Which version of Maryland's drunk-driving license suspension law controlled when two 1989 laws amended the same statute without referencing each other?

Plain-English summary

At the end of 1989, Maryland's Motor Vehicle Administrator asked the Attorney General to untangle a mess created by the General Assembly's own 1989 session. Two separate laws, the Drunk Driving Act (Chapter 284) and the Commercial Driver's License Act (Chapter 291), both took effect January 1, 1990, and both amended the very same Transportation Article section, §16-205.1, governing license suspensions and disqualifications for alcohol-related driving offenses. Neither law referenced the other, so the Code's publisher printed both sets of changes side by side in the 1989 supplement, producing several places where the published statute flatly contradicted itself: one part said hearings would be scheduled automatically, another said a driver had to request one; one part described an old, broader authority for the MVA to soften a suspension, another described a newer, narrower version of that same authority. The opinion worked through each conflict and decided, based on what each act was actually trying to accomplish, which published provision reflected the General Assembly's real intent and which had simply been left in by mistake. It concluded that the Drunk Driving Act's newer hearing-request procedure and its narrower suspension-modification rule controlled, that the old automatic-hearing and broader-modification language should be disregarded as publication error, and that a provision requiring officers to warn commercial drivers about license consequences should be read narrowly to apply only when a driver refused the alcohol test. The opinion closed by recommending the General Assembly pass an emergency technical fix, since MVA hearings under the confusing statute were set to begin within weeks.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1989. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. The opinion's own text, as later annotated by the Attorney General's office, records that Chapters 11 (Senate Bill 398) and 413 (House Bill 492) of the Laws of Maryland 1990, the very next legislative session, substantially rewrote the statutory provisions discussed in this opinion.

Common questions

In 1989, which version of Maryland's drunk-driving hearing procedure controlled after two conflicting laws were published together?
According to this opinion, the newer procedure requiring a driver to request a hearing within 10 days of a suspension order, enacted by the Drunk Driving Act and printed as TR §16-205.1(g), controlled. The opinion concluded the old automatic-scheduling language mistakenly reprinted at TR §16-205.1(f)(1) and (2) had been repealed and should be disregarded.

Did a police officer have to warn every commercial driver about losing commercial driving eligibility?
No, per the opinion's reading. It concluded the warning requirement in TR §16-205.1(b)(1)(iii) applied only if the driver refused the alcohol test, not if the driver took the test and failed it, since only a test refusal (not a failed test) could trigger commercial-driving disqualification under the law as it then stood.

Could the Motor Vehicle Administration still soften a license suspension under the old, broader rule the Code supplement printed?
No. The opinion concluded the Drunk Driving Act's narrower modification authority, printed at TR §16-205.1(l) and limited to drivers who took the test, needed a license for work or treatment, and had a clean five-year record, was the only modification authority that applied; the broader old rule reprinted at TR §16-205.1(f)(5) had been repealed and should not be given effect.

Was this confusion ever fixed?
Yes. As the opinion itself recommended an emergency legislative fix, and an editor's note attached to the opinion records that the very next year's General Assembly, through Chapters 11 and 413 of the Laws of Maryland 1990, substantially rewrote the provisions this opinion had to untangle.

Background and statutory framework

The conflict arose because the Drunk Driving Act of 1989 (Chapter 284) and the Commercial Driver's License Act of 1989 (Chapter 291) each separately amended Transportation Article §16-205.1 to serve different purposes: the Drunk Driving Act overhauled the implied-consent testing procedures, sanctions, and hearing process for all drivers testing at or above a .10 alcohol concentration or refusing the test, while the CDL Act separately authorized disqualifying commercial drivers who refused the test. Because the two acts made no reference to each other, the Code's publisher printed both sets of amendments into the 1989 cumulative supplement without resolving the overlaps, producing internally inconsistent text, most notably duplicate and contradictory hearing-scheduling provisions at TR §16-205.1(f)(1)-(2) versus §16-205.1(g), and duplicate suspension-modification provisions at §16-205.1(f)(5) versus §16-205.1(l).

The opinion's analytical starting point was Article 1, §17 of the Maryland Code, the general rule for reconciling multiple amendments to the same code section: where two amendments do not reference each other, courts construe them together and give effect to both if possible, but where they are irreconcilable, the latest enactment controls. Citing Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Authority for discerning legislative intent from an enactment's purpose and language, Prince George's County v. McBride for the principle that repeal by implication is disfavored, and Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Clerk of Superior Court for giving full effect to each act unless truly irreconcilable, the opinion worked through each specific conflict rather than declaring one entire act superior to the other.

