Could a Maryland county pass its own law requiring gun owners to store firearms safely away from children, or did state law preempt that kind of local rule?

Plain-English summary

A state delegate asked whether Montgomery County could enact Bill No. 42-91, a proposed ordinance that would have barred leaving a loaded firearm, or an unloaded one near ammunition, anywhere an unsupervised person under 18 might get to it, unless the firearm was locked up or fitted with a trigger lock. The bill would also have required firearms dealers to offer buyers a trigger lock and warn them about the storage rule, and directed the county police to run a public education campaign. The question was whether Maryland's general statute preempting local handgun regulation, Article 27, §36H, blocked the county from passing this kind of child-safety measure.

The opinion concluded the bill was not preempted. It read the statute's own exception allowing local regulation "with respect to minors" as broad enough to cover a storage requirement aimed at keeping guns away from children, since the phrase "with respect to" was understood in ordinary usage and case law to mean simply "concerning" or "with reference to," and a rule requiring adults to secure firearms so children could not reach them was, in the opinion's view, unmistakably a regulation concerning minors even though it directly regulated adult gun owners' conduct. The opinion supported this reading with the statute's own legislative history: an earlier attempt to preempt essentially all local firearms regulation was vetoed by the Governor in 1984 specifically because it would have wiped out beneficial local rules, including a Baltimore County law restricting weapon purchases by people under 21 and a Prince George's County law on transferring weapons to minors, without any statewide substitute. The compromise that followed, enacted in 1985, deliberately carved out local authority to regulate "with respect to minors" as one of the concessions won in response to that veto. Given that history, the opinion found the minors' exception was meant to preserve exactly the kind of child-protective local ordinance Montgomery County was proposing.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1991 and addressed a specific proposed Montgomery County bill under the firearms preemption statute then codified at Article 27, §36H. Subsequent statutory amendments, recodifications (Maryland's firearms statutes have since moved from Article 27 into the Criminal Law and Public Safety Articles), court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Notably, the opinion's own editor's note records that the following year, the General Assembly enacted a statewide child-access-prevention law, Chapter 439 of the Laws of Maryland 1992 (former Article 27, §36K), making it an offense to allow a loaded firearm to be accessible to minors, which changed the legal landscape this opinion addressed. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify the current statutory citations and the current scope of state and local firearms regulation before relying on any specific rule described here.

Common questions

Could a Maryland county require gun owners to lock up firearms so children couldn't reach them?
According to this 1991 opinion, yes. The opinion read Maryland's firearms preemption statute's exception for local regulation "with respect to minors" as broad enough to cover a safe-storage requirement aimed at keeping guns away from unsupervised children, since the bill's core rule concerned minors' access to firearms even though it directly regulated adult gun owners' conduct.

Didn't Maryland law generally block counties from passing their own gun laws?
Yes, generally, according to the opinion. Article 27, §36H broadly preempted local regulation of handguns, rifles, shotguns, and ammunition, but the statute carved out specific exceptions, including regulation "with respect to minors," "with respect to" certain public-assembly zones, and "with respect to" local law enforcement personnel, and the opinion found the county's child-safety bill fit within the minors exception.

Why did the opinion put so much weight on a Governor's veto from years earlier?
Because the opinion found that veto history directly explained why the minors exception existed. A 1984 bill would have preempted nearly all local firearms regulation, but the Governor vetoed it, citing local child-protective ordinances (in Baltimore County and Prince George's County) that would have been wiped out without any statewide substitute; the 1985 compromise that became law preserved local authority "with respect to minors" partly in direct response to that veto.

Background and statutory framework

Montgomery County's proposed Bill No. 42-91 would have prohibited leaving a loaded firearm, or an unloaded one near fixed ammunition, anywhere the owner knew or should have known an unsupervised person under 18 might gain access, proposed Montgomery County Code §57-5A(a), with an exception for firearms in a locked cabinet or fitted with a trigger lock, §57-5A(b)(3). It would also have required firearms dealers to offer buyers a trigger lock, §57-5A(c)(1), and warn them of the storage prohibition, §57-5A(c)(2), while directing the county police department to run an educational campaign on the hazards of unsupervised firearms.

