Can a New York town use a different definition of 'mobile home park' for its site-plan review than the State law uses for landlord-tenant regulation?

Plain-English summary

The Town of Nassau had a local law subjecting "mobile home parks" to site-plan review by the town planning board. The town's definition (two or more mobile homes on a parcel) was narrower than Real Property Law § 233(a)(3)'s definition (three or more mobile homes on a contiguous parcel). The town attorney asked the AG whether the State law's definition preempted the town's narrower one for site-plan purposes.

The AG said no. Real Property Law § 233 is preemptive but only of mobile home park landlord-tenant relations. The Halperin and Ba Mar cases established that point: the State's comprehensive regulation of the rights and obligations of mobile home park owners or operators and mobile home tenants displaces local regulation in that field, because the Legislature wanted statewide uniformity to address bargaining-power imbalances. But that preemption is limited to landlord-tenant matters. Site-plan review under Town Law § 274-a is a land-use regulation, not a landlord-tenant regulation. The town can define "mobile home park" for site-plan purposes in whatever way fits its land-use scheme, independent of § 233's tenant-protection definition.

The AG noted the broader principle that excluding mobile home parks from certain districts has been held constitutional (Malone Village Board v Zoning Board), and that requiring compliance with site-plan regulations falls comfortably within local land-use authority (Town of Pompey v Parker). The AG also flagged a practical caveat: review the local law in its entirety to ensure it does not also try to regulate landlord-tenant relations under the guise of site-plan review. If it does, those provisions would be preempted.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What does Real Property Law § 233 preempt?
Section 233 preempts local laws that regulate the landlord-tenant relationship in mobile home parks. Rent control, eviction procedures, fees, rules governing park operations as they affect tenants, and similar subjects are within the preempted field. Under Halperin v Sullivan County and Ba Mar v Rockland County, this preemption is broad within the landlord-tenant subject area.

What does § 233 not preempt?
Land-use regulation. Site-plan review (Town Law § 274-a), zoning, building codes, environmental review, and the location and physical layout of mobile home parks are all outside the preempted field. The AG cites its prior Informal Opinion 89-20 for the same point.

Can a town use a different mobile-home-park definition for site-plan review?
Yes. The State law's definition (three or more mobile homes on a contiguous parcel) is the definition for § 233 tenant protection purposes. A town can adopt a different definition (say, two or more) for site-plan review under § 274-a because that definition is operating in a different regulatory field. There is no preemption at the definition level for land-use purposes.

What goes into a site-plan review?
Town Law § 274-a(2) at the time authorized site-plan elements including the arrangement, layout, and design of the proposed use; parking; means of access; screening; signs; landscaping; architectural features; building location and dimensions; adjacent land uses; physical features to protect adjacent uses; and any additional elements the town board specified in its local law. None of those topics is in § 233.

Can a town exclude mobile home parks from certain zones entirely?
The Malone Village case held exclusion of mobile home parks from designated areas of a town constitutional, with the important condition that the town not exclude all mobile homes as permanent residences. The combination of zoning permission in some districts plus site-plan conditions in those districts (Town of Pompey v Parker) is the workable approach. Total exclusion from a municipality would face a different constitutional analysis.

What's the practical caution for towns?
Check the local law for landlord-tenant content. If the site-plan review code requires the park operator to offer specific lease terms, set rent limits, follow particular eviction processes, or enforce other tenant-facing rules, those provisions are preempted by § 233. Land-use authority does not extend to landlord-tenant regulation, no matter what the local law calls itself.

Background and statutory framework

The two statutory regimes:

Real Property Law § 233 (the "Mobile Home Park" statute) at the time of the opinion established a detailed and comprehensive scheme governing the rights and obligations of mobile home park owners or operators and mobile home tenants. Section 233(a)(3) defined "mobile home park" as a contiguous parcel of privately-owned land used for the accommodation of three or more mobile homes occupied for year-round living. The Halperin and Ba Mar cases held that § 233 preempts local laws in the field of mobile home park landlord-tenant relations.

Town Law § 274-a authorized towns to subject specified land uses to site-plan review by the planning board. Section 274-a(2) listed the elements a town could require in a site-plan submission, all of them focused on the physical arrangement of the proposed use and its compatibility with surrounding land uses.

The AG's analytic move was to define the preempted "field" narrowly. Section 233 covers landlord-tenant relations; it does not cover land use generally. Different definitions of "mobile home park" can therefore coexist in the two regulatory regimes, each serving its own purpose.

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_96-30_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

REAL PROPERTY LAW § 233; TOWN LAW § 274-a(2).

The definition of a mobile home park in a town local law establishing site plan regulations is not preempted by section 233 of the Real Property Law. While section 233 is preemptive, it covers landlord/tenant relationships in mobile home parks.