On hearing scheduling, the opinion found the Drunk Driving Act had completely repealed and replaced the old automatic-hearing procedure in TR §16-205.1(f) with a new request-based procedure, which the publisher correctly relocated to new §16-205.1(g), but the publisher had also mistakenly left the old, repealed automatic-scheduling language sitting at §16-205.1(f)(1)-(2). Since giving effect to both was impossible, and the Drunk Driving Act's intent to replace the old procedure was unmistakable, the opinion concluded §16-205.1(g) controlled. On the CDL warning requirement, the opinion read the CDL Act's advisory provision narrowly in light of the fact that only a test refusal, not a failed test, could disqualify a commercial driver at that time, so an officer needed to give the CDL-specific warning only in the refusal scenario. On suspension modification, the opinion found the Drunk Driving Act had substituted a narrower modification authority (available only to drivers who took the test, needed the license for work or alcohol treatment, and had a clean record for five years) for the CDL Act, which had not touched modification authority at all; the publisher had again mistakenly reprinted the old, broader modification rule at §16-205.1(f)(5) after the General Assembly repealed it, and had left an erroneous, outdated suspension-length table at §16-205.1(f)(4) instead of the correct, longer periods enacted by the Drunk Driving Act at §16-205.1(g)(4)(ii) and (g)(7)(iii). Given the practical urgency, since thousands of hearings under the confusing statute were expected before the General Assembly's next session ended, the opinion recommended an emergency technical-amendment bill to clean up the published text.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Transportation Article §16-205.1 and its subsections (b)(1), (b)(1)(i)-(iii), (f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(4), (f)(5), (g), (g)(4), (g)(4)(ii), (g)(7)(iii), and (l), Maryland's implied-consent/license-suspension statute for alcohol-related driving offenses, as amended by two conflicting 1989 acts
• Transportation Article §16-808(5), disqualifying a driver from commercial driving during a license suspension
• Transportation Article §11-111.1 and §11-109.1, defining "disqualification" and "commercial motor vehicle"
• Transportation Article §21-902, the criminal DUI/DWI statute referenced in the suspension-modification eligibility rule
• Article 1, §17 of the Maryland Code, the general rule for construing multiple, non-cross-referencing amendments to the same code section
• Chapter 284, Laws of Maryland 1989, the Drunk Driving Act
• Chapter 291, Laws of Maryland 1989 (including §§3 and 7), the Commercial Driver's License Act

Cases:

• Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Authority, 267 Md. 687, 695-96, 298 A.2d 413 (1973), on discerning legislative intent from the purpose and language of enactments
• Prince George's County v. McBride, 263 Md. 235, 242-43, 282 A.2d 486 (1971), on the disfavored status of repeal by implication
• Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Clerk of Superior Court, 270 Md. 316, 319-20, 311 A.2d 261 (1973), on giving full effect to each of two acts unless they are truly irreconcilable

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1989/Volume74_1989.pdf (this opinion appears at printed pages 295-302 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Vehicle Law - Drunk Driving Act - Commercial Driver's License Act -
Effect Of Amendments To Same Section of Code

                          December 21, 1989

Mr. W. Marshall Rickert
Motor Vehicle Administrator

 You have requested our opinion concerning the version of §16-

205.1 of the Transportation Article ("TR" Article) that appears in the
1989 cumulative supplement to that article. After the passage of two
major acts in the last session of the General Assembly amending that
section, the version of TR §16-205.1 published in the 1989 supplement
contains several significant inconsistencies.

 For the reasons stated below, we conclude as follows:

1. The procedures for the scheduling of hearings are those set

out in TR §16-205.1(g). The inconsistent procedures in TR §16-
205.1(f)(1) and (2) were published in error and should be disregarded.

 2. TR §16-205.1(b)(1)(iii) should be read to require a police

officer to advise a commercial motor vehicle driver of the driver's
ineligibility to operate a commercial motor vehicle only if the driver
refuses to take the test for alcohol after being requested to do so by the
officer.1

3. The MVA's authority to modify a suspension is set out in TR

§16-205.1(l). The inconsistent provision in TR §16-205.1(f)(5) was
published in error and should be disregarded. In addition, the
suspension periods for refusal to take a test are those set out in TR
§16-205.1(g)(4)(ii) and (g)(7)(iii), not those erroneously published in
TR §16-205.1(f)(4).