Maryland's general firearms preemption statute, Article 27, §36H(a), barred counties, municipalities, and special taxing districts from regulating the purchase, sale, taxation, transfer, manufacture, repair, ownership, possession, and transportation of handguns, rifles, shotguns, and ammunition, but §36H(b) carved out specific exceptions: local regulation "with respect to minors," §36H(b)(1); regulation within 100 yards of parks, schools, public buildings, and other places of public assembly (excluding firearms-safety training), §36H(b)(2); and regulation of local law enforcement personnel, §36H(b)(3). The opinion found that two other preemption provisions, covering pistol and revolver sales under Article 27, §§442(a) and 445(a) (enacted by Chapter 502, Laws of Maryland 1966) and an uncodified 1972 provision preempting local regulation of carrying or transporting handguns (Chapter 13, Laws of Maryland 1972, discussed in Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 542, 489 A.2d 1114 (1985)), did not control here, because ordinary canons of construction give a specific, later-enacted statute priority over an earlier, more general one covering the same subject, Lumberman's Mut. Casualty v. Ins. Comm'r, 302 Md. 248, 268-69, 487 A.2d 271 (1985); Prince George's County v. Fitzhugh, 308 Md. 384, 390 n.4, 519 A.2d 1285 (1987), so the specific and more recent §36H(b) minors exception governed.

Turning to the statutory text, the opinion applied the ordinary-meaning canon, Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 603, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648 (1991), finding that "with respect to" was understood broadly, both by dictionary definition and in case law, as meaning "referring to" or "concerning," Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P.2d 563, 566 (1934); In re Weyerhauser Timber Co., 53 Wash. 2d 235, 332 P.2d 947, 949 (1958), so any regulation reasonably related to minors' access to firearms qualified, even though Bill No. 42-91 directly regulated adult behavior rather than children's own conduct, since (per testimony from a pediatricians' group) children's access to guns typically results from adult carelessness, and the only realistic way to reduce the roughly 3,000 annual child firearm deaths the testimony cited was to regulate how adults stored their weapons.

The opinion found this reading strongly reinforced by legislative history. Earlier disputes over Montgomery County's attempts to regulate handgun ammunition, ultimately found preempted in Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 489 A.2d 1114 (1985), prompted a 1984 bill (Senate Bill 66/House Bill 315) that would have preempted nearly all local firearms regulation, leaving only local authority over discharge of firearms. Governor Hughes vetoed those bills, explaining that their broad sweep would invalidate beneficial existing local laws, including Baltimore County Code §18-9(a) (restricting weapon purchases by people under 21) and Prince George's County Code §14-141 (regulating weapon transfers to minors), without any statewide substitute. Following that veto, compromise legislation, Senate Bill 88 and House Bill 176, carved out specific exceptions including the minors exception, and was enacted as Chapter 724 of the Laws of Maryland 1985, becoming Article 27, §36H. The opinion treated the Governor's veto message as evidence of the statute's context under Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), and Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390 Mass. 1, 453 N.E.2d 421 (1983), concluding that the minors exception was written specifically to preserve local child-protective firearms measures like the ones the Governor had cited, and that Bill No. 42-91 fell squarely within it.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article 27, §36H(a) of the Maryland Code, general State preemption of local handgun, rifle, shotgun, and ammunition regulation
• §36H(b)(1), exception for local regulation "with respect to minors"
• §36H(b)(2), exception for regulation near parks, schools, and public assembly places
• §36H(b)(3), exception for regulation of local law enforcement personnel
• Article 27, §§442(a) and 445(a), State preemption of local pistol/revolver sale, possession, and transfer regulation
• Chapter 502 of the Laws of Maryland 1966, enacting §§442(a) and 445(a)
• Chapter 13 of the Laws of Maryland 1972, uncodified preemption of local carrying/transporting regulation
• Chapter 724 of the Laws of Maryland 1985, enacting Article 27, §36H
• Chapter 439 of the Laws of Maryland 1992, enacting the child-access-prevention offense (per the opinion's editor's note)
• Article 27, §36K, the resulting 1992 child-access-prevention statute
• Proposed Montgomery County Code §57-5A(a), the bill's core safe-storage prohibition
• §57-5A(b)(3), exception for locked cabinets or trigger-locked firearms
• §57-5A(c)(1), dealer trigger-lock offer requirement
• §57-5A(c)(2), dealer warning requirement
• Baltimore County Code §18-9(a), restricting weapon purchases by people under 21 (cited in the Governor's 1984 veto message)
• Prince George's County Code §14-141, regulating weapon transfers to minors (cited in the Governor's 1984 veto message)

