Who has authority to prosecute someone whose dog attacked a person under New York's dangerous-dog law: the town attorney, the district attorney, or anyone? And can the dog-bite victim get money damages in that proceeding?

Plain-English summary

The Town of Lansing's law firm (Thaler & Thaler) had four questions about enforcing New York's dangerous-dog laws and the town's own Dog Control Ordinance. The Agriculture and Markets Law (Article 7) provides both civil and criminal remedies for dog-related offenses; the Town of Lansing's local ordinance provides only criminal penalties. The questions split along that civil-criminal line.

First, can Thaler & Thaler, as town attorneys, represent the Town in civil and criminal Agriculture and Markets § 121 proceedings? Civil, yes. Town Law § 65(1) authorizes the town board to direct the town attorney to appear in any proceeding in the town's name, and Town Law § 20(2) authorizes the office of town attorney itself. So in civil dangerous-dog matters seeking civil penalties under § 119(2)(b), the town attorney is the appropriate counsel. Criminal, no, unless the district attorney authorizes it. County Law § 700 requires the district attorney to prosecute all crimes and offenses in the county. Under Soddano and People v. Van Sickle, the district attorney can consent to municipal or private attorneys handling specific offenses, but cannot delegate the ultimate, non-delegable responsibility. Without that consent, a town attorney cannot prosecute the criminal violations.

Second, can Thaler & Thaler prosecute violations of the Town's Dog Control Ordinance? Same answer. The town ordinance creates only criminal penalties (treated as "violations" under Penal Law § 10.00(3)). Criminal proceedings need DA authorization regardless of the source of the criminal offense.

Third, can the town intervene in a § 121 dangerous-dog proceeding brought by a private citizen? Yes, with the court's leave. A § 121 proceeding is a special proceeding because it requires expedited adjudication (probable cause immediately, hearing within five days). CPLR § 401 governs intervention in special proceedings and requires leave of court. So the town may apply to intervene; whether the court grants leave depends on the case.

Fourth, can the town justice order the dog owner to pay restitution or reparations to a dog-attack victim? Yes. AML § 121(12) expressly preserves any common-law or statutory claims the victim may have, so a court hearing a § 121 proceeding can order such relief through those preserved remedies. In criminal cases, Penal Law § 60.27(1) requires the court to consider restitution and authorizes restitution as part of the sentence. AML § 125 also has its own restitution mechanism for dog damage to domestic animals, including reimbursement of the county for indemnification it paid.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

New York's dog-control framework in Agriculture and Markets Law Article 7 was substantially revised in 2010, and some of the specific section numbers and procedures have changed since 2005. Anyone advising a town on dangerous-dog enforcement today should consult the current Article 7 text, the relevant county DA's standing authorizations, and current court rules.

Common questions

Q: Who is the right lawyer to bring a dangerous-dog case to court?
A: It depends on whether you're seeking civil penalties or criminal sanctions. The town's dog control officer can commence either kind of action under § 119 (and § 121 for dangerous dogs). The town's lawyer can appear and prosecute in civil matters. Criminal matters require the district attorney or a person duly authorized by the district attorney.

Q: Can a private dog-attack victim bring the case themselves?
A: Yes. AML § 121 lets "any person" file a complaint about a dangerous dog. The statute defines "person" broadly to include individuals, corporations, partnerships, and municipalities. So the victim, or a neighbor, can commence a proceeding without waiting for a dog control officer or town attorney. The court must hold a hearing within five days.

Q: What is a "dangerous dog"?
A: AML § 108(24), as of 2005, defined a dangerous dog as one that "(a) without justification attacks a person and causes physical injury or death, or (b) poses a serious and unjustified imminent threat of harm to one or more persons, or (c) without justification attacks a service dog, guide dog or hearing dog and causes physical injury or death."

Q: How fast does a dangerous-dog hearing have to happen?
A: AML § 121 set up expedited procedures. The court has to determine "immediately" whether there is probable cause to believe the dog is dangerous (and if so, must order seizure). Then the court has to hold a hearing within five days after the complaint is filed, on at least two days' written notice to the dog's owner.

Q: Can the dog-attack victim get money damages out of the proceeding?
A: Yes. AML § 121(12) preserves any common-law or statutory claims the victim has; civil damages can be sought through those preserved remedies. In a criminal proceeding, Penal Law § 60.27(1) requires the sentencing court to consider restitution and authorizes restitution for "the actual out-of-pocket loss caused" by the offense. AML § 125 has its own framework for dog damage to domestic animals, with the county indemnifying and the dog owner reimbursing the county.

