Could Maryland enforce its 1992 'gas guzzler' tax surcharge and fuel-efficiency credit law, or did federal fuel economy law preempt it?

Plain-English summary

Maryland's 1992 legislature passed a "gas guzzler" tax law, new TR §13-818, adding an excise tax surcharge for buyers of low-mileage cars, a tax credit for buyers of high-mileage cars, and a requirement that dealers post a notice on each car showing its fuel economy rating and whether it would trigger the surcharge or credit. The federal government's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration told Maryland's Motor Vehicle Administration that the whole law was preempted by a federal statute barring states from adopting fuel-economy disclosure rules that aren't identical to the federal window-sticker label, and separately barring state laws that "relate to" federal fuel economy standards. The MVA asked the Attorney General whether NHTSA was right.

The Attorney General agreed only in part. The notice requirement was indeed preempted, because it required a single "fuel economy rating" different from the federal label's separate city and highway mileage figures, and federal law bars any state fuel-economy disclosure rule that isn't identical to the federal one. But the opinion pushed back hard on NHTSA's broader claim that the tax surcharge and credit themselves were preempted just because they used federal mileage figures as a reference point; the opinion argued Maryland could tax gas guzzlers more heavily using any yardstick it liked, including one based on the federal mileage rating, without that tax "relating to" federal fuel economy standards in the sense that matters for preemption, since the tax imposed no obligations on automakers at all and only shaped consumer purchasing choices. Still, the opinion concluded the surcharge and credit could not be enforced for now, because they weren't legally severable from the invalid notice provision: without the point-of-sale notice, the tax's whole purpose of nudging buyers toward fuel-efficient cars before they made their purchase decision would be undermined, so the entire law had to sit dormant until either the General Assembly fixed the notice language or Congress amended the federal disclosure statute to allow it.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992 and analyzed a brand-new statute against contemporary Supreme Court preemption case law, most notably a decision issued just weeks earlier. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here, including the current status of TR §13-818, the federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act's preemption provisions, and current preemption doctrine, which the Supreme Court has continued to develop since 1992.

Common questions

Was Maryland's 1992 gas guzzler tax notice requirement legal?
No, according to this opinion. The Attorney General concluded the notice, which required disclosure of a single "fuel economy rating," was a state fuel-economy disclosure rule that wasn't identical to the federal window-sticker label, and federal law preempts any state disclosure rule that isn't identical to the federal one.

Did federal law also block Maryland from taxing low-mileage cars more and giving a credit for high-mileage cars?
Not necessarily, according to the opinion. It argued the federal preemption provision only reaches state laws about "fuel economy standards" themselves, and Maryland's tax imposed no requirements on car manufacturers at all, only affecting consumer buying decisions, so it had at most a "tenuous, remote, and peripheral" connection to the federal program, the kind of effect the Supreme Court had said does not trigger preemption even under a broadly worded "relating to" clause.

If only the notice part of the law was clearly illegal, why couldn't Maryland just collect the tax without the notice?
Because the opinion concluded the notice and the tax mechanism weren't legally severable. The tax's entire purpose was to influence a buyer's choice before they bought a car, and a surcharge or credit buried in the paperwork after the fact, without the point-of-sale notice, wouldn't meaningfully change anyone's decision, so the opinion concluded the legislature would not have wanted the tax to operate without it.

Could Maryland's gas guzzler tax ever become enforceable?
Yes, according to the opinion, in either of two ways: the General Assembly could amend the notice language to remove the federal-mileage-specific disclosure and describe the surcharge and credit some other way (for example, framing it around environmental harm rather than a miles-per-gallon figure), or Congress could amend the federal disclosure statute to allow the kind of notice Maryland wanted to use.

Background and statutory framework

TR §13-818, enacted in a 1992 special session focused on transportation funding, imposed a fuel efficiency surcharge on passenger cars with poor fuel economy ratings and a tax credit for cars with high fuel economy ratings, calculated relative to the federal "fuel economy" definition borrowed from 26 U.S.C. §4064 of the Internal Revenue Code and adjusted by the EPA; for cars with model years of 1995 or later, the surcharge and credit scaled at $50 per mile-per-gallon above or below set thresholds, capped at 1% of the purchase price either way. The law also required dealers to post a notice on each car showing its "fuel economy rating" and whether a surcharge or credit applied, with the MVA given authority to prescribe the notice's exact form and to adopt implementing regulations.

The federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act established a national average fuel economy program administered by NHTSA, including two separate preemption clauses: one barring states from adopting or enforcing any law relating to federal fuel economy standards, and a second, narrower one barring state fuel-economy disclosure rules unless "identical" to the federal manufacturer labeling requirement. The opinion found the notice provision squarely preempted under the second, disclosure-specific clause: because Maryland's notice required a single combined "fuel economy rating" rather than the federal label's separate city and highway mileage figures, it was not identical to the federal disclosure and therefore unenforceable, though the opinion suggested the General Assembly could fix this by rewriting the notice to avoid referencing a miles-per-gallon figure at all, describing the surcharge instead in terms like environmental harm.

On the harder question, whether the tax itself was preempted under the broader "relating to" clause, the opinion engaged directly with a U.S. Supreme Court decision handed down just three weeks earlier, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, which read "relating to" broadly in striking down state airline advertising guidelines under a similarly worded federal preemption clause. The opinion argued Morales was distinguishable because the Supreme Court itself had cautioned that state actions with only a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection to the federally regulated subject escape preemption, and unlike the airline guidelines in Morales, Maryland's gas guzzler tax imposed no obligations on manufacturers, who remained free to sell any car regardless of its mileage; the tax only shaped consumer demand, an effect the opinion characterized as having no more than an incidental, indirect relationship to the federal fuel economy program. The opinion committed to defending this position in court if the tax provisions were ever challenged, once the notice problem was resolved.

Because Maryland severability doctrine asks what the legislature would have wanted if it had known part of a law would be invalid, and because the opinion concluded the tax program's behavioral purpose depended on buyers learning about the surcharge or credit at the point of sale, the opinion concluded the General Assembly would not have wanted the tax mechanism to take effect without the notice, so all of TR §13-818 remained legally dormant, not repealed, but unenforceable, until either the state or Congress resolved the notice defect.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• TR §13-818 (Transportation Article), Maryland's 1992 gas guzzler tax surcharge, credit, and notice law, including subsections (a)(3), (b), (c), (f), and (g)
• TR §13-809, the vehicle excise tax to which the surcharge and credit attached
• 15 U.S.C. §2001(6) and (7), defining "fuel economy" and "average fuel economy standard" under the federal Cost Savings Act
• 15 U.S.C. §2002(a)(4), authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to set average fuel economy standards
• 15 U.S.C. §2006(a)(1)(A) and (a)(3), the federal manufacturer fuel economy label requirement
• 15 U.S.C. §2008, civil penalties for manufacturers who fail to meet federal fuel economy standards
• 15 U.S.C. §2009(a), (b), and (c), the federal preemption provisions for fuel economy standards and disclosure requirements
• 26 U.S.C. §4064 (Internal Revenue Code), the federal "fuel economy" definition incorporated by TR §13-818
• 49 C.F.R. §531.5, the NHTSA regulation establishing average fuel economy standards
• 40 C.F.R. §600.307-86, the EPA regulation specifying the federal fuel economy window-sticker label
• 42 U.S.C. §§7507 and 7543, cited as an example of Congress allowing states to adopt stricter vehicle emissions standards
• U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, the Supremacy Clause underlying federal preemption

Cases:

• City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57 (1988), cited for the rule that a state law preempted by Congress is unconstitutional
• Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 60 U.S.L.W. 4444 (June 1, 1992), the recent Supreme Court decision construing "relating to" broadly in an analogous airline preemption clause
• Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), cited for the principle that state actions with only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral effect escape preemption
• Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), cited on respecting the separate spheres of state and federal authority in preemption analysis
• Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, No. 90-1676 (U.S. June 18, 1992), cited as evidence the Supreme Court itself was divided on close preemption questions
• Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990), cited on the Maryland severability standard
• Home Utilities Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956), cited on a dormant statute becoming enforceable if a legal defect is later cured
• Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976), cited on a statute becoming fully enforceable after a curative amendment to one subsection