Cases:

• Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 542, 489 A.2d 1114 (1985), Maryland Court of Appeals decision on preemption of local ammunition regulation
• Lumberman's Mut. Casualty v. Ins. Comm'r, 302 Md. 248, 268-69, 487 A.2d 271 (1985), Maryland Court of Appeals decision on specific-versus-general statutory construction
• Prince George's County v. Fitzhugh, 308 Md. 384, 390 n.4, 519 A.2d 1285 (1987), Maryland Court of Appeals decision on later-enacted specific provisions controlling
• Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 603, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990), Maryland Court of Appeals decision on statutory text as the starting point of interpretation
• Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648 (1991), Maryland Court of Appeals decision on giving words their ordinary meaning
• Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P.2d 563, 566 (1934), Montana Supreme Court decision defining "with respect to"
• In re Weyerhauser Timber Co., 53 Wash. 2d 235, 332 P.2d 947, 949 (1958), Washington Supreme Court decision on the same phrase
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), Maryland Court of Appeals decision on using legislative context to construe statutes
• Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390 Mass. 1, 453 N.E.2d 421 (1983), Massachusetts high court decision on considering veto messages as evidence of legislative intent
• Atlantic Guns, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Equity No. 85854 (Cir. Ct. for Mont. Co., opinion and order filed October 27, 1983), the trial court decision finding the county's ammunition ordinance preempted

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1991/Volume76_1991.pdf (this opinion appears at printed pages 240-248 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

FIREARMS

Handguns - Counties - Preemptions - County Legislation to
Prevent Access By Minors to Firearms Not Preempted

                      December 17, 1991

The Honorable Jennie M. Forehand
Maryland House of Delegates

  You have requested our opinion on the authority of Montgomery

County to enact legislation that would impose certain safeguards to
prevent children from gaining access to loaded and unlocked firearms.
In particular, you have directed our attention to Bill No. 42-91, pending
before the Montgomery County Council, which is described in its short
title as concerning "Weapons - Safeguarding from Minors." You have
asked whether Montgomery County would be preempted by State law
from enacting this proposed legislation.

 For the reasons stated below, we conclude that local legislation of

the kind set out in Bill No. 42-91 is not preempted by State law.

                                I

                          Background

A. Proposed Bill

 Bill No. 42-91, now pending before the Montgomery County

Council, concerns the safeguarding of firearms from minors. The bill
generally prohibits any person from "leav[ing] a loaded firearm ..., or
an unloaded firearm in close proximity to fixed ammunition, in any
location where the person knows or reasonably should know that an
unsupervised person under the age of 18 may gain access to the
firearm." Proposed Montgomery County Code §57-5A(a). This
prohibition does not apply, however, if (among other exceptions) "the
firearm is in a locked gun cabinet ... or is secured with a trigger lock
...." §57-5A(b)(3).

 The bill would require firearms dealers to offer to sell or give a

trigger lock to any buyer. §57-5A(c)(1). Dealers would also have to
warn buyers about the bill's prohibition. §57-5A(c)(2). Finally, the
Montgomery County Police Department, in cooperation with various
organizations, would conduct an educational campaign on the hazards of
unsupervised firearms.

B. Preemption Issue

 With certain exceptions, the State has "preempt[ed] the rights of any

county, municipal corporation, or special taxing district whether by law,
ordinance, or regulation to regulate the purchase, sale, taxation,
transfer, manufacture, repair, ownership, possession, and transportation
of" handguns, rifles, shotguns, and ammunition. Article 27, §36H(a) of
the Maryland Code. One of the enumerated exceptions, §36H(b)(1),
permits local regulation "with respect to minors."1 The interpretive issue
is whether this exception permits legislation like Bill No. 42-91.

 Other preemption provisions relating to handguns do not affect the

issue, in our opinion. Under Article 27, §§442(a) and 445(a), the State
has preempted local regulation of the sale, possession, and transfer of
pistols and revolvers. These provisions were enacted in Chapter 502 of
the Laws of Maryland 1966. Furthermore, Chapter 13 of the Laws of
Maryland 1972 contains an uncodified section preempting local laws
regulating the wearing, carrying, or transporting of handguns. See
Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 542, 489
A.2d 1114 (1985).

