendments as evidence of legislative intent, citing Watson v. Sellers, 299 S.C. 426, 385 S.E.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989). The opinion expressly limited itself to South Carolina law and did not opine on federal law.

Citations

• S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-20 (access rights for disabled persons and assistance/guide dog trainers)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-40 (interference with those rights unlawful)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-920 (Layla's Law definitions of guide dog, service animal, service-animal-in-training)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-980 (misrepresenting an animal as a service animal; permitted inquiries)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 45-9-10 (Public Accommodations Act definition)
• 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (federal service-animal inquiry limits)
• Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 712 S.E.2d 416 (2011)
• In re Manigo, 398 S.C. 149, 728 S.E.2d 32 (2012)
• Beaufort Cnty. v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 395 S.C. 366, 718 S.E.2d 432 (2011)
• Watson v. Sellers, 299 S.C. 426, 385 S.E.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/opinion-addressing-the-accessibility-and-regulation-of-service-animals-in-training-in-public-colleges-and-universities/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/media/0efh3tuk/03496641.pdf

Original opinion text

OI

°^outhc^

Alan Wilson
Attorney General

January 31, 2024

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Clemson University
207 Sikes Hall
Clemson, South Carolina 29634-5003
Dear Mr. Hood:

We received your letter requesting an attorney general’s opinion regarding service animals-intraining. Specifically, you ask three questions, which we address individually.
Law/Analysis

1.

Does puppy raising, puppy training, bladder control training and general obedience
training qualify an animal as an “assistance or guide dog in training” or a “service animal
in training” under South Carolina law?

Chapter 33 of title 43 of the South Carolina Code provides specific rights to blind and physically
disabled persons in South Carolina. Included in these rights is the right to be accompanied by an
“assistance dog.” S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-20(c) (2015). The law specifies:
Every handicapped person has the right to be accompanied by an assistance

dog, especially trained for the purpose, in any of the places listed in item (b) of
this section without being required to pay an extra charge for the assistance dog.
Each handicapped person is liable for any damage done to the premises or
facilities by the dog.

Id. As you mentioned in your letter, section 43-33-20(d) (2015) provides similar rights to
assistance or guide dog trainers.
Every person who is a trainer of an assistance or guide dog, while engaged in
the training of an assistance or guide dog, has the same rights and privileges
with respect to access to public facilities and accommodations as blind and
disabled persons, including the right to be accompanied by an assistance or

guide dog or assistance or guide dog in training, in any of the places listed in
item (b) of this section without being required to pay an extra charge for the
'cmii-ctc. Dennis Bjiildino

_

I’osTOmcE Bo.x i 1 549

«

COLVMBJA, SC 292 11 4 549

TELEi*; iON!:

7 34-3970

.

rACJ.VtM i; v-(B- :53-62cA

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 2
January 3 1 , 2024

assistance dog. A person who uses premises or facilities accommodations
accompanied by a dog under the authority of this item is liable for any damage
done to the premises or facilities by the dog.
S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-20(d). Section 43-33-40 of the South Carolina Code (2015) makes it
unlawful for another person or his agent to deny or interfere with the rights of a blind or disabled
person provided under section 43-33-20, which includes interfering with a trainer of assistance or
guide dogs while they are engaged in training a dog.

You question whether basic obedience and/or house training qualifies as “the training of an
assistance or guide dog” under section 43-33-20. We note, chapter 33 of title 43 does not specify
the type of “training” being received by the assistance or guide dog to bring them under this
provision. Therefore, we turn to the rules of statutory construction.

“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature
must prevail if it reasonably can be discerned from the words used in the

statute.” Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 192, 712 S.E.2d416,
425 (2011). “These words must be construed in context and in light of the
intended purpose of the statute in a manner which harmonizes with its subject
matter and accords with its general purpose.” Id.
In re Manigo, 398 S.C. 149, 157, 728 S.E.2d 32, 35-36 (2012). Simply using the context of section
43 -3 3 -20(c), we presume the training involves teaching a dog to become an assistance or guide

dog, not basic obedience or house training. Specifically, we believe the training entails teaching
the dog how to guide or assist the blind or disabled person in public places.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that it is consistent with statutes protecting guide dogs
and service animals. As our Supreme Court stated, “it is well settled that statutes dealing with the
same subject matter are in pari materia and must be construed together, if possible, to produce a
single, harmonious result.” Beaufort Cnty. v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 395 S.C. 366, 371, 718
S.E.2d 432, 435 (201 1). In 2003, the Legislature enacted provisions aimed at protecting guide dogs
referred to as “Layla’s Law.” S.C. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-910 et seq. (2017 & Supp. 2023). Layla’s
Law made it unlawful to interfere with the use of a guide dog or service animal. S.C. Code Ann. §