Q: Can a town pass its own dog ordinance?
A: Yes, within limits. AML § 124(1) authorizes a municipality to enact a local law or ordinance "upon the keeping or running at large of dogs and the seizure thereof," but the municipality cannot vary the provisions on identification, licensing, rabies vaccination, or euthanization. AML § 107(5) lets the town adopt its own dangerous-dog program if it's at least as strict as Article 7 and doesn't regulate by breed.

Q: What if the town's ordinance only has criminal penalties, not civil?
A: Then every enforcement is a criminal matter and the town needs DA authorization. The Town of Lansing's situation in 2005 was exactly this: its ordinance § 8 imposed only criminal fines and short jail terms, so the town attorney could not prosecute without DA authority. The Court of Appeals' rule in Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 53-54 (1983), limits how much of that responsibility the DA can delegate.

Q: When does it make sense for a town to intervene in a private dangerous-dog case?
A: When the town has its own interest at stake, like resources committed to seizure or impoundment, future enforcement concerns, or risk that the resolution will affect other dogs in town. The town would apply to the court under CPLR § 401 for leave to intervene, supported by an affidavit explaining the town's interest. The decision is the court's.

Background and statutory framework

Agriculture and Markets Law Article 7 (sections 106 through 130 in the 2005 version) provides the statewide framework for dog licensing, identification, and population control, and protection of "persons, property, domestic animals and deer from dog attack and damage" (§ 106). The framework gives dog control officers a duty to enforce eight statutory requirements when a dog owner violates them (§ 119(1)-(2)). Section 121 specifically addresses dangerous dogs.

Civil-criminal choice. Section 119(2) lets a municipality pick its enforcement path. Civil penalties tier from $25 (first offense in five years) to $100 (third offense). Criminal prosecutions under the Penal Law follow the same tier for fines but operate as criminal offenses subject to the Criminal Procedure Law. Section 121 layers additional civil penalties on dog-bite cases and exposes owners to misdemeanor liability under §§ 121(7)-(10) for certain acts and omissions.

The "violation" mechanism. The Penal Law treats "violations" (Penal Law § 10.00(3)) as offenses, defined in § 10.00(1) as "conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any law of this state or by any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state." So a local dog-control ordinance imposing fines and jail time creates "violations" under the Penal Law. Once you're in the Penal Law's violation category, you're in the Criminal Procedure Law's prosecutorial framework (CPL §§ 1.20(39), 10.10, 10.30).

District attorney's role. County Law § 700(1) gives the DA the duty to prosecute all crimes and offenses in the county. Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 53-54 (1983), and Soddano limit how much the DA can delegate; the DA must retain "ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting all crimes and offenses." But the DA can consent to municipal or private attorneys handling specific petty offenses, as long as the DA keeps awareness of all prosecutions. People v. Van Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61, 62-63 (1963), is the classic statement: the DA "must set up a system whereby he knows of all the criminal prosecutions in his county and either appears therein in person or by assistant or consents to appearance on his behalf by other public officers or private attorneys." Prior AG opinions have applied the same rule to county attorneys prosecuting mechanical-trade laws (Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 98-14), village attorneys prosecuting local laws (Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 97-52), and town attorneys prosecuting GML § 136 violations (Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 90-8).

Town attorney authority. Town Law § 20(2) authorizes a town board to establish the office of town attorney or employ counsel. Town Law § 65(1) authorizes the town board to direct any town officer to institute or appear in any action or proceeding in the town's name. Those two provisions together give the town attorney civil-side authority. Criminal authority is limited by the DA-supervision framework.

Special proceedings and intervention. A § 121 proceeding is a special proceeding because it requires expedited adjudication. David D. Siegel's New York Practice § 547 characterizes it as such. CPLR § 401 governs intervention in special proceedings and requires court leave. So the town can apply to intervene in a private § 121 case, and the court decides on the showing.

