When did Maryland's 1992 constitutional amendments changing the civil jury trial rules, six-person juries and a $5,000 threshold, take effect, and did they apply to cases already pending?

Plain-English summary

Maryland's State Court Administrator asked the Attorney General when four newly approved constitutional amendments on civil jury trials took effect, and whether they applied to cases that were already pending in court. The amendments allowed civil juries of as few as six people instead of twelve, and raised the amount-in-controversy threshold for demanding a jury trial from $500 to $5,000.

The Attorney General concluded the amendments and their implementing statutes took effect December 1, 1992, the date the Governor proclaimed the voters had approved them, and that they applied to pending cases rather than only to new filings. Because the legislature had not written an explicit prospectivity or retroactivity clause, the opinion applied Maryland's common-law rules for construing statutes: procedural and remedial changes are generally given retroactive effect, while changes to substantive rights are presumed prospective absent a clear contrary intent. The opinion found several signs the legislature intended some application to pending matters, including a fiscal note projecting a decrease in local jury expenditures during fiscal year 1993 that made sense only if the higher jurisdictional threshold reached pending cases right away. It settled on a specific trigger for each change: the $5,000 threshold applied to any jury trial demand ("prayer") made on or after December 1, 1992, regardless of when the case itself was filed, and the six-person jury rule applied to any jury impaneled on or after that date, meaning a twelve-person jury already sitting did not have to be reduced.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

When did Maryland's 1992 constitutional amendments on civil jury trials take effect?
The opinion concluded the amendments and their implementing statutes took effect December 1, 1992, the date the Governor signed a proclamation declaring that the voters had approved them.

Did the new $5,000 jury trial threshold apply to cases that were already pending in 1992, or only to new lawsuits filed after December 1?
The opinion concluded the higher threshold applied to pending cases too, but only based on when a jury trial was actually demanded: a demand made before December 1, 1992 would still be honored even if the amount in controversy was as low as $501, while a demand made on or after December 1, 1992 required more than $5,000 in controversy.

Did sitting twelve-person juries have to be reduced to six people because of the 1992 amendments?
No. The opinion concluded the six-person jury rule applied only to juries impaneled on or after December 1, 1992, so a twelve-person jury already sitting before that date did not need to be reduced.

Background and statutory framework

Four constitutional amendments approved by Maryland voters in 1992 changed civil jury trial rules: Chapters 203 and 204 of the Laws of Maryland 1992 (Senate Bill 262 and House Bill 320) allowed civil juries of fewer than twelve but at least six jurors, implemented by Chapter 85 (Senate Bill 263), which fixed the number at six; and Chapters 205 and 206 (Senate Bill 434 and House Bill 489) raised the amount-in-controversy threshold for a jury trial demand from $500 to $5,000, implemented by Chapter 95 (Senate Bill 433), which let a party demand a jury trial and transfer a case from District Court to Circuit Court once that higher threshold was met. All four implementing statutes were contingent on voter approval of the corresponding constitutional amendments and took effect October 1, 1992 subject to that contingency; the Governor's December 1, 1992 proclamation confirmed voter approval and, under Article XIV, §1 of the Maryland Constitution, made the amendments and contingent legislation effective that day.

Because none of the statutes contained an express applicability clause, the opinion turned to Maryland common-law retroactivity principles, noting the General Assembly's own past practice on similar jurisdictional-amount changes had been inconsistent (contrasting Chapter 758 of the Laws of Maryland 1981, which had no applicability provision, with Chapter 512 of the Laws of Maryland 1982, which expressly applied only to cases filed after a set date). Applying the general rule that procedural and remedial statutes are given retroactive effect while substantive-rights statutes are presumed prospective absent clear legislative intent otherwise, the opinion looked to a Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee floor report describing the amendments as intended "to promote economy and efficiency in the judicial branch," and to a fiscal note anticipating a fiscal year 1993 decrease in local jury expenditures, as evidence the legislature meant the changes to reach pending cases immediately rather than apply only prospectively. The opinion then fixed the specific trigger for each provision: for the jurisdictional-amount statute, the timing of the jury trial demand itself, and for the six-person jury statute, the date a jury was actually impaneled, an approach the opinion described as both retroactive (reaching pending cases) and prospective (keyed to an event occurring after the amendments' effective date).

