When the New York Legislature enacts a salary increase for state Supreme Court Justices effective January 1, do justices start earning the new salary on January 1 or at the start of the next pay period?

Plain-English summary

The 1998 Legislature passed Chapter 630 to raise the salaries of various state officers, including the justices of the State Supreme Court, effective January 1, 1999. The first payroll period to begin after the effective date opened on January 7, 1999. The Comptroller calculated the increase as starting on January 7. The Association of Supreme Court Justices argued that it should have started on January 1, with a partial-period increase. The Unified Court System asked the Attorney General to settle the question.

Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's office sided with the Comptroller. Section 12 of Chapter 630 (titled "Date of entitlement to salary increase") used the standard clause New York has used in pay statutes since 1957: the increase "shall be added to the salary or compensation of such officer or employee at the beginning of that payroll period the first day of which is nearest to the effective date of such increase." The AG read "entitlement" as the date the right vests, not the calendar effective date of the statute. The legislative history confirmed the purpose: avoid calculating a payroll period at two different pay rates. The Comptroller, the agency charged with administering state payroll under State Finance Law §§ 8 and 200, had applied this language consistently for decades; the Legislature had repeatedly used the same clause without amendment, evidence of acquiescence in the construction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

State payroll and judicial salary statutes have continued to be amended. The standard "date of entitlement" clause remains common, but specific pay bills may include different timing language. Anyone analyzing a current pay raise effective date should look at the actual text of the operative statute.

Common questions

Q: What is a "payroll period nearest" rule?
A: It says the new salary kicks in at the start of the payroll period that begins closest to (before or after) the effective date set in the statute, not necessarily on the calendar effective date itself.

Q: Why is the Comptroller's interpretation entitled to deference?
A: Under Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v. New York State Tax Comm'n (1988), the construction given a statute by the agency responsible for administering it is entitled to great weight if not unreasonable. The Comptroller administers state payroll under State Finance Law §§ 8 and 200.

Q: Did the justices get a partial-period raise for January 1-6?
A: No. The opinion confirmed that the Comptroller correctly applied the full raise starting with the pay period beginning January 7, 1999, with no split-period adjustment for January 1-6.

Q: What is "legislative acquiescence"?
A: When an agency interprets a statute over many years and the Legislature reenacts the same language without amendment, the Legislature is charged with knowledge of the agency's interpretation; failure to amend signals acceptance. Engle v. Talarico (1973).

Q: How does this affect collective bargaining agreements?
A: The same "date of entitlement" clause appears in many pay bills enacted to ratify collective bargaining agreements. The opinion noted that lump-sum back-pay clauses (in this statute, section 13) typically handle the timing gap between the calendar effective date and the date of entitlement.

Background and statutory framework

The 1957 origin (L. 1957, ch. 191, § 2) of the "payroll period nearest" rule was meant to spare the Comptroller's office from calculating split-rate payrolls. The Legislature has used the same language continually since, including in pay bills in 1984, 1987, 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2003.

Section 12 of Chapter 630 carries the rule into the 1998 judicial pay raise. The title, "Date of entitlement to salary increase," is consistent with reading the section as governing when the entitlement to receive the higher rate first attaches; the statutory effective date in section 16 (January 1, 1999) tells you when the law took effect, but does not by itself convert the entitlement clock. Section 13 of the chapter ties the loop by providing for a lump sum to incumbents in the unusual case where the increased salary cannot be paid in the first eligible payroll period.

State Finance Law §§ 8 and 200 vest payroll administration in the State Comptroller, and the Comptroller has read the statutory entitlement clause consistently since 1957. Legislative reenactment without amendment provides the doctrinal basis for deferring to that reading under Engle v. Talarico.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• State Finance Law §§ 8, 200 (Comptroller's payroll authority)
• Statutes § 123 (statutory construction; section titles)
• L. 1957, ch. 191, § 2 (origin of payroll-nearest rule)
• L. 1984, ch. 986, § 28; L. 1987, ch. 263, § 27; L. 1993, ch. 60, § 35; L. 1998, ch. 630; L. 2000, ch. 68, § 15; L. 2000, ch. 69, § 12; L. 2003, ch. 22, § 23

Cases:

• Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v. New York State Tax Comm'n, 72 N.Y.2d 166 (1988)
• Engle v. Talarico, 33 N.Y.2d 237 (1973)

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/2004-F4_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE FINANCE LAW §§ 8, 200; STATUTES § 123; L. 2003, CH. 22, § 23; L. 2000, CH. 68, § 15; L. 2000, CH. 69, § 12; L. 1998, CH. 630, §§ 1, 12, 13, 16; L. 1993, CH. 60, § 35; L. 1987, CH. 263, § 27; L. 1984, CH. 986, § 28; L. 1957, CH. 191, § 2.

A statutory pay raise due the Supreme Court Justices became effective on the first day of the payroll nearest the statute's effective date (i.e. January 7, 1999), not on effective date of statute.