 4. Finally, we recommend that an emergency bill be introduced

in the next session correcting the published version of TR §16-205.1.

 1 The officer should also provide the same information about license suspension

as the officer would to any driver. See note 6 below.

                                     I

             Harmonizing The Drunk Driving Act
           And The Commercial Driver's License Act

The Drunk Driving Act of 1989, Chapter 284 of the Laws of

Maryland 1989 ("Chapter 284" or "Drunk Driving Act"), and the
Commercial Driver's License Act of 1989, Chapter 291 of the Laws
of Maryland 1989 ("Chapter 291" or "CDL Act"), both of which take
effect on January 1, 1990, contain several substantive amendments to
TR §16-205.1. To cite perhaps the most important of its provisions,
the Drunk Driving Act amended TR §16-205.1 to authorize the Motor
Vehicle Administration ("MVA") to suspend the license of a person
who drives with an alcohol concentration of .10 or more. Likewise,
the CDL Act amended TR §16-205.1 to authorize the MVA to
disqualify a person from operating a commercial motor vehicle if that
person refused the test for alcohol.2 Other amendments will
dramatically change the procedures used by the MVA and the police in
handling drunk drivers and the sanctions available to the MVA in
disposing of a case brought before it under TR §16-205.1.

Article 1, §17 of the Maryland Code provides the background for

our review of the amendments to TR §16-205.1 made by the Drunk
Driving Act and the CDL Act. Article 1, §17 provides as follows:

       If two or more amendments to the same section or
   subsection of the Code are enacted at the same or different
   sessions of the General Assembly, and one of them makes
   no reference to and takes no account of the other or
   others, the amendments shall be construed together, and
   each shall be given effect, if possible, and with due regard
   to the wording of their titles. If the amendments are
   irreconcilable and it is not possible to construe them
   together, the latest in date of final enactment shall prevail.

 2 A "disqualification" means "a prohibition against driving a commercial motor

vehicle ...." TR §11-111.1. A "commercial motor vehicle" is defined in TR §11-
109.1 as generally including vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 26,001 or more
pounds, vehicles designed to transport 16 or more passengers, or vehicles transporting
hazardous materials.

 The CDL Act and Drunk Driving Act make no reference to each

other. In determining the combined effect of their amendments to TR
§16-205.1, we must try to discern the legislative intent from the
purpose and language of the enactments. Mass Transit Administration
v. Baltimore County Revenue Authority, 267 Md. 687, 695-96, 298
A.2d 413 (1973). While the CDL Act was signed after the Drunk
Driving Act, that fact is to be considered only if the acts are
irreconcilable and cannot stand together; repeal by implication is
disfavored. Prince George's County v. McBride, 263 Md. 235, 242-
43, 282 A.2d 486 (1971). The acts are each to be given full effect
unless irreconcilable. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Clerk
of Superior Court, 270 Md. 316, 319-20, 311 A.2d 261 (1973).3

The purpose of the CDL Act, in pertinent part, is (1) to create a

commercial driver's license, and (2) as it relates to TR §16.205.1, to
require that operators of commercial motor vehicles "impliedly consent
to take a chemical breath test if any alcohol is detected in the
operator." See Chapter 291, title.

 In contrast, the purpose of the Drunk Driving Act, as it relates to

TR §16-205.1, is (1) to "alter provisions relating to the implied consent
to take certain tests," (2) to "establish certain sanctions for certain test
results," (3) "to establish certain procedures," and (4) to provide "for
the issuance of a restricted license and modification of a license
suspension under certain circumstances ...." See Chapter 284, title.

 The two acts' amendments to TR §16-205.1 must be read with

these different goals in mind. In our view, these amendments can and
should be construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent of the
two acts. The published version of TR §16-205.1 in the 1989
cumulative supplement to the Transportation Article does not properly
reflect the legislative intent underlying the amendments to TR §16-
205.1 in the several respects described below.

 3 The publisher of the Annotated Code did not view either of the acts making

amendments to TR §16-205.1 as prevailing. Instead, the publisher published both sets
of amendments to TR §16-205.1 and thus included inconsistent language in its
publication.