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Chapters 203 (Senate Bill 262) and 204 (House Bill 320) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, six-person civil jury constitutional amendments
• Chapter 85 (Senate Bill 263) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, implementing legislation fixing civil juries at six
• Chapters 205 (Senate Bill 434) and 206 (House Bill 489) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, $5,000 jury trial threshold constitutional amendments
• Chapter 95 (Senate Bill 433) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, implementing legislation on the jurisdictional amount for jury trial demand
• Article XIV, §1 of the Maryland Constitution, effective date of constitutional amendments upon gubernatorial proclamation
• Chapter 758 of the Laws of Maryland 1981 and Chapter 512 of the Laws of Maryland 1982, prior jurisdictional-amount legislation cited for legislative practice on applicability clauses

Cases:

• State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 124, 360 A.2d 1 (1976), Maryland Court of Appeals
• WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987), Maryland Court of Appeals
• State v. Burning Tree Club, 315 Md. 254, 263-68, 554 A.2d 366 (1989), Maryland Court of Appeals
• Estate of Dauer v. Zabel, 156 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Mich. App. 1967), Michigan Court of Appeals
• Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 635-36, n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1981), federal appeals court
• Ex Parte Johnson, 215 Md. 391, 395, 138 A.2d 347 (1958), Maryland Court of Appeals

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1992/Volume77_1992.pdf (this opinion appears at printed page 52 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Courts and Judges - Jurisdiction and Procedure -
Constitutional Law - Amendment Process -
Applicability of Constitutional Amendments Affecting
Jury Trials

                        December 10, 1992

George B. Riggin, Jr., Esquire
State Court Administrator

  You have requested our opinion on the effective date of recently

approved constitutional amendments on civil jury trials. You have also
asked to what degree, if any, the amendments and implementing legislation
apply to pending cases.

   For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the jury trial

amendments and implementing statutes took effect December 1, 1992 and
that they apply to pending cases. The jurisdictional amount statute applies
to jury trials prayed after December 1, 1992. The six-person jury statute
applies to juries impaneled on or after December 1, 1992.

                                  I

                           Background

   Chapters 203 (Senate Bill 262) and 204 (House Bill 320) of the

Laws of Maryland 1992 proposed identical constitutional amendments
allowing fewer than twelve, but at least six, jurors to sit in a civil
proceeding. Chapter 85 (Senate Bill 263) of the Laws of Maryland 1992,
which took effect October 1, 1992, contingent on the approval of these
constitutional amendments, fixed the number of jurors in a civil case at six.

   Chapters 205 (Senate Bill 434) and 206 (House Bill 489) of the

Laws of Maryland 1992 proposed identical constitutional amendments
raising the amount in controversy triggering a right to jury trial from $500
to $5,000. Chapter 95 (Senate Bill 433) of the Laws of Maryland 1992,
which took effect October 1, 1992, contingent on the approval of these
constitutional amendments, amends the District Court jurisdictional statute
to provide that a party may demand a jury trial in a civil action and transfer
the action to the Circuit Court if the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000.

   On December 1, 1992, the Governor signed a proclamation declaring

that the four amendments in question had been approved by the voters and
thus "shall become part of the Constitution." As a result of this
proclamation, the amendments are adopted and effective. Article XIV, §1
of the Maryland Constitution. Therefore, the effective date of the
amendments and the legislation contingent upon them is December 1,
1992.

                                    II

                               Analysis

   Because the statutes contain no special applicability provision or an

express prospectivity or retroactivity clause, their operative effect should
be determined by common law principles of statutory construction aimed
at determining the intent of the General Assembly. Under Maryland
common law, if a statute affects a procedure or remedy, it will be given
retroactive effect. See State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom
Div., 278 Md. 120, 124, 360 A.2d 1 (1976). On the other hand, if the
legislation affects substantive rights, it is presumed to operate
prospectively and will not be applicable to a pending case, absent a clear
expression of legislative intent. WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md.
556, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987). Presumptively prospective legislation may
still be found to be retroactive to a degree, even in the absence of an
express retroactivity clause, although such an intent must be clearly
stated. See, e.g., State v. Burning Tree Club, 315 Md. 254, 263-68,
554 A.2d 366 (1989); State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom
Div., 278 Md. at 127.

