Does a Maryland county have to fund the full budget its local liquor licensing board requests?

Plain-English summary

Talbot County's Board of Liquor License Commissioners asked the Attorney General whether an unappealed Circuit Court for Talbot County decision about funding the local elections board also controlled how the county had to fund the liquor board. The liquor board had requested $15,970 in operating expenses plus $3,000 to revise license application forms, funded out of the roughly $145,000 it generated in license fee revenue, and the County Council had cut that request without specifying which expenses it viewed as unnecessary.

The Attorney General agreed that the circuit court's reasoning carried over. The election board funding statute at issue in that case and the liquor board funding statute in Article 2B, §63(q) both used mandatory language requiring the county to pay the board's "necessary" expenses, and the opinion found no meaningful difference between them. Under that reasoning, Talbot County's council had an obligation to appropriate the liquor board's full requested budget unless the council could point to a factual basis for concluding that a specific requested expense was not "necessary and reasonable." The opinion also rejected the County Council's argument that its separate local power to regulate the retail sale of alcoholic beverages let it cut the liquor board's funding, reasoning that funding the board's operating expenses was not itself an act of "regulating" retail alcohol sales.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could a Maryland county cut a liquor board's budget just because the council thought it was spending too much?
Not without more, according to the opinion. The AG concluded the council needed a factual basis for finding a specific requested expense unnecessary or unreasonable; an across-the-board reduction without that finding did not satisfy the funding statute as construed here.

Did the county's power to regulate alcohol sales let it control the liquor board's budget?
No, according to the opinion. It held that a county's local authority to "regulate the retail sale of alcoholic beverages" was a separate power from the statutory duty to fund the liquor board's necessary expenses, so that regulatory authority did not excuse a funding cutback.

Was the circuit court decision about the elections board legally binding on the liquor board's funding question?
Not directly. The opinion noted that the circuit court's decision was an unappealed trial-level ruling with no binding precedential effect beyond its own case, but concluded that the same statutory analysis applied because the wording of the two funding statutes was materially the same.

Background and statutory framework

Under Article 2B, §63(q), license fee revenues in Talbot County funded "the necessary office, clerical, and investigational expenses" of the county's liquor board, subject to a $3,500 annual cap on amounts the board could spend at its own discretion. The Attorney General compared that language to Article 33, §2-4(b), which required a county to pay "all necessary and reasonable expenses" of its local elections board, the statute construed in State Administrative Board of Elections Laws v. Talbot County. In that case, the Circuit Court for Talbot County held the county was under an "imperative duty" to fund positions the elections board proposed unless the county had a factual basis for finding the expenses not "necessary and reasonable."

The opinion also considered whether Talbot County's local authority under Article 2B, §206 and Article 25, §3(ee) to enact local alcohol-sale regulations superseding state law gave the council a separate basis to control the liquor board's budget. It concluded that provision addressed substantive regulation of retail alcohol sales, not the funding obligation set out separately in §63(q), so it did not change the council's duty to fund the board's necessary expenses.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article 33, §2-4(b), Maryland Code, elections board funding obligation
• Article 2B, §63(a), (q), Maryland Code, liquor board funding source and duty
• Article 2B, §206, Maryland Code, Talbot County local alcohol-regulation authority
• Article 25, §3(ee), Maryland Code, cross-referenced local regulation authorization

Cases:

• State Administrative Board of Elections Laws v. Talbot County, Case No. CG1622 (Cir. Ct. for Talbot Cty. May 27, 1992)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1992/Volume77_1992.pdf (this opinion appears at printed page 7 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

Liquor Boards - Counties - Obligation of Talbot County to
Fund Liquor Board

                         October 22, 1992

Mr. W. Francis Callahan
Chairman, Board of Liquor License
Commissioners of Talbot County

    You have requested our opinion concerning the obligations of the

Talbot County Council to provide appropriations to the liquor board.
Specifically, you ask whether the rationale of State Administrative Board
of Elections Laws v. Talbot County, Case No. CG1622 (Cir. Ct. for Talbot
Cty. May 27, 1992) (Sause, J.), applies to the funding of the liquor board.
If so, the Talbot County Council will be required to revisit its decision to
reduce the appropriation requested by the liquor board.1

  For the reasons stated below, we conclude as follows: The rationale

of SABEL v. Talbot County is applicable to the County Council's
obligation to fund the liquor board. Unless an expense is unnecessary, the
County Council must appropriate the full amount requested by the liquor
board.

                                   I

                            Background

   As we understand the facts, the Board of Liquor License

Commissioners submitted a budget request contemplating operating
expenses of $15,970, plus an additional expense of $3,000 to revise and
print license application forms. The liquor board estimated that it would
generate revenues of approximately $145,000, out of which its budget
would be funded. The County Council imposed reductions in the budget,
although the materials supplied us do not reveal the exact amount of the
cut.

