Can a New York court security officer or marine patrol officer (both peace officers) detain or arrest someone they know has an outstanding arrest warrant, even though peace officers can't execute warrants?

Plain-English summary

Yates County employed court security officers and marine patrol officers through the Sheriff's Office. Both are statutorily classified as "peace officers" under the Criminal Procedure Law (court officers under § 2.10(21)(a), marine patrol under § 2.10(70)). Sometimes those officers spotted someone with an outstanding arrest warrant: a person being processed through court, or a boater at the lake. The County's standing instruction was to call law enforcement headquarters and let a police officer make the arrest. The problem was that the wanted person might try to leave before the police arrived. The County Attorney asked: can the peace officer (1) physically detain the person until police arrive, and (2) actually make the arrest themselves?

The AG worked through two distinct legal pieces.

Detention: yes. Penal Law § 35.30(1) authorizes a peace officer to use physical force to effect or attempt an arrest, or to prevent escape, of a person the officer reasonably believes committed an offense. The AG read knowledge of a valid outstanding arrest warrant as meeting the "reasonable belief" standard: a magistrate has already found reasonable cause before issuing the warrant, and a peace officer who knows about the warrant can rely on that determination. The opinion analogized to People v. Borrero, 118 A.D.2d 345 (1st Dep't 1986), where the First Department upheld a drugstore security guard's use of force to detain a suspect for police arrival. If a private security guard has that authority under Penal Law § 35.30(4), a peace officer has at least that much. So a peace officer who learns of an outstanding warrant in the course of their special duties may physically restrain the wanted person until police arrive, using the minimum force necessary.

The AG cautioned that the line between brief detention and arrest is fine. A long detention or excessive force can convert detention into arrest, and a peace officer without arrest authority for the underlying offense should keep detention short and minimal.

Arrest: yes, but only sometimes. Peace officers generally cannot execute arrest warrants. Criminal Procedure Law § 120.50 specifies who an arrest warrant may be addressed to, and § 120.60 specifies who can execute one; peace officers are not in those lists. A practice commentary by Peter Preiser says it bluntly: "Peace officers . . . cannot receive delegated authority to execute New York warrants." So a peace officer who finds out about a warrant cannot just go arrest the person under the warrant's authority.

But peace officers are authorized to make warrantless arrests for certain offenses under Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25 when they have reasonable cause to believe the person committed the offense, even if the offense was not committed in their presence. The AG concluded that knowledge of a valid outstanding arrest warrant supplies "reasonable cause," because reasonable cause and probable cause are synonymous (People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631 (1995)), and police officers can make arrests based on warrant knowledge (People v. Reddick, 265 A.D.2d 855 (4th Dep't 1999)). It would make no sense to let a peace officer arrest based on a citizen informant's tip but not on a magistrate's finding.

The narrowing limit is the scope of § 140.25 itself. A peace officer who did not personally observe the offense can make a warrantless arrest only for two kinds of "qualifying offenses": (a) misdemeanors or felonies that the officer is authorized or required to enforce as part of the officer's special duties, or any offense committed in a manner or place that makes the arrest an integral part of the officer's specialized duties (§ 140.25(1)(b), (2)); or (b) any felony committed within the officer's geographic area of employment (§ 140.25(3)(b)). Most ordinary offenses underlying a routine warrant will not fit. A court security officer cannot arrest someone for an unpaid-trash-ticket warrant. A marine patrol officer cannot arrest someone for an old DWI warrant from a different county. So even though the officer has reasonable cause via warrant knowledge, the arrest is only authorized if the underlying offense is a qualifying offense.

The execution-vs-probable-cause distinction. The AG was careful to distinguish "arrest using the warrant" (which peace officers cannot do) from "arrest based on probable cause that happens to come from warrant knowledge" (which they sometimes can do). The case law turns on how the officer encountered the wanted person. If the officer was performing their special duties, validly contacted the person for an independent reason, and then learned of the warrant (for example, through a check during the encounter), the resulting arrest can be analyzed as probable-cause arrest, not warrant execution. People v. Gulley, 809 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 2005), takes that view. If the officer was hunting for the person solely based on warrant knowledge, the officer is effectively executing the warrant, which peace officers cannot do. People v. Ebron, 275 A.D.2d 490 (3d Dep't 2000), illustrates the warrant-execution side.