47-3-930 (2017). It defines “guide dog” as “a dog that is trained for the purpose of guiding blind
persons or a dog trained for the purpose of assisting hearing impaired persons.” S.C. Code Ann.
§ 47-3-920(1) (2017). The Legislature amended Layla’s Law in 2019 to include the following
definition of “service animal” or “service animal-in-training”:
an animal that is trained or that is being trained to do work or perform tasks for

an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric,
intellectual, or other mental disability. A service animal is not a pet and is
limited to a dog or a miniature horse. The work done or tasks performed must

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 3
January 31, 2024

be directly related to the individual’s disability and may include, but are not
limited to:

(i) guiding an individual who is visually impaired or blind;
(ii) alerting an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing;

(iii) pulling a wheelchair;
(iv) assisting with mobility or balance;
(v) alerting others and protecting an individual if the individual is having
a seizure;

(vi) retrieving objects;
(vii) alerting an individual to the presence of allergens;
(viii) providing physical support and assistance with balance and

stability to an individual with a mobility disability;
(ix) helping an individual with a psychiatric or neurological disability

by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors;
(x) reminding an individual with a mental illness to take his prescribed
medications;

(xi) calming an individual with post-traumatic stress disorder during an
anxiety attack; or

(xii) doing other specific work or performing other special tasks.

S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-920(4)(a) (Supp. 2023) (emphasis added). These definitions make clear
that a guide dog or service animal-in-training is in the process of learning skills it will use to assist
a blind or disabled person. While section 43-33-20 refers to “guide and assistance dogs,” as we
concluded in a 2015 opinion, an assistance dog is equivalent to a “service animal” as defined in
section 47-3-920. Op. Att’y Gen., 2015 WL 731710 (S.C.A.G. Feb. 9, 2015). As such, these
definitions further support our belief that in order for a trainer to have the same rights as a disabled
person under section 43-33-20, they must be training the guide or assistance dog to “do work or
perform tasks” for the disabled person like those listed in section 47-3-920(4)(a) rather than
general obedience and house training.

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 4
January 3 1 , 2024

2.

Are colleges and universities “places of public accommodations” that must grant access

to persons training service animals? If so, does that obligation to grant access apply to
our entire campus?

The right of disabled persons and trainers to be accompanied by an assistance or guide dog is

limited under section 43-33-20 to the places listed in section 43 -3 3 -20(b), which include:
common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor buses, street
cars, boats or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation, hotels,
lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort, and

other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons ....

S.C. Code Ann. § 43 -3 3 -20(b). Colleges and universities are not specifically listed and therefore,
you inquire as to whether they are considered “places of public accommodation” for purposes of
this statute.

In our 2015 opinion referenced above, we discussed what is considered a “place of public
accommodation” under section 43-33-20(b). Op. Atf y Gen., 2015 WL 731710 (S.C.A.G. Feb. 9,

2015). We noted the Legislature did not provide a definition of “places of public accommodation”
for section 43-33-20(b), but we found similar language in the Public Accommodations Act found
in chapter 9 of title 45 of the South Carolina Code. Id.
The Public Accommodations Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 45-9-10 et seq„ has
language very similar to section 43-33-20 and it states:

(A) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations
of any place of public accommodation, as defined in Article 1 of this
chapter, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin.

(B) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a
place of public accommodation within the meaning of this chapter if
discrimination or segregation by it is supported by state action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located
within a building which contains not more than five rooms for
rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of
such establishment as his residence;

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 5
January 31, 2024

(2) any restaurant cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda

fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any

such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment,
or any gasoline station...
(C) “Supported by state action” means the licensing or permitting of any
establishment or any agent of an establishment listed above, subject to

the exclusion provided in Section 45-9-20, which has or must have a
license or permit from the State, its agencies, or local governmental
entities to lawfully operate.
S.C. Code Ann. § 45-9-10 (1976 Code, as amended) (emphasis added).
Although it pertains to race, color, religion, or national origin instead of
handicap or disability, section 45-9-10 closely parallels section 43-33-20
because they both deal with the same subject matter, discrimination against a
certain type of person in public places. The Legislature chose to define ““place

of public accommodation” in sections 45-9-1 0(b) and (c) and not in section 4333-20. In view of the obvious close parallel between the two statutes, however,
we believe that both of the statutes are governed by the same definition of
“place of public accommodation.”
Id.

