Could Maryland voters force a referendum to block the Camden Yards stadium financing legislation?

Plain-English summary

Maryland's Secretary of State asked the Attorney General a practical question with a lot riding on it: could opponents of the 1987 Camden Yards stadium legislation gather signatures and force a statewide vote to block it? The stadium package was three linked laws, Chapters 122, 123, and 124 of 1987, that let the newly created Maryland Stadium Authority pick the Camden Yards site, gave it condemnation power to assemble the land, and set up the financing, sports lotteries, a Baltimore City contribution, and lease-backed bonds, needed to pay for it. Maryland's Constitution lets voters petition many new laws to referendum, but it also exempts laws that are an "appropriation for maintaining the State Government."

The Attorney General concluded all three chapters fell inside that exemption and so could not be referred to a popular vote. Chapter 124, the financing law, counted as an appropriation because it raised and dedicated public revenue (lottery proceeds, a city payment, bond proceeds) to a specific government purpose, tracing that rule back to a 1927 Attorney General opinion and Court of Appeals cases going back to the 1920s. Building a stadium counted as "maintaining the State Government" because Maryland governments, state and local, had funded athletic facilities going back to the early 1900s, a history the opinion traced chapter by chapter through Baltimore's earlier stadium leases and legislative appropriations. And because Chapters 122 and 123 were so tied to the financing mechanism that suspending either one would have undone the whole package, the opinion concluded all three chapters stood or fell together as a single, referendum-exempt appropriation.

An editor's note added after publication records that the Court of Appeals later agreed in full: in Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, the court held that no part of the stadium package could be referred to referendum because the three chapters were "a single, inseparable law" making an appropriation for maintaining the state government.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why couldn't opponents of the Camden Yards stadium put it to a public vote?
Because the Attorney General concluded, and the Court of Appeals later agreed, that the stadium legislation was a budget appropriation for maintaining the state government, a category the Maryland Constitution's Referendum Article expressly excludes from the petition-to-referendum process, regardless of how many voters wanted a vote on it.

Did the fact that Camden Yards was for a professional baseball and football stadium matter to whether it counted as "maintaining the State Government"?
Yes. The opinion spent considerable space establishing that stadium construction was a traditional government function in Maryland, tracing state and Baltimore City support for athletic facilities back to 1906 and through decades of prior legislative appropriations for Memorial Stadium and other venues, to support the conclusion that funding a new stadium fit within "maintaining the State Government" rather than being an entirely new kind of spending.

Were all three of the 1987 Camden Yards laws treated the same way, even though only one of them actually raised money?
Yes. The opinion concluded Chapters 122 (site approval) and 123 (powers, including condemnation authority) were so integrated with Chapter 124's financing mechanism that suspending either one would have effectively nullified the appropriation, so all three were treated as a single, legally inseparable package exempt from referendum together.

Background and statutory framework

The Maryland Stadium Authority was created in 1986 (Chapter 283, Laws of Maryland 1986, codified in the Financial Institutions Article) to acquire, construct, and operate facilities for professional baseball and football. After a required site-selection process, the General Assembly enacted three companion 1987 laws: Chapter 122 approved the Camden Yards site, Chapter 123 reorganized the Authority and gave it condemnation power, and Chapter 124 built the financing structure, sports lotteries, a required annual Baltimore City payment, and lease-backed revenue bonds, needed to pay for the project.

Maryland's Referendum Article (Article XVI of the state Constitution) lets voters petition many new laws to a statewide vote, but Article XVI, §2 excludes any law "making an appropriation for maintaining the State Government." The opinion worked through decades of prior authority, starting with a 1927 Attorney General opinion and the Court of Appeals decisions in Winebrenner v. Salmon and Dorsey v. Petrott, establishing that a law counts as an "appropriation" for this purpose if it raises and dedicates public revenue to a specific purpose, even if it is not itself a formal budget-bill appropriation. It then worked through the separate question of whether stadium funding counted as "maintaining the State Government," concluding that it did because Maryland state and local governments had a long history, tracing back to 1906, of funding athletic facilities as a recognized governmental function, citing parallel out-of-state stadium-financing cases from New Jersey, Ohio, California, Michigan, and elsewhere reaching the same conclusion about public purpose.

Finally, the opinion addressed whether Chapters 122 and 123, which did not themselves raise money, could still be swept into Chapter 124's referendum exemption. Relying on Maryland's "package bill" case law (particularly O.C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights v. Mayor of Ocean City) and parallel authority from Michigan, North Dakota, and Missouri courts treating interdependent companion bills as legally inseparable, the opinion concluded the three chapters had to stand or fall together, since suspending the site-approval or powers legislation would have nullified the financing law's purpose. The Court of Appeals adopted this same reasoning later in 1987 in Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, resolving the litigation that followed the stadium package's enactment.

Citations

Statutes:

• FI §13-702 (Stadium Authority as instrumentality of the State)
• FI §13-703 (Authority membership, gubernatorial appointment)
• FI §13-708 (Authority's purpose: acquire, construct, and operate facilities)
• FI §13-709(c) (report required before site acquisition or construction contract)
• FI §13-709(c)(2) (contents of the required report)
• FI §13-701(c) (definition of "facility")
• FI §13-701(d) (facility includes adjacent parking lots and garages)
• FI §13-709(f) (definition of the Camden Yards site)
• FI §13-711 (referenced by all three 1987 chapters)
• FI §§13-712 and 13-719 (amended by both Chapter 123 and Chapter 124)
• Article XVI, §2 (Maryland Constitution, referendum exception for state-maintenance appropriations)
• Article XVI, §§1 and 2 (referendum petition mechanism generally)
• Article XVI, §6 (separate referendum exception for liquor laws)
• Article III, §52 (the Budget Amendment)
• Article III, §53(13) (legislature's power to enact laws necessary to carry out the Budget Amendment)
• §§7-209 and 7-217 of the State Finance and Procurement Article (statutory budget amendment process)
• Article 41, §10-701 (Special Advisory Council on Professional Sports and the Economy)

Cases:

• Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 677 (1917)
• Tyler v. Secretary of State, 229 Md. 397, 402 (1962)
• Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 570 (1978)
• Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230 (1940)
• Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563 (1928)
• Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 9 (1937)
• Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606 (Ohio 1930)
• New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457 (1971)
• New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972)
• National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976)
• City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841 (Cal. 1982)
• Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Mich. 1972)
• Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ohio 1968)
• City of Anaheim v. Michel, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Cal. App. 1968)
• Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 689 (Colo. 1968)
• Martin v. Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 898-99 (Pa. 1966)
• Page v. Francis, 196 Ark. 822 (1938)
• Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.E. 435, 438 (S.C. 1933)
• Green v. Garrett, 192 Md. 52, 61-63 (1949)
• Rockville v. Randolph, 267 Md. 56, 62 (1972)
• Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)
• Stevens v. State, 27 Md. App. 460, 466 n.3 (1975)
• Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279 (1977)
• Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 7 (1966)
• O.C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, 280 Md. 585, 597-98 (1977)
• Gay v. Laurens County, 100 S.E.2d 271, 276 (Ga. 1957)
• Berlin v. Shockley, 174 Md. 442, 446 (1938)
• Michigan Good Roads Federation v. Alger, 53 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Mich. 1952)
• County Road Association v. Board of State Canvassers, 282 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1979)
• Boards of County Road Commissioners v. Riley, 218 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1974)
• Baird v. Burke County, 205 N.W. 17 (N.D. 1925)
• State ex inf. Attorney-General v. Dallmeyer, 295 Mo. 638 (1922)
• Gravning v. Zellmer, 291 N.W.2d 751, 754 (S.D. 1980)
• State v. Meyers, 363 P.2d 121, 124 (Wash. 1961)
• District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics v. Jones, 481 A.2d 456 (D.C. 1984)
• Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 310 Md. 437 (1987)
• Henderson v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. & Power Co., 63 So. 616 (La. 1913)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1987/Volume72_1987.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Constitutional Law—Referendum—“Appropriation for Maintaining State Government”—Camden Yards Stadium Legislative Package Not Subject to Referendum.

May 28, 1987

The Honorable Winfield M. Kelly, Jr.
Secretary of State

You have requested our opinion on the question of whether any of the acts comprising the Camden Yards Stadium legislation, Chapters 122, 123, and 124 of the Laws of Maryland of 1987, may be referred to referendum under the provisions of Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution. We have concluded that Chapter 124, the financing component of this legislative package, is an “appropriation” and that this appropriation is “for maintaining the State Government,” within the meaning of Article XVI, §2 of the Constitution. Moreover, because Chapters 122 and 123 are so integrally related to the stadium financing mechanism that their suspension would effectively nullify the appropriation, these two acts are likewise part of an “appropriation for maintaining the State Government.” Hence, as explained in detail below, we are of the opinion that Chapters 122, 123 and 124 fall within an exception to the referendum power and therefore may not be petitioned to a vote. In our opinion, a petition calling for any of these acts to be submitted to referendum is of no legal effect.

I
The Maryland Stadium Authority and the 1987 Enactments

At its 1986 Session, the General Assembly created the Maryland Stadium Authority. Chapter 283, Laws of Maryland 1986 (codified as Subtitle 7, Title 13 of the Financial Institutions Article (“FI” Article)). The Authority is an instrumentality of the State and a public corporation. FI §13-702. It consists of five members, appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. FI §13-703. The purpose of the Authority is to acquire, construct and operate facilities for professional baseball and football teams. FI §13-708. Under the 1986 Act, prior to acquiring or leasing a facility site and entering into a construction contract, the Authority is required to submit to the General Assembly and the Board of Public Works a detailed report and findings justifying the acquisition, lease or contract. FI §13-709(c). In particular, the report must include: 1. A detailed plan of the method of funding the acquisition, lease, or contract involving a facility or site; 2. A statement of the economic necessity of the proposed facility or site acquisition, lease, or contract; 3. A detailed comparative analysis between the costs and benefits of the proposed facility or site and the costs and benefits of improving Memorial Stadium; and 4. A detailed analysis justifying the reasons for acquiring a site or constructing a new facility. FI §13-709(c)(2).1 On December 5, 1986, in accordance with the deadlines established by FI §13-709, the Authority gave notice of its intention to recommend the Camden Yards site for the location and construction of a new facility.2 This notice also announced a public hearing scheduled for March 9, 1987. Following review of the report, the Administration caused four bills to be introduced in each House of the General Assembly at the 1987 Session. This package of companion bills included: Senate Bill 228/House Bill 254—Maryland Stadium Authority —Approval of Facility Site at Camden Yards, the former of which became Chapter 122; Senate Bill 229/House Bill 248—Maryland Stadium Authority —Deadline for Site Selection;3 Senate Bill 230/House Bill 249—Maryland Stadium Authority —Powers and Duties, the former of which became Chapter 123; and Senate Bill 847/House Bill 1382—Maryland Stadium Authority —Financing, the former of which became Chapter 124. The Senate bills were jointly referred to the Finance Committee and the Budget and Taxation Committee; the House bills were referred to the Ways and Means Committee. The Senate committees held joint hearings on the bills; all three were reported out of committee favorably, with amendments, on March 27. On March 30, after extensive floor debate, the committee reports on the Senate bills were adopted and the package passed on second reader. On April 1, 1987, a cloture vote having been obtained on a motion to limit debate on all three measures, Senate Bills 228, 230, and 847 passed the Senate and were sent to the House of Delegates, where they were assigned to the Ways and Means Committee. On April 2, all three Senate bills were reported favorably to the floor of the House, the committee report was adopted, and the bills passed on second reader. On April 3 they passed third reader and were returned passed to the Senate on April 6. Meanwhile, anticipating that the Maryland Stadium Authority would obtain the funds for its operating budget from the financing mechanism established by Senate Bill 847, the General Assembly struck all general fund appropriations for the Authority from the budget bill.4 On April 30, the Governor signed the bills into law as Chapters 122, 123, and 124. All three chapters take effect on June 1, 1987. Chapter 122 expressly authorizes the Maryland Stadium Authority to acquire a facility site at the Camden Yards area of Baltimore City and to enter into a contract for the construction of a facility. It also specifically defines the “Camden Yards” site.5 Chapter 123 removes the Maryland Stadium Authority from the Department of Economic and Community Development, and makes it an independent unit in the Executive Branch of State government. This act also amends the Authority’s powers in a number of ways, most notably by giving it ordinary and quick-take condemnation authority over private property in connection with the Camden Yards site.6 Chapter 124 is the financing element and the centerpiece of the package. This act expresses a preference for financing the construction of the facility with private investments, amends several provisions of law to provide for alternative and complementary means of financing the facility, and imposes several restrictions and conditions on the issuance of bonds for purposes of the Camden Yards site. Among other things, Chapter 124 creates the Maryland Stadium Facilities Fund, a special, nonlapsing fund within the State Treasury held by the Treasurer and accounted for by the Comptroller. In supplementing the existing ability of the Stadium Authority to issue revenue bonds and to expend their proceeds for its purposes, Chapter 124: (1) requires the Maryland Lottery Commission to conduct at least two, but no more than four, sports lotteries per fiscal year for the benefit of the Stadium Authority; (2) requires Baltimore City to pay $1 million annually to the Stadium Authority; and (3) authorizes the State to lease or sublease any facility from or to the Authority, whether or not constructed or usable. Under Chapter 124 the sports lottery proceeds are to be paid into the Facilities Fund and, subject to certain limitations, transferred by appropriation in the budget bill or by budget amendment from that account to the Financing Fund. Baltimore City’s annual payment is to be paid directly into the Financing Fund. Any lease payment appropriated by the State is to be paid directly into the Financing Fund. At the end of each fiscal year, monies in the Facilities Fund in excess of $24 million and the debt service reserve fund will be transferred, dedicated to the Authority, to the State Reserve Fund and are transferable back to the Authority only by an appropriation in the budget bill or through budget amendment. The unspent balance of any revenues for the Authority in the reserve fund will revert to the general fund two years after the end of each fiscal year in which the transfer is made. According to the Department of Fiscal Services, this package will enable the Authority to proceed as follows: “[The Authority] may issue $200 million of tax-exempt bonds for the use of Stadiums in accordance with the Federal Thx Reform Act of 1986. The Authority bond issue will be secured by a lease agreement with the State under which annual rental payments would be sufficient to pay the debt service on the Authority’s bonds. A principal advantage of this financing arrangement is that it enjoys the credit strength of the State without a direct State pledge of general obligation, assuming continued annual appropriations by the General Assembly. As a source of revenue for the State’s appropriations, [Chapter 124] created a minimum of two and a maximum of four Sports Lotteries, estimated to yield net revenues of $16.4 million of the approximately $17 million in annual revenues needed to service the Authority’s debt. Of the remainder, $1 million is to be contributed by the City of Baltimore. In addition the Authority is expected to generate approximately $5.3 million in operating revenues.” Department of Fiscal Services, The Sine Die Report, A Summary of Major Legislative Action, 1987 Session 56 (April 13, 1987).