Practical bottom line. The AG repeatedly recommended the "safer course": detain pending police arrival, alert police, and let them make the arrest. The peace officer's detention authority is robust and easy to apply. The arrest authority is technical, depends on the underlying offense, and risks the arrest being deemed an unauthorized warrant execution. Most of the time, calling police and physically detaining the person until they arrive is both legally cleaner and operationally sufficient.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2007. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Can a court officer detain someone in the courthouse with an unrelated arrest warrant?
Under the 2007 reading, yes, if the officer learned of the warrant in the course of court-security duties. The officer should hold the person until a police officer arrives, using minimum force, and avoid a lengthy detention.

Can a marine patrol officer arrest a boater for a felony warrant from another county?
Section 140.25(3)(b) allows a peace officer to arrest for a felony committed within the officer's geographic area, regardless of whether the special-duties test is met. If the underlying offense is a felony in another county, that section does not authorize the marine patrol officer to arrest, but they can still detain and call police.

What if the warrant is invalid or has already been executed?
A peace officer's good-faith belief in the warrant does not validate the arrest if the warrant was already executed, vacated, or otherwise invalid. People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981), and People v. Lent, 92 A.D.2d 941 (2d Dep't 1983), are the controlling cases.

What is a "qualifying offense" for a court security officer?
The opinion does not catalogue them. The test is whether the offense falls within "the specialized nature of the officer's particular employment" or whether the place and manner of the offense make the arrest "an integral part" of the specialized duties. Courthouse-related crimes (assault on a juror or judge, contempt-related disorderly conduct, weapons in the courthouse) fit most easily. Most other offenses do not.

Can a peace officer chase a fleeing suspect outside their work area?
The opinion does not address pursuit outside the geographic area. The general rule under § 140.25(5)(b) limits peace-officer arrest authority to the geographic area of employment for felony arrests under § 140.25(3)(b). Fresh-pursuit doctrines and specific statutes for particular peace-officer categories could expand that.

Background and statutory framework

New York's Criminal Procedure Law draws a careful line between police officers (general law-enforcement personnel, defined at § 1.20(34)) and peace officers (specialized law-enforcement personnel, listed at § 2.10). Peace officers exercise their powers "pursuant to their special duties," § 2.20, § 140.25. They are not general-purpose police.

Penal Law § 35.30 authorizes peace officers (and citizens, for related purposes) to use physical force when reasonably believed necessary to effect arrest or prevent escape of a person reasonably believed to have committed an offense. Borrero (1986) is the leading civilian-detention case interpreting the parallel citizen-arrest provision; the 2007 opinion uses it as a structural floor for peace-officer detention authority.

Arrest warrant execution is governed by Criminal Procedure Law §§ 120.50 (addressees) and 120.60 (who can execute). Peace officers are not in either list (with narrow exceptions, like the § 120.55 authority for parole/probation officers in specific contexts).

Warrantless arrest authority for peace officers is in Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25, which divides into special-duties arrests (§ 140.25(1) and (2)) and felony-within-geographic-area arrests (§ 140.25(3)). The reasonable-cause standard is the same as for police officers (§ 70.10(2), § 140.10).

The execution-vs-probable-cause distinction in Gulley and Ebron gives police and peace officers a roadmap. Police can clearly use either route. Peace officers can use the probable-cause route only when the underlying offense qualifies, and even then only when they were already performing special duties when they learned of the warrant.