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1992/Volume77_1992.pdf (this opinion appears at printed page 222 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Vehicle Laws - Taxation - Environment - Preemption -
Validity of "Gas guzzler Law"

                          June 24, 1992

Mr. W. Marshall Rickert
Motor Vehicle Administrator

   You have asked for our opinion whether federal law preempts the

Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") from enforcing certain provisions
of the recently enacted Chapter 3 of the Laws of Maryland 1992 (First
Special Session). These provisions, which were enacted as new §13-818
of the Transportation Article ("TR" Article) and become effective on July
1, 1992, require an excise tax surcharge to be imposed on a buyer of a
vehicle with a low fuel mileage rating, a tax credit to be given to a buyer
of a vehicle with a high fuel mileage rating, and a notice to be affixed to
vehicles offered for sale telling consumers about the applicability of the
surcharge or credit. By letter dated June 8, 1992, the Chief Counsel of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") expressed
NHTSA's view that TR §13-818 is preempted in its entirety and may not
be enforced.

  We do not agree with NHTSA's overall assessment, which we find

to be too broad. While we share its conclusion that the consumer notice
requirement in TR §13-818(f) is preempted, we do not concede that the
tax surcharge-tax credit aspect of the Maryland law is likewise preempted.
In our view, Maryland and the other states are not barred from enacting
important environmental legislation merely because the State law uses fuel
economy numbers as a point of reference.

   Nevertheless, applying principles of Maryland law, we advise that the

tax surcharge and tax credit provisions of TR §13-818 should not now be
enforced, because they are not severable from the invalid notice
requirement in TR §13-818(f). If the legal defect in the notice requirement
is corrected in the future, the surcharge and credit provisions could then
be applied, and we will defend the statute if it is challenged in court.

                                  I

                            TR §13-818

   The April Special Session of the General Assembly enacted a number

of measures related to transportation funding, combined in Chapter 3.
These measures included the tax mechanism summarized in TR §13-
818(b): "In conjunction with the tax imposed under §13-809 of this
Article, a fuel efficiency surcharge or fuel efficiency credit shall be imposed
under this section based on the fuel economy rating of the model type of
the passenger car."

  "[T]he tax imposed under §13-809" refers to the vehicle excise tax.

The term "fuel economy" is defined to have "the meaning stated in §4064
of the Internal Revenue Code as determined and adjusted by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to account for the difference between
controlled laboratory conditions and actual road driving." TR §13-
818(a)(3). Section 4064 of the Internal Revenue Code defines "fuel
economy" as "the average number of miles traveled by an automobile per
gallon of gasoline (or equivalent amount of other fuel) consumed as
determined by the EPA Administrator ..."

  For passenger cars with a model year of 1993 or 1994, a surcharge

of $100 is to be imposed if the car has a fuel economy rating that is less
than 21 miles per gallon. TR §13-818(c)(1)(i). For cars with a model year
of 1995 or later, the fuel efficiency surcharge is computed by multiplying
by $50 the "nearest whole number of miles per gallon that the fuel
economy rating of the model type of the automobile is less than 27 miles
per gallon." TR §13-818(c)(1)(ii)2. So, for example, the purchaser of a
1995 model with a fuel economy rating of 23 miles per gallon would pay
$200 ((27-23) x $50). However, the surcharge for cars with a model year
of 1995 or later may not exceed 1% of the purchase price of the car. TR
§13-818(c)(2).

   As an incentive for people to buy vehicles with a high fuel economy

rating, the General Assembly provided a $50 credit against the excise tax
paid for any passenger cars with a model year of 1993 or 1994 that have
a fuel economy rating greater than 35 miles per gallon. TR §13-
818(c)(3)(ii). For cars with a model year of 1995 or later and with a fuel
economy rating over 35 miles per gallon, the credit is computed by
multiplying $50 by the number of miles per gallon that the fuel economy
rating exceeds 35 miles per gallon. TR §13-818(c)(3)(ii). The buyer of a
1995 model year car with a fuel economy rating of 38 miles per gallon, for
example, would receive a $150 tax credit against the excise tax owed
under TR §13-809 ((38-35) x $50). As with the surcharge, though, the
amount of the tax credit is limited to an amount not to exceed 1% of the
purchase price of the car. TR §13-818(c)(4).