II
Maryland’s Referendum

“From the establishment of the first Constitution of Maryland—and it might be said before that date—until the adoption of this [Referendum] Article, its people had lived under a well recognized form of representative self-government.” Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 677 (1917). Rooted in the early institutions of England, this representative form of government was reflected in each of the American colonies and was adopted or ratified by the original states in both their respective constitutions and the constitution of their offspring, the United States of America. This principle of representative government “was for many years looked upon as one of the great principles of popular government, and as necessary and indispensible for the preservation of civil order and popular liberty.” However, following the Civil War, “great abuses [such as the selling of franchises and the enactment of special favors] began to creep into legislation and into the administration of the National and State governments.” Consequently, there arose various proposals to abolish the principle of representation altogether or to modify it by creating rights such as the referendum, initiative, and recall.7 In 1914 a bill amending the Maryland Constitution to create the right of referendum passed the General Assembly and was approved by the voters. Chapter 673, Laws of Maryland 1914 (ratified on November 2, 1915). The Referendum Article of the Maryland Constitution expressly reserves to the people the power, by timely petition of three percent of the qualified voters of the State based on the votes cast at the last gubernatorial election, to suspend an act or part of an act of the General Assembly, and to require that it be submitted to the voters for approval or rejection at the next ensuing statewide, congressional election. Article XVI, §§1 and 2. The Court of Appeals has characterized this procedure as “a concession to an organized minority and a limitation upon the rights of the people.” Tyler v. Secretary of State, 229 Md. 397, 402 (1962).8 This referendum power is not, however, without limitation. Not every act of the General Assembly may be petitioned to referendum. There are three exceptions to referendum, two of which are set out in Article XVI, §2: “No law making any appropriation for maintaining the State Government, or for maintaining or aiding any public institution, not exceeding the next previous appropriation for the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or repeal under this Section.” The third is in Article XVI, §6: “No law, licensing, regulating, prohibiting, or submitting to local option, the manufacture or sale of malt or spirituous liquors, shall be referred or repealed under the provisions of this Article.” The Constitution directs the Secretary of State to refer to a vote of the people only a law or part of a law “capable of referendum”—that is, not within one of these three exceptions. Article XVI, §2. The only exception potentially applicable to Chapters 122, 123, and 124 is the exception for an “appropriation for the maintaining of State Government.”9 Hence, we turn to the meaning of that phrase.

III
Scope of “Appropriations” Under the Referendum Exception

A. Prior Construction

In order to come within the exception for a law “making an appropriation for maintaining the State Government”, an act must “(1). . . make an ‘appropriation’ of public funds, and (2) such appropriation must be for ‘maintaining the State Government.’” Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 570 (1978). “[Although an act of the General Assembly may be passed for the purpose of maintaining the State government, the act is nevertheless subject to The Referendum, unless it be an act . . . appropriating public funds for that purpose.” Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230 245 (1940). The earliest analysis of the nature of an “appropriation” in this context is in 12 Opinions of the Attorney General 228 (1927). Attorney General Robinson was asked whether Chapter 118 of the Laws of Maryland 1927, which provided for the imposition and disposition of an additional gasoline tax, was an appropriation within the meaning of the Referendum Article. In concluding that it was, the Attorney General observed: “In determining what constitutes a law making an appropriation, consideration must be given to the radical change effected by the budget amendment (Article III, Section 52, of the State Constitution ratified one year after the adoption of Article XVI) in the system of financing the State government. All disbursements of the State’s revenues are now controlled by the budget bill and supplemental appropriation bills. If provision for disbursement is not made by either of these methods, appropriated money cannot be withdrawn from the State Treasury. Under this system, to make an appropriation effective, two steps are required to be taken. First, the tax must be imposed from which the required revenue is to be derived; and second, the disbursement payment or withdrawal of the appropriated monies from the treasury must be authorized in the manner specified by the budget amendment. In the case of a supplemental appropriation bill, both of these prerequisites are covered by the same statute, but with respect to all other appropriations the revenue producing and the revenue disbursing features are embodied in separate bills. The budget bill is merely the warrant for the disbursement of the appropriated monies. It cannot stand alone. It is inseparably connected with the bill prescribing the annual rate and items of the State tax, and other revenue producing measures, because it is predicated upon the estimated revenues of the State from practically all sources, during the period covered thereby. On the other hand, all revenue producing laws (except supplemental appropriation bills) are equally ineffective, unless the proceeds derived therefrom are disbursed by the budget bill. The budget and revenue producing measures being thus mutually interdependent, it is my opinion that both together must be regarded as appropriation bills, within the meaning of Article XVI. Within the meaning of Article XVI at the time of its adoption, Chapter 118 is unquestionably an appropriation measure. It imposes the tax from which the revenue required for road construction is to be derived, it also provides, in detail, for the disposition of the proceeds. . . . In this connection, it should be noted that the word ‘appropriation’ is not used in the same sense in the budget amendment and in Article XVI. As used in Article XVI, it signifies the act of setting apart or assigning to a particular use or person in exclusion of all other, that is to say, the application to a special use or purpose, as of money to carry out some object. In the budget amendment, it denotes disbursement, payment or the withdrawal of appropriated monies from the State Treasury.