 Customary principles of statutory construction, however, lead us to

give effect to the specific and later-enacted authorization for local
regulation in §36H(b), notwithstanding these other preemption
provisions. First, where the General Assembly has enacted both a
specific and a general statute, and the general statute includes the same
subject matter as the more specific, the general statute governs only
those cases that do not fall within the provisions of the specific statute.
See Lumberman's Mut. Casualty v. Ins. Comm'r, 302 Md. 248, 268-69,

    1
       Counties, municipalities, and special taxing districts may also regulate

"[w]ith respect to" the purchase, sale, transfer, ownership, possession, and
transportation of firearms and ammunition "within 100 yards of parks, schools,
public buildings, and other places of public assembly," except that "the teaching
of firearms safety training or other educational or sporting use may not be
prohibited." §36H(b)(2). Finally, these local governments may regulate "[w]ith
respect to law enforcement personnel of the subdivision." §36H(b)(3).

487 A.2d 271 (1985) (citing earlier authority). Moreover, when the
General Assembly enacts a specific provision subsequent to a general
provision, the later-enacted provision controls. Prince George's County
v. Fitzhugh, 308 Md. 384, 390 n.4, 519 A.2d 1285 (1987) (citing
earlier authority).

Under either canon of construction, the specific regulatory authority

given local governments under §36H(b) prevails over more general
preemption provisions found elsewhere. Hence, we turn to the task of
construing §36H(b)(1).

                                II

                      Statutory Language

 The starting point for any exercise in statutory interpretation is the

words of the provision in question. Morris v. Prince George's County,
319 Md. 597, 603, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990). We are to give these words
their "ordinary and common meaning." Dickerson v. State, 324 Md.
163, 171, 596 A.2d 648 (1991).

 The dictionary definition of the term "with respect to" is exceedingly

general: "referring to; concerning." Random House Dictionary of the
English Language 1640 (2d ed. 1987). Judicial constructions are no
narrower: "[T]he phrase 'with respect to' means 'with reference to' ...."
Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P.2d 563, 566
(1934). See also In re Weyerhauser Timber Co., 53 Wash. 2d 235, 332
P.2d 947, 949 (1958). Therefore, any regulation that bears a reasonable
relation to minors' access to, or use of, firearms is a firearms regulation
"with respect to minors."

 Bill No. 42-91 unquestionably is one "with respect to minors." It

seeks to protect them against death and injury caused by improperly
stored firearms. According to the Maryland Chapter of the American
Academy of Pediatrics, firearms accidents kill more than 3000 American
children each year. Testimony of Modena Wilson before the Judiciary
Committee of the Baltimore City Council (May 7, 1991).

To be sure, the bill regulates the behavior of adults, not children.

But since children gain access to firearms because adults are careless, no
other manner of regulation would serve the goal of protecting children.
As the physician group testified, "Maryland pediatricians believe that the
only way to prevent childhood firearm injuries in homes with guns is to
assure that gun owners store the guns so that a child or adolescent cannot
obtain or fire [them]." The core requirement of Bill No. 42-91, that
people not leave loaded weapons in accessible places, is carefully framed
so that a gun owner who knows that a child will never be able to lay
hands on the weapon is not covered.2

 Hence, unless something in the legislative history were so

compelling as to cause us to doubt the plain import of the statutory text,
Bill No. 42-91 is permissible under Article 27, §36H(b)(1). In fact, as
we discuss in the next part of this opinion, the legislative history
supports our conclusion.

                                    III

                          Legislative History

 In late 1981 the Village of Friendship Heights considered an

ordinance that would have banned, with limited exceptions, the
possession of all ammunition within that special taxing district. The
Montgomery County Council shortly thereafter also considered
legislation that would have imposed restrictions on the sale of handgun
ammunition, requiring ammunition dealers to register with the county
police, and requiring proof of registration before sale of ammunition to
customers.

 Senate Bill 323, introduced in the 1982 session of the General

Assembly, would have amended Article 27, §§442(a) and 445(a) to
permit counties, municipalities, and special taxing districts to impose
restrictions more stringent than those imposed under State law on the
sale or transfer of pistols or revolvers by dealers and private parties.
The bill died in committee, however.