Citations

• Criminal Procedure Law §§ 1.20, 1.20(34) (police officer definition); 2.10 (peace officer list); 2.10(21)(a) (uniformed court officers); 2.10(70) (Yates County marine patrol officers); 2.20, 2.20(1)(a)-(b) (peace-officer powers).
• Criminal Procedure Law §§ 70.10(2), 120.20(2) (reasonable cause; magistrate finding for warrant); 120.50 (addressees of arrest warrant); 120.55 (parole/probation officers); 120.60 (who can execute arrest warrants); 140.10 (police-officer warrantless arrest); 140.25, including subsections (1), (1)(a), (1)(b), (2), (3), (3)(a), (3)(b), (4), (5)(b) (peace-officer warrantless arrest).
• Penal Law § 10.00(6) (crime = misdemeanor or felony); § 35.30, § 35.30(1) (peace-officer force); § 35.30(4) (citizen force).
• People v. Borrero, 118 A.D.2d 345 (1st Dep't 1986) (citizen-detention authority under § 35.30(4)).
• People v. Karp, 158 A.D.2d 378 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 76 N.Y.2d 1006 (1990) (force to halt fleeing suspect under § 35.30).
• People v. Rivera, 210 A.D.2d 895 (4th Dep't 1994) (citizen informant reliability for probable cause).
• People v. Reddick, 265 A.D.2d 855 (4th Dep't 1999) (police officer's knowledge of outstanding warrant supplies probable cause).
• People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631 (1995) (reasonable cause and probable cause synonymous).
• People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981); People v. Lent, 92 A.D.2d 941 (2d Dep't 1983) (already-executed or vacated warrant does not support arrest).
• People v. Hartman, 114 Misc. 2d 138 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Co. 1982) (railroad police officer cannot arrest for car-horn violation outside special duties).
• People v. Gulley, 809 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 2005); People v. Cherry, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3615 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006) (probable-cause-via-warrant arrest after valid stop).
• People v. Ebron, 275 A.D.2d 490 (3d Dep't 2000) (arrest characterized as warrant execution where officer approached defendant solely to execute warrant).
• United States v. Miller, 382 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (distinguishing probable-cause arrest from warrant execution).
• Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries to CPL § 2.10, § 2.20, § 120.60, § 140.25; Joseph W. Bellacosa, Practice Commentaries to CPL § 1.20.

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_2007-7_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

Criminal Procedure Law §§ 1.20, 1.20(34), 2.10, 2.10(21)(a), 2.10(70), 2.20, 2.20(1)(a), 2.20(1)(b), 70.10(2), 120.20(2), 120.50, 120.60, 120.55, 140.10, 140.25, 140.25(1), 140.25(1)(a), 140.25(1)(b), 140.25(2), 140.25(3), 140.25(3)(a), 140.25(3)(b), 140.25(4), 140.25(5)(b); Penal Law §§ 10.00(6), 35.30, 35.30(1), 35.30(4), 350

A peace officer who becomes aware of an outstanding arrest warrant through the performance of his special duties may physically detain the subject of the warrant pending arrival of a police officer to make the arrest if the subject of the warrant tries to leave. A peace officer may make a warrantless arrest based upon knowledge of an outstanding arrest warrant for a qualifying offense when the peace officer learns of the outstanding warrant through the performance of his special duties.

December 17, 2007

Bernetta A. Bourcy
County Attorney
Yates County
415 Liberty Street
Suite 204
Penn Yan, New York 14527

Informal Opinion No. 2007-8

Dear Ms. Bourcy:

You have requested an opinion regarding the authority of certain peace officers to (1) physically restrain a person against whom the peace officer knows an arrest warrant is outstanding until a police officer arrives to make the arrest, and (2) make a warrantless arrest of such a person. As explained more fully below, although not free from doubt, we are of the opinion that when a peace officer becomes aware of an outstanding warrant through the performance of his special duties, he may physically detain such person pending arrival of a police officer, and that in some, but not all, instances, a peace officer may properly make an arrest based on knowledge of the outstanding warrant.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

You have explained that Yates County employs, through the Sheriff's Office, court security officers and marine patrol officers. You have advised that these employees are peace officers under the Criminal Procedure Law. See id. § 2.10(21)(a) (uniformed court officers of the unified court system) and (70) (employees appointed by the sheriff of Yates County, pursuant to their special duties serving as uniformed marine patrol officers). In the past, the County has instructed these peace officers to contact law enforcement headquarters in the event they observe a person against whom they know an arrest warrant has been issued; a police officer will be sent to make the arrest. The person against whom the warrant is outstanding may, however, try to leave the courthouse or the waterside. Thus you ask whether the peace officer may take either of the suggested actions to prevent the person from leaving. We assume that the peace officer would have no independent information other than the existence of the arrest warrant that would allow him to physically detain or arrest the person; thus, the detention would be solely based on knowledge of the outstanding warrant.