  The law also requires a dealer to "prominently display on a vehicle

offered for sale" a notice to its customers indicating whether the car being
purchased is subject to a surcharge or a tax credit. TR §13-818(f). The
customer is informed, generally, that the mileage or credit is based on the
fuel economy rating, as that rating is determined by the Environmental
Protection Agency. The MVA is to develop the exact form that will
appear on vehicles, but the statute sets out the basic requirements. The
notice is to begin as follows:

      "For this vehicle, the fuel economy rating is     . The
      fuel efficiency surcharge is                or the fuel
      efficiency credit is

The notice goes on to describe the manner in which the fuel economy
rating is determined, the legislative requirements for a surcharge, and the
legislative requirements for a credit.

   Finally, the law grants to the MVA authority to "adopt rules and

regulations to implement and operate the fuel efficiency surcharge and
credit program under this section." TR §13-818(g).

                                 II

                    Federal Cost Savings Act

  Subchapter V of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2001 through 2013 (the "Cost Savings Act"), establishes
a comprehensive average fuel economy program. The Cost Savings Act,
enacted as part of the 1975 Energy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
163, 89 Stat. 90 (1975), was intended to bring "measured savings in
consumption of energy by improving the efficiency of the cars we drive."
H.R. Rep. No. 94-340, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 1762, 1763 (94th Cong. 1st Sess.).

   Specifically, the Cost Savings Act authorizes the federal Secretary

of Transportation to establish the average fuel economy standards for
manufacturers of passenger automobiles. 15 U.S.C. §2002(a)(4). "The
term 'average fuel economy standard' means a performance standard
which specifies a minimum level of average fuel economy which is
applicable to a manufacturer in a model year." 15 U.S.C. §2001(7). "The
term 'fuel economy' means the average number of miles traveled by an
automobile per gallon of gasoline (or equivalent amount of other fuel)
consumed, as determined by the EPA Administrator in accordance with
procedures established under section 2003(d) of this title." 15 U.S.C.
§2001(6).

   The Cost Savings Act contains the following preemption provisions:

            (a) Whenever an average fuel economy standard
        established under this subchapter is in effect, no State
        or political subdivision of a State shall have authority
        to adopt or enforce any law or regulation relating to
        fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
        standards applicable to automobiles covered by such
        Federal Standard.

             (b) Whenever any requirement under section 2006
        of this title is in effect with respect to any automobile,
        no State or political subdivision of a State shall have
        authority to adopt or enforce any law or regulation
        with respect to the disclosure of fuel economy of such
        automobile, or the fuel cost associated with the
        operation of such automobile, if such law or regulation
        is not identical with such requirement.

15 U.S.C. §2009.2

                                   III

              Preemption of the Notice Requirement

  Turning first to the notice requirement in TR §13-818(f), we

conclude that it is a law "with respect to the disclosure of fuel economy ...
[that] is not identical with" the federal disclosure requirement.
Accordingly, TR §13-818(f) is preempted by 15 U.S.C. §2009(b) and is
unenforceable.3

  There can be no doubt that TR §13-818(f) is a provision "with

respect to the disclosure of fuel economy of [an] automobile ..." It
requires notice of a car's "fuel economy rating" and explains the method
by which that rating was determined.

  Furthermore, TR §13-818(b) is not "identical with" the federal

requirement. Under 15 U.S.C. §2006(a)(1)(A), automobile manufacturers
are required to affix a label on each automobile indicating, among other
things:

           (i) the fuel economy of such automobile,

           (ii) the estimated annual fuel cost associated with
       the operation of such automobile, and

           (iii) the range of fuel economy of comparable
       automobiles (whether or not manufactured by such
       manufacturer),

         as determined in accordance with rules of the EPA
       Administrator ....

