Can a Mississippi city contract with a private vendor to run an ALPR camera system that mails traffic tickets to uninsured drivers and offers a paid diversion program?

Plain-English summary

A private company approached Columbus, Mississippi, with a turnkey program. Install ALPR (Automated License Plate Recognition) cameras on city roadways. Every car that passes gets photographed. The camera system checks each plate against the state insurance database. If the system thinks the owner is uninsured, an officer reviews and confirms. The company then mails the owner a traffic ticket: pay $315 and enroll in a diversion program (split between the company and the city), or face prosecution for driving without insurance. Tickets the program issues differ from the state's Uniform Traffic Ticket. Tickets are dismissed by the program if the owner pays.

The city attorney asked six questions. The AG answered them with a mix of partial yeses, partial fact-question deferrals, and pointed flags about how the program is structured.

1. Can an officer establish probable cause that the registered owner was the actual driver from a license plate photo alone? Probable cause is a case-specific determination under Benjamin v. Hooper Elec. Supply Co. The AG cannot opine on mixed questions of fact and law, but the question highlights an obvious gap: an ALPR photo identifies the vehicle, not the driver.

2. Can a city contract with the company to install ALPRs without explicit statutory authority? Yes, generally. The Home Rule statute, Section 21-17-5(1), gives cities broad authority to act on municipal affairs unless preempted. The AG had previously opined in Purdie that cities are not explicitly prohibited from operating ALPR-based motor vehicle insurance enforcement programs.

3. Has the AG approved the deviations from the Uniform Traffic Ticket? Outside the AG's opinion authority. But the AG noted the recent Howell opinion: any traffic ticket, citation, or affidavit issued must contain the information required by Section 63-9-21(3)(b)-(d). A ticket the program issues that omits required content is defective.

4. Is unilateral dismissal of tickets by the company or police, outside court and without the judge's consent, consistent with Mississippi law? The AG retained the position from MS AG Op., Miller (Mar. 3, 1993): a misdemeanor affidavit, including a traffic ticket, can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51, which requires court action on motion of the prosecuting attorney. Whether a particular program meets that requirement is a factual determination.

5. Is the diversion program consistent with Section 63-9-11(3)(a)? That section provides first-time violators of Chapter 3, 5, or 7 of Title 63 the option to complete a traffic safety violator course. Driving-without-insurance offenses live in Sections 63-15-4(4) and 63-16-13(1), which the AG had previously noted in Purdie do not prohibit a diversion program but do not specifically contemplate one either. Fact question for the city or court.

6. Can the city lawfully contract with the company to operate a municipal court diversion program for driving without insurance? Depends on case-specific facts. From Purdie: whether a diversion program ultimately meets all statutory requirements is a fact question outside AG opinion authority.

The AG's overall message: under Home Rule, a city is "not explicitly prohibited" from running an ALPR insurance-enforcement program, but several of the city's questions (probable cause that the owner was driving, whether the non-uniform ticket and pay-or-prosecute structure are consistent with statute, whether the diversion program meets all statutory requirements) turn on case-specific facts the AG cannot resolve by official opinion. The one firm legal point the AG retained is that a traffic ticket can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51.

What this means for you

For mayors and city councils evaluating ALPR vendor pitches

The opinion holds that, under the Home Rule statute (Section 21-17-5(1)), a municipality is "not explicitly prohibited" from operating an ALPR-based motor vehicle insurance enforcement program (citing the AG's prior Purdie opinion). It does not approve any particular program: the AG held that whether a specific program is consistent with state statute is a factual determination for the City or a court, and that it cannot opine on the program's deviations from the State's Uniform Traffic Ticket.

For municipal judges and prosecutors

The opinion retains the AG's longstanding position (from its Miller opinion) that "a misdemeanor affidavit, including a traffic ticket, can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51," which allows dismissal on motion of the prosecuting attorney, by the court, when the ends of justice will be served. Whether a particular program's dismissal mechanism is consistent with that statute is, per the opinion, a factual determination for the City or a court.

On the probable-cause question

The opinion holds that probable cause is a case-specific determination under Benjamin v. Hooper Elec. Supply Co. (an honest belief in guilt plus reasonable grounds for it), and that under Section 7-5-25 the AG cannot opine on a mixed question of fact and law such as whether an officer can establish probable cause that the registered owner was the driver. The requestor's own caveat, noted in the opinion, is that ALPRs cannot determine a vehicle's driver.