September 16, 1996

Philip J. Danaher, Esq.
Town Attorney
Town of Nassau
11 North Pearl Street
Albany, NY 12207

Informal Opinion No. 96-30

Dear Mr. Danaher:

You have asked whether section 233 of the Real Property Law, in its regulation of mobile home parks, has preempted a local law enacted by your town.

Under the local law which authorizes "site plan" review, a "mobile home park" is a parcel of land which is planned and improved for the placement of two or more mobile homes which are to be used as dwellings. Any person desiring to establish a mobile home park must fill out a detailed application so that the town can determine whether the proposed site meets the minimum requirements of the State and county Departments of Health and all applicable sanitary codes of the State of New York. The applicant also must appear before the town planning board for review by the board of the general arrangement of the park, including the location and width of streets; the location, size and arrangement of lots; and other considerations relative to the site plan.

Specifically, your concern is that section 233 of the Real Property Law defines "mobile home park" differently than the town's local law. Under section 233, a "mobile home park" means a contiguous parcel of privately-owned land which is used for the accommodation of three or more mobile homes occupied for year-round living. Real Property Law § 233(a)(3). Your question is whether the town local law legally can have a different definition of "mobile home park" than State law.

While section 233 preempts local regulations in the field of mobile home park landlord/tenant relations, it has no application to the field of local government site plan regulations. Therefore, section 233's definition of "mobile home park" does not apply to your municipality's local law on site plan regulation.

Section 233 of the Real Property Law establishes a detailed and comprehensive statutory scheme for regulation of the rights and obligations of mobile home park owners or operators and mobile home tenants. Halperin v Sullivan County, 171 AD2d 157, 159-160 (3d Dept 1991); see also, Ba Mar v Rockland County, 164 AD2d 605 (2d Dept), app dismissed, 78 NY2d 877 (1991). Compelling evidence of the State's intent to preempt is found in the statute's legislative history, which indicates a design by the Legislature to alleviate various problems existing in the area of mobile home landlord and tenant relationships and the goal of striking a balance between the interests of mobile home park owners or operators and mobile home tenants throughout the State. Id. Amendments to section 233 were prompted by State-wide concerns regarding the disparity in bargaining positions between mobile home park owners or operators and mobile home tenants. Id.; see, Mobile Home Parks: A Joint Report of the New York State Attorney General and New York State Consumer Protection Board (June 1984). The courts have held that Real Property Law § 233, because of its comprehensive treatment of mobile home park owner or operator and tenant relations, preempts local laws in the field. Id.; Halperin v Sullivan County, supra; Ba Mar v Rockland County, supra.

It seems clear that while section 233 of the Real Property Law has been held to be preemptive, it only covers the field of landlord/tenant relations in mobile home parks. Any local law dealing with this subject area would be preempted by the provisions of section 233. Local laws dealing with the siting of mobile home parks in accordance with zoning and land use regulations are outside the field of regulation and, therefore, are not subject to section 233. See, Op Atty Gen (Inf) No. 89-20.

Therefore, a different definition of "mobile home park" for purposes of site plan review by a town of a proposed mobile home park under the provisions of section 274-a of the Town Law would not be preempted by section 233's definition because site plan regulation is not governed by section 233. It appears from your letter that your town has enacted a local law granting to the planning board the power of site plan review and has designated mobile home parks as a use subject to that review. Under section 274-a(2), site plans show the arrangement, layout and design of the proposed use of land. Site plan elements which may be included in the town's legislation include parking requirements, means of access, screening, signs, landscaping, architectural features, location and dimension of buildings, adjacent land uses, physical features to protect adjacent land uses and any additional elements specified by the town board as part of the local law. Id. These elements are outside the coverage of section 233.

We note that the exclusion of mobile home parks from designated areas of a town has been held constitutional. Malone Village Board v Zoning Board, 164 AD2d 24 (3d Dept 1990). It is significant that the town has not excluded all mobile homes as permanent residences, but has merely limited their location by requiring compliance with site plan regulations. Town of Pompey v Parker, 44 NY2d 805 (1978).

We conclude that the definition of a mobile home park in a town local law establishing site plan regulations is not preempted by section 233 of the Real Property Law. While section 233 is preemptive with respect to landlord/tenant relationships in mobile home parks, it does not apply to site plan regulations enacted as part of the municipality's local laws on land use regulation. We recommend, however, that you review your local law in its entirety to determine whether it also covers landlord/tenant relationships. Section 233 would preempt these matters.

The Attorney General renders formal opinions only to officers and departments of State government. This perforce is an informal and unofficial expression of the views of this office.

Very truly yours,
JAMES D. COLE
Assistant Attorney General
in Charge of Opinions