The "form and content" of this label is to be determined by the EPA
Administrator. 15 U.S.C. §2006(a)(3). EPA has in fact issued a
regulation specifying in elaborate detail the content and appearance of the
familiar window sticker with "gas mileage information." See 40 C.F.R.
§600.307-86 and Part 600, App. III.

   The notice required by TR §13-818(f) departs from the federal label.

For example, the federal label shows separate "City MPG" and "Highway
MPG" figures; TR §13-818(f) mandates disclosure of a single "fuel
economy rating." As NHTSA points out in its letter, these differing
versions of information on the same topic - "fuel economy," defined by 15
U.S.C. §2001(6) to mean miles per gallon as determined by EPA -
potentially give rise to consumer confusion. Congress evidently sought to
allay that risk by allowing states to use only the federal disclosure
information if a state wishes to legislate with respect to the disclosure of
"fuel economy," as defined in the Cost Savings Act.

  The General Assembly could correct the problem by amending TR

§13-818(f) to eliminate any reference to "fuel economy" - that is, a car's
miles-per-gallon rating. Presumably consumers can be informed about the
tax surcharge-tax credit mechanism in other ways. For example, the notice
could refer to the fact that a surcharge is imposed "because this car's
excessive use of energy harms the environment." Such a general
disclosure, devoid of any reference to the car's miles-per-gallon rating,
would not be one "with respect to the disclosure of fuel economy" and
would not be preempted by 15 U.S.C. §2009(b).4

                                    IV

            Preemption of Tax Surcharge and Credit

 A second issue is whether the tax surcharge-tax credit mechanism in

TR §13-818 "relates to [federal] fuel economy standards or average fuel
economy standards" and so is preempted under 15 U.S.C. §2009(a).

   At the outset, we reject any suggestion that Maryland is generally

barred from acting to encourage the purchase of fuel-efficient cars. The
federal preemption provision speaks only of "fuel economy standards,"
which by definition concern only the miles per gallon attained by a car. See
15 U.S.C. §2001(6). Thus, if the Maryland General Assembly used its tax
power to shift consumer demand away from gas guzzlers toward fuel-
efficient cars without reference to the federal fuel economy standards - by
linking the tax surcharge and credit to factors like engine displacement and
vehicle weight, for example, rather than miles per gallon - the State law
would not be preempted.

  TR §13-818 is problematic because it describes the incidence of the

tax surcharge and credit by explicit reference to the federal fuel economy
standards. NHTSA is of the view that the Maryland law is preempted for
this reason.5 And, indeed, we acknowledge that the case for preemption
has seemingly been bolstered by a recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting a different preemption provision using the term
"relating to."

  On June 1 of this year, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal statute

prohibiting states from enacting laws "relating to" airline rates preempted
the Texas Attorney General from enforcing certain guidelines on airline
advertising that had been established by the National Association of
Attorneys General ("NAAG"). Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 60
U.S.L.W. 4444, 4448 (June 1, 1992).

   The Court, in construing the preemption clause of the Airline

Deregulation Act contained in 49 U.S.C. §1305(a), stated that the words
"relating to" had a broad meaning. They mean '"to stand in some relation;
to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with
or connection with ...,' and the words thus express a broad pre-emptive
purpose." 60 U.S.L.W. at 4446 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th
ed. 1979)). Relying on a series of cases construing the same phrase in the
preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§1001 et seq., the Court held that "State enforcement
actions having a connection with or reference to airline 'rates ...' are pre-
empted ..." Id. The Court specifically rejected the Texas Attorney
General's argument that the preemption language in the Airline
Deregulation Act simply precluded a State from establishing or prescribing
rates. The Court stated:

       This [argument] simply reads the words "relating to"
       out of the statute. Had the statute been designed to
       pre-empt state law in such a limited fashion, it would
       have forbidden the States to "regulate rates..."

Id. (emphasis in original).

  In its letter urging the view that the Cost Savings Act preempted TR

§13-818 in its entirety, NHTSA quoted some of the language from
Morales set out above as if it were dispositive. We do not view the issue
as quite so simple.

