Can a Maryland state agency hand off one of its programs to a private nonprofit without legislative approval, and does the nonprofit's money count as public funds?

Plain-English summary

Maryland's Governor's Office for Individuals with Disabilities (OID) had built a program, the Maryland Corporate Partnership Project, to connect employers with qualified workers who have disabilities, then handed its day-to-day operation off to a newly formed private nonprofit corporation, the Maryland Corporate Partnership, Incorporated (MCP). The Legislative Auditor raised two questions: did OID need the General Assembly's or the Board of Public Works' approval before privatizing the program this way, and were the fees and grant money MCP collected actually public funds that had to be deposited in the State Treasury rather than kept in the corporation's own checking account?

The Attorney General concluded OID's privatization was lawful without further approval, because OID had the statutory power to run this kind of program but was never legally required to run it directly itself, only to identify, evaluate, and coordinate services for people with disabilities. On the money question, the opinion walked through a multi-factor test used in an earlier opinion about the Chesapeake Bay Trust (who controls the entity's leadership, who controls its budget and assets, whether its services benefit the public generally versus a narrow group, and whether the State gives it unusual financial support) and concluded MCP was not functioning as an "alter ego" of the State on any of these factors: its board, not a state official, controlled it; it funded itself through fees, donations, and grants rather than direct appropriations; its services served a defined group rather than the general public; and free office space in a state building wasn't enough, on its own, to make it a state instrumentality. So MCP's revenue stayed out of the State Treasury.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here, including the current status of the Office for Individuals with Disabilities, the Maryland Corporate Partnership, and the specific statutes cited.

Common questions

Could a Maryland state agency privatize one of its programs without the legislature's sign-off?
According to this opinion, yes, at least where the agency had the statutory power to run the program but no statutory mandate to run it directly itself. OID's core statutory role was to identify, evaluate, and coordinate disability services, not to personally operate every program it developed, so handing the Corporate Partnership Project to a private nonprofit didn't require legislative or Board of Public Works approval.

Did the money the private nonprofit collected count as state funds that had to go into the State Treasury?
No, according to the opinion. Applying a multi-factor test from an earlier opinion on the Chesapeake Bay Trust, the Attorney General found the nonprofit's board (not a state official) controlled it, it wasn't funded through direct legislative appropriation, its services went to a defined population rather than the public at large, and receiving grant funds or free state office space wasn't enough by itself to make it a state instrumentality.

Does simply giving a nonprofit free office space or grant funding turn it into a state agency?
Not on its own, according to the opinion. It treated rent-free office space in a state-owned building and receipt of state grant funds as relevant but not decisive facts, especially where the value of the space was already factored into the state's grant amount and the nonprofit wasn't otherwise subject to day-to-day state control.

How did the opinion decide whether a nonprofit is really a "state agency" for fiscal-control purposes?
It applied a four-factor framework from a prior Attorney General opinion on the Chesapeake Bay Trust: who appoints or controls the entity's decisionmakers, who controls its budget and assets, whether its activities benefit the public broadly or a narrower group, and whether the state provides it unusual financial support. No single factor was treated as automatically controlling.

Background and statutory framework

OID was created within the Office of the Governor under Subtitle 11 of Title 9 of the State Government Article, with a statutory role under SG §9-1105 to identify and evaluate programs and services for individuals with disabilities, collect information about needed services, identify barriers to service delivery, develop information and referral services, and foster coordination among public and private agencies serving this population. In 1988 OID launched the Maryland Corporate Partnership Project with the Department of Economic and Employment Development (DEED) and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, contemplating from the start that the project would eventually move to the private sector. A contractual employee hired to direct the project, under Article 64A, §15A, was tasked with incorporating it, and on August 16, 1989 the Maryland Corporate Partnership, Incorporated (MCP) was formed as a private nonprofit; that director then became MCP's president, and DVR and DEED funding for the project was redirected to MCP through grant agreements rather than passing through OID.

