In Maryland child support cases, can a non-lawyer caseworker sign the court paperwork to withhold a parent's wages, or does the circuit court clerk have to handle the paperwork instead?

Plain-English summary

The Executive Director of Maryland's Child Support Enforcement Administration asked the Attorney General two questions about the state's earnings-withholding process for collecting overdue child or spousal support. First, whether a non-lawyer employee of a support enforcement agency could sign the court motion or request that starts the withholding process, or whether an attorney had to sign it. Second, whether certain follow-up duties, sending notices to the obligor, serving the withholding order on the employer, and notifying the parties when a stay is requested, belonged to the circuit court or to the support enforcement agency itself, a question that had come up because clerks in some counties already handled other court-related paperwork for the agency.

The Attorney General concluded that the statutes authorizing a support enforcement agency to file a withholding motion or request only give the agency, as opposed to the individual support recipient, the right to bring that filing; they say nothing about letting non-lawyer agency staff sign court papers without an attorney, so an attorney representing the agency must sign these filings under Maryland's general rule that pleadings need an attorney's signature. On the second question, the opinion concluded that the statute's use of the word "court" in these particular sections meant the circuit court (acting through the clerk for these ministerial tasks), not the support enforcement agency, because the law consistently used "court" and "support enforcement agency" as separate terms elsewhere, and reading them as interchangeable here would create nonsensical results, like the agency being required to notify itself of a stay motion.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could a non-lawyer caseworker at a Maryland child support agency file the paperwork to start withholding a parent's wages in 1987 without a lawyer's signature?
No, according to this opinion. The Attorney General concluded that Maryland's earnings-withholding statutes only authorized the agency, rather than the support recipient personally, to bring these filings; they did not override the general rule that every pleading filed in court needs an attorney's signature, so an attorney representing the agency had to sign.

Who was responsible for actually serving the wage-withholding order on a parent's employer, the circuit court or the child support agency?
The circuit court, specifically the clerk. The opinion found the statute used "court" and "support enforcement agency" as distinct terms throughout, and concluded the General Assembly meant exactly that when it assigned these ministerial service and notice duties to the "court" rather than the agency.

Why did the Attorney General reject the idea that "court" in this statute could just mean the support enforcement agency, given that clerks already handled some agency paperwork?
The opinion explained that reading "court" as interchangeable with "support enforcement agency" would make parts of the law meaningless or absurd, for example requiring the agency to notify itself when a parent asked for a stay of the withholding order. Since the law elsewhere spelled out the agency's own separate duties explicitly, the opinion found no basis to blur the two terms just because clerks happened to handle related tasks.

Background and statutory framework

Maryland's Family Law Article, Title 10, Subtitle 1, Part III, lets a support recipient or a support enforcement agency file a motion or request to withhold a delinquent obligor's wages once support arrears exceed 30 days. Under Article 10, §1 of the Maryland Code and Maryland Rule 1-311(a), a person who has not been admitted to the bar may not practice law, and every pleading filed by a represented party must be signed by an attorney. The opinion explained that a statute simply authorizing a government agency to participate in a legal proceeding, a common pattern found throughout the Maryland Code, does not itself signal an intent to let non-lawyer agency employees practice law on the agency's behalf, particularly since a separate statute, FL §10-115, specifically designates certain attorneys to represent the Child Support Enforcement Administration in support litigation.

On the second question, the opinion applied ordinary statutory construction, explaining that where a statute consistently uses two different terms ("court" and "support enforcement agency") in different provisions, courts presume the distinction was deliberate, and that no interpretation should render statutory language meaningless or produce an absurd result. Because FL §10-124 and §10-130(d) assign notice, service, and stay-related duties specifically to the "court," while other provisions like FL §10-108(b) explicitly assign parallel duties to the support enforcement agency, and because reading "court" to mean the agency would require the agency to notify itself of certain filings, the opinion concluded the General Assembly meant the circuit court, acting through its clerk for these ministerial functions, to perform them.

Citations

Statutes:

• §10-120(b)(1) of the Family Law Article (pre-1985 withholding orders becoming continuing orders)
• §10-123(a) of the Family Law Article (filing a request for service of an earnings withholding order)
• §10-124 of the Family Law Article (court's duty to send notices to the obligor and serve the employer)
• §10-125(b) of the Family Law Article (order binding on present and future employers)
• §10-130(d) of the Family Law Article (court's duty to notify parties of a stay motion)
• §10-108(b) of the Family Law Article (support enforcement agency's duty to collect and distribute payments)
• §10-101(e)(2) of the Family Law Article (definition of "local support enforcement office" including a circuit court component)
• §10-115 of the Family Law Article (designation of attorneys to represent the Child Support Enforcement Administration)
• Article 10, §1 of the Maryland Code (prohibition on unauthorized practice of law)
• Maryland Rule 1-311(a) (requirement that pleadings be signed by an attorney)

Cases:

• Lukas v. Bar Association of Montgomery County, 35 Md. App. 442 (1977)
• Public Service Comm'n v. Hahn Transportation, Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583 (1969)
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987)
• Supervisor of Assessments v. Chase Associates, 306 Md. 568, 575 (1986)
• Management Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341 (1984)
• Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 353 (1987)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1987/Volume72_1987.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

SOCIAL SERVICES

Child Support Enforcement—Earnings Withholding—Court Filings To Be Signed By Attorney For Enforcement Agency—Clerk of Court To Perform Certain Ministerial Functions.