On the diversion program

The opinion holds that Section 63-9-11 gives first-time violators of Chapters 3, 5, or 7 of Title 63 the option of a traffic safety violator course, and that (per Purdie) Sections 63-15-4(4) and 63-16-13(1) on insurance "do not prohibit . . . [but] do not specifically contemplate a diversion program." It notes Section 21-23-7 lets municipal judges establish probation and other court programs. Whether a particular diversion program meets all statutory requirements is, the AG held, a question of fact on which it may not opine.

Common questions

Can the city use the cameras for other purposes, like locating stolen vehicles?
The opinion addresses only the proposed no-insurance enforcement program described in the request. It does not opine on other potential uses of ALPR cameras.

What if the registered owner authorizes a relative to drive the car?
Probable cause that a particular person was driving requires more than registration. The AG flagged this gap. Whether an officer can establish probable cause in a particular case is a fact-specific call for the court.

Why is the dismissal mechanism a problem?
Section 99-15-51 puts dismissal authority in the court, on motion of the prosecutor. A vendor-administered dismissal (pay $315, ticket goes away) does not flow through that statutory channel. The AG retained the longstanding position that misdemeanor affidavit dismissal is statutory only.

Does Section 21-17-5 home rule authority cover any of this?
It covers the city's general authority to enter contracts on municipal affairs. It does not override specific state statutes about ticket content (63-9-21), dismissal (99-15-51), or insurance enforcement. Home rule plus other statutes equals a constrained authority.

Had the AG addressed this kind of program before?
Yes. The opinion relies on the AG's prior MS AG Op., Purdie (Aug. 30, 2024), which addressed the same ALPR insurance-enforcement structure and concluded cities are not explicitly prohibited from such programs while leaving the statutory-compliance questions to case-specific determination.

Background and statutory framework

Section 7-5-25 limits AG opinions to prospective state-law questions. The AG cannot opine on mixed questions of fact and law (such as case-specific probable cause determinations) and cannot interpret federal law.

Section 21-17-5(1), the Home Rule statute, gives municipalities broad authority over municipal affairs unless inconsistent with state law or the constitution. Jones v. City of Canton, 278 So. 3d 1129, 1133 (Miss. 2019). The AG concluded in MS AG Op., Purdie (Aug. 30, 2024) that cities are not explicitly prohibited from operating ALPR-based motor vehicle insurance enforcement programs.

Section 99-15-51 governs dismissal of misdemeanor petty offenses:

In prosecutions for petty misdemeanors, if the party injured appear before the court where the same shall be pending and acknowledge to have received satisfaction, on motion of the prosecuting attorney the court, if it shall adjudge that the ends of justice will be conserved thereby, may discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings and may require the payment of court costs.

The AG retained MS AG Op., Miller (Mar. 3, 1993) that a misdemeanor affidavit, including a traffic ticket, can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51.

Section 63-9-11 provides first-time violators of Chapter 3, 5, or 7 of Title 63 the option to complete a traffic safety violator course. Sections 63-15-4(4) (failure to have proof of insurance) and 63-16-13(1) (failure to maintain insurance) do not prohibit a diversion program but do not specifically contemplate one either.

Section 21-23-7 gives municipal judges authority to establish probation programs, dispute resolution programs, and other practices to aid in the administration of justice.

Section 63-9-21(3)(b)-(d) sets content requirements for any traffic ticket regardless of issuing agency.

Probable cause is case-specific. Benjamin v. Hooper Elec. Supply Co., 568 So. 2d 1182, 1190 (Miss. 1990).

Citations

• Miss. Code Ann. § 7-5-25 (scope of AG opinions)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 21-17-5(1)-(2) (Home Rule statute)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-51 (dismissal of petty misdemeanors)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-11 (traffic safety violator course option)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-21(3)(b)-(d) (traffic ticket content requirements)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 63-15-4(4) (proof of insurance)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 63-16-13(1) (failure to maintain insurance)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-7 (municipal judge authority over court programs)
• Benjamin v. Hooper Elec. Supply Co., 568 So. 2d 1182, 1190 (Miss. 1990) (probable cause as case-specific)
• Jones v. City of Canton, 278 So. 3d 1129, 1133 (Miss. 2019) (Home Rule scope)
• Maynard v. City of Tupelo, 691 So. 2d 385, 387 (Miss. 1997) (Home Rule scope)
• MS AG Op., Purdie (Aug. 30, 2024) (ALPR insurance enforcement not prohibited; diversion program fit is fact question)
• MS AG Op., Miller (Mar. 3, 1993) (misdemeanor affidavit dismissal under Section 99-15-51)
• MS AG Op., Howell (Nov. 8, 2024) (Section 63-9-21(3)(b)-(d) content required on every traffic ticket)