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Peace officers and police officers are statutorily distinct groups of law enforcement officers. Compare Criminal Procedure Law § 2.10 (officers defined as peace officers) with id. § 1.20(34) (officers defined as police officers). Peace officers are responsible for law enforcement in a particular area, they are "official[s] who perform a law enforcement function for an agency that does not have policing as its central mission." Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries to Criminal Procedure Law § 2.10, 11A McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 69 (2003). Exercise of nearly all of the powers of peace officers is explicitly limited to when they are "acting pursuant to their special duties." Criminal Procedure Law §§ 2.20, 140.25; see also Joseph W. Bellacosa, Practice Commentaries to Criminal Procedure Law § 2.20, 11A McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 56 (1981) ("It is clearly [not] permissible to act, other than in the specified and inherent duties of the office held and at those appropriate times."). In contrast, police officers perform general law enforcement functions. See generally Joseph W. Bellacosa, Practice Commentaries to Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20, 11A McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 29 (1981) (under Criminal Procedure Law, police officers are accorded primary, and often exclusive, power and obligation with respect to matters involving enforcement of criminal law).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Authority to Physically Detain

You have asked whether a peace officer may physically detain a person against whom he knows a warrant is outstanding pending the arrival of a police officer to make the arrest. Although not free from doubt, we believe that the peace officer who becomes aware of an outstanding arrest warrant through the performance of his special duties may physically detain the subject of the warrant pending arrival of a police officer to make the arrest if the subject of the warrant tries to leave.

Peace officers are expressly authorized to use physical force to effect an arrest or prevent an escape pursuant to Penal Law § 35.30. Criminal Procedure Law § 2.20(1)(b). Section 35.30 of the Penal Law provides that a peace officer,

in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest, or of preventing or attempting to prevent the escape from custody, of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody . . . .

Penal Law § 35.30(1). Comparable language applying to citizens found in Penal Law § 35.30(4) has been interpreted to authorize a citizen to use force to prevent a person who committed an offense from leaving the scene pending the arrival of a police officer. In People v. Borrero, 118 A.D.2d 345 (1st Dep't 1986), the court upheld the authority of a drugstore security guard to detain a person who had drawn a gun and made threats with it, until a police officer arrived to make the arrest. In that case, the detention resulted in a confrontation in which the detained person died. The court reversed the conviction of the security guard for criminally negligent homicide, on the ground that the guard was acting within his lawful authority under Penal Law § 35.30(4) to use ordinary physical force to the extent necessary to facilitate the arrest of the detained person by a police officer or to prevent his escape. The court found that the guard had

left the store for the specific purpose of effecting Johnson's arrest. According to [the guard], he had seen a policeman pass by only a few minutes earlier . . . . Therefore, when [the guard] went outside, it was his intention to find the police officer or else to detain Johnson until the arrival of the police summoned by the druggist. Under Penal Law § 35.30(4), [the guard] had the authority to use ordinary physical force to the extent necessary to arrest Johnson or prevent his escape.

Id. at 350. See also People v. Karp, 158 A.D.2d 378, 381 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 76 N.Y.2d 1006 (1990) (force designed to halt flight of suspect and secure his apprehension falls squarely within purview of Penal Law § 35.30). If a security guard who is not a peace officer has the authority to detain a person for arrest by a police officer, a peace officer has no less authority to do the same.

The peace officer must "reasonably believe" that the subject of the physical detention committed an offense. Penal Law § 35.30. This standard is, in our opinion, met by the peace officer's knowledge of the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. An arrest warrant is issued upon a finding by an impartial magistrate that reasonable cause exists to believe that the subject of the warrant committed an offense charged. Criminal Procedure Law § 120.20(2). We believe that a peace officer who has knowledge of the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant, relying on the reasonable cause determination by the magistrate, would reasonably believe that the subject of the warrant has committed an offense.

Therefore, applying Penal Law § 35.30 as interpreted by the Borrero court, we believe that a peace officer is justified in using the degree of physical force he reasonably believes necessary to prevent the subject of the warrant from leaving pending the arrival of a police officer to make the arrest.

We note that, except in circumstances where the peace officer is authorized to make an arrest, as discussed below, it is necessary that the peace officer merely detain and not in fact make an arrest. Because the line between temporary detention and arrest can be a fine one, a peace officer exercising the power to detain should avoid a lengthy period of detention and should use the minimum force necessary.

As we explain below, we believe that knowledge of the existence of the outstanding warrant would provide probable cause for a peace officer to make an arrest, but a peace officer does not have the authority to make an arrest in all instances. Thus, the safer course may well be for a peace officer who comes across a person against whom an arrest warrant is outstanding to physically detain the person if he tries to leave, to alert police officers, and to leave the arrest for them.