   The Court was careful to end its opinion with the observation that

"'[s]ome state actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect." 60 U.S.L.W. at 4448
(quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
And the Court was at pains to point out the "significant effect" that the
NAAG Guidelines supposedly would have on fares: Enforcement of the
guidelines, according to the Court, would "curtail the airlines' ability to
communicate fares to their customers"; would "severely burden [the
airlines'] ability" to both restrict the availability of cheap seats and
advertise cheap fares; would "effectively prevent the airlines from using
[certain] terms to call attention to the fares ..."; and "may make it
impossible [for the airlines] to use this marketing process at all." 60
U.S.L.W. at 4447. In our view, the point of the contrast is that some state
laws, although they might literally "refer to" a matter within the zone of
federal preemption, have so little actual impact on those subject to federal
regulation as to avoid preemption.

   At the appropriate time, we are prepared to argue to a court that the

tax surcharge-tax credit mechanism of TR §13-818, despite its use of
federal fuel economy standards as a point of reference, has at most a
"tenuous, remote, [and] peripheral" effect on those standards. Unlike the
NAAG Guidelines at issue in Morales, TR §13-818 does not impose any
obligations or restrictions on the federally regulated industry. Automobile
manufacturers may continue to market their cars in Maryland whatever the
cars' fuel economy. The tax program affects only consumers, not
manufacturers or dealers. And if the Maryland law succeeds in its
objective of shifting consumer demand incrementally away from the most
environmentally harmful cars to more fuel-efficient ones, that change in
demand will have no effect on the operation of the federal fuel economy
program (except to make it marginally easier for manufacturers to achieve
their minimum corporate average standard, if they produce more fuel-
efficient cars to meet the incremental demand).

  No immediate court test of the validity of TR §13-818 will be

necessary, for the reasons explained in Part V of this opinion. But if and
when that time comes, we shall seek to convince the court that, "guided by
respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our
federalist system," Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522
(1981), it should uphold Maryland's exercise of its sovereign tax power to
protect its environment.6

                                 V

                            Severability

  Because the notice provision of TR §13-818(f) is invalid, running

afoul of the preemption provision in 15 U.S.C. §2009(b), we must consider
whether the otherwise enforceable balance of TR §13-818 is severable.
The issue of severability is entirely a matter of State law.

   As we observed in a prior opinion, "The question of severability is

in every case a question of legislative intent. Of course, the intent to be
ascertained is not the actual legislative intent (which is always that the
entire law should be effective), but what the General Assembly would have
intended had it known that the statute could be only partially effective."
73 Opinions of the Attorney General 78, 83 (1988). See, e.g., Porten
Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 410, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990).

   TR §13-818 as a whole is primarily intended to achieve

environmental benefits by encouraging car buyers to choose fuel-efficient
cars (although in the long run it is also expected to yield significant
revenue). It can achieve this objective only if consumers learn about the
tax consequences of their purchasing decisions while they are considering
various car models. The notice in TR §13-818(f) would give them that
information. Indeed, this subsection was the result of an amendment by the
sponsors, who saw the value of this uniform method of consumer
notification.

   Without the notice, the law loses much of its capacity to affect

consumer choice. A tax surcharge buried in the excise tax line item on the
purchase agreement, if it is noticed by the buyer at all, is not likely to
change a decision already made. The program will work as intended only
if the surcharge-credit mechanism is brought forcefully to the buyer's
attention early in the transaction, when even the comparatively small sums
involved might be enough to shift a buyer's preference. We cannot
conclude that the General Assembly would have intended to have the
surcharge-credit mechanism operate without any real opportunity to sway
buying decisions. Hence, we advise that the tax surcharge-tax credit
mechanism cannot now be given effect.7

 That TR §13-818 is not presently enforceable because of a

combination of federal preemption of one part of the statute and
nonseverability of the rest does not take the statute out of the code. It
remains a part of Maryland law, albeit dormant for now, and it could
become enforceable in the future if TR §13-818(f) were no longer invalid.