  Although the need for immediate advice precludes an exhaustive

examination of all relevant out-of-state authorities, we note that a
Michigan court has said that "the manner" of demanding trial by jury is
"procedural." Estate of Dauer v. Zabel, 156 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Mich.
App. 1967). A federal appellate court, moreover, has described a
change in an amount-in-controversy requirement as "directed at the
remedy." Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 635-36, n.14 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). In addition, in Ex Parte Johnson, 215 Md. 391, 395, 138
A.2d 347 (1958), the Court of Appeals, in concluding that denial of a
jury trial was not immediately appealable, stated that:

                It has even been held that an order denying
          a jury trial neither affects a substantial right nor
          involves the merits of an action, and hence is not
          appealable because the ruling or order relates
          only to the method of trying facts, and leaves the
          rights of the parties on the merits of the matter
          entirely unadjudicated.

   But even if the new jury trial legislation relates to substantive

rights, the intent of the General Assembly was that the measure apply in
some degree to pending cases. The constitutional amendments and
implementing legislation were "intended to promote economy and
efficiency in the judicial branch." See Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee Floor Report on Senate Bills 262 and 263; Fiscal Note on
Senate Bill 433. In fact, the fiscal note to Senate Bill 433 anticipates that,
as a result of enactment of the new jury trial jurisdictional amount
requirement, local expenditures for juries "would decrease in fiscal year
1993" - a highly unlikely prospect if the measure applied only to cases filed
on or after December 1, 1992. In light of these indications of legislative
intent and the fact that legislation contingent upon the constitutional
amendments was enacted by the General Assembly to implement the
measures immediately, we believe that the statutes were not intended to be
fully prospective, but rather were designed to apply to pending cases.

   The question remains as to the degree that the statutes were intended

to apply to pending cases. In other words, what event triggers the
application of the new provisions? In our view, a reasonable construction
of the new legislation that gives due regard to the expectations of parties,
the nature of the jury trial right, and the goals of the legislation would
hinge present application of the increased jurisdictional amount statute to
the time when a jury trial was prayed. Thus, if a jury trial were prayed
before December 1, 1992, the request would be honored and the case
transferred to circuit court, even if the amount in controversy involved only
$501. However, on or after December 1, 1992, a jury trial request would
be granted and the case transferred only if the amount in controversy
exceeded $5,000.

   Similarly, the six-person jury statute can be reasonably construed to

apply to juries impaneled on or after December 1, 1992. Twelve-person
juries presently sitting need not be reduced. While such a construction
would be retroactive in the sense that it applies to pending cases, it would
also be prospective in that the triggering event takes place after the
effective date of the statute.

                                III

                           Conclusion

   In summary, it is our opinion that the jury trial amendments and

implementing statutes took effect December 1, 1992 and that they apply
to pending cases. The jurisdictional amount statute applies to jury trials
prayed after December 1, 1992, and the six-person jury statute applies to
juries impaneled on or after December 1, 1992.

                                           J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                           Attorney General

                                           Robert A. Zarnoch
                                           Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice

1
In the past, the practice of the General Assembly on similar measures
has not been consistent. For example, Chapter 758 of the Laws of Maryland
1981, which raised the jurisdictional amount in the District Court from $5,000 to
$10,000, contained no express applicability provision. Chapter 512 of the Laws
of Maryland 1982, which excluded attorney's fees from the amount-in-controversy
computation, expressly applied only to cases filed after July 1, 1982.

2
A key question in many retroactivity cases is not whether a statute
should be applied retroactively, but how. For example, in State Human Relations
Comm'n v. Division of Amecom, the Court held that a statute was intended to
apply prospectively to acts of discrimination occurring after its effective date, but
at the same time was designed to apply "retroactively" to existing employee
contracts.