November 3, 1987

Ann Helton, Executive Director
Child Support Enforcement Administration

You have requested our opinion concerning the provisions of the Family Law Article ("FL" Article) that deal with the withholding of earnings from a person obligated to pay child or spousal support. Specifically, you pose the following questions concerning these provisions, codified at FL Title 10, Subtitle 1 Part III:

1. Must a motion for an earnings withholding order and a request for service of an earnings withholding order be signed by an attorney if the motion or request is filed by a support enforcement agency?

2. Is the court or the support enforcement agency responsible for (i) sending certain required documents to the obligor upon receipt of a request for service of an earnings withholding order; (ii) serving the employer with a copy of the earnings withholding order; and (iii) providing the recipient and the support enforcement agency with notice of the filing of a motion for a stay of an earnings withholding order?

For the reasons given below, we conclude as follows:

1. A motion for an earnings withholding order and a request for an earnings withholding order filed by a support enforcement agency must be signed by an attorney representing the agency.

2. The clerk of the circuit court, not the support enforcement agency, is required to send notice to the obligor of the filing of a request for service of an earnings withholding order, serve the employer with the order, and notify the recipient and the support enforcement agency of the filing of a motion for stay.1

I
Signature of Attorneys

FL §10-120(b)(l) provides as follows:

"Any order under this Part III of this subtitle that is passed before July 1, 1985 shall become an immediate and continuing withholding order on all earnings of the obligor that are due on or after the date of the withholding order on the filing by the recipient or support enforcement agency of: (i) a motion for a withholding order on the earnings of the obligor; and (ii) a current support order."

Similarly, FL §10-123(a) provides: "If an obligor accrues support payment arrears amounting to more than 30 days of support, the recipient or the support enforcement agency may file a request for service of the earnings withholding order."

You are asking, in effect, whether the language granting authority to the support enforcement agency to file a motion under FL §10-120(b)(l) and a request under FL §10-123(a) implicitly authorizes agency employees who are not attorneys to sign those papers on behalf of the agency.

A person who has not been admitted to the bar "may not practice the profession or perform the services of an attorney-at-law . . ." Article 10, §1 of the Maryland Code. The boundaries of legal practice, as distinct from activities that a nonlawyer may perform, are not always clear. See generally 65 Opinions of the Attorney General 28 (1980). However, it is clear that "[e]very pleading or paper" filed in court "shall be signed by at least one attorney admitted to practice law in this State . . . ." Maryland Rule 1-311(a).2 More broadly, a nonlawyer may not represent another person or entity before an adjudicatory body. See Lukas v. Bar Association of Montgomery County, 35 Md. App. 442 (1977).

To be sure, the General Assembly has latitude in defining the nature of unauthorized practice of law. See 65 Opinions of the Attorney General at 29.3 However, we have little difficulty in concluding that the language of FL §§10-120(b)(l) and FL 10-123(a) does not implicitly authorize nonlawyer employees of a support enforcement agency to file wage withholding requests and motions in court themselves, without the signature of an attorney representing the agency. These sections merely confer authority on State and local support enforcement agencies, as distinct from the support recipients themselves, to file these wage withholding papers.

The Maryland Code is replete with provisions that confer authority on State agencies to participate in legal proceedings. E.g., §2-609 of the Environment Article (Department of Environment may enforce air quality requirements); §3-304 of the State Finance and Procurement Article (Central Collection Unit may institute civil action to collect debts). A legislative directive authorizing an agency to participate in a legal proceeding simply does not reflect an intent to authorize persons who are not attorneys to practice law on behalf of the agency. In our view, there is no basis to believe that the statutory authorization for a support enforcement agency to participate in an earnings withholding proceeding authorizes agency personnel to practice law, especially when a separate statute specifically designates certain attorneys to provide legal representation to the Child Support Enforcement Administration in civil support litigation. FL §10-115.

II
"The Court"

Your second question asks for our opinion on the meaning of the term "court," as used in FL §§10-124(a), 10-124(b) and 10-130(d). Specifically, you wish to know whether the circuit court or the support enforcement agency must perform certain ministerial functions described in these sections. This question stems from a suggestion from the clerks in a few jurisdictions that the term "court" in these sections should be construed to refer to the support enforcement agency, since the agency performs other court-related ministerial functions.

