Could Maryland's Transportation Trust Fund pay for parking lot construction at the old Redskins stadium site?

Plain-English summary

State Senator Chris Van Hollen, Jr. asked the Attorney General whether Maryland's Transportation Trust Fund could be used to grant money to the Washington Redskins (owned at the time by Jack Kent Cooke, Inc.) or another party to help pay for on-site infrastructure at a proposed new stadium on the Wilson Farm property in Prince George's County, including parking lot construction.

The opinion split the question into three parts. First, the Secretary of Transportation already had authority under the Transportation Article to grant Trust Fund money for the construction of on-site roadways and related infrastructure changes, like rerouting a sewer line needed because of that road construction, since building roads is squarely a "transportation related purpose." Second, the Secretary could never use Trust Fund money for on-site infrastructure, such as water or sewer lines, that the stadium itself made necessary rather than the roadwork, since that falls outside any reasonable reading of "transportation related purpose." Third, parking lots fell in an ambiguous middle ground: out-of-state courts had treated parking facilities tied to a transportation project as transportation-related, but no Maryland authority had addressed the term, so the opinion concluded the ambiguity should be resolved by looking to the annual budget bill's own language governing the Trust Fund, and that a grant for parking lot construction would be authorized if, and only if, the budget bill for the relevant fiscal year expressly approved that use.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, fund-use restriction, or budget bill condition mentioned here, particularly since the Redskins Stadium project and the underlying Transportation Trust Fund budget conditions described here reflect fiscal year 1996 legislative choices.

Common questions

Could Maryland use highway or transit trust fund money to help build a private stadium's parking lot?
According to this opinion, only if the state's annual budget bill expressly authorized that specific use. The opinion found the underlying statutory term "transportation related purpose" ambiguous as applied to parking, so it looked to budget bill language governing the Transportation Trust Fund to resolve the ambiguity in a given fiscal year rather than deciding the question in the abstract.

Could the fund be used to pay for water and sewer upgrades needed because of a new stadium?
No, according to this opinion. It drew a firm line here: infrastructure work needed because a stadium (not a road) was being built on the site fell entirely outside the Secretary of Transportation's "transportation related purpose" grant authority, and no budget bill language could expand the statute to cover it.

Can a state budget bill override or expand what a trust fund statute otherwise allows?
No, expand is the wrong word according to this opinion. It explained that budget bill language cannot authorize a program "contrary to statute" or enlarge the scope of an ambiguous statute beyond what it could reasonably bear, but where a statutory term is genuinely ambiguous, budget bill language addressing that same subject can help resolve which reasonable interpretation controls.

Background and statutory framework

Under Transportation Article §3-216(d)(1), the Transportation Trust Fund may be used by the Department of Transportation, after debt service, for any lawful purpose related to its rights, powers, duties, and obligations. Separately, TR §2-103(i)(2) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make grants "to the extent permitted by the State budget" to governmental transportation agencies or any other person for "any transportation related purpose," a phrase the opinion found undefined by statute, unaddressed by any reported Maryland case, and not clarified by the provision's legislative history since its original 1970 enactment and 1972 expansion to cover private grantees.

The opinion resolved the resulting ambiguity by applying the principle that laws on the same subject should be read together as an integrated body of law, drawing on Haskell v. Carey and In re Douglas P., and by looking to the annual Department of Transportation budget condition then in effect, which limited large unbudgeted Trust Fund commitments to purposes "bearing direct relation to the State Transportation program" absent legislative budget committee review. It distinguished this permissible use of budget bill language to interpret an ambiguous grant-making statute from an impermissible attempt to "legislate in the budget," citing Bayne v. Secretary of State for the rule that a budget bill cannot implement a program contrary to statute or enlarge a statute's scope. It also drew on out-of-state case law treating stadium or highway-adjacent parking facilities as transportation-related, including the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decisions in Miller v. Commonwealth and Commonwealth v. E-Z Parks, Inc., and the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in Kennedy v. Aerr Co. construing a "transportation" exclusion in an insurance policy.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Transportation Article, §3-216(d)(1), authorizing use of Transportation Trust Fund money for any lawful departmental purpose after debt service
• Transportation Article, §2-103(i)(2), authorizing grants "to the extent permitted by the State budget" for any transportation related purpose
• Transportation Article, §2-107, describing the Department of Transportation's modal administrations
• Transportation Article, §2-103.1(c), defining the Consolidated Transportation Program
• Maryland Constitution, Article III, §52, the Executive Budget Amendment governing the annual budget bill's unique legislative features

Cases:

• Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 556, 451 A.2d 658, on reading related statutes together as an integrated body of law
• In re Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 393, 635 A.2d 427 (1994), on gleaning legislative intent from a statute's relationship to other legislation
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), on legislative intent and statutory relationships
• Ward v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 339 Md. 343, 351-52, 663 A.2d 66 (1995), on construing a statute as part of an entire statutory scheme
• Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 574, 392 A.2d 67 (1978), holding budget bill language cannot implement a program contrary to statute
• Yangming Marine Transport Corp. v. Revon Products U.S.A. Inc, 311 Md. 496, 536 A.2d 633 (1988), on construing a statute to avoid a constitutional problem
• Miller v. Commonwealth, 498 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), a Pennsylvania court holding a parking garage integral to a highway project was a transportation purpose
• Commonwealth v. E-Z Parks, Inc., 620 A.2d 712, 719-20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), a Pennsylvania court on leased land for a parking garage as a related transportation purpose
• E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 498 A.2d 1364, 1368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), a Pennsylvania court holding public parking was a highway related use
• Kennedy v. Aerr Co., 833 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1991), a Colorado court construing "transportation" broadly to include activities flowing from transportation

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1996/81oag269.pdf

Original opinion text

Gen. 269] 269

T RANSPORTATION – S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION – B UDGETARY
A DMINISTRATION – U SE OF T RANSPORTATION T RUST F UND
F OR G RANT TO P AY O N-S ITE I NFRASTRUCTURE C OSTS AT
R EDSKINS S TADIUM

                      February 15, 1996

The Honorable Chris Van Hollen, Jr.
Maryland Senate

 You have requested our opinion whether funds from the

Transportation Trust Fund may be used as a grant to reimburse the
Washington Redskins or any other party for the construction of
parking lots or other on-site improvements for the proposed
Redskins Stadium.

  Jack Kent Cooke, Inc., the owner of the Washington Redskins,

plans to build a new football stadium on a tract of land in Prince
George's County known as the Wilson Farm property.[1] As part of
the inducement for Cooke to build the stadium, the State has agreed
in principle to pay for certain on-site infrastructure, including
parking lot construction.[2] Your question is whether the
Transportation Trust Fund may be used to fund a grant for this
purpose.

  Our opinion is as follows:

  1. Subject to any restriction that might appear in the budget

bill, the Secretary of Transportation has authority to use
Transportation Trust Fund money for a grant to the Redskins or
another party for the construction of on-site roadways and related
infrastructure changes, like the rerouting of a sewer line required by
the road construction.

269 [81 Op. Att'y

  2. Whatever the budget bill might provide, the Secretary

does not have authority to use Trust Fund money for a grant to the
Redskins or another party for the construction of on-site
infrastructure, like water or sewer lines, that is needed because of the
stadium itself, not because of road construction.

  3. The Secretary would have authority to provide a grant for

the construction of on-site parking lots if the budget bill for fiscal
year 1997 expressly authorizes that use of Trust Fund money.

                               I

  Secretary of Transportation's Grant-Making Authority

  The Transportation Trust Fund may be used by the Department

of Transportation, after payment of debt service, "for any lawful
purpose related to the exercise of its rights, powers, duties, and
obligations." §3-216(d)(1) of the Transportation ("TR") Article,
Maryland Code. Under TR §2-103(i)(2), the Secretary of
Transportation has the authority to make grants "for any
transportation related purpose":

            To the extent permitted by the State
        budget, the Secretary may make grants-in-aid
        to:

            (i) Any governmental transportation
        agency in this State, including any county
        agency, bi-county agency, multi-jurisdiction
        agency, or municipal agency; or

            (ii) Any other person for any
        transportation related purpose.[3]

The phrase "transportation related purpose" is not defined; neither
is the term "transportation." The language has not been construed
in any reported Maryland case. Nor has it been interpreted by
regulation or adjudicatory decision.

   The text is not illuminated by the legislative history. When the

Department of Transportation was created in 1970, the Secretary
was granted authority to "apply for and receive ... grants in aid or
gifts to be used for transportation related purposes." Former Article
41, §208(m). See Chapter 526 of the Laws of Maryland 1970. At
the time, the Secretary's authority to make grants was limited to
"any governmental transportation agency within the State of
Maryland."

  In 1972, the Secretary's grant-making authority was expanded

beyond governmental transportation agencies. As a result of
Chapter 17 of the Laws of Maryland 1972, the Secretary was
additionally authorized to make grants "to any person, corporation,
association, or other entity for any transportation related purpose."
Former Article 41, §208(g). The 1977 enactment of TR §2-103(i)
carried forward this language without substantive change or
elaboration. See Chapter 13 of the Laws of Maryland 1977.