On the authority question, the opinion relied on the general principle that state agencies hold only the powers expressly granted by the legislature plus those implied as necessary to carry them out, and that an agency may not relinquish express statutory powers absent legislative authorization, but that using a private contractor to carry out a function the agency is permitted, but not required, to perform directly is not an improper relinquishment. Because MCP's stated purpose (centralizing information for employers about hiring workers with disabilities) fell within OID's own statutory functions, and OID was never required by SG §9-1105 to run such a program itself rather than merely identify, evaluate, and coordinate it, the transfer was proper, drawing a parallel to an earlier opinion upholding a county's authority to contract out operation of a detention facility so long as the county didn't wholly abdicate its underlying statutory responsibility.

On the fiscal-control question, the opinion applied Article VI, §3 of the Maryland Constitution and SF §6-213(a), which require State Treasury deposit of state agency revenues, but only for entities that are actually state agencies or their "alter ego." Using the four-factor Chesapeake Bay Trust framework, the opinion found MCP's board of directors (only 3 of 13 members from the public sector), not any state official, controlled the corporation's operations and finances; MCP's funding came from fees, donations, and grant agreements rather than direct legislative appropriation, and receipt of grant money alone did not convert it into a state agency; its services benefited a defined population (employers and workers with disabilities) rather than the general public; and the free office space it received in a state building, whose value was already reflected in the state's grant calculations, was not the kind of unusual financial arrangement that would indicate state-instrumentality status. On each factor, the opinion concluded MCP operated independently enough of the State that its revenue was private, not public, money.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• SG §9-1105 (State Government Article), defining OID's statutory functions
• Article 64A, §15A and §15A(3), governing contractual employees and their supervision
• Article 83A, §§3-101(c) and 3-103, defining DEED's employment and training coordination role
• Education Article §21-303(b)(3) and (6), defining the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation's functions
• Article VI, §3 of the Maryland Constitution, requiring State Treasury deposit of state moneys
• SF §6-213(a) (State Finance and Procurement Article), requiring units of state government to pay collections into the State Treasury

Cases:

• In re North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, 417 A.2d 1115 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), cited for the principle that a function may be contracted out if the agency is not under a legal mandate to perform it directly
• Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1989), cited on whether a private nonprofit under state contract counts as a state agency
• League General Insurance Company v. Michigan Catastrophic, 458 N.W.2d 632 (Mich. 1990), cited for the principle that an entity can be an "agency" if created by agency action, not only by statute
• Alaska Commercial Fishing v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986), cited for the principle that corporate status is a neutral factor in the state-agency analysis
• Ram Ditta v. Md. Nat. Capital Park and Planning Commission, 822 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1987), cited for the "alter ego" analysis factors used to determine an entity's state agency status
• Hester International Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1989), cited among decisions applying an "alter ego" analysis
• Patterson v. Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523 (D.Md. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 552 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1977), cited among decisions applying an "alter ego" analysis
• Baltimore Arts Festival, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council, 326 Md. 653, 607 A.2d 1 (1992), cited for the principle that a city's contract with and funding of a private corporation does not automatically make the corporation a city agency
• Kentucky Region Eight v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1974), cited for the same principle that receiving and administering state grant funds does not make a private corporation a state agency

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1992/Volume77_1992.pdf (this opinion appears at printed page 173 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

PUBLIC AGENCIES AND ENTITIES

Budgetary Administration - Disabled Persons - Creation of
Private Corporation to Carry Out Program of Office
for Individuals With Disabilities - Status of
Corporation's Funds

                        August 17, 1992

Ms. Diane K. Ebberts
Director, Governor's Office for
Individuals with Disabilities

  You have requested our opinion concerning the privatization of the

Maryland Corporate Partnership Project (the "Project"), a program
developed by the Governor's Office for Individuals with Disabilities
("OID") to increase opportunities for employees with disabilities.
Specifically, you ask (1) whether OID's transfer of the operation of the
Project to the Maryland Corporate Partnership, Incorporated ("MCP"),
a private nonprofit corporation, required the approval of the General
Assembly or the Board of Public Works, and (2) whether MCP's cash
receipts for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 were public funds subject to
deposit in the State Treasury.