B. Authority to Arrest

As explained below, we believe that a peace officer may, in some instances, arrest a person against whom a warrant is outstanding, based on knowledge of the existence of the warrant.

The legal question arises because peace officers generally lack authority to execute an arrest warrant. See Criminal Procedure Law § 120.50 (specifying the officers to whom an arrest warrant may be addressed); id. § 120.60 (specifying the police officers who may execute an arrest warrant); Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries to Criminal Procedure Law § 120.60, 11A McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 507 (2004) ("Peace officers . . . cannot receive delegated authority to execute New York warrants.").

Peace officers are, however, authorized to make warrantless arrests for certain offenses when they have "reasonable cause to believe" that a particular person has committed such an offense. Criminal Procedure Law § 2.20(1)(a); id. § 140.25. The offense need not be committed in the peace officer's presence, see id. § 140.25(1)(b), (3)(b), and thus the peace officer necessarily is authorized to make a warrantless arrest based on information obtained by other than his observation of the commission of the offense. This information could be provided to the peace officer by another person, such as a reliable citizen informant. See People v. Rivera, 210 A.D.2d 895 (4th Dep't 1994) (identified citizen informant is presumed to be reliable source of information upon which to base probable cause for arrest). Logically, if a peace officer may rely on information provided by a citizen to make the determination himself that reasonable cause to arrest exists, he should be able to make an arrest based on knowledge that an impartial magistrate determined reasonable cause before issuing the arrest warrant.

Considering these two sources of authority, we conclude that the better answer is that a peace officer may make an arrest based on knowledge of an outstanding arrest warrant under certain circumstances described below, in which there is an appropriate connection to the special duties of the peace officer.

Police officers who rely on knowledge of a valid outstanding arrest warrant have reasonable cause to make an arrest. See People v. Reddick, 265 A.D.2d 855 (4th Dep't 1999) ("When the [police] officer learned of the existence of the outstanding warrant, he had probable cause to arrest defendant."). We believe that a peace officer may similarly rely on knowledge of an outstanding warrant to provide reasonable cause to make the arrest. The "reasonable cause" standard applies to arrests made by both police officers and peace officers. Compare Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25(1), (3) (peace officers) with id. § 140.10(1) (police officers); see id. § 70.10(2) (definition of "reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense" applicable to Criminal Procedure Law). Moreover, to conclude otherwise would lead to the absurd result of a peace officer being able to rely on information provided by a reliable citizen but not being able to rely on knowledge that an independent magistrate determined that reasonable cause to arrest existed. We therefore conclude that knowledge of the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant may provide a peace officer with reasonable cause to make an arrest.

This is not, however, the end of the inquiry. While a peace officer might have reasonable cause to make an arrest, he is not authorized to execute an arrest warrant, and he is authorized to make a warrantless arrest only in the situations specified in Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25. We put to one side a peace officer's authority to make an arrest for an offense committed in his presence, see Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25(1)(a), (3)(a), and (4), and consider only those provisions that authorize an arrest on reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a crime, namely Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25(1)(b) and (3)(b).

Section 140.25(1)(b) provides that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant for a crime when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, so long as the peace officer is acting "pursuant to his special duties." According to section 140.25, a peace officer acts pursuant to his special duties in making an arrest either when the arrest is for (1) an offense defined by a statute that the peace officer, by reason of the specialized nature of his particular employment or by express provision of law, is required or authorized to enforce, or (2) an offense committed or reasonably believed by him to have been committed in such manner or place as to render arrest of the offender by such peace officer under the particular circumstances an integral part of his specialized duties. Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25(2). Thus, to determine whether a particular peace officer may make a particular warrantless arrest under this provision, it is generally necessary to consult the legal authority that authorizes employment of the peace officer to determine whether "the offense falls within the specialized nature of the officer's employment or is one which by express provision of law the officer is authorized or required to enforce." Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries to Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25, 11A McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 328 (2004).

Section 140.25(3)(b) provides that a peace officer, whether or not he is acting pursuant to his special duties, may arrest a person for a felony when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed the felony within the geographical area of the peace officer's employment.