The Budget amendment prescribes the method whereby appropriated funds may be withdrawn from the State Treasury. Article XVI refers to all laws assigning public monies to a particular use or purpose, regardless of whether such law is adequate or legally sufficient to authorize the payment or disbursement of the appropriated monies. ” 12 Opinions of the Attorney General at 233-35 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals agreed. In Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563 (1928), the Court concluded that Chapter 118 was an appropriation act even if it was not sufficient to authorize the withdrawal from the State Treasury of monies collected under its provisions. According to the Court, “That act and the budget act are in pari materia, and must be construed together as though they constituted one act.” 155 Md. at 567 (citations omitted). In Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230 (1940), the Court of Appeals examined the history of the Referendum Article and its interaction with Article III, §52 (the Budget Amendment). Again concluding that an act that is not an appropriation for the purposes of Article III nevertheless may be an appropriation for the purposes of the Referendum Article, a unanimous court wrote:

“It is evident that the Referendum Amendment did not mean to include within the purview of its operation a statute to raise revenues for these specific purposes by a levy of taxes or by the imposition of other fiscal measures. The act for these purposes and the moneys so procured are, therefore, an act and a fund for the maintenance of the State Government; and, so, the act is excepted from the Referendum Amendment. There is no basis to assume that a law passed pursuant to a constitutional requisite and in fulfillment of an authorized undertaking whereby funds had been procured for public use is subject to repeal as a law within the meaning of that term as used in the Referendum Amendment.

Nor is there any sound basis for the construction that a law imposing or providing for a tax levy or other means of raising revenue for the maintenance of the state government is a law referable to the electorate pursuant to the terms of the Referendum Amendment. If such a law should fail to comply with the conditions created by section 32 of article III of the Constitution, it would be ineffective as an appropriation because of this failure, but it would not thereby become a law within the Referendum Amendment.” 178 Md. at 240 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In the Court’s view, the budget bill and revenue bills are necessarily opposite sides of a single appropriation:

“[T]he budget bill is to be implemented by the passage of such money bills or revenue measures as shall produce and supply the moneys necessary for the Treasury to meet the appropriations made by the budget bill. The enactment of such legislation gains the quality of definiteness, in the sum appropriated and the object to which it is applied, by the budget bill, of which the legislation supplying the money is an associated and necessarily component part of one fiscal system. The essential unity of the revenue measure to provide the funds appropriated by the budget bill gains certainty from its public necessity. The text of the Amendment argues to the same effect. On the one hand the Budget Amendment makes it mandatory upon the executive to submit a budget which shall contain a complete plan of proposed expenditures and estimated revenues for the particular fiscal year to which it relates. Among other duties, he shall make any suggestion he conceives expedient as to methods for the reduction or increase of the State’s revenue. On the other hand, the Amendment empowers the Legislature to enact such laws as shall not be inconsistent with the Budget Amendment as may be necessary and proper to carry out its provisions. These two, as well as other provisions for which mandatory legislation is prescribed, as, for example, in the case of the payment of the principal and interest of the public debt, and the exaction of a particular tax to meet the appropriation made by a supplementary appropriation bill, irrefutably indicate that the Budget Amendment contemplates as an integral part the passage of revenue measures to raise the funds the appropriations require. It follows that revenue measures to raise the public funds to pay the appropriations of the Budget Bill are excepted from the operation of the Referendum Amendment although the revenue thus procured is disbursed by the Treasury through the provisions of the budget without any express authorization in the money bill for its disbursement. 178 Md. at 243-244 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In 1947, citing Attorney General Robinson, Winebrenner, and Dorsey, Attorney General Hammond recognized and applied “the constitutional interpretation theory that revenue bills and the budget bills constitute in substance one single legislative act, so that a revenue producing bill for maintaining the State government is clearly not one subject to referendum.” Thereupon, he advised the Governor that Chapter 281 of the Laws of Maryland 1947 (the Sales Tax Act) was not capable of referendum. 32 Opinions of the Attorney General 134, 140 (1947). In 1948, Judge McWilliams, then of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, denied a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of State for refusal to accept a petition seeking to submit the Sales Tax Act of 1947 to referendum. In so doing, Judge McWilliams said: “It must be apparent to all literate people that any State government has two basic functions—to raise money and to spend it for the common good. Since the money can’t be spent until it is collected, these two functions are for all practical purposes inseparable. It must be admitted that the stricter meaning of the term ‘appropriation’ is the allotment of funds in hand, or to be collected, to some specific purpose. But it cannot be supposed that the framers of the Referendum Amendment intended a situation which would clothe the legislative act alloting funds to some specific purpose with a halo of sanctity and a garment of immunity and leave its alter ego, the legislative act providing the funds which give life and effect to the act of allotment, to the tender mercies of any group of disgruntled taxpayers with enough energy and initiative to prepare and circulate a petition. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more effective method of sabotaging the State government than to deprive it of its anticipated revenues. It cannot be doubted that this is the very thing the exception was designed to prevent.” Black v. Boone, The Daily Record (Jan. 24, 1948), quoted in Everstine, The Legislative Process In Maryland, 10 Md. L.Rev. 145, 154 (1949). Finally, in 1975, Attorney General Burch opined: “Since the passage of the Budget Amendment (Chapter 159 of the Laws of Maryland of 1916) which revised the State fiscal procedure, revenue-producing bills have been deemed appropriation bills. The annual budget contemplates as an integral part the passage of revenue measures to raise funding for its various appropriations. Hence, revenue measures to raise public funds to pay the appropriations of the budget are excepted from the operation of the referendum amendment. The budget and revenue-producing measures must be considered together and ‘regarded as appropriation bills, as that term is used in Article XVI of the Constitution.’” 60 Opinions of the Attorney General 621, 622 (1975) (citations omitted). Thus, it is well settled in Maryland that acts which produce revenue for the payment of appropriations of the budget are appropriation bills within the meaning of the Referendum Article. B. Application to Chapter 124