Restitution. AML § 121(12) preserves claims and remedies, so civil restitution from any preserved common-law or statutory claim is available. Penal Law § 60.27(1) and § 60.00(1) extend Penal Law restitution rules to offenses defined outside the Penal Law, including AML violations. AML § 125 supplies a separate restitution framework for dog damage to domestic animals.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Agriculture and Markets Law art. 7 (dog control framework)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 106 (purpose)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 107 (state functions)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5) (municipal dangerous-dog programs)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 108 (definitions)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 108(17) (definition of "person")
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 108(24) (definition of "dangerous dog")
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 119 (dog control officer duties)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 119(1) (eight enumerated violations)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 119(2) (civil-criminal election; penalty tiers)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 121 (dangerous dog proceedings)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 121(3), (4) (commencement and hearing requirements)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 121(7)-(10) (penalties for serious offenses)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 121(12) (preservation of other remedies)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 124 (municipal authority to regulate)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 124(1) (limits on municipal regulation)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 124(2) (civil or criminal penalties)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 125 (damage to domestic animals)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 125(1) (county indemnification)
• Agriculture and Markets Law § 125(3) (owner reimbursement to county)
• County Law § 700(1) (district attorney's prosecution duty)
• Civil Practice Law and Rules § 401 (intervention in special proceedings)
• Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20(39) (definition)
• Criminal Procedure Law § 10.10 (criminal courts)
• Criminal Procedure Law § 10.30 (local criminal courts)
• Penal Law § 10.00 (definitions)
• Penal Law § 10.00(1) (offense)
• Penal Law § 10.00(3) (violation)
• Penal Law § 60.00(1) (sentences applicable to offenses outside Penal Law)
• Penal Law § 60.27(1) (restitution)
• Town Law § 20(2) (town attorney office)
• Town Law § 65(1) (town board's authority to direct counsel)

Cases:

• Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983)
• Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 728
• People v. Van Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61 (1963)

Treatises:

• David D. Siegel, New York Practice §§ 547, 551 (3d ed. 1999)

Prior AG opinions:

• Op. Att'y Gen. 83-F12 (state preemption of dog control field)
• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 98-14 (county attorney prosecution with DA authorization)
• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 97-52 (village officials prosecuting local laws)
• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 91-3 (violations subject to criminal procedure)
• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 90-8 (town attorney prosecution with DA authorization)
• Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 79-125 (private complainant under dog control ordinance)

Local:

• Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance § 2 (scope)
• Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance § 8 (criminal penalties)

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_2005-12_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW, ART. 9, §§ 106, 107, 108, 119, 121, 124, 125; COUNTY LAW § 700(1); C.P.L.R. § 401; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW §§ 1.20(39), 10.10, 10.30; PENAL LAW § 10.00, 60.00, 60.27; TOWN LAW §§ 20, 65.

The attorney for a town may represent the town in civil proceedings brought pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law § 121, but may prosecute criminal violations of dog control laws only if duly authorized by the district attorney. The town may seek the court's leave to intervene in a special proceeding brought pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law § 121. Restitution and reparations to the victim of a dog attack may be ordered.

May 9, 2005

Kate M. Powers, Esq.
Guy K. Krogh, Esq.
Thaler & Thaler
309 North Tioga Street
P.O. Box 266
Ithaca, NY 14851-0266

Informal Opinion
No. 2005-12

Dear Ms. Powers and Mr. Krogh:

In Thaler & Thaler's capacity as attorneys for the Town of Lansing, you have asked several questions relating to the enforcement of Agriculture and Markets Law ("A.M.L.") § 121 and the Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance. Specifically, you sought the opinions of this office on the following:

(1) whether Thaler & Thaler may represent the Town of Lansing in civil or criminal proceedings brought pursuant to A.M.L. § 121;
(2) whether Thaler & Thaler may represent the Town of Lansing in proceedings brought pursuant to section 8 of the Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance;
(3) whether a town may intervene in civil proceedings filed by private citizens pursuant to A.M.L. § 121; and
(4) whether a Town Justice may, consistent with A.M.L. § 121, order a dog owner to pay restitution or reparations to the victim of a dog attack.

A.M.L. § 121 addresses dangerous dogs exclusively; the town ordinance applies to several actions and behaviors related to dog ownership, including the ownership of dangerous dogs. See Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance § 2. A "dangerous dog" is one that "(a) without justification attacks a person and causes physical injury or death, or (b) poses a serious and unjustified imminent threat of harm to one or more persons, or (c) without justification attacks a service dog, guide dog or hearing dog and causes physical injury or death." A.M.L. § 108(24).

I. Representation of the Town Under Agriculture & Markets Law Article 7

A.M.L. § 121 is part of Article 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law. Article 7 provides "for the licensing and identification of dogs, the control and protection of the dog population and the protection of persons, property, domestic animals and deer from dog attack and damage." A.M.L. § 106. To enforce Article 7, municipal dog control officers must commence an action against a dog owner who has violated any of eight statutory requirements, including those pertaining to the confinement, restraint, or destruction of dangerous dogs. A.M.L. § 119(1)–(2). With respect to dangerous dogs, A.M.L. § 121 underscores the requirement that a dog control officer commence a proceeding in municipal court if he or she has "reason to believe [a] dog is a dangerous dog." A.M.L. § 121(3). In addition to dog control officers, the statute permits "any person", defined as "any individual, corporation, partnership, association or other organized group of persons, municipality, or other legal entity," A.M.L. § 108(17), to file a complaint in municipal court. A.M.L § 121(4).