  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude as follows:

  1. OID has sufficient statutory authority to transfer operation of

the Project to a private entity. The privatization of the program thus
was valid without either legislative action or Board of Public Works
approval.

   2. MCP was not required to deposit revenue received during

fiscal years 1990 and 1991 into the State Treasury. Because MCP is not
a State agency, the constitutional restrictions relevant to State funds are
inapplicable.

                                    I

                             Background

  The Office for Individuals with Disabilities, created by and

operating under Subtitle 11 of Title 9 of the State Government Article
("SG" Article), is a unit within the Office of the Governor.1 In brief,
OID's purpose is to examine State, public, and private programs and
services for individuals with disabilities in order to provide assistance and
coordination as needed. See SG §9-1105.

   Early in 1988, OID initiated the Maryland Corporate Partnership

Project, a program to improve employment opportunities for individuals
with disabilities through the establishment of a "partnership," or
network, between private and public agencies and corporate employers.
To implement the Project, OID enlisted the aid of the Department of
Economic and Employment Development ("DEED") and the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation ("DVR") within the State Department of
Education.2 DEED, through its Division of Employment and Training,
is responsible for coordinating the State's public and private resources
for employment and job training. See Article 83A, §§3-101(c) and 3-
103 of the Maryland Code.3 DVR's functions include vocationally
rehabilitating individuals with disabilities and placing them in gainful
occupations. See §21-303(b)(3) and (6) of the Education Article.

   In June 1989, OID, DEED, and DVR entered into a "Cooperative

Agreement Concerning the Maryland Corporate Partnership." The
agreement stated that DEED would provide office space and furnishings
for the Project; that all three agencies would participate in the selection
of Project staff; that OID would supervise the staff; and that the
agencies would work together to educate "corporate partners" regarding
the hiring and retention of employees with disabilities. The agreement
further provided for funding of the Project by DEED and DVR.4

   The parties to the agreement, we are told, contemplated from the

outset that the Project would be transferred to the private sector once it
became operational. Responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the
Project was not assigned to regular OID staff but, rather, to a
contractual employee hired as director of the Project pursuant to Article
64A, §15A. A major task assigned to the director was incorporation of
the Project.

   On August 16, 1989, the Maryland Corporate Partnership,

Incorporated was established as a private, nonprofit corporation. The
Project director assumed full-time duties with the corporation, initially
as an acting director and then as president of MCP.5 Funding from
DVR and DEED, budgeted for the Project as reimbursable funds in
OID's fiscal year 1991 budget, did not pass through OID but instead was
directed to the Project through grant agreements executed between MCP
and DEED and DVR.

                                     II

            Authority of OID to Privatize the Project

   The Legislative Auditor has asked whether OID was empowered

to transfer operation of the Project to a private entity without approval
by the General Assembly or the Board of Public Works. In our opinion,
OID's privatization of the Project was legally authorized without these
approvals.6

  State agencies have those powers expressly granted by the General

Assembly and those powers impliedly necessary to carry out such
express powers. See 73 Opinions of the Attorney General 295, 297
(1988) (citing cases). In the absence of express legislative authorization,
these powers may not be relinquished by the agency. 73 Opinions of the
Attorney General at 302.

  The establishment of a private entity to assume a function of a

State agency, however, does not necessarily amount to an improper
relinquishment of that agency's statutory powers. Generally speaking,
a function may legally be carried out by a contractor if the agency has
the power to carry out the activity in question but is under no legal
mandate to perform the function itself. See In re North Jersey District
Water Supply Commission, 417 A.2d 1115 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1980). Cf. 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 21A, 277 (1986)
(recognizing "essential discretion in the contracting process").

   OID's development of the Maryland Corporate Partnership Project

and its subsequent transfer to a private entity was accomplished in
accordance with these basic principles. MCP's purpose, as stated in its
articles of incorporation, is to provide employers with a centralized
information source for locating qualified employees with disabilities,
finding suitable training programs, and obtaining information to
facilitate the hiring and retention of these individuals. This purpose falls
squarely within OID's powers under SG §9-1105 to:

           (1) identify and evaluate the programs and
       services for handicapped individuals in the State;

           (2) collect information to identify programs and
       services that handicapped individuals need;

           (3) identify barriers to the delivery of adequate
       services and recommend procedures to remove the
       barriers;

            (4) develop an information and referral service
        for programs and services for handicapped
        individuals; [and]

            (5) foster coordination of and support for public
        and private agencies that provide programs and
        services to handicapped individuals.