As we indicated earlier, the stadia are to be funded by 30-year Stadium Authority tax exempt revenue bonds with debt service being financed by appropriated lease payments to the Authority from the State, using sports lottery revenues, an annual Baltimore City contribution, and Authority operating revenues to fund the State’s appropriations. To provide the revenues for these appropriations, Chapter 124 is unquestionably a revenue-producing bill. It requires sports lotteries, mandates an annual Baltimore City contribution to the Stadium Authority, facilitates the sale of revenue bonds, authorizes the State to make lease payments to help pay for the bonds authorized by the 1986 legislation, and it encourages private financing. There also is no question that it raises revenues to support appropriations in the budget. The lottery revenues, which constitute significant start-up revenues, will be paid into the State Treasury and appropriated to the Stadium Authority through the budget bill, either as a specific item or through the budget amendment process authorized by the budget bill.10 Similarly, Chapter 124 requires that Stadium Financing Fund monies exceeding $24 million and the amounts needed for the debt service reserve fund being held for the Authority be paid annually into the State Treasury until dispersed pursuant to the budget bill, again either directly or through the budget amendment process. Finally, Chapter 124 authorizes the lease-backed financing of the revenue bonds, the payment of the principal and interest on the bonds to be funded ultimately from the proceeds of the sports lotteries, via a lease agreement with State. “This ‘lease backed financing’ would take the form of a ‘master lease structure’ by which annual state appropriations would secure the cost of site acquisition and then the stadium.” Department of Fiscal Services, The Stadium Issue, 1987 General Assembly Session (March 1987).11 The appropriations will be supported by lease revenues and grants or loans. Accordingly, we conclude that Chapter 124 is an appropriation law for the purposes of the Referendum Article.

IV
“Maintaining the State Government”

Even if a law is an “appropriation” for the purposes of Article XVI, it nevertheless is subject to referendum unless it also is an appropriation “for maintaining the State Government.” Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. at 571. In one sense, “maintaining the government means providing money to enable it to perform the duties which it is required by law to perform.”12 Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. at 568. Certainly, in this sense, the Stadium package maintains State government. Without it, the Stadium Authority has no State funds and cannot carry out its statutory purposes. However, the Court of Appeals also has spoken of this requirement in terms of whether the law provides for a “primary function of government.” Bayne, 283 Md. at 571. See also Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. at 568. In analyzing the issue, the Court has treated as “primary” those functions traditionally viewed as proper governmental endeavors, particularly when evidenced by a pattern of State funding. Bayne, 283 Md. at 57273. Likewise, in Winebrenner v. Salmon, the Court suggested that the key question was whether the funded activity was long recognized “as coming within the sphere of governmental activity,” as distinct from “an entirely new function.” 155 Md. at 568. We think it abundantly clear that the construction of stadium facilities is a function long recognized as coming within the sphere of governmental activity—both in Maryland and elsewhere. Nearly 60 years ago, in Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606 (Ohio 1930), the Ohio Court of Appeals traced the long history of governmental involvement in the construction of public stadia: “Stadiums were constructed in Greece 600 years before the Christian era. Rome in the zenith of her power not only constructed the Coliseum at Rome, but caused similar structures to be erected and maintained in various large cities of the empire for the entertainment and edification of the public. In 1896 the stadium at Athens was placed in repair and the Olympian games were revived there. American athletes participated and won most of the prizes. Since then the erection and maintenance of stadiums in America has come into vogue, until now there are hundreds of them in various towns and cities of the United States. In fact, within the forty-eight states of the Union ninety-three municipal stadiums have been erected, or are in process of erection, to say nothing of private stadiums and those of colleges and universities. New York City has two municipal stadiums, one in Manhattan and the other in the Bronx. There are such, also, in Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Baltimore. . . 171 N.E. at 607. New Jersey cases are particularly instructive in this area. In New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457 (1971), the court reviewed, with favor, the reasoning of the Ohio Court of Appeals, and noted further the social and economic benefits to a region of a professional sports franchise. The court concluded: “[T]he view that the construction and maintenance of stadiums and related facilities constitutes a public purpose has received virtually universal approval in most jurisdictions. Health, recreation, and sports are encompassed in and intimately related to the general welfare of a wellbalanced state. Moreover, the activities of the Authority meet the criteria that have been articulated for determining whether a particular function is a proper govern- [72 Op. Att’y

mental one. . . . Today stadiums and other professional sports facilities throughout the country are constructed and maintained by governmental agencies. . . ,[13] Public financing is necessary, and the wide variety of recreational and other benefits flowing to that public render the function of the Sports Authority a proper governmental one.” 292 A.2d at 598 (citations omitted). Cf National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (“provision ... of recreation” was a “traditional” governmental function). On appeal, New Jersey’s highest court also found a valid public purpose in promoting the recreation or pleasure of the public by building and operating a sports facility. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972), appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 991 (1973). See also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841 (Cal. 1982); Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Mich. 1972); Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ohio 1968); City of Anaheim v. Michel, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Cal. App. 1968); Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 689 (Colo. 1968); Martin v. Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 898-99 (Pa. 1966); Page v. Francis, 196 Ark. 822 (1938); and Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.E. 435, 438 (S.C. 1933). Significantly, McCrane expressly held that the tunneling of racetrack revenues to the New Jersey Authority constituted “the support of government.” 292 A.2d at 556. The State of Maryland and its political subdivisions have a long-standing history of support for athletic facilities. In this century, as early as 1906 (Chapter 201, Laws of Maryland 1906) and 1908 (Chapter 106, Laws of Maryland 1908), the General Assembly passed legislation for the establishment of athletic fields and playgrounds in Baltimore City. In 1922, the City of Baltimore acquired property on 33rd Street known as Venable Park. A stadium was constructed on the property, and from 1922 until 1939 this municipal stadium was used for college football games such as the Army-Navy game, track meets and civic events. In 1944, a fire destroyed another stadium, known as Oriole Park at 29th and Greenmount Avenue in which the International League Baltimore Orioles played. Mayor McKeldin offered, and the club accepted, the use of the 33rd Street stadium on a temporary basis. In 1947, when the City offered the club a long-term lease, a taxpayers suit was instituted seeking to have the long-term lease enjoined and the current short-term lease declared void. The petitioners contended, among other things, that the authority of the Department of Recreation and Parks to establish, maintain, operate and control athletic and recreational facilities for the people of Baltimore City did not include the power to execute a lease with a professional team. In rejecting this argument, Chief Judge Marbury, speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeals, wrote: “Recreation is a broad term, and it would be an unnatural use of it to say that it does not apply to watching a football or baseball game, but only applied to engaging in one. From the onlooker’s point of view, a game conducted by professionals is often more interesting than one played by amateurs. The very purpose of a stadium is to afford facilities for spectators. The players need only the ground to play upon.