In further support of our 2015 opinion, the 2019 amendments to Layla’s Law added the following
definition of “places of public accommodation”: “(7) ‘Places of public accommodation’ means

airports, train stations, bus stations, and establishments defined in Section 45-9-10.” This addition
solidifies our belief that the Legislature intended for the definition of “place of public
accommodation” contained in section 45-9-1 0(B) be used for purposes of the disability statutes in
general and specifically in regard to guide dogs and services animals.
Colleges and universities are not referenced as places of public accommodation under section 459-1 0(B). While colleges and universities may house some facilities falling under this definition of

“places of public accommodation,” such as restaurants and retail establishments, we do not believe

this definition encompasses colleges and universities as a whole. Therefore, a court is unlikely to
find that colleges and universities as a whole are “places of public accommodation” for purposes

of the Public Accommodations Act. In turn, we believe it is unlikely a court would find colleges

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 6

January 31, 2024

and universities are places of public accommodation for purpose of section 43-33-20, but caution

that certain areas of a college or university could fall under this definition.1
3.

Can Clemson University require trainers to verify that dogs are “assistance or guide dogs
in training” or “service animals in training” before allowing them to into classrooms,
offices and other areas on campus that are not open to the public? Similarly, can the
university enforce other regulations such as an age limit, verification of obedience
training, and registration for the service animal in training?

Chapter 33 of title 43, governing the rights of physically disabled persons, does not speak a

facility’s ability to inquire as to a dog’s status as an “assistance or guide dog.” Moreover, it does

not provide such guidance regarding a dog in training to serve as an assistance or guide dog. The
law simply requires that assistance or guide dog trainers be allowed access to public facilities and
accommodations while engaged in training. S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-20(d). Similar to our analysis

above, we look to the provisions contained in Layla’s Law in order to obtain further guidance as

to the legal parameters surrounding assistance and guide dogs in training, or as that law refers to
them, service animals-in-training.
In 2019, our Legislature recognized state and federal law do not require documentation or a vest

or other marking indicating an animal is a service animal, which may lead to abuse of the
protections afforded to service animals. As such, the Legislature amended Layla’s Law to prevent
people from misrepresenting an animal as a service animal. In preamble to the amendments to
Layla’s Law, the Legislature stated:
Whereas, service animals that are properly trained to assist persons with
disabilities play a vital role in establishing independence for such persons; and
Whereas, the term “service animal” has a distinct meaning in the law. A service

animal means an animal that is trained for the purposes of assisting or
accommodating the sensory, mental, or physical disability of a disabled person.

Under the law, the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or
companionship does not constitute the work or tasks of a service animal; and
Whereas, no vest, other marking, or documentation is required for an animal to
qualify as a service animal, nor are such vests, markings, or documentation a
reliable indication of whether an animal is, by law, a service animal. People
sometimes erroneously think that a therapy animal, an emotional support
animal, or any animal wearing a vest or having any other type of marking is a
service animal as defined by law; and
1 This opinion is limited in scope to South Carolina Law. We do not opine as to whether colleges and universities are
considered places of public accommodation under federal law. See Op. Att’y Gen.. 2022 WL 20471449 (S.C.A.G.
June 28, 2022) (stating “it is the general policy of this Office not to opine on issues involving federal law.”).

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 7
January 3 1 , 2024

Whereas, there is an increasing number of occurrences in which people exploit
the confusion related to service animals and attempt to bring an animal into a
place that it would otherwise not be allowed to enter by passing off the pet,
therapy animal, or emotional support animal as a service animal, either by oral
misrepresentation, placement of a vest or other marking on the animal, or

presentation of a "certificate", despite knowing that it is not a service animal;
and

Whereas, some companies mislead individuals into believing that they will be
entitled to the rights or privileges for individuals with disabilities with service
animals if they buy the company's vests or obtain some type of certificate. These
misrepresentations, in some cases, are unlawful deceptive trade practices and
compound the confusion around service animals; and
Whereas, commendably, federal and state laws require places of public
accommodation, including airports, restaurants, theaters, stores, hospitals, and

more, to allow any animal that is presented as a service animal into the place of
public accommodation. These same places of public accommodation face a
dilemma if someone enters the premises and intentionally misrepresents his

animal as a service animal; and

Whereas, when people try to falsely represent a nonservice animal as a service
animal, business owners and other places of public accommodation become
increasingly distrustful that the animals being represented to them as service
animals are, in fact, service animals. Misrepresentation of service animals
delegitimizes the program and makes it harder for persons with disabilities to
gain unquestioned acceptance of their legitimate, properly trained, and essential
service animals.