                               II

                    Scheduling of Hearings

 Under the language of TR §16-205.1(f)(2) in effect until January

1, 1990, a licensee who refuses a test for alcohol automatically is
scheduled to receive a hearing within 30 days of the date of detention.
Effective January 1, 1990, the Drunk Driving Act, Chapter 284,
repeals TR §16-205.1(f) in its present form. Instead, the Drunk
Driving Act enacted new procedures, which were designated by
Chapter 284 to be a completely new TR §16-205.1(f). See Laws of
Maryland 1989 at 2340-45. Under these new procedures, a person
may submit a request for a hearing within 10 days of the date of the
issuance of an order of suspension. This new provision, that the
hearing be requested by the licensee, applies not only when the licensee
refuses to test for alcohol but also when the licensee takes the test and
is found to have an alcohol concentration of .10 or more.

 Thus, as of January 1, 1990, when the Drunk Driving Act,

becomes effective, the licensee must request a hearing within 10 days
of the date of the issuance of an order of suspension. A hearing will
no longer be scheduled automatically.

The CDL Act, Chapter 291, did not amend the present wording of

TR §16-205.1(f)(2). Thus that act, standing alone, did not provide for
any change in the procedures by which a licensee obtains a hearing at
the MVA. Nevertheless, when the General Assembly enacted Chapter
284 and thereby repealed current TR §16-205.1(f) and enacted instead
the new procedures discussed above, it unmistakably intended to
provide that all hearings held under TR §16-205.1 comply with the new
procedures.

The publisher, in printing amended TR §16-205.1 in the 1989

cumulative supplement, properly included the new procedures that the
Drunk Driving Act had designated to be new TR §16-205.1(f).
Because of the need to accommodate other subsections of TR §16-
205.1, the publisher put these procedures in new TR §16-205.1(g).
That redesignation is no problem. The problem, however, is that the
publisher also printed, in the supplement's TR §16-205.1(f)(1) and (2),
the same language about the automatic scheduling of hearings that the
General Assembly had repealed in Chapter 284.

 Although it is impossible to give effect to both TR §16-205.1(f)(1)

and (2) and to TR §16-205.1(g), as set out in the 1989 supplement, it
is certainly possible to discern what the General Assembly intended.
In our view, TR §16-205.1(g) in the 1989 supplement properly
represents the procedures that the General Assembly intended be
followed by the MVA, the police, and the general public in those
instances in which a test for alcohol is refused or the test result shows
an alcohol concentration of .10 or more. The procedures outlined in
TR §16-205.1(g) apply regardless of whether the driver was operating
a commercial motor vehicle or a non-commercial motor vehicle.

                                    III

                   Advice About CDL Eligibility

Currently, TR §16-205.1(b)(1) provides that a police officer is to

advise the detainee of the licensing sanctions that are to be imposed if
the detainee refuses the test for alcohol. As of January 1, 1990, the
Drunk Driving Act requires the officer also to explain the licensing
consequences in the event that the licensee is tested and the result
indicates an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. Laws of Maryland
1989 at 2334-36. This new requirement is codified at TR §16-
205.1(b)(1)(i) and (ii).

The CDL Act provides that the police officer must advise a driver

detained in a commercial motor vehicle of the consequences to the
driver's eligibility to operate a commercial motor vehicle if the driver
refuses the test. See Laws of Maryland 1989 at 2453. The CDL Act
does not provide that the driver may be disqualified from his or her
commercial driving eligibility if the driver takes the test with a
resulting alcohol concentration of .10 or more.4

The provision in the CDL Act regarding advice about

disqualification is set out at TR §16-205.1(b)(1)(iii) in the 1989
supplement, following the provisions in the Drunk Driving Act. Thus

 4 Of course, that test result would lead to a suspension of the driver's license.

During the period of the suspension, the person would be ineligible to drive a
commercial vehicle. TR §16-808(5).
In 1992, it will become an offense for a person to drive a commercial motor
vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .04 or more. See Chapter 291, §§3 and 7.

positioned, TR §16-205.1(b)(1)(iii) reads as if it requires the detaining
officer to advise a commercial motor vehicle driver that the person may
be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle if the person
takes the chemical test and the test result indicates an alcohol
concentration of .10 or more. Since the person may be disqualified
from operating a commercial motor vehicle only if the person refuses
the test, there is no basis for the police officer's advising the person of
any consequences to the person's eligibility to drive a commercial
motor vehicle if the person takes the test, regardless of the test's
results.5