In sum, the offenses for which a peace officer may make an arrest, when the offense was not committed in his presence, are limited to (1) misdemeanors or felonies proscribed by laws the enforcement of which come within the peace officer's special duties, and (2) felonies committed within the peace officer's geographical area of employment, which in this case appears to be the County, see Criminal Procedure Law § 140.25(5)(b). We will refer to these hereinafter as "qualifying offenses." Therefore, even when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that an offense was committed, the peace officer must determine that the offense underlying the warrant was an offense for which he may properly make an arrest.

Finally, because peace officers are generally not authorized to execute arrest warrants, as discussed above, it is necessary to distinguish between relying on the warrant for probable cause, which is permissible, and executing the warrant, which is not. We believe the distinction may turn on the manner in which the peace officer becomes aware of the outstanding warrant. We distinguish between, for example, the peace officer who, while performing his special duties, validly stops a person and then discovers, through a computer check, that a warrant is outstanding, and the peace officer who is given a list of people against whom warrants are outstanding and is told to look for those people (unless, of course, the special duties of the peace officer authorize such seeking-out).

We believe that in the first instance, because the peace officer has an independent basis for approaching a person in the performance of his special duties, becomes aware of the outstanding warrant through the performance of his special duties, and the arrest flows from the performance of those duties, this peace officer would not be considered to be executing the arrest warrant. While we are not aware of this precise point having been judicially determined, language used by courts suggests the distinction. For example, in People v. Gulley, 809 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 2005), a police officer validly stopped the defendant to issue a summons for an administrative code violation. During the stop, the police officer discovered an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest. The court determined that at that point the police possessed probable cause to arrest him. The validity of the arrest based on the warrant was described in terms of the arresting officer's probable cause, rather than in terms of executing the outstanding warrant. See also People v. Cherry, 2006 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 3615 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006) (police lawfully requested information from defendant; his responses permitted the police to detain defendant and authenticate his identification; once they discovered an outstanding warrant, they had probable cause to arrest).

In the second instance, however, the peace officer has no basis for approaching the person other than knowledge of the outstanding warrant. Under these circumstances, we believe that the peace officer could reasonably be viewed to be executing the arrest warrant. Language in People v. Ebron, 275 A.D.2d 490 (3d Dep't 2000), lends support to this conclusion. In Ebron, a police officer was informed by a colleague that an arrest warrant had been issued for the defendant's arrest. The police officer, who already knew the defendant, saw the defendant during his patrol. He approached the defendant, confirmed the defendant's identity, and informed him of the outstanding warrant. After verifying with his colleagues the validity of the warrant, the police officer arrested the defendant. In upholding the validity of the arrest, the court stated, "This case does not involve a warrantless police-initiated street encounter with a citizen which would necessitate consideration of the De Bour factors [citation omitted]. Rather, in this case, the arresting officer approached defendant to execute a concededly valid arrest warrant." 275 A.D.2d at 491 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Miller, 382 F. Supp. 2d 350, 369, n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (distinguishing between valid arrest made with probable cause based on outstanding warrant and delegation of power to execute outstanding warrant). Under these circumstances, we believe that the peace officer would be performing general law enforcement duties, a responsibility of police, rather than peace, officers.

In sum, we conclude that a peace officer may make a warrantless arrest based upon knowledge of an outstanding arrest warrant for a qualifying offense when the peace officer learns of the outstanding warrant through the performance of his special duties. We recognize that the limitations on the authority to arrest described above may result in an impracticable standard for particular types of peace officers to use. As we explained above, we believe that knowledge of the existence of the outstanding warrant would provide sufficient basis for a peace officer to physically detain the subject of a warrant, regardless of whether the underlying offense is a qualifying offense or not, pending the arrival of a police officer to make an arrest. Thus, the simpler course may well be for a peace officer who, through the performance of his special duties, comes across a person against whom an arrest warrant is outstanding to physically detain the person if he tries to leave and to alert police officers and allow the arrest to be made by them.

Therefore, in response to your inquiry, we conclude that in those instances where a peace officer becomes aware of an outstanding warrant through the performance of his special duties, he may physically detain such person pending arrival of a police officer. We further conclude that in some, but not all, instances, a peace officer may properly make an arrest based on knowledge of the outstanding warrant.

The Attorney General issues formal opinions only to officers and departments of state government. Thus, this is an informal opinion rendered to assist you in advising the municipality you represent.

Very truly yours,

KATHRYN SHEINGOLD
Assistant Solicitor General
In Charge of Opinions