  If the term "transportation" were construed with primary

regard for its broad statutory context, the term would be taken to
refer to the goals and activities of the various components of the
Department of Transportation. The Department is the spine of an
organization that, through its modal administrations, renders
particular transportation services: mass transit, highways, airport
services, the Port of Baltimore, and the like. See TR §2-107.
"Transportation," in other words, is what the parts of the Department
do, and what they do is provide the means by which people and
goods move from place to place. This concept of "transportation"
dovetails with the everyday definition of the term. See Random
House Dictionary of the English Language 2012 (2d ed. 1987);
Black's Law Dictionary 1499 (6th ed. 1990).

  Under the everyday definition, and under any other

conceivable reading of the term "transportation," at least one
component of the on-site infrastructure construction, the
construction of roadways, is unquestionably an object for which the
Secretary's grants may be provided. A grant would also be
"transportation related" if it covered the cost of infrastructure work
caused by road construction, if, for example, storm drains or sewer
lines had to be relocated.

272 [81 Op. Att'y

  Conversely, the Secretary may not provide a grant for

infrastructure work that is needed, not because of road construction,
but because a stadium will be built on the site in place of farm
buildings. Presumably 78,000 people will impose quite a demand on
water and sewer lines; if the existing lines are inadequate, they will
need to be upgraded. That is not a "transportation related purpose"
and may not be the object of a grant from the Secretary.

  Between these clear categories of what is allowed and what is

not fall parking lots. On the one hand, no component of the
Department is responsible for parking lots (except, of course, in
connection with a direct transportation service, like a park-and-ride
lot for mass transit). If "transportation related purpose" were
construed to mean only purposes related to the mission of the
Department's administrations, a grant for parking lots to
accommodate fans at a football stadium would not be permissible.

  On the other hand, we cannot say that the term "transportation

related purpose" bears no meaning other than this relatively narrow
one. To the contrary: Out-of-state authority suggests that the
provision of parking can itself fairly be regarded as a "transportation
related purpose," because access to parking reduces potentially
hazardous road congestion.

  In Miller v. Commonwealth, 498 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1985), the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation had
condemned some property for a highway easement. When the
highway was delayed, the property was leased to a private party for
use as a parking lot. Later, when the original highway design was
scaled down and the property was no longer to be part of a highway
interchange, the property was planned to be used as a parking garage
adjacent to the highway. The landowner objected to the taking for
this purpose, contending that the parking garage was not a
permissible objective of condemnation under a statute authorizing
condemnation for "transportation purposes." The court rejected this
argument, holding that the term "transportation purpose" was broad
enough to include transportation-related activities, like the parking
garage, "which was designed as a integral part of the highway
project and was intended to mitigate the loss of existing surface
parking and minimize traffic congestion." 498 A.2d at 1374. See
also Commonwealth v. E-Z Parks, Inc., 620 A.2d 712, 719-20 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1993) (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation had
discretion to conclude that leased land for a parking garage was a
"related transportation purpose"); E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 498
A.2d 1364, 1368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), aff'd, 503 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1986)
(public parking was a "highway related use").

  These Pennsylvania cases, with their broad view of

"transportation," are not unique. Other courts, in other contexts,
have taken a similar view of the term. For example, in Kennedy v.
Aerr Co., 833 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1991), the issue was whether a
"transportation" exclusion in an insurance policy excused an insurer
from liability for an accident caused by a parked piece of
construction equipment. The equipment spilled some oil while
being loaded onto a trailer, and the plaintiff was injured when her car
skidded on a patch of the oil. The court held that the
"transportation" exclusion applied: "Transportation includes a
process that is not limited to a moving vehicle, but also includes the
activities (processes) originating from or flowing from
transportation." 833 P.2d at 809. Parking a vehicle is surely an
activity "originating from or flowing from transportation."

   To summarize, the phrase "transportation related purpose" is

ambiguous. A conservative interpretation would limit parking
facility grants to those parking facilities that are directly related to
a programmatic mission of a component within the Department of
Transportation. A more expansive interpretation would allow a
grant for a parking facility that the Secretary might determine to be
needed to reduce the risk of gridlock on roads near the stadium as
fans park where they can.

 In our view, the better approach to resolving the matter is to

construe this ambiguous statute in light of another legislative
enactment: the annual budget bill.

                              II

              Effect of Budget Bill Language

  The annual budget bill is a law like any other law. To be sure,

it has certain unique features, deprived from the requirements of
Article III, §52 of the Constitution, the Executive Budget
Amendment. Nevertheless, the budget bill is subject to the
customary principles of statutory construction.