2019 S.C. Acts 44. Accordingly, the Legislature enacted section 47-3-980 of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 2023) making it unlawful to misrepresent an animal as a service animal. Subsection
(C) of this provision states: “Inquiries made in order to investigate and enforce the provisions of
this section are limited to those inquiries allowed by the Department of Justice pursuant to 28
C.F.R. Section 36.302.” S.C. Ann. § 47-3-980(C). The federal regulation referred to in section

47-3-980(c) prohibits inquiry into “the nature or extent of a person’s disability . . . .” 28 C.F.R.
Section 36.302. But this regulation allows public accommodations to make two inquiries to
determine whether an animal qualifies as a service animal. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302. “A public
accommodation may ask if the animal is required because of a disability and what work or task
the animal has been trained to perform.” Id. However, this regulation does not address inquiries
for service animals-in-training as service animals-in-training are not currently addressed under
federal law. Additionally, applying these inquiries to a service animal-in-training would not make
sense as these animals are neither required because of a disability nor are they performing tasks
for their trainers.

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 8
January 31, 2024

The preamble to the 2019 amendments to Layla’s Law clearly shows the Legislature’s intent to
prevent people from passing off pets as service animals. See Watson v. Sellers, 299 S.C. 426, 436,
385 S.E.2d 369, 374 (Ct. App. 1989) (determining the preamble of an act can provide evidence of
legislative intent). As such, we believe the Legislature intended to allow public facilities and
accommodations, which are mandated under section 43-33-20(d) to allow access to trainers of
assistance and guide dogs, to make inquiries to determine their right to access. Therefore, we
presume at a minimum these facilities may ask questions pertaining to the animal’s status as an
assistance or guide dog-in-training. Moreover, we find no limitations on the scope of any
additional inquiries regarding assistance or guide dogs-in-training.

As to whether Clemson may impose other regulations such as age limits, verification or training,
and registration is unclear. We appreciate Clemson’s need to control what animals may be
considered service animals-in-training to prevent unauthorized access. However, in our review of
both section 43-33-20 and Layla’s Law, we did not find authority to impose particular
requirements on service animals-in-training. As noted above, federal regulations prohibit a public
accommodation from requiring documentation, “such as proof that the animal has been certified,

trained, or licensed as a service animal.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302. Nonetheless, because service
animals-in-training are not protected under federal law, we believe the Legislature can and should
clarify this issue.
Conclusion

Based on our analysis above, we are of the opinion that in order for a trainer of an assistance or
guide dog to receive the same protections afforded to disabled persons regarding the right to use
public facilities, they must be training the dog to perform tasks for blind or disabled persons.

Therefore, we do not believe general obedience or house training qualify as the type of training by
which such protections can be afforded to a trainer under South Carolina Law. We also do not
believe colleges and universities as a whole are considered “places of public accommodation”

under South Carolina Law. However, some facilities contained on college or university campuses
may be considered places of public accommodation, therefore entitling blind and physically
disabled persons, as well as trainers of assistance or guide dogs, to access.

You also ask about whether Clemson may require trainers to verily that dogs are assistance or
guide dogs in training and what regulations it may impose on access given to service animals-intraining. Companion legislation affording protections to guide dogs and services animals prevents
misrepresenting an animal as a service animal and permits inquiries allowed under federal law to

make this determination. However, because service animals-in-training are not protected under
federal law, we do not believe a facility is limited to these inquiries. As such, we presume a facility
may make such inquiries it deems necessary in order to determine whether an animal is in fact a
service animal-in-training. However, the Legislature did not give authority to facilities to add

W.C. Hood, Jr., Esq.
Page 9
January 31, 2024

additional

requirements

for

service

animal-in-training,

Therefore,

clarification is needed to allow for these requirements.

Sincerely,

Cydney Milling

Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General

we

believe

legislative