  Moreover, OID was under no statutory mandate to operate the

program itself. The statutory language makes it clear that OID's overall
function is to serve as the advocate, or supporter and protector, of
individuals with disabilities, and not as a direct provider of services.
The statute does not assign to OID the duty of executing a specific
program but makes the agency responsible for "identifying" and
"evaluating" programs, for "fostering" and "coordinating" support for
agencies, and for "promoting" programs.7

   A prior Attorney General's opinion on privatization supports the

approach set out here. In 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 197
(1986), the Attorney General concluded that Talbot County could
contract with a private entity for custody of inmates in a county
detention facility. The county had broad statutory authority "to
establish, maintain, regulate and control" county jails and "to regulate all
persons confined therein." 71 Opinions of the Attorney General at 201.
This grant of authority, the opinion went on, "necessarily includes
choosing whether to operate the institution with county employees or
through the use of a contractor." Id. The opinion concluded that while
the county may contract for prison services, it may not by contract
"wholly abdicate its [statutory] responsibility for the operation of a
county jail." 71 Opinions of the Attorney General at 203.

   In our view, establishment of the Maryland Corporate Partnership

Project by means of a private corporation, MCP, was proper because
MCP performs a function within the powers of OID and because the
transfer of that function to MCP did not divest the OID of any authority
that it was required to carry out directly.

                                   III

                        Fiscal Accountability

  The Legislative Auditor's second question is whether the deposit

of MCP's cash receipts for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 into the
corporation's checking account, instead of the State Treasury, was
proper. This question arises for two reasons. First, in fiscal year 1990
these cash receipts, primarily representing fees paid by various
organizations for services provided and donations, were generated
largely as a result of the work of the president of the corporation under
his contract with the State. Second, in fiscal year 1991, reimbursable
funds were budgeted to OID for the Project but channeled to the MCP
through grant agreements between DEED and DVR and MCP.8

  The deposit of funds into the State Treasury is governed by Article

VI, §3 of the Maryland Constitution, which requires the State Treasurer
to "receive the moneys of the State, and, until otherwise prescribed by
law, deposit them, as soon as received, to the credit of the State ...."
Correspondingly, §6-213(a) of the State Finance and Procurement
Article ("SF" Article) provides that "each unit of the State government
monthly shall ... pay into the State Treasury all collections, fees,
income, and other revenues that are received by the unit ... and ...
account to the Comptroller for those revenues." Article VI, §3 and SF
§6-213 apply only to State agencies.

   In form, MCP is not a State agency but a private, non-profit

corporation. However, we must still consider whether OID created a
corporate entity that nonetheless serves as an instrumentality of the
State. A corporation can be treated as a unit of state government even
if not created by statute. In Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa
1989), state law required a particular state agency to contract with a
private nonprofit organization to provide mediation services between
farmers and creditors. The court considered whether the private
organization was a state agency for purposes of that state's
Administrative Procedure Act. See also League General Insurance
Company v. Michigan Catastrophic, 458 N.W.2d 632 (Mich. 1990) (an
entity can be an "agency" not only if created by constitution or statute
but also if created by agency action). Cf. Alaska Commercial Fishing
v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986) (corporate status is a
neutral factor that neither precludes nor mandates a finding of state
"agency"). In other words, we must consider whether MCP is
functionally the State's "alter ego."9 If MCP is but an "alter ego" of a
State agency, its revenues would be State monies subject to deposit in
the State Treasury.

   In 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 10 (1986), an opinion

dealing with the Chesapeake Bay Trust, the Attorney General identified
several factors to determine whether an entity falls within the purview
of constitutional and statutory provisions governing State moneys.10 We
shall apply these same criteria to MCP to determine whether the MCP
is a State unit for purposes of fiscal control.