1
You also posed a question, the background facts of which are not clear
from the materials provided, about a "furlough" of the liquor board's attorney
ordered by the county. See note 3 below.

   The liquor board contends that the requested budget embraced only

necessary expenses and therefore was required to be fully funded under the
rationale of SABEL v. Talbot County. The County Council contends that
SABEL v. Talbot County is inapplicable to the liquor board.

                                 II

                    SABEL v. Talbot County

   This case involved the obligation of Talbot County to fund the local

board of supervisors of elections. Under Article 33, §2-4(b) of the
Maryland Code, "all ... necessary and reasonable expenses of each
[election] board shall be an expenditure of the county or Baltimore City in
which the board is located ..." The case arose when the Talbot County
Council declined to fund two staff positions at the election board on a full-
time basis. The position of the election board, supported by SABEL, was
that full funding was "reasonable and necessary."

  In a very thorough opinion, the circuit court held that the county was

under an "imperative duty" to fund the positions as proposed by the local
board, unless the county had a basis in fact for concluding that the
expenses in question were not "necessary and reasonable." Slip op. at 52.
The circuit court's decision was not appealed.

                                 III

           Funding of Talbot County Liquor Board

  Under Article 2B, §63(a), revenues from license fees are paid to each

county. In Talbot County, those license fees are the source of the liquor
board's funding: "In Talbot County the salaries of the Board of License
Commissioners and the necessary office, clerical, and investigational
expenses of the Board shall be paid by the County Council out of receipts
from licenses from the sale of alcoholic beverages. However, the Board
may expend in its discretion not more than $3,500 in any year for salaries
and expenses." Article 2B, §63(q).

 The statute thus imposes a duty on the County Council: It "shall"

pay "the necessary office, clerical and investigational expenses of the
Board ..." There is no material difference between §63(q) and the election
board funding statute construed in SABEL v. Talbot County. Hence,
unless some other provision of law requires a different result, the reasoning
of SABEL v. Talbot County would be applicable.2

  We are not aware of any other such law. It is true that under Article

2B, §206, the County Council has been given power under certain
circumstances to enact local laws that would supplant otherwise applicable
requirements of Article 2B:

           (a) The Talbot County Commissioners shall
       regulate the retail sale of alcoholic beverages within
       Talbot County.

           (b) Any law enacted by the Talbot County
       Commissioners pursuant to §3(ee) of Article 25 shall
       prevail over any provision of the Code of Public
       General Laws of Maryland regulating the retail sales of
       alcoholic beverages. However, unless and until the
       Talbot County Commissioners enact a law which is
       contrary to a provision of the Code of Public General
       Laws regulating the retail sale of alcoholic beverages,
       the provisions of the Code of Public General Laws
       shall remain in effect.

The cross-referred provision, Article 25, §3(ee), is an identically worded
authorization to "regulate the retail sale of alcoholic beverages within
Talbot County."

    Whatever may be the result of an exercise of this power in other

contexts, we do not believe that this provision is relevant to the present
issue. Although the source of the liquor board's funding derives from "the
retail sale of alcoholic beverages," the provision in §63(q) that imposes the
duty on the County Council to fund the necessary expenses of the liquor
board is not itself an aspect of "regulat[ing] the retail sale of alcoholic
beverages." Thus, no enactment by the County Council pursuant to §206
could affect its duty to provide the funding required under §63(q).

2
We do not mean to suggest that SABEL v. Talbot County, an unappealed
circuit court decision, itself has any binding or even precedential effect beyond that
case itself. Our conclusion is that the analysis undertaken by Judge Sause of the
county's obligation under Article 33, §2-4(b) is the same analysis that should be
applied to the county's obligation under Article 2B, §63(q).

                                    IV

                               Conclusion

   In summary, it is our opinion that the reasoning of the decision of

SABEL v. Talbot County applies to the funding of the Board of Liquor
License Commissioners of Talbot County. Therefore, the County Council
is required to fund the "necessary" expenses of the liquor board.3

  An Attorney General's opinion cannot probe the details of this

question of necessity, which the County Council apparently did not
address. We recommend that the County Council and liquor board
reexamine the issue of the liquor board's budget in light of SABEL v.
Talbot County.4

                                          J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                          Attorney General

                                          Jack Schwartz
                                          Chief Counsel
                                          Opinions & Advice

3
The "necessity" test, calling for the ascertainment of objective facts, is
to be applied after the liquor board determines the manner in which its statutory
duties are to be carried out. See SABEL v. Talbot County, slip op. at 20-21.

4
Likewise, the issue of the "furlough" of the liquor board's attorney
should be reconsidered.