Source

• Landing page: https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/divisions/opinions-and-policy/recent-opinions/
• Original PDF: https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/J.-Turnage-March-18-2025-Proposed-ALPR-based-Program.pdf

Original opinion text

March 18, 2025

Jeffery J. Turnage, Esq.
Attorney, City of Columbus
Post Office Box 1366
Columbus, Mississippi 39703-1366

Re: Proposed ALPR-based Program

Dear Mr. Turnage:

The Office of the Attorney General has received your request for an official opinion.

Background

According to your request, Columbus ("City") has been approached by a private company ("company") to install Automated License Plate Recognition ("ALPR") cameras on city roadways. The cameras would photograph the license plates of every vehicle that passes by and check the license plates of those vehicles against the state's insurance database to determine whether the owner of the vehicle has car insurance. If an officer confirms that the vehicle's owner does not have insurance, the company would mail the vehicle's owner a traffic ticket stating that the vehicle owner will be prosecuted for driving without insurance unless he or she agrees to enroll in a diversion program and pay a $315 fee that is split between the company and the municipality.

Questions Presented

1. In the provided scenario, can an officer establish probable cause that the owner of the photographed vehicle was also driving the vehicle in the absence of being able to independently verify who was driving the vehicle?
2. May municipalities contract with the company to install ALPRs in the absence of explicit statutory authority allowing municipalities to install ALPRs and issue no-insurance tickets from them?
3. Has the Mississippi Attorney General approved the subject deviations from the State's Uniform Traffic Ticket?
4. Is the proposed program, where a private company and/or law enforcement officer unilaterally dismisses tickets outside of a court and without the judge's consent, consistent with Mississippi statute providing when a traffic ticket may be dismissed?
5. Is the proposed diversion program consistent with Mississippi Code Annotated Section 63-9-11(3)(a)?
6. If the answer to question five is no, may the City lawfully contract with the company to operate a municipal court diversion program for driving without insurance?

Brief Response

1. The Mississippi Supreme Court has opined that a probable cause determination is dependent upon the applicable case-specific facts. Benjamin v. Hooper Elec. Supply Co., 568 So. 2d 1182, 1190 (Miss. 1990). Pursuant to Section 7-5-25, this office may only issue opinions on questions of state law.
2. Section 21-17-5(1), known as the Home Rule statute, "grants municipalities the right to adopt ordinances with regard to their 'municipal affairs' . . . if said ordinances are not inconsistent with state legislation and/or the Mississippi Constitution." Jones v. City of Canton, 278 So. 3d 1129, 1133 (Miss. 2019) (quoting Maynard v. City of Tupelo, 691 So. 2d 385, 387 (Miss. 1997)).
3. Section 7-5-25 authorizes this office to issue official opinions answering only questions of state law; therefore, we are unable to respond to your question.
4. While retaining the position stated in MS AG Op., Miller at *1 (Mar. 3, 1993) ("[A] misdemeanor affidavit, including a traffic ticket, can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51 of the Mississippi Code"), ultimately, whether a particular program is consistent with a state statute is a factual determination to be made by the City or a court of law.
5. Section 63-9-11 "provides first-time violators of Chapter 3, 5, or 7 of Title 63 the option to complete a traffic safety violator course." MS AG Op., Purdie at *4 (Aug. 30, 2024). But "Sections 63-15-4(4), relating to the failure to have proof of insurance, and 63-16-13(1), relating to the failure to maintain insurance, while not prohibiting such a diversion program, also do not specifically contemplate a diversion program." Id. Whether a particular program is consistent with a state statute is a factual determination to be made by the City or a court of law.
6. Whether the City may lawfully contract with the company to operate a municipal court diversion program for driving without insurance would be dependent upon the applicable case-specific facts. As provided in MS AG Op., Purdie at *5, whether a diversion program ultimately meets all statutory requirements is a question of fact upon which this office may not opine.