 Thus, it is our view that TR §16-205.1(b)(1)(iii), as printed in the

1989 supplement, should be construed to require the police officer to
advise a commercial motor vehicle operator about disqualification only
in the event that the person refused the test for alcohol.6

                                    IV

              Modification and Length of Suspensions

 TR §16-205.1(g)(4) and (g)(7)(iii), as published in the 1989

supplement, correctly spell out the suspension periods for test results
showing an alcohol concentration of .10 or more and for test refusals.7
The published version of TR §16-205.1, however, contains
inconsistent provisions regarding the authority of the MVA to modify
this suspension.

The Drunk Driving Act allows the MVA to modify a suspension

under TR §16-205.1 only when the suspended driver took the test, the
person needs a license for employment or alcohol treatment, and the

 5 An advisement of that kind will be needed as of April 1, 1992, when the driver

of a commercial vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .04 or more will be subject
to being disqualified.
6 The officer would also advise the driver about license suspension, as distinct
from CDL eligibility, either in the event of test refusal or if the test showed an
alcohol concentration of .10 or more.
7 This language is the redesignation of the provisions enacted as TR §16-205.1
(f)(4) and (f)(7)(iii) by Chapter 284. See Laws of Maryland at 2340 and 2343-44.

person has no violations of TR §16-205.1 or convictions under TR §21-
902 during the past five years. Chapter 284, Laws of Maryland 1989
at 2344-45. This narrow exception to the mandatory suspension
periods otherwise provided for in TR §16-205.1 is set out at TR §16-
205.1(l) in the 1989 supplement. The legislative intent is further
evidenced by the General Assembly's repeal of the modification
provisions in current TR §16-205.1(f)(5).8

The CDL Act, on the other hand, did not address the MVA's

authority to modify a suspension; rather, that act dealt only with the
mandatory disqualification periods for refusing a test. See TR §16-
205.1(f)(6) through (8), as enacted by Chapter 291, Laws of Maryland
1989 at 2456-57.

The publisher, rather than deleting the language of the current TR

§16-205.1(f)(5) effective January 1, 1990, as envisioned by the General
Assembly when it repealed that paragraph in Chapter 284, republished
the paragraph as the new TR §16-205.1(f)(5). In our view, TR §16-
205.1(f)(5), as printed in the 1989 supplement, should not be given
effect. The only instance in which a suspension imposed under TR
§16-205.1 may be modified is pursuant to the provisions of Chapter
284, redesignated as TR §16-205.1(l) in the 1989 supplement.

Finally, TR §16-205.1(f)(4) in the 1989 supplement contains an

error. It indicates that the suspension period for refusal to take a test
is 60 days to 6 months for a first offense and 120 days to one year for
a second or subsequent offense. These suspension periods were
repealed when current TR §16-205.1(f) was repealed by Chapter 284.
Effective January 1, 1990 the longer, mandatory suspension periods
enacted by Chapter 284, 120 days for a first offense and one year for
a second or subsequent offense, will be applicable, as set out in TR
§16-205.1(g)(4)(ii) and (g)(7)(iii) in the 1989 supplement.

 8 Under the current provision, the MVA may modify a suspension or issue a

restrictive license for alcohol treatment or employment reasons, even if the driver has
a record of prior violations. Moreover, the current provision permits modification
of a suspension even if the driver refused the test.

                              V

                         Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that the published version of TR §16-

205.1, in the several respects discussed in this opinion, does not
properly give effect to the goals of the General Assembly in enacting
the Drunk Driving Act and the CDL Act.

 Given the significance of these two acts, and the fact that most

attorneys and the general public rely on the publisher's version of the
law, we strongly recommend that the language of this section be
clarified through technical amendments in the next session of the
General Assembly. Also, because we understand that hearings at the
MVA under this section are not expected to begin until early February,
but that thousands of hearings will be held before the General
Assembly adjourns in April, we recommend that the appropriate
amendments to this section be enacted on an emergency basis.

                                  J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                                  Attorney General

                                  Edward R. K. Hargadon
                                  Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice

Editor's Note:

Chapters 11 (Senate Bill 398) and 413 (House Bill 492) of the Laws
of Maryland 1990 substantially rewrote the provisions discussed in this
opinion.