For any one of the eight violations listed in A.M.L. § 119(1), Article 7 allows municipalities to choose whether to seek civil penalties or to prosecute actions as violations under the Penal Law. A.M.L. § 119(2). If a municipality seeks only a civil penalty, the penalty must not exceed $25 for the first offense in a five-year period, $50 for the second, and $100 for the third. A.M.L. § 119(2)(b). Likewise, actions prosecuted pursuant to the Penal Law for first offenses may result in a fine of not more than $25; individuals who have violated Article 7 once or twice in the five years preceding a new enforcement action face fines up to $50 and $100, respectively. A.M.L. § 119(2)(a). A.M.L. § 121 provides that additional civil penalties may be imposed against owners of dogs who bite and injure people, service dogs, guide dogs, or hearing dogs, while other acts and omissions may expose dog owners to misdemeanor criminal prosecutions. A.M.L. § 121(7)–(8), (9)–(10).

Article 7 thus expressly permits municipalities to bring actions pursuant to A.M.L. §§ 119 and 121. The attorney for a town may therefore represent the town in municipal court actions in which civil penalties are sought. See Town Law § 65(1) (town board may direct any town officer to institute or appear in any action or legal proceeding in name of town); id. § 20(2) (town board may establish office of town attorney or employ counsel as necessary).

Where a municipality elects to prosecute a violation as a criminal offense, however, we conclude that a town attorney's authority is limited. Article 7 infractions may be prosecuted as "violations" under the Penal Law. A.M.L. § 119(2). "Violations" are offenses, other than traffic infractions, that carry a maximum sentence of fifteen days. Penal Law § 10.00(3). The Penal Law defines an "offense," in turn, as

conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any law of this state or by any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, or by any order, rule or regulation of any governmental instrumentality authorized by law to adopt the same.

Penal Law § 10.00(1). Violations are therefore a subset of offenses under the Penal Law; prosecutions for these offenses are subject to criminal procedure laws, even when initiated in the local criminal courts. See Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 91-3; C.P.L. §§ 1.20(39), 10.10, 10.30.

County Law § 700 requires that the district attorney for a particular county prosecute all crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of that county. See County Law § 700(1). The district attorney must "retain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting all crimes and offenses," Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d at 728, but he may consent to the prosecution of petty crimes and offenses by municipal or even private attorneys, as long as he is "kept aware of all of the criminal prosecutions in the county." Id. (citing People v. Van Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61, 62-63 (1963) (district attorney "must set up a system whereby he knows of all the criminal prosecutions in his county and either appears therein in person or by assistant or consents to appearance on his behalf by other public officers or private attorneys")); see also Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 98-14 (with proper grant of authority from district attorney, county attorney may prosecute violations of county's mechanical trade laws); Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 97-52 (with proper grant of authority from district attorney, village officials may prosecute violations of village's local laws); Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 90-8 (with proper grant of authority from district attorney, town attorney may prosecute certain violations of General Municipal Law § 136).

Therefore, we conclude that an attorney for a town may bring and try civil actions pursuant to A.M.L. §§ 119 and 121 on the town's behalf. Thaler & Thaler, as attorneys for the Town of Lansing, may not, however, prosecute criminal violations under Article 7 without being duly authorized by the Tompkins County District Attorney, which authorization may assign duties to Thaler & Thaler but may not divest the District Attorney of the ultimate discretionary judgment to initiate or resolve prosecutions. See Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 53-54 (1983) (voiding an ultra vires delegation by a district attorney of her "fundamental responsibilities").

II. Representation of the Town Under Local Ordinance

Although state law generally preempts the field of dog control, see Op. Att'y. Gen. 83-F12, Article 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law extends some legislative power to municipalities. A.M.L. § 124 provides that a municipality "may enact a local law or ordinance upon the keeping or running at large of dogs and the seizure thereof, provided no municipality shall vary, modify, enlarge or restrict the provisions of [Article 7] relating to identification, licensing, rabies vaccination and euthanization." A.M.L. § 124(1). Municipalities may also adopt their own programs for the control of dangerous dogs, "provided . . . that no such program shall be less stringent" than Article 7 itself or regulate such dogs in a manner that is specific as to breed. A.M.L. § 107(5).

Municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to Article 7 may subject violators either to civil "penalties" or to "fine[s] or imprisonment." A.M.L. § 124(2). You note in your letter that the Town of Lansing appears to have opted to provide only for criminal sanctions. Section 8 of the Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance provides:

A violation of this law shall constitute a violation as defined in the Penal Law of the State of New York, and shall be punishable by a penalty of not more than $25.00 for the first violation, not more than $50.00 for the second violation, and not more than $75.00 for the third and all subsequent violations, or by imprisonment for a term not to exceed five days for each violation. These penalties shall be in addition to any other penalty provided by law.