Applicable Law and Discussion

You ask several questions regarding a proposed ALPR-based motor vehicle insurance verification program. Your first question is whether an officer can establish probable cause that the owner of a vehicle was also driving the vehicle in the absence of being able to independently verify who was driving the vehicle. You caveat this question by stating that ALPRs cannot determine a vehicle's driver. The Mississippi Supreme Court has opined that a probable cause determination is dependent upon the applicable case-specific facts. Benjamin, 568 So. 2d at 1190. There, the Court explained, "[i]n order to find probable cause there must be a concurrence of (1) an honest belief in the guilt of the person accused and (2) reasonable grounds for such belief." Id. When the facts are undisputed, the court determines probable cause, but when the facts are disputed, it is a jury question. Id. Either way, a probable cause determination requires the application of case-specific facts. Pursuant to Section 7-5-25, this office may only opine upon questions of Mississippi law; we are unable to opine upon mixed questions of fact and law.

You next ask if municipalities may contract with the company to install ALPRs in the absence of explicit statutory authority allowing municipalities to install ALPRs and issue 'no insurance' tickets from them. In MS AG Op., Purdie at *1, this office opined that municipalities are "not explicitly prohibited by Mississippi law from initiating and utilizing an ALPR-based motor vehicle insurance enforcement program. However, certain factual and legal determinations, which are outside the scope of this opinion, must be considered in regard to the proposed program." Section 21-17-5(1), known as the Home Rule statute, "grants municipalities the right to adopt ordinances with regard to their 'municipal affairs' . . . if said ordinances are not inconsistent with state legislation and/or the Mississippi Constitution." Jones, 278 So. 3d at 1133 (quoting Maynard, 691 So. 2d at 387). Subject to the specific exceptions set forth in Section 21-17-5(2), none of which are applicable here, "the powers granted to governing authorities of municipalities in this section are complete without the existence of or reference to any specific authority granted in any other statute or law of the State of Mississippi." Miss. Code Ann. § 21-17-5(1).

Third, you state that the proposed sample diversion ticket differs from the State's Uniform Traffic Ticket, and you ask if the Mississippi Attorney General has approved the subject deviations from the State's Uniform Traffic Ticket. This question is outside the scope of an opinion. As noted above, Section 7-5-25 grants this office the authority to issue official opinions on questions of Mississippi law only.

Fourth, you ask if the proposed program, where a private company and/or law enforcement officer unilaterally dismisses tickets outside of a court and without the judge's consent, is consistent with Mississippi's statute providing when a traffic ticket may be dismissed. You highlight that this office has previously opined that a misdemeanor affidavit, including a traffic ticket, can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51, which provides:

In prosecutions for petty misdemeanors, if the party injured appear before the court where the same shall be pending and acknowledge to have received satisfaction, on motion of the prosecuting attorney the court, if it shall adjudge that the ends of justice will be conserved thereby, may discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings and may require the payment of court costs.

See MS AG Op., Miller at *1 ("[A] misdemeanor affidavit, including a traffic ticket, can only be dismissed in accordance with Section 99-15-51 of the Mississippi Code."). We retain the position stated in Miller. This said, whether a particular program is consistent with a state statute is a factual determination to be made by the City or a court of law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 7-5-25.

Next, you ask if the proposed diversion program is consistent with Section 63-9-11(3)(a), which provides individuals, under certain circumstances, the option of attending traffic safety school so that no record of a violation appears on their driving record. As discussed in Purdie, Section 63-9-11 "provides first-time violators of Chapter 3, 5, or 7 of Title 63 the option to complete a traffic safety violator course." MS AG Op., Purdie at *4. But "Sections 63-15-4(4), relating to the failure to have proof of insurance, and 63-16-13(1), relating to the failure to maintain insurance, while not prohibiting such a diversion program, do not specifically contemplate a diversion program." Id. We also note that Section 21-23-7 gives municipal judges the ability to "establish and operate a probation program, dispute resolution program and other practices or procedures appropriate to the judiciary and designed to aid in the administration of justice." But again, whether a particular program is consistent with a state statute is a factual determination to be made by the City or a court of law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 7-5-25.

In follow up, you ask if the City may lawfully contract with the company to operate a municipal court diversion program for driving without insurance. Such question would be dependent upon the applicable case-specific facts. As provided in MS AG Op., Purdie at *5, whether a diversion program ultimately meets all statutory requirements is a question of fact upon which this office may not opine.

If this office may be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,
LYNN FITCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: /s/ Maggie Kate Bobo
Maggie Kate Bobo
Special Assistant Attorney General

[Footnote 1: In MS AG Op., Howell at *2 (Nov. 8, 2024), we stated that "any traffic ticket, citation, or affidavit issued . . . must contain the information required by [Section 63-9-21(3)(b)-(d)] of the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law."]