A. State Oversight Responsibility

   When an entity's decisionmaker is appointed by a State official,

the inference is that the State is able to influence the entity's operations
significantly. State oversight of this nature is characteristic of units of
the State. 71 Opinions of the Attorney General at 18.

   MCP's president was selected by MCP's board of directors, not

by a State official. To be sure, the individual who served as president
was a contractual employee of the OID subject to its "control and
direction" in the performance of his duties. Article 64A, §15A(3).
However, control and direction of the business and affairs of MCP is not
vested in any one officer of the corporation under its articles of
incorporation, but in its board of directors. And, of the 13 board
members of MCP during fiscal year 1990, only three were from the
public sector. Hence, the State did not control policy and other
decisions made by the board, and, consequently, the affairs of MCP, by
either the contractual employment of MCP's president or through its
board of directors. We therefore conclude that the president's status as
a State employee was not indicative of MCP's State agency status.11

B. Fiscal Responsibility

 A second relevant inquiry is whether State officials determine the

agency's budget or manage its assets. 71 Opinions of the Attorney
General at 21. See also 76 Opinions of the Attorney General 59 (1991).

  Under its articles of incorporation, MCP and not the State controls

the corporation's fiscal affairs. The articles of incorporation establish
MCP's power to receive and administer funds, to acquire real and
personal property without limitation as to amount of value and to dispose
of any such property, to invest and reinvest the principal thereof, and to
deal with and expend the income for any of its lawful purposes.

   MCP does not derive its funds through a direct legislative

appropriation, but through fees, donations, and State grants. To the
extent of the terms of the grant agreements, the State has control over
the disposition of the grant funds. But the receipt of grant funds in itself
does not subject MCP to Article VI, §3. As the Court of Appeals
recently observed about the relationship between Baltimore City and a
private corporation that furthered a city cultural project, the city's duty
to maintain control over the subject matter of the contract with the
corporation and to require accountability for city grants "does not mean,
however, that the corporation with which a city contracts, or to which
it contributes funds, ipso facto becomes an agency of the city for all
purposes, or that the city may control other aspects of the corporation's
activities." Baltimore Arts Festival, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council,
326 Md. 653, 657, 607 A.2d 1 (1992). Accord, Kentucky Region Eight
v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Ky. 1974) ("the mere fact that
private corporations receive and administer grants of state funds does not
mean that they are state agencies"). See also 71 Opinions of the Attorney
General at 22 (where revenues are grant receipts, in contrast to being
derived by means of a public levy or charge, there should be no
presumption to include the unit's revenues or expenditures within the
purview of State fiscal controls).

C. Scope of Public Services

    If an entity's activity "benefits the citizens of Maryland generally,

not merely some small or discrete segment of the population," that fact
is evidence of the entity's State status. 71 Opinions of the Attorney
General at 23. Although no one can seriously question the public policy
wisdom of encouraging the employment of individuals with disabilities,
the services offered by MCP are not directly for the benefit of an agency
of the State or for the general public, but for individuals within a
discrete segment of the population. Consequently, the public nature of
the services performed by MCP is not an indicium of State agency
status.

D. Special Financing Arrangements

  A final factor to be taken into account in determining the

applicability of Article VI, §3 to MCP is whether the State provides any
unusual financial support to that corporation. 71 Opinions of the
Attorney General at 23.

   Although MCP has no special financing relationship with the

State, it does maintain rent-free office space in a State-owned building.
We are told that the location of the MCP at the same site as DEED is
mutually beneficial to both entities in the operation of the Project and
that the value of the space was taken into account in determining the
amount of DEED's grant to MCP. Under these circumstances, the
provision of State-owned office space to MCP is not evidence of
continuing State control or State agency status.

                             IV

                        Conclusion

  In summary, it is our opinion that OID's privatization of the

Maryland Corporate Partnership Project was consistent with that
agency's statutory powers. It is further our opinion that the cash
receipts of MCP are not public moneys subject to deposit in the State
Treasury, inasmuch as MCP is a private corporation separate and apart
from the State.