In pertinent part, FL §10-124 provides:

"(a) When the court receives a request for service of the earnings withholding order under §10-123 of this subtitle, the court shall send [the various documents specified in paragraphs 1 through 6] to the obligor, by certified mail, return receipt requested and first class mail, the home address or, if the home address is unknown, the place of employment last reported to the court:

(b) If the obligor fails to move for a stay under §10-130 of this subtitle, the court shall immediately cause a copy of the earnings withholding order to be served on the employer of the obligor."

Further duties are placed upon the "court" in FL §10-130(d). This subsection states: "Upon receipt of a motion for a stay of the withholding order under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall immediately notify the recipient and the support enforcement agency, if applicable, and shall schedule a hearing within 15 days."

In this instance, we believe that the words of the statute, given their ordinary meaning, unmistakably express the legislative purpose or aim. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987). The terms "court" and "support enforcement agency" are used separately throughout the statute. We cannot find in the language in the statute, or in its history or context, anything that suggests a legislative intention to use these terms interchangeably. It is our view that the General Assembly used the word "court" in its ordinary sense and not as an awkward synonym for the support enforcement agency.4

Elsewhere in the Family Law Article, the General Assembly has expressly authorized the support enforcement agencies to perform certain ministerial court functions. For example, both local and State support enforcement agencies collect and distribute support payments whenever a court orders an obligor to make payments to a public agency. FL §10-108(b). However, these functions are clearly identified as the responsibility of the support enforcement agency.

It is reasonable to assume that a distinction between terms was intentional when those terms are used separately in various parts of a statute. See Supervisor of Assessments v. Chase Associates, 306 Md. 568, 575 (1986). See generally 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §47.16, at 161 (4th ed. 1984). Here, the term "court" cannot reasonably be read as referring to the support enforcement agency, because elsewhere in the same statute the duties of the support enforcement agency are expressly set out.

Moreover, treating the terms "court" and "support enforcement agency" as if they were interchangeable would create several anomalies and render parts of the statute nugatory or surplusage. For example, the statute requires certain notices to be sent to both the court and to the support enforcement agency. E.g., FL §§10-127(1), 10-128(a), and 10-129. A construction that assumes that "court" includes "support enforcement agency" would make the latter term in these sections surplusage. No word, clause, or phrase of a statute should be construed into meaninglessness. Management Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341 (1984).

Similarly, that construction would require the support enforcement agency to notify itself of the filing of a motion to stay. FL §10-130(d). Statutory constructions that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided. Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 353 (1987).

In short, there is no basis for our reading "court" to mean "support enforcement agency." Stated conversely, the General Assembly used the term "court" in the earnings withholding statute when it intended the court, and not the support enforcement agency, to perform certain ministerial functions.5

III
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that:

1. A motion for an earnings withholding order and a request for an earnings withholding order filed by a support enforcement agency must be signed by an attorney representing the agency.

2. The clerk of the circuit court, not the support enforcement agency, is required to send notice to the obligor of the filing of a request for service of an earnings withholding order, serve the employer with the order, and notify the recipient and the support enforcement agency of the filing of a motion for stay.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
Joseph B. Spillman, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1 You also asked whether an earnings withholding order is binding on each present and future employer of the obligor and, if so, whether the language of the order nevertheless should specify the name of the obligor's current employer. FL §10-125(b) provides: "An earnings withholding order is binding on each present and future employer of the obligor on whom a copy of the order is served." The language of this subsection could not be clearer. Accordingly, an order should not specify the current employer but should instead provide generally that all employers who employ the obligor are subject to the order.

2 This requirement applies to the filings "of a party represented by an attorney"; filings by "a party who is not represented by an attorney shall be signed by the party." Rule 1-311(a).

3 Final authority for determining the scope of unauthorized practice is with the Court of Appeals. See Public Service Comm'n v. Hahn Transportation, Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583 (1969).

4 Indeed, when the General Assembly intended to extend the term "local support enforcement office" to include the circuit court, that is, beyond the term's ordinary usage, it did so expressly. FL §10-101(e)(2) defines the phrase "local support enforcement office" as "(1) a county agency; or (2) a component of the circuit court for a county."

5 We recognize that the term "court" is used in some parts of the statute to refer to the judge and in other parts to the clerk. As indicated in a prior memorandum to the clerks, we believe that the term "court" refers to the judge when a judicial function is described and to the clerk when a ministerial function is described. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Julia M. Freit to All Clerks of the Circuit Court (May 15, 1987). However, the need to differentiate two different senses of the word "court" for this purpose does not, in our view, permit us to give the word a construction far beyond its ordinary meaning or its usage in the statute.