If a New York town supervisor sends his resignation letter to the town board with a copy to the town clerk, is that a valid resignation?

Plain-English summary

The Town of Catlin's supervisor resigned by letter on May 3, 1996, citing health concerns and making the resignation "effective May 31, 1996." The letter was addressed to the town board, with the town clerk listed first on the distribution list as a copy recipient. The town clerk received her copy through the mail at her office, in an envelope addressed to her, and she acted on it by notifying the State and county boards of election of an impending vacancy. The town attorney asked the AG two things: (1) who determines whether the resignation is procedurally valid, and (2) is "copy to" the town clerk enough delivery under State law?

The AG said the town clerk determines validity, and yes, a copy delivered to her office is enough. The reasoning is statutory and substantive. Public Officers Law § 31(1)(g) requires every town officer's resignation to be addressed to the town clerk. Town Law § 26 reinforces that a town officer may resign "to the town clerk in the manner provided by section thirty-one of the public officers law." § 31(2) requires the resignation to be in writing addressed to the officer or body to whom it is made, and § 31(3) requires delivery to that officer's place of business or filing in that officer's office.

The town supervisor's letter was not addressed to the town clerk in the strict sense, but the AG was willing to find substantial compliance. The contents of the letter expressed an unmistakable intent to resign. The town clerk received written notice at her office. She acted on the notice by triggering the vacancy-filling process. The court in Brescia v Mugridge held that a village mayor's resignation was valid even though the statutory procedure was not followed precisely, on substantially similar facts. Any contrary conclusion, the Brescia court said, "would presume a difficulty in prying oneself from public office not apparent in precedent or the statute."

The town board has no role in accepting or rejecting the resignation. The clerk receives it; the office becomes vacant; the vacancy-filling process begins.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Who decides whether a town supervisor's resignation is valid?
The town clerk. Public Officers Law § 31(1)(g) makes the town clerk the recipient of town officers' resignations. Once the clerk has a written communication memorializing the resignation, with the necessary intent and delivery, the resignation is effective. The town board does not have authority to accept or reject it.

What is the minimum content of a valid resignation?
A writing that clearly expresses the intent to resign the office, addressed to (or, at minimum, delivered to) the right recipient. The 1996 letter said: "I hereby resign my four year elected position as Town Supervisor, due to health related matters effective May 31, 1996." That is unambiguous. Even though it was addressed to the town board, the clerk was listed first as a copy recipient, she received the copy at her office, and she acted on it.

Does the statute require the resignation to be hand-delivered?
At the time of the opinion, Public Officers Law § 31(3) required the resignation to be "delivered to him at his place of business or filed in his office." The AG treated mail delivery to the town clerk's office in an envelope addressed to her as satisfying the delivery requirement. The clerk physically had the document at her office and was acting on it.

Can a town supervisor "withdraw" a resignation after the letter is delivered to the town clerk?
The opinion does not directly address withdrawal. The general rule is that once a resignation is effective, it is effective. A future-dated resignation (here, effective May 31) may potentially be withdrawn before the effective date, depending on the circumstances, but that question is outside the scope of the AG's analysis.

What about effective-date language?
The supervisor's letter said "effective May 31, 1996." The opinion does not separately analyze the effective-date language. The general approach in New York is that a future-effective resignation can be deemed irrevocable upon receipt or upon the effective date, depending on the surrounding facts. The Brescia case discussed in the opinion involved a substantially similar situation, where the resignation was held valid notwithstanding less-than-perfect compliance with the statutory procedure.

Why does the town board sometimes think it has acceptance authority?
Probably because of common assumptions borrowed from corporate or contract settings, where an offer needs acceptance. Public office resignations work differently. The resignation is a unilateral act by the officeholder. The town clerk is the statutory recipient, but does not "accept" or "reject" in the contract sense. The role is to receive, file, and trigger the vacancy-filling process.

What happens after the resignation becomes effective?
The office is vacant. The vacancy-filling procedure under Town Law applies. For a town supervisor, the town board generally fills vacancies by appointment until the next general election, after which the voters fill the office for the remainder of the term.