    One possibility is that Congress could amend 15 U.S.C. §2009(b) to

permit the kind of notice now contained in TR §13-818(f). If Congress did
so, all of TR §13-818 would become enforceable without further action by
the General Assembly. See Home Utilities Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass,
Inc., 209 Md. 610, 619, 122 A.2d 109 (1956).

   If Congress does not act to change federal law, the General

Assembly nevertheless could amend TR §13-818(f) to eliminate the
preemption problem. See Part IV above. Once the amendment became
effective, all of TR §13-818 would become enforceable, even if the General
Assembly only amended subsection (f). Cf. Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md.
619, 651, 366 A.2d 21 (1976).8

                                    VI

                               Conclusion

  In summary, it is our opinion that the notice requirement in TR §13-

818(f) is invalid under federal law and is not severable from the rest of TR
§13-818. Therefore, the MVA should refrain from enforcing the entire
provision until the problem with TR §13-818(f) is corrected. If and when
the law does become effective, this office will defend its validity if it is
challenged in court.

   We conclude by observing that Congress could give meaning to basic

principles of federalism, as it has done in related contexts, by amending the
Costs Savings Act's preemption provision to explicitly authorize state laws
like TR §13-818.9 Like many other states, Maryland faces a formidable
task in meeting Clean Air Act requirements. An effort to promote use of
more fuel-efficient cars would help reduce air pollution and might translate
into jobs saved in the industrial sector of our economy. Such a law does
no harm to national policy and could potentially achieve significant
environmental benefits locally. Congress should act in the interests of both
the federal system and the environment to ratify the validity of laws like TR
§13-818.

                                          J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                          Attorney General

                                          Jack Schwartz
                                          Chief Counsel
                                          Opinions and Advice

                                          Edward R. K. Hargadon
                                          Assistant Attorney General

1
The standards are established by regulation. See 49 C.F.R. §531.5
(1991). Failure by a manufacturer to meet the standards established by NHTSA
results in the imposition of civil penalties. 15 U.S.C. §2008.

2
15 U.S.C. §2009(c) contains language preserving the prerogative of a
state to establish "requirements with respect to fuel economy of automobiles
procured for its own use."

3
When federal law preempts the state from enacting a law, Article VI,
Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires that the federal law shall prevail. Any
attempt by a state to enforce a law preempted by Congress is unconstitutional. City
of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988).

4
TR §13-818(f) authorizes the MVA to prescribe the form used for the
notice. Because the statute sets out specific language and requires that the notice
"be in substantially [that] form," however, we conclude that the MVA may not itself
simply alter the notice to eliminate references to fuel economy.
The MVA could, however, exercise its regulatory authority to "implement"
the program by fashioning some alternative method for informing consumers about
the surcharge-credit mechanism. A regulation adopted under TR §13-818(g) would
have the force and effect of law. Like a legislative change in the notice, however,
any regulatory alternative must avoid fuel economy disclosures that are not identical
with federal disclosures. See also note 8 below.

5
NHTSA's prompt decision to assert that TR §13-818 is wholly
preempted is somewhat surprising in light of Executive Order 12611 (October 15,
1987), in which President Reagan ordered federal executive branch agencies to
"closely examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any federal
action that would limit the policy making discretion of the States, and [to] carefully
assess the necessity for such action." Sec. 3(a).

6
The Supreme Court itself is hardly of one mind about close preemption
questions. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, No. 90-1676
(U.S. June 18, 1992).

7
The rest of Chapter 3, a compendium of crucially important
transportation revenue measures, is manifestly severable from TR §13-818. See
Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 410.

8
The MVA has authority under TR §13-818(g) to adopt a regulation embodying
an alternative form of consumer notification. See note 4 above. Whether such
action by an administrative agency could have the effect of restoring the
enforceability of the statute is a novel question that we need not presently address.
We understand from the MVA that other, unrelated issues might prevent
implementation even if the problem resulting from the present invalidity of TR §13-
818(f) were corrected. This opinion does not address those other issues.

9
Congress, for example, has wisely chosen to allow first California and
then the other states to adopt and enforce certain emission control standards more
stringent than federal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§7507 and 7543.