Watching games of baseball, and particularly a game of professional baseball, is to many people in this county the greatest possible recreation with respect to athletic activity. We think the Department has ample power to recognize this, to provide such recreation, and to enter into a long term lease if it and the Board of Estimates think it advisable, and for the interest of the City and its people to do so.

This is a use for the benefit of the public, and comes within the scope of the Charter Provision.” Green v. Garrett, 192 Md. 52, 61-63 (1949).14 In 1947, the General Assembly authorized the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to issue certificates of indebtedness not exceeding $2,500,000 to construct a stadium in Baltimore. Chapter 97, Laws of Maryland 1947. A special session that same year authorized an additional $2,500,000 for the same stadium. Chapter 17, Laws of Maryland 1947 (Special Session).15 In 1950, the General Assembly authorized the issuance of revenue bonds to construct a combination physical education, auditorium and indoor athletics building for the University of Maryland. Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 1950. In 1957, the Baltimore Civic Center Authority was created. Chapter 127, Laws of Maryland 1956. In 1971, the Legislature authorized a State debt in the amount of $7,000,000 for capital improvements to be made to Memorial Stadium in Baltimore. Chapter 425, Laws of Maryland 1971. In 1972, the General Assembly, declaring that “professional sports add to the economy, the culture and the vitality of Baltimore City, the Greater Baltimore Region and the entire State of Maryland,” enacted the Maryland Sports Complex Authority Act. Chapter 178, Laws of Maryland 1972. The purpose, powers and duties of that State agency were substantially the same as the purpose, powers, and duties of the Maryland Stadium Authority under Chapter 283, Laws of Maryland 1986, and the General Assembly expressly declared that the Authority’s exercise of its powers should be deemed to be the performance of “an essential public function.” The Authority was also given the right of eminent domain within the area known as the Camden Station Yards.16 In 1973, the General Assembly amended the definition of “industrial building” to include “any sports stadium or sports arena in Prince George’s County,” for purposes of issuing industrial revenue bonds. Chapter 396, Laws of Maryland 1973. In 1975, the Legislature appropriated an $850,000 loan for the design and preparation of detailed plans and specifications for the renovation of Memorial Stadium. Chapter 816, Laws of Maryland 1975. In 1976, the 1975 Act was amended to repeal the design, plans and specifications limitation. Chapter 598, Laws of Maryland 1976. And, in 1977, the 1975 Act was amended from a loan to a grant. Chapter 691, Laws of Maryland 1976. In Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279 (1977), the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 396 of the Laws of 1973. In so doing, the Court specifically rejected the contention that the issuance of industrial revenue bonds to retire financial obligations incurred by a partnership for the acquisition of the sports arena was not a valid public purpose. For each of the fiscal years from 1978 through 1982, the General Assembly appropriated $1 million for the renovation of Memorial Stadium. See Chapter 934, Laws of Maryland 1978; Chapter 542, Laws of Maryland 1979; Chapter 707, Laws of Maryland 1980; Chapter 457, Laws of Maryland 1981; and Chapter 662, Laws of Maryland 1982. In 1980, an additional $300,000 was appropriated for this purpose in Program Open Space funds. Chapter 120, Laws of Maryland 1980. Also in 1980, some $22 million was appropriated for Memorial Stadium Seating and Field Facilities. Chapter 529, Laws of Maryland 1980 (amended by Chapter 552, Laws of Maryland 1982, and Chapter 496, Laws of Maryland 1983). In 1982, $250,000 was appropriated for the Hagerstown Municipal Stadium. Chapter 599, Laws of Maryland 1982. In 1984, the General Assembly created the Special Advisory Council on Professional Sports and the Economy. See Article 41, §10-701 et seq. of the Maryland Code. In 1985, the General Assembly appropriated $350,000 for the Hagerstown Municipal Stadium. Chapter 337, Laws of Maryland 1985. In 1986, the General Assembly empowered Charles County to borrow up to $1,500,000 to construct a multi-purpose stadium in Charles County for the holding of athletic events. Chapter 270, Laws of Maryland 1986. This chronology of ongoing State legislative and judicial action evidences an indisputable fact: The State’s financial support for stadia and similar athletic facilities is traditional and reflects the recognition, by the General Assembly and the Court of Appeals alike, such that support yields important public benefits. This activity is, in our view, a legitimate and important function of State government—in the terminology of the Bayne case, a “primary function of government.” Accordingly, the appropriation made by Chapter 124 is one for the “maintaining of the State Government.”

V
Relationship of Chapters 122 and 123 to the Appropriation in Chapter 124

Under Maryland law, interdependent and legally inseparable bills forming a package on a single subject are considered as one for purposes of interpretation and construction, Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 7 (1966), and for purposes of severability and effectiveness, O. C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, 280 Md. 585, 597-98 (1977). Sutherland has set forth the most comprehensive analysis of the non-severability of “package” bills: “Although separability problems usually arise with reference to different provisions or applications of a single, separate, independent ‘act’ of the legislature, they are not intrinsically confined to that situation. In fact, the conception of legislation being validated and promulgated in separate, self-contained statutory units called acts, corresponding to independent bills did not always figure as prominently as it does now. Except as constitutional provisions prohibit bills from dealing with more than one subject, there is nothing about the nature of the legislative process which compels either that each separate rule of enacted law be issued in a separate act or that every separate act embrace all of the interdependent and inseparable legislative treatment of a single subject. In practice, it is not uncommon for a legislative program, involving relating and interacting provisions, to be embodied in a group of associated bills. This may be done for a variety of reasons, to facilitate referral of different portions of the program to different legislative committees during the enacting process or to simplify the incorporation of different portions of the legislation into different sectors of a compilation after their enactment. None of these reasons has anything directly to do with the considerations which govern the decision on questions of separability. It is possible, therefore, for separate acts to be legally inseparable. ” Statutory Construction §44.02., at 482 (4th ed. 1986) (emphasis added). See also Gay v. Laurens County, 100 S.E.2d 271, 276 (Ga. 1957). This realistic view of the legislative process was embraced by the Court of Appeals in 0. C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, 280 Md. at 597-98. There, in rejecting the contention that the issue of severability did not arise when only one of a package of municipal enactments was found invalid, the Court noted: “[P]artial invalidity subjects the entire scheme to scrutiny. A determination must always be made as to whether this partial invalidity so affects the legislative scheme that it must fall as a whole, or whether its otherwise valid provisions may be separately enforced. It is, of course, customary to find such legislative schemes within the confines of a single legislative enactment. This is, however, by no means obligatory. A legislature may, if it so chooses, embody a single scheme, dealing with a single subject, in associated bills or acts. ” 280 Md. at 597 (emphasis added).17 The Supreme Court of Michigan has applied these very same principles to conclude that a package of bills constituted an act “making appropriations for State institutions” that was not referable under that State’s constitution. In Michigan Good Roads Federation v. Alger, 53 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Mich. 1952), that Court wrote:

“[The bills] constitute a comprehensive system for the collecting of specific taxes on motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuels, the allocation of funds therefrom, and the use thereof for highway purposes. They were all enacted by the 1951 legislature and became effective at the same time. Construed together, they provide for levying the specific taxes and the use thereof for highway purposes, the manner in which the said appropriations for highway purposes are allocated to said institutions, and the specific highway purposes for which they are to be used by said institutions.”