Despite the bill's failure, the Montgomery County Council

proceeded forward with the Friendship Heights ordinance and its own
ammunition regulation bill. (The Friendship Heights ordinance needed
the approval of the County Council.) The Montgomery County
Attorney opined that the local legislation was preempted by State law,

    2
        The bill's requirement that a firearms dealer offer to sell or give away

a trigger lock applies to all buyers, even those who know that no minor will have
unsupervised access to the firearm. But those buyers can simply refuse the offer;
they are not covered by the basic prohibition in §57-5A(a). We should not be
understood to be commenting on the legality of a local ordinance that, unlike Bill
No. 42-91, would require all buyers of firearms to buy a trigger lock too.

while the attorney for Friendship Heights had a differing view. Our
office was then consulted and concluded that local legislation banning or
restricting the sale of handgun ammunition was preempted by State law.
67 Opinions of the Attorney General 316 (1982). Given that
ammunition is an integral part of a handgun, the opinion concluded that
local regulation of the possession or sale of ammunition was "in reality
... local regulation of handguns - a result expressly prohibited by State
law." 67 Opinions of the Attorney General at 320.

 The Montgomery County Council nevertheless enacted the proposed

ammunition control ordinance as Chapter 50 (Council Bill 17-82) of the
Laws of Montgomery County 1983.3 The ordinance was challenged in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The trial court found that
the ordinance was "invalid inasmuch as the power to enact such
legislation has been preempted by State law." Atlantic Guns, Inc. v.
Montgomery County, Equity No. 85854 (Cir. Ct. for Mont. Co.,
opinion and order filed October 27, 1983). The decision was appealed
to the Court of Special Appeals and, before any proceedings took place
in that court, a petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by the Court
of Appeals.

 While the matter was pending in the Court of Appeals, legislation

was introduced in the 1984 session of the General Assembly that would
have entirely removed any local authority to regulate weapons and
ammunition. Senate Bill 66, sponsored by Senator Long, and its
companion House Bill 315, sponsored by Delegate Riley, would have
expressly preempted local governments from regulating the purchase,
sale, taxation, transfer, manufacture, repair, ownership, possession, and
transportation of a broad range of firearms, explosives, and ammunition.
The only possible remaining local authority would have been over the
discharge of firearms. See Letter from Richard E. Israel, Assistant
Attorney General, to Frederick R. Millhiser, Assistant Legislative
Officer (May 21, 1984). The proponents of the legislation argued that
it was necessary to enact a sweeping preemption law "in response to
problems which have arisen because of overlapping and inconsistent
licensing regulations promulgated by local jurisdictions." See Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee, Summary of Committee Report on
House Bill 315.

    3
          The County Council had earlier defeated the Friendship Heights

ordinance.

 The Hughes Administration registered its opposition to the proposed

legislation. The Lieutenant Governor advised Chairman Miller of the
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee that he was opposed to such a
sweeping preemption bill, particularly while a case on that issue was
pending before the Court of Appeals. He also noted that the legislation
appeared to prohibit any local law dealing with weapons and ammunition
and raised questions about the ability of local governments to continue
to enforce existing tax or local laws that might have affected the sale or
transfer of weapons. Letter from Lieutenant Governor J. Joseph Curran,
Jr., to Senator Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr. (March 20, 1984).

Despite the opposition of the Administration, House Bill 315 and

Senate Bill 66 passed both houses and were presented to Governor
Hughes for his signature.

 The Governor vetoed the bills. VI Laws of Maryland 1984 at 3866.

He stated that while he understood that the premise underlying the
legislation was to provide greater statewide uniformity in weapons
regulation, the broad sweep of the bills raised the possibility that they
would "invalidate beneficial existing local legislation without any
corresponding statewide substitute and, contrary to the sponsor's intent,
... undermine public safety."4 He noted that the repealer clause in
Section 2 of the bills would invalidate all public general or public local
laws that were inconsistent with the exclusive State authority to regulate
in the areas specified in the legislation. Governor Hughes then gave a
number of examples of local legislation that would be invalidated by
Senate Bill 66 and House Bill 315.