Background and statutory framework

The two statutes at the center of the opinion:

Public Officers Law § 31, which governs resignations of public officers:

• § 31(1) lists the recipients for various types of public officers' resignations. Under § 31(1)(g), every town officer's resignation goes to the town clerk.
• § 31(2) requires the resignation to be in writing addressed to the officer or body to whom it is made.
• § 31(3) requires the resignation to be delivered to that officer's place of business or filed in that officer's office.

Town Law § 26 cross-references Public Officers Law § 31 and provides that any town officer may resign to the town clerk in the manner that statute provides.

The AG's approach treats the statutory formalities as serving an underlying purpose (clear written notice to the appropriate official that the officeholder is resigning), not as ends in themselves. When the formalities are imperfectly followed but the purpose is served, the resignation is effective. Brescia v Mugridge supplies the substantial-compliance principle in the resignation context, and prior AG opinions (1976 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 113, 1965 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 127) had reached similar conclusions on similar facts.

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.ny.gov/libraries-documents/opinions/opinions-year
• Original PDF: https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/I_96-26_pw.pdf

Original opinion text

Opn. No. 96-26
PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW § 31; TOWN LAW § 26.

The resignation of the town supervisor became effective once a copy was delivered to the office of the town clerk.

September 16, 1996

Kevin Moshier, Esq.
Town Attorney
Town of Catlin
1448 Chambers Road
Beaver Dams, NY 14812

Informal Opinion No. 96-26

Dear Mr. Moshier:

You have asked which town official is responsible for determining whether the supervisor's resignation was made properly. You also ask whether a resignation addressed to the town board—with a copy sent to the town clerk—constitutes sufficient delivery to the town clerk under State law.

In a letter dated May 3, 1996, the town supervisor tendered his resignation to the town board by simply stating: "I hereby resign my four year elected position as Town Supervisor, due to health related matters effective May 31, 1996". The resignation letter contained a distribution list indicating the different individuals or offices that were to receive copies of the letter, with the words "Town Clerk, Catlin" appearing at the top of the list. You state that the town clerk received her copy of the letter through the mail at her office in an envelope addressed to her and that the town clerk acted upon the May 3, 1996 resignation letter by notifying the State and county boards of election of an impending vacancy in the office of town supervisor.

Town Law § 26 provides that "[a]ny town officer may resign to the town clerk in the manner provided by section thirty-one of the public officers law". The pertinent portions of Public Officers Law § 31 state:

§ 31. Resignations

1. Public officers may resign their offices as follows:
   . . .
   g. Every town officer, to the town clerk.

Subsection 2 of section 31 states that "[e]very resignation shall be in writing addressed to the officer or body to whom it is made". Public Officers Law § 31(2). Subsection 3 states that "[a] resignation addressed to an officer shall be delivered to him at his place of business or filed in his office". Id., § 31(3).

The Public Officers Law clearly requires that the town supervisor's letter of resignation be directed to the town clerk. Therefore, in response to your first question, the town clerk determines whether statutory requirements were met for the town supervisor's resignation.

While the letter was not addressed to the town clerk, the clerk was listed first on the letter as a copy recipient. This copy did meet the primary requirements of the statute—the resignation was memorialized in writing and delivered to the town clerk at her office. See, 1976 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 113, 114; copy enclosed. The contents of the town supervisor's May 3d letter indicated an unmistakable intent to resign his office.

In our opinion, the town supervisor took sufficient action to effect a valid resignation under section 31 of the Public Officers Law. While the town board clearly lacked the authority to accept the supervisor's resignation, his resignation letter became effective once a copy was delivered to the office of the town clerk. 1976 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 113; 1965 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 127. It is clear that the town clerk received actual written notice of the supervisor's intent to resign. You state that she received her copy by mail at her office and she notified the boards of election of an impending vacancy. There was substantial compliance with the main elements of section 31. Any conclusion to the contrary "would presume a difficulty in prying oneself from public office not apparent in precedent or the statute". Brescia v Mugridge, 52 Misc 2d 859, 863 (Sup Ct Suffolk Co), affd, 29 AD2d 632 (2d Dept 1967) (resignation of village mayor found valid notwithstanding failure to fully comply with statutory procedure).

The Attorney General renders formal opinions only to officers and departments of State government. This perforce is an informal and unofficial expression of the views of this office.

Yours truly,
JOSEPH CONWAY
Assistant Attorney General
Enclosure