These laws, the court stated, were acts in pari materia that had to be considered and construed together. Separate consideration would render them unworkable. 53 N.W.2d at 485. Thus, the court found that one of the bills in the package that opponents sought to petition to referendum constituted an appropriation exempt from referral when considered along with the rest of the package. See also County Road Association v. Board of State Canvassers, 282 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1979); Boards of County Road Commissioners v. Riley, 218 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1974).

The Michigan courts are not alone in applying principles of severability and construction in pari materia in a referendum setting. For example, in Baird v. Burke County, 205 N.W. 17 (N.D. 1925), North Dakota’s highest court held that when a vital portion of a statute was repealed by referendum the remaining sections would be rendered legally ineffective and declared void. In State ex inf. Attorney-General v. Dallmeyer, 295 Mo. 638 (1922), the Supreme Court of Missouri held that when one of two statutes in pari materia was suspended by the filing of a referendum petition, so too was the second act. See also 82 C.J.S. Statutes §146. And courts in South Dakota and Washington have analyzed a bill sought to be referred in conjunction with related but unreferred measures enacted at the same session to determine whether the legislation in question fell within a particular referendum exclusion. See Gravning v. Zellmer, 291 N.W.2d 751, 754 (S.D. 1980); State v. Meyers, 363 P.2d 121, 124 (Wash. 1961).18 In fact, we have found no cases embracing a contrary position. We believe that the Court of Appeals would apply the tenets of the O.C. Taxpayers case and related authority in the referendum context. Indeed, in Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563 (1928), the Court of Appeals, in holding that a gas tax was not referable, declined to consider the bill in isolation, noting that the “act and the Budget Act . . . are in pari materia, and must be construed together as though they constituted one act.” 155 Md. at 567. See also Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230 (1940) (analyzing referred bill and companion bill to conclude that the legislation was referable). In terms of the policy underlying the Referendum Article, no other approach makes sense. If legally inseparable bills were considered separately for purpose of the “appropriation” exclusion, the legal and practical effect would be the indirect suspension of a money bill or a revenue raiser by the direct referral of another bill in the package. In light of the vital importance of the “appropriation” exclusion for the continued operation of the government, it is hard to believe that the framers of the Referendum Article could have intended such a result or that the Court of Appeals would bless it. Moreover, if an integrated appropriation measure were referrable in part simply because of the form in which it was packaged, the way would be opened for legislative game-playing. “It would be a simple matter to load a . . . [package containing a revenue measure or money bill] with riders and clauses in order to insure its passage, only to remove them by the referendum.” Baird v. Burke County, 205 N.W at 24. In our view, Chapters 122, 123, and 124 represent an interdependent and legally inseparable legislative treatment of a single subject—the acquisition of a site and construction of a stadium facility through the expenditure of State monies. The bills were considered by the same committees—fiscal as well as nonfiscal committees—and approved at the same time in committee and on the floor. In addition, each bill amends or makes reference to provisions contained in other bills in the package. For example, both Chapter 123 and Chapter 124 amend FI §§13-712 and 13-719; and all three bills make reference to FI §13-711. Moreover, each bill amends a single piece of legislation, the 1986 Stadium Authority Act, to give the Maryland Stadium Authority the fiscal and other tools needed to carry out its previously established statutory purposes. Without each component of the package in effect, the entire object of the legislation would be frustrated, including its revenue raising and appropriation features. For example, Chapter 122 defines the location of the project funded by Chapter 124 and gives the prior legislative approval required by the 1986 legislation for acquisition and construction of the stadia. Chapter 123 is expressly made contingent upon the taking effect of Chapter 122. Chapter 123 also gives the Stadium Authority the power of condemnation needed to acquire the property at the Camden Yards site; and, because private property may not be condemned without the payment of just compensation, the funds needed to carry out this task must come from the financing mechanism established by Chapter 124. Chapter 123 and 124 are integrally connected in at least two other respects: (1) Chapter 123 anticipates changes made by Chapter 124 by providing that Stadium Authority revenue bonds shall be payable from “any other source authorized by law” and by providing that Stadium Authority Financing Fund shall consist of “any additional revenues ... or other source authorized by law”; and (2) Chapter 123 (along with the budget bill) makes certain changes affecting the operational budget of the Stadium Authority so that the agency will receive no general fund appropriation but will survive and accomplish its statutory purposes only from the special funds appropriated by way of Chapter 124. See Report of the Chairmen of the House Appropriations Committee and Senate Budget and Taxation Committee—1987 Session 204 (April 13, 1987). In short, the dominant purpose of the 1987 stadium legislative package is to facilitate acquisition and construction of stadia at Camden Yards. If any bill in the package is rendered ineffective, the entire package fails. The legislative history demonstrates the unitary nature of the three measures. The General Assembly would not have enacted the funding mechanism in Chapter 124 if property could not be acquired at the Camden Yards site pursuant to Chapter 123 or if construction on that site could not be commenced as authorized by Chapter 122. The latter bills implement and make more specific the financing legislation. In essence, they give to Chapter 124 “the quality of definiteness” in the “object to which [the appropriation] is applied.” Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. at 243. Their suspension would effectively negate Chapter 124. Because of this interrelationship, Chapters 122 and 123—like Chapter 124 itself—are within the Referendum Article’s exception for an “appropriation for maintaining the State Government.”

VI
Conclusion

In our opinion, Chapter 122, 123, and 124 of the Laws of Maryland 1987 may not be petitioned to referendum.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
Judson R. Garrett, Jr., Deputy Attorney General
Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General and Counsel to the General Assembly
Linda H. Lamone, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Editor’s Note: In Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 310 Md. 437 (1987), the Court of Appeals held that no component of the stadium legislative package was subject to referendum, because the package constituted “a single, inseparable law making an appropriation for maintaining the State government. . . .” 310 Md. at 474.