You have indicated that you believe that the "penalty" described in the ordinance amounts to a fine under the Penal Law.

As explained above, violations under the Penal Law are subject to the Criminal Procedure Law and must be prosecuted either by the district attorney or by someone acting with the authorization of the district attorney. Because Lansing's Dog Control Ordinance provides only for criminal penalties, we conclude that Thaler & Thaler, as attorneys for the Town of Lansing, may not prosecute dog owners for violations pursuant to section 8 of the ordinance without the authorization of the Tompkins County District Attorney. Without such authority, an attorney for a town may bring only those civil actions provided in A.M.L. §§ 119 and 121.

III. Town Intervention in Private Actions

Pursuant to A.M.L. § 121, any individual who complains of an attack by a dog has the right to commence a proceeding in municipal court; the court, in turn, must hold a hearing on the complaint to determine whether the dog is dangerous. A.M.L. § 121(3) and (4); see also Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 79-125 (private individual may file accusatory information under local dog control ordinance that provides for criminal penalties). A dog control officer aware of a dog attack who believes the dog in question is dangerous has the duty to initiate a court proceeding himself. A.M.L. § 121(3) and (4).

You have asked whether a town may intervene in a proceeding brought by a private individual pursuant to A.M.L. § 121. The proceeding described in A.M.L. § 121 provides for expedited adjudication in two stages: (1) the court must determine "immediately" whether there is probable cause to believe a dog is dangerous, and, if such probable cause exists, must order the dog's seizure; (2) regardless of the probable cause determination, the court must hold a hearing within five days after a complaint is filed (on written notice of not less than two days to the owner of the dog in question) to determine whether the dog is dangerous. A.M.L. § 121(4).

Because A.M.L. § 121 provides for expedited proceedings, complaints under the statute are considered special proceedings. See David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 547 (3d ed. 1999) (characterizing A.M.L. § 121 as authorizing special proceeding). C.P.L.R. § 401 governs intervention in special proceedings, and provides that a party may intervene in such a proceeding by leave of the court. See C.P.L.R. § 401; see also Siegel, supra, § 551 (with court's leave, intervention available in special proceeding). We therefore conclude that, under the authority of C.P.L.R. § 401, the Town of Lansing may seek the court's leave to intervene in any private proceeding brought pursuant to A.M.L. § 121. Whether the Town will be allowed to intervene in a particular case will be determined by the court.

IV. Restitution and Reparations

Finally, you ask whether a Town Justice may, in a proceeding brought pursuant either to A.M.L. § 121 or to the Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance, order a dog owner to pay restitution or reparations to the victim of a dog attack.

You note that A.M.L. § 121 does not provide specifically for restitution or reparations, and question whether, in a special proceeding brought pursuant to A.M.L. § 121(4), a court could order such relief. A.M.L. § 121 expressly preserves any common law or statutory claims available to victims of dangerous dogs; the enforcement provisions set forth in A.M.L. § 121 are in addition to any remedies available based on those claims. See A.M.L. § 121(12). Thus, victims may seek, and a Town Justice may order, restitution or other damages without running afoul of the Agriculture and Markets Law.

Likewise, A.M.L. § 125, which mandates county indemnification for damage done by dogs to domestic animals, see A.M.L. § 125(1), explicitly provides for restitution in certain circumstances. Specifically, it requires that the owner of a dog causing such damage must reimburse the county for any indemnification outlays. See A.M.L. § 125(3).

Moreover, where a dog owner is prosecuted criminally, the court can require restitution:

[i]n addition to any of the dispositions authorized by [the Penal Law], the court shall consider restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime and may require restitution or reparation as part of the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of an offense, and . . . require the defendant to make restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby.

Penal Law § 60.27(1); see also Penal Law § 60.00(1) (sentences prescribed by Penal Law apply to offenses defined outside Penal Law).

Therefore, we conclude that, in both civil and criminal matters brought pursuant to both A.M.L. § 121 and the Town of Lansing Dog Control Ordinance, a town justice may order restitution, reparations, or other damages to a dog attack victim.

The Attorney General issues formal opinions only to officers and departments of State government. Thus, this is an informal opinion rendered to assist you in advising the municipality you represent.

Very truly yours,

KATHRYN SHEINGOLD
Assistant Solicitor General
In Charge of Opinions

By: Julie Loughran
Assistant Solicitor General