                                     J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                     Attorney General

                                     Gail Rudie Cohn
                                     Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1
Chapter 946 of the Laws of Maryland 1977 created an "Office for the
Coordination of Services to the Handicapped." Chapter 295 of the Laws of
Maryland 1984 renamed the unit "Office for Handicapped Individuals." The most
recent amendment, Chapter 103 of the Laws of Maryland 1991, redesignated the
unit "Office for Individuals with Disabilities".

2
Under Chapter 42 (House Bill 251) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, the
name of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation will be changed to the Division
of Rehabilitation Services on October 1, 1992.

3
DEED is responsible for coordinating federal and State funded training,
employment, and unemployment programs and placing trained program graduates
and other unemployed persons in jobs. DEED also assists employers in developing
a qualified work force and advises of the availability of public financial hiring
incentives.

4
The budget bill for fiscal year 1990 appropriated $27,323 in the budget
of the Department of Education and $27,324 in the budget of DEED to reimburse
OID for the Project. The budget bill for fiscal year 1991 appropriated $33,840 each
in the budgets of the Department of Education and DEED for this purpose. OID
was granted authorization to use the reimbursable fund income for operating
expenses. See budget bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 at item 23.01.02.01.

5
The president and his assistant, who continue to serve in those positions
today, remained under contract with the OID until June 30, 1990.

6
Senate Joint Resolution 14 (1992 Session) requests the Governor and the
General Assembly to appoint a Commission on Privatization to review State
government functions and develop guidelines for the use of privatization by the
State. This opinion attempts to set out considerations pertinent to your inquiry; it
does not purport to be an exhaustive treatment of the issues concerning
privatization, which the new commission presumably will explore.

7
Certain direct support activities are carried out by the Maryland State
Planning Council on Developmental Disabilities and the Technology Assistance
Program, operationally separate components within OID.

8
During fiscal year 1990, MCP received fees totaling $35,281 from
various organizations for services provided in developing corporate interest in
hiring employees with disabilities. For fiscal year 1991, the MCP received fees for
services and donations from various organizations totalling $32,666. In addition,
MCP received grants during both fiscal years from DVR and DEED. These grants
were funded by moneys appropriated to the two departments and budgeted as
reimbursable funds to OID for purposes of the Project. (The figures stated in this
note are as of March 25, 1991, the date that the audit was concluded.)

9
Such an "alter ego" analysis was used in Ram Ditta v. Md. Nat. Capital
Park and Planning Commission, 822 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1987), where the question
was whether the Maryland National Park and Planning Commission was the State's
"alter ego" for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. There the factors used
by the court to determine the agency's status were: whether the State Treasury will
be responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded; whether the entity
exercises a significant degree of autonomy; whether it is involved with statewide
concerns; and how it is treated as a matter of State law. Other decisions using an
"alter ego" analysis include First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio,
462 U.S. 618 (XWI), Hester International Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
879 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1989); and Patterson v. Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523 (D.Md.
1976), aff'd on other grounds, 552 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1977).

10
That opinion distinguished among entities expressly identified by the
General Assembly as part of State government and thus generally subject to Article
VI, §3; entities expressly identified as excluded from State government and thus
generally exempt from the constitutional requirement; and entities that the General
Assembly neither excluded from nor included in State government, in which case
the applicability of Article VI, §3 was to be discerned by examining all aspects of
the interrelationship between the entity and the State. 71 Opinions of the Attorney
General at 12.
Other opinions addressing aspects of the "moneys of the State" problem
include 76 Opinions of the Attorney General 59 (1991); 70 Opinions of the
Attorney General 35 (1985); 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 86 (1983); 67
Opinions of the Attorney General 356 (1982); 58 Opinions of the Attorney
General 88 (1973); and 53 Opinions of the Attorney General 3 (1968).

11
If there is an issue with regard to the president's employment, we think
it is that OID failed to terminate its contract with this individual once he ceased
performing services for OID. See note 5 above. The continuation of the employer-
employee relationship under the existing contract was incongruous given the
incorporation of the Project.