1 The information required for the detailed report is contained in four volumes published by the Maryland Stadium Authority as follows: 1. Report on Phase I—Evaluation of Stadium Site and Design Alternatives (December, 1986) 2. Volume 1: Report on Phase 2—Evaluation of Stadium Design Concepts and Cost Estimates, Review of Alternative Financing Mechanisms and Recommendations of Design Concept and Financing Package (February, 1987). 3. Volume 2: Architectural Supplement—Preparation and Evaluation of Stadium Concept Alternatives and Cost Estimates for Stadium Development on the Camden Yard Site and for Renovation of Memorial Stadium (February, 1987). 4. Report on the Economic and Tax Impacts of the Camden Yards Stadium Development (March, 1987). All of these have been submitted to the General Assembly and the Board of Public Works. All of these have been submitted to the General Assembly and the Board of Public Works.

2 The Camden Yards site consists of “approximately 85 acres in Baltimore City in the area bounded by Camden Street on the north, Russell Street on the west, Ostend Street on the south, and Howard Street and Interstate 395 on the east.” Chapter 122, Laws of Maryland 1987 (to be codified at FI §13-709(f)).

3 These bills were withdrawn by the sponsors.

4 See Report of the Chairmen of the House Appropriations Committee and Senate Budget and Taxation Committee, 1987 Session 204 (April 10, 1987) (“Depletes general funds for agency in anticipation of special funds becoming available as part of a stadium financing plan. Gap financing should be provided through the General Emergency Fund if necessary.”).

5 See note 2 above. The term “facility” means stadia for the primary purpose of holding professional football games, major league baseball games, or both. FI §13-701(c). “Facility” also means adjacent properties directly related to stadia, e.g., parking lots and garages. FI §13-701(d).

6 Chapter 123 is expressly contingent on Chapter 122’s taking effect. If Chapter 122 does not become effective, Chapter 123 is null and void.

7 “During the first two decades of the 20th century, twenty-two states (most of them in the West) adopted constitutional provisions for referendum, initiative, or both. Since then, four more states have added such provisions. Only Maryland and two other states have referendum powers but no initiative provision.” Department of Legislative Reference, Update, Vol. 87-1, at 1 (May 21, 1987).

8 “The exercise of the right of referendum is drastic in its effect. The very filing of a petition, valid on its face, suspends the operation of any of a large class of legislative enactments and provides an interim in which the evil designed to be corrected by the law may continue unabated, or in which a need intended to be provided for, may continue unsatisfied.” Id.

9 The Stadium Authority is an integral part of the Executive Branch of State government; it is not a “public institution.” The latter phrase refers to “educational and eleemosynary institutions, sometimes designated as State-aided institutions.” 12 Opinions of Attorney General 228, 237 (1927). These are “not owned or controlled by the State.” Id. at 238. See also Henderson v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. & Power Co., 63 So. 616 (La. 1913). And, of course, the Stadium Authority has nothing to do with liquor regulation.

10 Pursuant to its authority to enact such laws as may be necessary and proper to carry out the budget provisions of the Constitution, the General Assembly has enacted a statutory budget amendment process and regularly provides in the budget bill itself that certain monies may be expended by that statutory budget amendment process. Article III, §53(13) of the Constitution; §§7-209 and 7-217 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. As we have noted earlier, the Joint Chairmen’s report confirms that the General Assembly decided to delete the proposed fiscal year 88 general fund appropriations for the Authority in favor of special fund appropriation via the statutory budget amendment process. In our opinion, that time honored process is a budget bill appropriation for the purposes of Article XVI. See 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 3 (1986); 34 Opinions of the Attorney General 105, 106 (1949).

11 See also Peat Marwick, Vol. 1: Report on Phase 2, Evaluation of Stadium Design Concepts and Cost Estimates, Review of Alternative Financing Mechanisms, and Recommendation of Design Concept and Financing Package 29.

12 The Court of Appeals long ago rejected the contention that the phrase “maintaining State Government” merely refers to “overhead expenses, such as salaries and expenses incident to keeping the government afloat.” Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 9 (1937); Winebrenner, 155 Md. at 568.

13 For example, in addition to Baltimore’s Memorial Stadium, Cleveland’s Stadium, and New Jersey’s Meadowlands, the Pittsburgh Stadium Authority owns Three Rivers Stadium; the Metropolitan Council Sports Facilities Commission owns the Metrodome; the Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District owns the Louisiana Superdome; the Tampa Sports Authority owns Tampa Stadium; the City of Irving owns Texas Stadium; the Pontiac Stadium Authority owns Pontiac Silverdome; the Jackson County (Mo.) Sports Complex Authority owns both Royals Stadium and Arrowhead Stadium; the City of Philadelphia owns Veterans Stadium; King County (Wash.) owns the Kingdome; the City of Atlanta and the Fulton County Recreation Authority own The Omni; the City of Philadelphia owns the Spectrum; and the City of Houston owns the Summit. Maryland Special Advisory Commission on Professional Sports and the Economy, Professional Sports Arena Plan, Final Report, 143-48 (September 1985).

14 The Court of Appeals has said “on a number of occasions that cities and counties are but local divisions of the State.” Rockville v. Randolph, 267 Md. 56, 62 (1972). Such political subdivisions “have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964), quoted with approval in Stevens v. State, 27 Md. App. 460, 466 n.3 (1975). Thus, Baltimore City’s long history of stadium ownership is, as a matter of law, a history of a local division of the State of Maryland assisting in carrying out a State governmental function.

15 Further, in 1947, the General Assembly authorized the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to issue certificates of indebtedness up to $2,500,000 for public park facilities. Chapters 43 and 44, Laws of Maryland 1947. The Legislature also authorized the sale of bonds known as “Cumberland Playground Bonds” for the City of Cumberland (Chapter 375, Laws of Maryland 1947) and created a Recreation Board for Prince George’s County. (Chapter 832, Laws of Maryland 1947).

16 The Maryland Sports Complex Authority was abolished in 1976. Chapter 702, Laws of Maryland 1976.

17 In a referendum exclusion case, the Court of Appeals articulated the rule that the “single subject” requirement in the Maryland Constitution is the only limitation on joining referable and nonreferable items in a single bill excepted from referendum: “An association in a single enactment of a referable law and one of the kinds excepted from the referendum, if that would be feasible without violation of the constitutional prohibition in article 3, section 29, against including more than one subject, might, perhaps, be found to leave part of an enactment referable, but not part of the excepted law. That law, with its incidents, still could not be referred.” Berlin v. Shockley, 174 Md. 442, 446 (1938).

18 See also District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics v. Jones, 481 A.2d 456 (D.C. 1984) (exception for “laws appropriating funds” in charter provision for initiative applies to measure that, although not itself an appropriation, would force appropriations to be made).