Of greatest relevance to the question at hand, Governor Hughes

identified the following as one example of local legislation that would
have been invalidated by the preemption bills:

     Baltimore County Code §18-9(a) which makes it
     unlawful for a person under 21 to purchase, trade,
     acquire or possess certain weapons except under
     certain circumstances. See also Prince George's
     County Code §14-141 relating to the transfer of
     weapons to minors

VI Laws of Maryland 1984 at 3867. Governor Hughes pointed out that,
in the past, State preemption of local firearms regulation had been

   4
      Governor Hughes related that he had received veto requests from the

Mayor of Baltimore City, the County Executive of Prince George's County, and
the County Executive of Montgomery County expressing the same concern.

coupled with "a comprehensive statewide regulatory scheme that
provided enhanced protection to the public." Senate Bill 66 and House
Bill 315, by contrast, "lack[ed] a substitute comprehensive approach ..."
for the local regulation that was to be displaced. "For that reason,"" he
concluded, he was "unwilling to sign into law a bill that would invalidate
the judgment of local elected officials when they determine that local
legislation of the type described above ... is required within a particular
jurisdiction." VI Laws of Maryland 1984 at 3868.5

 Following the veto, efforts were made by the Governor's Office and

Senator Long and Delegate Riley to arrive at compromise legislation that
would be mutually acceptable. Eventually a bill was drafted that
broadly preempted local regulation of firearms but excepted from the
scope of preemption, among other things, regulation "with respect to
minors." Senate Bill 88 and House Bill 176 were introduced in the 1985
Session as the product of this compromise. A bill analysis prepared by
the Judicial Proceedings Committee stated that the bill would change
current law as follows:

        The General Assembly partially preempts the rights of
        counties, municipalities, and special taxing districts to
        regulate the purchase, sale, taxation, transfer,
        manufacture,     repair,     ownership,     possession,
        transportation, and discharge of handguns, rifles,
        shotguns, and their ammunition.

        Some exceptions are made in this preemption.
        Localities still may regulate some weapons and their
        ammunition with respect to minors, various places of
        public assembly, and law enforcement and security
        personnel. Also, localities may continue to regulate
        the discharge of handguns, rifles, and shotguns.

(Emphasis added.) The legislation passed with the exception relating to
minors left unamended.6 Ultimately the Governor signed Senate Bill 88,
which became Chapter 724 of the Laws of Maryland 1985 and which
added section 36H to Article 27.

    5
     An attempt to override the vetoes at the start of the 1985 Session of the

General Assembly failed by a wide margin.
6
The Court of Appeals decided the Atlantic Guns case one day after the
House of Delegates passed House Bill 176. On April 3, 1985, the Court decided
that the Montgomery County ordinance strictly regulating the sale of ammunition
was preempted by State law and therefore invalid. See Montgomery County v.
Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 489 A.2d 1114 (1985).

 As this recitation of the legislative history demonstrates, Article 27,

§36H is a perfect example of a statute reflecting a political compromise.
Its predecessor legislation, Senate Bill 66 and House Bill 315 of 1984,
would have preempted virtually all local regulation of firearms,
ammunition, and explosives. Governor Hughes' veto prompted several
compromises from the legislative sponsors of the 1984 legislation.
Among those compromises was the creation of a specific exception to
the general preemption rule, to allow local governments to regulate
weapons and ammunition with respect to minors. Indeed, that exception
can be traced to Governor Hughes' veto message itself, in which he
asserted the need for "comprehensive" regulatory authority, either at the
State or the local level, and identified examples of local legislation that
he believed should not be preempted. The effect of the compromise is
that local governments may regulate to whatever extent they consider
appropriate for the protection of the public, so long as they do so only
in the areas identified in §36H(b).7

 In short, the legislative history supports the view that local

legislation like Bill No. 42-91, dealing with minors' access to firearms,
is squarely within the exception carved out in §36H(b)(1).

     7
        Governor Hughes' veto message is evidence of "the context of the

statutory language" of §36H. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505,
515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987). See generally N. Singer 2A Sutherland Statutory
Construction, §48.05 (Sands 4th ed. 1984) (a Governor's veto message, and
subsequent legislative enactment of a bill with corresponding amendments, may
be considered in determining legislative intent); Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390
Mass. 1, 453 N.E.2d 421 (1983).

                              IV

                         Conclusion

 In summary, it is our opinion that Bill No. 42-91 is not preempted

by State law. Article 27, §36H(b)(1) specifically authorizes local
legislation of the sort embodied in the proposed law.

                                         J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                         Attorney General

                                         David R. Durfee, Jr.
                                         Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice

Editor's Note:

 In Chapter 439 of the Laws of Maryland 1992, codified at Article

27, §36K, the General Assembly enacted a prohibition against an
individual's allowing a loaded firearm to be accessible to minors.