May 24, 2004

Michael Colodner
Counsel
New York State Unified Court System
25 Beaver Street
New York, New York 10004

Formal Opinion No. 2004-F4

Dear Mr. Colodner:

You have requested an opinion as to the effective date of a salary increase for justices of the State Supreme Court, pursuant to Chapter 630 of the Laws of 1998. L. 1998, ch. 630, § 1. The statute had an effective date of January 1, 1999. Id. § 16. You have asked whether the increased salary began to accrue on this date or on January 7, 1999, the beginning of the payroll period the first day of which was nearest to the statute's effective date. The Office of the State Comptroller applied this statute so that the increased salary began to accrue to the justices on January 7, 1999. In our opinion, this was the correct interpretation of the statute.

Analysis

In addition to providing for increased salaries for certain State officers and employees, including the justices of the State Supreme Court, Chapter 630 includes a provision regarding when these increases accrue. Section 12, titled "Date of entitlement to salary increase," specifies that:

[n]otwithstanding the provisions of this act or of any other law, the increase of salary or compensation of any officer or employee provided by this act shall be added to the salary or compensation of such officer or employee at the beginning of that payroll period the first day of which is nearest to the effective date of such increase as provided in this act, or at the beginning of the earlier of two payroll periods the first day of which are nearest but equally near to the effective date of such increase as provided in this act . . . .

L. 1998, ch. 630, § 12. Section 16 of Chapter 630 provides for an effective date of January 1, 1999.

The question presented by the position papers of the justices and the Comptroller's Office is as follows: when section 12 is read in conjunction with section 16, on what date do the increases provided for in Chapter 630 accrue? The justices' position is that the increased salary began to accrue to the justices on January 1, 1999 and was to have been included in the first paycheck that they received following the statute's effective date, i.e., on January 6. The Comptroller's position is that the increased salary began to accrue at the beginning of the payroll period the first day of which was closest to the statute's effective date, i.e., on January 7, and was to be included in the paycheck that the justices received at the end of that payroll period. Our opinion is that section 12 provides for the increased salary to begin accruing at the beginning of the payroll period the first day of which was nearest the effective date (i.e., on January 7).

The text of section 12 leads us to this conclusion. First, we note that the title of section 12 is "Date of entitlement to salary increase" (emphasis added). Although a heading in a statute is not determinative of legislative intent, it may be used to clarify such intent. See Statutes § 123. "Entitlement" is defined as "[t]he act or process of entitling," while "entitle" means "[t]o furnish with a right or claim to something." Thus, the title of section 12 indicates that this section was meant to identify the date on which the justices would acquire their right to the increased salary, as opposed to the date on which they would actually receive the increased salary. This is consistent with the Comptroller's position that the date specified in section 12 refers to the time at which the salary increase would begin to accrue, not the time it would be paid.

Construing Chapter 630 as mandating that the salary increase begin to accrue on January 7, 1999 is also supported by the legislative history of a previously-enacted statute that included similar language. In 1957, the Legislature amended the State Finance Law to allow annual increments to the salaries of civil service employees. See L. 1957, ch. 191, § 2.

The legislative history to the 1957 statute indicates that the purpose of this language was to ensure that the salaries of affected employees would not have to be calculated on the basis of two different pay scales within one pay period. Both the Comptroller and the Governor's Office of Employee Relations have informed us that language substantially identical to that of section 12 of Chapter 630 of the Laws of 1998 is also included in civil service contracts and "pay bills" (State legislation enacted to ratify the terms of a collective bargaining agreement) today for the same reason. Requiring the Comptroller to calculate the pay due to a sitting judge for the pay period beginning December 24, 1998 using two different pay scales (one for December 24, 1998 to December 31, 1998, and another for January 1, 1999 to January 6, 1999) would undermine this goal.

Furthermore, we have been informed that language similar or identical to that in section 12 has been included in pay bills for many years. We understand that the interpretation outlined above (that the pay increase first began to accrue to the justices as of January 7, 1999) is consistent with the interpretation that has been given to similar language in pay bills and statutes increasing judicial salaries over the years by the Comptroller's Office. This interpretation is entitled to deference because the Comptroller's Office is the entity charged with administering the payroll for State officers. See State Finance Law § 8; id. § 200 et seq.; Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v. New York State Tax Comm'n, 72 N.Y.2d 166, 173 (1988).

In addition, during the lengthy period of time that the Comptroller has been interpreting this language, the Legislature has repeatedly enacted bills with identical or substantially identical language, including Chapter 630. Where the practical construction of a statute is well known, the Legislature is charged with such knowledge and its failure to interfere indicates acquiescence. Engle v. Talarico, 33 N.Y.2d 237, 242 (1973).

For the reasons discussed above, we are of the opinion that the date upon which the increased salary first began to accrue to the justices of the Supreme Court was January 7, 1999.

Very truly yours,

ELIOT SPITZER
Attorney General