  One such principle is that laws on the same subject are to be

read together, to the extent reasonably possible, so as to create an
integrated body of law. See, e.g., Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550,
556, 451 A.2d 658. "[L]egislative intent may be gleaned from a
statute's 'relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation.'" In re
Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 393, 635 A.2d 427 (1994) (quoting
Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628
(1987)) (emphasis added). This principle would seem especially apt
here, given that TR §2-103(i)(2) expressly recognizes the role of the
annual budget bill in shaping grant-making practice: The statute
conditions the Secretary's grant-making authority "[t]o the extent
permitted by the State budget ...." As the Court of Appeals recently
observed, "In examining the language, ... we cannot view individual
provisions in isolation, but must look at the entire statutory scheme."
Ward v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 339
Md. 343, 351-52, 663 A.2d 66 (1995).

 For the current fiscal year, and for the past several years, the

budget of the Department of Transportation has contained the
following condition:

              It is the intent of the General Assembly
          that funds dedicated to the Transportation
          Trust Fund shall be applied to purposes
          bearing direct relation to the State
          Transportation program, unless directed
          otherwise by legislation. To implement this
          intent for the Department of Transportation in
          FY 1996, no commitment of funds in excess
          of $250,000 may be made nor may such an
          amount be transferred, by budget amendment
          or otherwise, for any project or purpose not
          normally arising in connection with the
          ordinary ongoing operation of the Department
          and not contemplated in the budget approved
          or the last published Consolidated
          Transportation Program without review and
          comment by the budget committees.[4]

This language, applied to TR §2-103(i)(2), would prevent a grant for
a parking lot for the proposed Redskins Stadium "without review
and comment by the budget committees."[5] The statement of intent
in the first sentence of the budget condition, if applied rigorously by
the budget committees, would rule out such a grant, for it cannot be
said that the parking lot bears "direct relation to the State
Transportation program." Yet, the very existence of this budget
restriction implies that the statutory authority of the Secretary is
broader. If the statutory authority were narrow, the budget condition
might not be needed.

  We understand that the Administration is considering language

in a supplemental budget bill that would retain the prior condition
but add language expressly authorizing Transportation Trust Fund
money to be used for the construction of a parking facility at the
proposed Redskins Stadium. In all likelihood, the language would
recognize the special problem of traffic congestion that would be
posed by a crowd at a football game if parking were not adequate at
the stadium itself.

  In our view, such budget bill language would resolve the issue

squarely in favor of recognizing that a grant for the parking lot is
permitted by the statute. Of course, budget bill language cannot
authorize a program to be "implemented in a manner contrary to
statute ...." Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 574, 392 A.2d
67 (1978). A budget bill is not a means by which the General
Assembly may enlarge the scope of a statute. So, for example, the
budget bill could not authorize Trust Fund money to be used for on-
site water and sewer line construction not caused by road
construction.

 But it is not impermissible "legislating in the budget" for the

budget bill to specify a use of funds that can reasonably be
encompassed by the ambiguous term "transportation related
purpose." Because the statute itself recognizes that grants are to be
made "to the extent permitted by the State budget," there is all the
more reason to harmonize the statute with an interpretation of it in
the budget bill.[6]

                               III

                          Conclusion

  In summary, it is our opinion that Transportation Trust Fund

money may be used for a grant for on-site road construction and
related infrastructure work at the proposed Redskin Stadium. A
grant may also be made for parking lot construction if that use is
authorized in the budget bill. Trust Fund money may not be used for
a grant for on-site infrastructure work needed for reasons other than
road construction.

                                     J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                     Attorney General

                                     Jack Schwartz
                                     Chief Counsel
                                     Opinions and Advice

[1] The tract is now owned by the Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission.

[2] The agreements of the various parties are reflected in a Letter of
Intent dated December 3, 1995. The Letter of Intent is not itself legally
binding. The parties will be bound only after the deal is embodied in a
memorandum of understanding.

[3] Because of the broad wording "[a]ny other person," the Secretary
unquestionably may provide a grant to a private entity.

[4] The Consolidated Transportation Program is an annual list of
current and future projects. See TR §2-103.1(c).

[5] The Counsel to the Department of Transportation earlier gave the
Secretary of Transportation precisely this advice in a memorandum dated
November 9, 1995. He concluded that, given the language contained in
the budget bill, the Department should construe the term "transportation
related" in a conservative manner, so as not to permit grants to be utilized
for the construction of a parking lot. Memorandum from Assistant
Attorney General Edward R. K. Hargadon to Secretary David L. Winstead
(November 9, 1995).

[6] Indeed, if the budget bill were enacted with language authorizing
the use of Trust Fund money for stadium parking lots, a court would likely
favor a broad interpretation of the statute, to avoid declaring the budget
bill language unconstitutional. A construction of a statute that avoids a
constitutional problem is to be preferred. See, e.g., Yangming Marine
Transport Corp. v. Revon Products U.S.A. Inc, 311 Md. 496, 536 A.2d
633 (1988).